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
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7. *Reports on the Finance, Administration, and Condition of the Sudan.* London: Waterlow, 1913.
8. *Reports by H.M.'s Agent and Consul General on the Finances, Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Sudan.* London: Harrison, 1913. [Cd. 7358.]

THE Convention made between the British Government and the Government of the Khedive on January 19, 1899, lays down that the administration of the Sudan is to be vested in a Governor-General, who is appointed by Khedivial decree on British recommendation, and who cannot be removed save by Khedivial edict issued with British consent. Moreover, to render the Sudan absolutely free from Egyptian interference, no Egyptian law, ordinance or ministerial *arrête* applies in the Sudan unless by the Governor-General's proclamation.

Turkish or Egyptian Governors-General held power
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in the Sudan from the year 1825, but for the most part the holders of that office ruled for a very brief period. The first British Governor-General of the Sudan was General Gordon, who acted for barely fifteen months, and died at his post; after an interval of thirteen years, during which period the country was ruled by the Mahdists, there came a second British Governor-General, Lord Kitchener, who was also Sirdar of the Egyptian Army. It is interesting to recall Gordon's remarks in his 'Journals' (Nov. 1884) in connexion with the appointment of Lord Kitchener as Governor-General. Writing fifteen years before the event, Gordon said:— 'If Kitchener would take the place, he would be the best man to put in as Governor-General.' Since Lord Kitchener became British Agent in Egypt, he has followed the policy of his predecessor in office, Lord Cromer, in leaving the Governor-General of the Sudan very largely to his own discretion, a discretion which has never yet failed to prove sound and statesmanlike. While possessing the power of supervision, the British Agent at Cairo has wisely refrained from exercising it, except in the form of suggestions, the aim of both Lord Kitchener and Sir F. Reginald Wingate having been from the commencement to decentralise as far as possible, and to leave to the responsible men upon the spot the control and the details of administration.

The Central Administration consists of the Governor-General, his Council and the Provincial Governors. The two former for all official purposes reside in Khartoum, and have the control of the entire Sudan under their supervision. The pay of no official exceeds 1500*l.* per annum, this being the salary of the Governor-General, who, however, as Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, receives a substantial addition to this sum. The total expenses of the offices of the Governor-General and his Council are well under 10,000*l.* per annum. The Governor-General is assisted by the Inspector-General, the Civil Secretary, the Financial Secretary, the Director of Intelligence, the Legal Secretary, the Medical Director-General, the Directors of Railways and Steamers, the Director of Agriculture, the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, the Director of Public Works, the Director of Customs and the Director of Education. There are sub-departments

dealing with such matters as Game Preservation, Agricultural Schools and Experimental Stations, Geological Survey, Research Laboratories, Veterinary Science, and the Sleeping Sickness Commission.

The division of the Sudan into provinces was carried out by the Khedive Ismail in 1871. This reform placed at the head of each province a responsible and practically independent official, instead of a mere agent subordinate to a Governor-General at Khartoum, to reach which place from the majority of the seats of local government occupied many days, and sometimes weeks. For administrative purposes the Sudan is divided into fourteen provinces, namely, Dongola, Berber, Khartoum, Kassala, Sennar, Kordofan, the Bahr-el-Gazal, and the Upper Nile in the first class; and Halfa, the Red Sea, the Blue Nile, Mongalla, the White Nile and the Nuba Mountains in the second. Although Darfur is within the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, it is governed by its own independent Sultan, who maintains friendly relations with the Government at Khartoum.

Not only are the duties of the Governor-General continuous but the responsibilities are enormous, and, at the time when the new Government took over the country, may well have seemed overwhelming. After fifteen years of effort the problems to be solved have become less and less formidable; and, while the burden of responsibility remains heavy, the decentralisation of much of the government formerly conducted in the capital has considerably relieved the situation. Moreover, the Governor-General has for some years past delegated a large portion of the detail work in the earlier stages of consideration to various permanent boards, the members of which advise the chief about all matters coming within the scope of their investigations. These Boards are as follows: the Central Economic Board, which has been in existence since 1906, with its President and Secretary, and whose functions are purely consultative; the Civil Service Selection Committee, sitting in Cairo or in London, and consisting of the officials of the Egyptian and Sudan Governments who have in previous years formed part of the Annual Selection Committee in London; the Council of Secretaries, who deal with matters arising

under the Pension Ordinance; the Harbours and Lights Board, which is responsible for the management and regulation of the ports named in the Ordinance, and of lighthouses, beacons, buoys, etc., etc.; the Khartoum Town Improvements and Allotments Board, which has the control of building-sites on Government land—and practically all land in Khartoum is Government property—the laying-out of new roads, and all questions affecting town improvements; the Khartoum Museum Board; the Labour Bureau; the Permanent Promotion Board; the River Board; the Central Sanitary Board; the Sleeping Sickness Commission, etc. No additional payment is received by officials for their services on the different Boards, the only extra remuneration allowed being in connexion with the Sleeping Sickness investigations.

A decided change has come about in both the character and the scope of the administration of the Sudan within the past few years. Ten years ago the country had barely emerged from a state of barbarism; good government was the primary requisite; the introduction of western ideas of civilisation lay far ahead. Among the first duties of the Government was the abolition of slavery, and to this the closest attention was devoted, without, however, occasioning rebellion or even disorder among a people accustomed from time immemorial to carry on this terrible trade under the open encouragement and assistance of the Egyptian Government. The danger, always imminent, of religious fanaticism breaking out afresh had to be watched with unflagging care; while the extreme physical difficulties of governing a country twice the size of France and Germany combined, and mainly consisting of swamp, desert and primeval forest, hampered all the efforts of the Executive.

To-day things are different. Each province is really a small *imperium in imperio*, ruled by a Governor and his staff of British Inspectors and Egyptian under-officials. The difficulties of distance have been overcome by the establishment of excellent and complete telegraphic and telephonic communications, and the building of fifteen hundred miles of railway. Public order is secured by efficiently-disposed garrisons composed of reliable native troops. Above all, there has been a feeling of confidence established between the Government

and the governed, the moral effect of which upon the well-being of the people is enormous. As was pointed out by an observant writer, when Lord Kitchener's 'Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Sudan in 1913' was issued last May, these matter-of-fact documents, taking absolutely for granted all the marvels which British rule has wrought in Egypt and the Sudan, and rising to a note of enthusiasm only when they anticipate further reforms in the near future, might well stand as an epitome—complete because of its very unconsciousness—of the British genius for ruling subject peoples.

This salutary and satisfactory change in the situation has enabled the Government to devote more and more attention to those questions which had temporarily to be laid aside—questions of providing wider education, of improved methods of local native administration, of a more equitable system of taxation, of a closer inspection of sanitary matters, and generally of looking into, and, where found desirable, of improving the native mode of living. In a word, the early physical difficulties having been almost if not entirely overcome, the ground has been prepared for the introduction by the Government of those administrative, judicial and financial measures suitable to the requirements of the primitive peoples whose interests have been committed to their care.

From the time when the Sudan Government was first established as a separate and responsible entity, the greatest care has been exercised to keep the *personnel* of the administration absolutely free from reproach in connexion with official incapacity, favouritism or oppression. Service under the Sudan Government has become so popular, and is regarded with so much favour by the rising generation, that the supply of officials, both military and civil, is always far in advance of the demand. The conditions of service are, however, very strict, and in some cases may even be regarded as severe, especially in regard to Oriental linguistic proficiency. In this particular it is not rare to find candidates, otherwise suitable, failing to satisfy the requirements of the Departments. Candidates are drawn from the highest educational centres of England, Scotland and Ireland, that is to

say, from the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London, from Trinity College, Dublin, *inter alia*, and from the University of Edinburgh. While recommendations from individuals personally knowing the candidates are welcomed, no attention is paid to introductions emanating from persons, however highly placed socially or politically, who cannot claim to know the candidate personally. This provision, among several others equally important for maintaining the purity and efficiency of the administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, has been and is rigorously enforced. The selection of officials in all Government Departments, military and civil, is based solely upon the general capability of the candidate, as well as upon his intellectual and physical attainments; his character and moral qualifications likewise bear an important part in the decision arrived at. On the other hand, information is neither sought nor admitted regarding religious views or political tendencies, the Government disclaiming any concern in such questions.

Naturally, among the large number of applicants for appointments who are continually being interviewed, many must fail; a careful and conscientious consideration of all requests for admission results in the elimination of many applicants who are deemed to be ineligible. This is the work of a Special Committee; and, when its decisions have been arrived at, there still remain at least four times as many candidates as there are billets to fill. Even when an applicant may be considered in all other respects fit and suitable, a Medical Board, which sits in London, may find him ineligible; he cannot, indeed, be completely assured of his success until he has further passed a stiff examination in Arabic.

The candidate next passes before a 'final' Selection Board, which meets annually in London in the month of August. When he has been definitely accepted, the candidate is offered a choice of appointment in Egypt or the Sudan, and according to his preference he is placed upon the Egyptian or the Sudan list. It occurs but rarely that the former is selected; but once the decision either way is recorded it cannot be altered; should the candidate hesitate in expressing his choice, the Government concludes that he is willing to serve under either administration. Transfers of junior officials

from one Government to the other have, however, been occasionally permitted.

The successful applicant must now spend a further probationary year either at Oxford or Cambridge at his own expense, in order to study Arabic; and during this time he must also attend courses of instruction in first aid, elementary surveying, account-keeping, and such other subjects as the Selection Board may—in accord with the University authorities—consider necessary. Furthermore, the future official must know how to ride; if he does not, he is recommended to learn at once. The probationary year at an end, the candidate has to undergo the ordeal of an examination in Arabic; and the results of this test determine his seniority. Still another medical examination must be passed, and then the Selection Board once more sits in judgment, deciding finally whether the applicant shall be accepted or rejected. So high is the *esprit de corps* among the younger ranks of the officials, that it is not deemed by them sufficient to 'scrape through' their first examination; the majority endeavour to pass with honours; and even the handsome cash bonus of 100*l.*, which is presented to the successful competitor in the Advanced Arabic Examination, is of less moment than the distinction which his achievement brings to his Department, and which, incidentally, bears upon his own future promotion. The gaining of this high distinction is rare, there having been but four successful competitors up till now, among whom is the present governor of the Blue Nile Province, Mr G. E. Iles. Several young officers personally known to me have cheerfully devoted their entire furlough at home to improving their knowledge of Arabic either at language schools or by attending college lectures and studying law. With this lofty sentiment predominant among the juniors, it is not difficult to understand or to appreciate the pride with which the heads of the Sudan Government Departments point to the class of official now serving the country.

No first appointment is made for a longer period than two years, which are considered as probationary. If, during this time, the 'candidate'—he is still so regarded in the official eye—is found unsuitable, owing to ill-health or to any other cause, his services may be dispensed with

on two months' notice; and in this case he is given a free passage to England, should he wish to go home, and a gratuity of fifteen days' pay. The number of such eliminations, however, is very small, for the preliminary investigations are usually so exhaustive that few unsuitables manage to slip through.

From a remunerative point of view, as regards both salary and pension, an appointment under the Sudan Government may be regarded as distinctly attractive. Upon passing the first examination, the salary paid is E420l.* per annum; and thereafter an appreciably advancing scale of pay as well as promotion are enjoyed. The young official enters upon his service as a Deputy Inspector, which means that he acts as a magistrate to deal with civil and criminal cases; and he may rise from the Deputy to Junior and from Junior to Senior Inspector in a relatively short period, depending upon his ability, assiduity and opportunities, with an increasing salary according to his class. Thus a Deputy Inspector who starts at E420l. may soon be earning E480l. and E540l.; a Junior Inspector from E600l. may soon be receiving E660l. or E720l.; while a Senior Inspector, who begins with E780l., can rise to E840l. and E900l., according to the class—first, second, or third—to which he attains.

All officials are eligible for increase of pay in the same class every two years; and a Deputy Inspector, after serving for four years, stands every chance of being promoted to a Junior Inspectorship, and after a further two years to a Senior Inspectorship. In order to qualify him for an increase of pay or promotion, a Deputy Inspector must, within two years of the date of his appointment, pass an examination in law and a further examination in Arabic. Mere length of service establishes no claim either to an increase of pay or to promotion; everything depends upon the individual officer's abilities, his zeal and the manner in which he carries out his duties, coupled, of course, with the actual vacancies occurring. No better test could well be applied, nor any more convincing proof afforded of the selection of the fittest, throughout the Sudan Government service.

* One pound Egyptian is equivalent to £1 0s. 6d. English.

When an official has passed some of the best years of his life to work in the Sudan, either as a soldier or a civilian, he may retire with a certainty that his old age will be comfortable, so far as a liberal pension can help towards making it so. Pensions granted to Sudan officials upon retirement, voluntary or compulsory, are regulated by Ordinance. In order to render such pension as full as possible, a deduction of 5 per cent. is made from the pay of all pensionable officials as a contribution towards his pension. It is permissible to retire voluntarily, but there are few instances of this occurring. Those, however, who choose to leave the service may retire upon a pension after reaching the age of forty-five, provided they have done twenty years' service. Their pensions are then calculated on the average of the salaries drawn during the last three years of service, at the rate of $\frac{1}{48}$ th part of the salary for each year of service. No pension, however, can exceed 800*l.* per annum.

The Sudan Government, wherever possible, and in conformity with the requirements of the country, permits and, indeed, encourages officials to go on leave. By the regulations in force officers are granted leave (after the first year) at the rate of 90 days per annum, counting from the date of their departure from and return to Cairo. There exists a special provision for longer periods when ill-health is the cause. Moreover, owing to the very severe climatic conditions prevailing in the remoter parts of the Sudan, the Governor-General obtained a concession from the War Office to count service below Lat. 12° and in various unhealthy districts as double service—a provision which also exists in certain parts of West Africa and Nigeria.

Upon one point the Government is compelled to remain firm, that is, the engagement of single in preference to married men; the reason being the extreme unsuitability of the country as a whole as a place of residence for white women. If Khartoum, Atbara, Port Sudan, El Obeid, and possibly Wadi Medani be excepted, there are no places in the Sudan as yet where English ladies can live in comfort. Thus all candidates for appointments are made clearly to understand that they must neither be married nor yet engaged to be married, and they are warned that the Government will probably

dispense with the services of any official who becomes a 'benedict' during his period of probation. There exists a considerable proportion of married men among the superior officials; but in few cases—and these are confined to the towns above mentioned—are their wives to be found living in the Sudan.

The position of the unpensioned official in the Sudan is decidedly less enviable. The apparently high salaries which are offered lose much of their allurements when the cost of living in Khartoum and the Provinces has to be met; to save is extremely difficult, while the few economies which are effected by maintaining a modest expenditure upon existence and exercising an extreme moderation in regard to amusements, are swallowed up by the indispensable 'leave' and the expenses of home-journeys. Probably the same class of men would have done better for themselves in any of the British Colonies or in India. Moreover, the social advantages which are offered to civilians holding subordinate positions in the Government Offices are not great. The line of demarcation between the superior and the subordinate ranks is rigidly drawn. Nevertheless, large as is the class of such workers, but few complaints are heard.

Naturally the ambition of all officials is to become Governors of Provinces; and many of them, who commenced as Deputy Inspectors, have already done so. These enviable posts are not confined to military men, as was the case when the Sudan was first undergoing settlement, and when the sword necessarily played an important part in the administration of the country. To-day there exists a marked tendency in the policy of the Government to utilise the services of civilian governors where this may be done with safety. Thus civilian inspectors, when of sufficient seniority, are being more generally appointed to Governorships of Provinces at salaries ranging from £900*l.* to £1200*l.* per annum. Hitherto most of the Governorships and some of the appointments of Senior Inspector and Inspector have been filled by British officers selected from the Egyptian Army; and a proportion of these appointments will continue to be filled from the same source.

The position of a Provincial Governor is a very responsible one, for, subject only to the Governor-General

whose representative he is, he is supreme in his district, possessing the widest powers. Only tried and experienced men have hitherto been appointed, and it may be added, with fairness, that so far no failures have been recorded. It is the Governors who supervise and control the finances of their respective provinces, subject to the financial regulations of the Central Government; they are in direct charge of all public animals, arms, equipment and stores, any and all of which they must be prepared to deliver over in first-class condition at short notice for military purposes; they are responsible for the due observance of all ordinances, orders and regulations by their subordinates; they both administer justice and see it executed, while all official correspondence must pass through their hands. Heavy work is entailed upon them, notwithstanding the valuable assistance which they receive from their staffs, especially at times of assessment and collection of local taxes; while the hearing of numerous appeals, both reasonable and unreasonable, for relief, and the visiting of their outlying districts, which sometimes entails a week or even two weeks of day and night travelling through the desert, together with a multitude of minor duties, leave these hardworked officials, as a rule, but few hours of leisure.

The Senior Inspector ranks next in importance to the Provincial Governor; and it is usually from this class that governors are selected. In many cases the Seniors serve as Acting Governors whenever the supreme authority is absent, and thus they receive a practical training in their more responsible duties before being definitely called upon to assume them. In his own department the Senior Inspector is expected to be constantly at headquarters and to ensure uniformity of administrative methods during the absence of the Governor and to act as his right hand when he is present. He ranks as a first-class magistrate and administers both civil and criminal justice. Very often he is placed in complete control of an entire district, such district being, perhaps, as large as England and Wales combined; then he is a 'governor' in all but name.

The Junior and Deputy, or, as they are now officially termed, 'second' and 'third,' Inspectors are detailed for duty and residence in the various districts into which the

Province is divided, and they are answerable to the Governor for the due discharge of such duties. Under them are the Mamurs, the lowest rank of magistrate; and the Inspectors must supervise their subordinates' duties. They are likewise in charge of the police force in their district. The Mamur, who is generally an Egyptian but occasionally a Sudanese officer and a man of first-class ability and quality, acts as magistrate in small cases, while held responsible generally for the carrying out of all orders and regulations emanating from the Second or Third Inspector's Offices, and for the efficiency and discipline of the police force. In most districts there is a Sub-Mamur engaged, and sometimes more than one; this official assists the Mamur and is subject to his instructions. The Mamur and Sub-Mamurs, moreover, must execute, in their capacity of magistrate, all decrees and judgments issued by the Kadi from the Mohammedan Law Courts under the Civil Justice Ordinance.

In all Provinces, as well as in most districts, there is a separate Mohammedan Court, presided over by a Kadi, who deals with religious matters only. These are usually of a sufficiently numerous and complex nature to keep the judge fully occupied for the greater part of the day. Appeals from his decisions may be, but very seldom are, made to the Court of the Grand Kadi at Khartoum. This Court is judicially independent of the Executive; but, from an administrative point of view, even the Kadis and minor officials of the Mohammedan courts are subordinate to the Legal Secretary of the Sudan Government. The two staffs, however, work together quite harmoniously, and differences of opinion or of policy but seldom arise. Obviously it is the administrative staff which is called upon to execute the decrees and judgments of the religious courts; and this procedure is carried out with commendable tact and discrimination through the Mamurs, who mostly, but not invariably, are Mohammedans. From the very commencement, earnest efforts have been made, and made successfully, to perform the solemn promise given by Lord Cromer to the people of the Sudan, pledging the non-interference of the Government in any shape with religious affairs.

Hostile, and it must be added, unthinking critics

declare that the Moslems of to-day are really little more advanced temperamentally than the Moslems of 1300 years ago. They point, as an evidence of their contention, to the enslaved condition of their women in Egypt and the Sudan. Even if we admit that the doctrine which imposes the veil on Moslem women is out of date—it is, indeed, declared by many Mohammedans themselves to be against the tenets and principles of Islam—there can be no question that institutions like the Gordon Memorial College have helped, and are helping day by day, to assist Moslems along the paths of development and progress. It is undeniable that the present generation of Moslems is superior both intellectually and morally to those of bygone years; and the Egyptian officials, under the tutelage of the British, are proving themselves capable of doing good work in the administration. What the Moslem official has hitherto lacked has been a sufficiently strong and firm hand to control him; he is quite capable of performing good and useful work, but not intuitively. It must be firmly exacted of him, and encouraged by continual example and occasional admonition. Left wholly to himself, there is very little doubt that the average Moslem bureaucrat in the Sudan would speedily fall back into slack ways and attempt to revive many of those discreditable and dishonourable practices which caused the administration of the Turk to stink in the nostrils of the Sudanese only a generation ago. These practices were the primary cause of the long years of misery and oppression which the unhappy people of that country endured. The fifteen years of Mahdi *régime* which followed were hardly more terrible than their experiences under Egyptian rulers.

One great difficulty with which the Administration of the Sudan has had to contend has been, and is, the widely-practised eastern custom of making gifts, sometimes of great value, to the heads of departments or to minor officials. It is repugnant to the mind of the British ruler to accept presents—which may not inaptly be described as bribes—from those who are subject to their dominion; but in the Sudan the custom is so general that to have swept it out of existence without permitting of some exceptions would have meant deeply offending the native mind and severely wounding the

best-intentioned donors. Certain stringent rules have, however, been laid down to guide officials, and these are generally observed; and the discretion which is allowed to Provincial Governors is, on the whole, wisely exercised. The Governor-General himself is frequently obliged to break away from the principle of the rule imposed, since in his official position he must consent to the exchange of gifts between himself and native chiefs in their ceremonial intercourse; on the other hand, his presents are very frequently of greater intrinsic value than those which he receives. In those cases where presents (unless of trifling worth) are taken by Provincial Governors or their subordinates, they have to be delivered up to the Central Government; from this practice no deviation is permitted without the express sanction of the Governor-General. The Egyptian rulers of old were not only in the habit of freely accepting 'presents' but of cruelly exacting them; under the new *régime* these officials—now happily almost eliminated from the Administration—found one of their chief sources of enrichment snatched from them. But the ordinance is a thoroughly wholesome one, and being, as indicated, strongly adhered to, it has had an undoubtedly beneficial moral effect upon the minds of the native population. The punishment which may be inflicted upon any public servant for violating this injunction extends to a heavy fine or to three years' imprisonment, or to both. The number of convictions upon record of such offences is infinitesimal.

Much still remains to be done to reform village life in some parts of the Sudan, more especially in regard to a closer supervision of the men who held the offices of Omda and Sheikh. The natives still pay an almost superstitious reverence to their responsible chiefs; and no doubt it would be a highly dangerous expedient upon the part of the Central Government to adopt a policy which would be calculated to lessen this sentiment—of immemorial existence—since it is one which not alone holds villages and communities together but relieves the Government itself of an immense amount of minor work and a great deal of personal responsibility.

The class of men from among whom Omdas and Sheikhs are selected is, on the whole, a respectable one

and worthy of confidence. That petty tyrannies are practised by some among them occasionally may be granted, but these when examined seem but little worse, and hardly less supportable, than the oppressions noticeable in most small communities of the world, those of the most advanced European character included. There can be no doubt that the Omdas occasionally oppress the people and frequently cheat the Government in many ways; and usually they succeed in escaping detection. Even when exposed, the punishment meted out to them is generally quite inadequate; indeed the risks of practising dishonesty and tyranny are so small and the penalty so trifling that it is a matter for surprise that so many honest Omdas are to be found. In some villages the Omdas maintain a number of professional prostitutes, deriving a not inconsiderable revenue from their earnings and protecting them from any attempt which may be made to punish them for robbery or other crimes committed. Evidence came before me which showed that the greater part of the men and boys in one small village were hopelessly syphilitic, as a result of an establishment of this kind, which was openly maintained by the Omda and his elder son. These same individuals—who were also owners of the largest *merissa** distillery—continually cheated and fleeced the poverty-stricken inhabitants by weighing out their *dura* in false measures, and by compelling them to sell at anything between 20 and 40 per cent. below the market value, and this at a time when grain was commanding a substantial premium on account of its scarcity. Other kinds of petty, and sometimes serious, robbery are perpetrated by district Omdas and their subordinates, the village Sheikhs; and such things will probably continue until a closer observation can be maintained regarding their operations, and until the people themselves strengthen the hands of the Government by making complaints. This they are permitted and encouraged to do, but, from long submission to traditional tyranny, they dare not appear as witnesses against the oppressors.

It is characteristic of the British official, wherever his duties may take him, to make the best of the situation.

* *Merissa*—a native intoxicating beer.

The Sudan official speedily settles down in his strange surroundings, establishes himself quietly in his simple straw-hut or his mud-brick residence, decorating the ugly walls with such of his *lares et penates* as he may have been enabled to collect around him during his exile, and forthwith sets about forming a tennis, squash rackets or fives' court. To 'keep fit' is his main concern. He cannot afford to become flabby or 'run down'; to avoid qualifying for the sick-list any sacrifice will be made, and almost any inconveniences endured. Not only does indisposition interfere with views of promotion and customary leave, but it is considered to be unjust to 'the other fellow,' the colleague and chum, upon whose already sufficiently burdened shoulders must fall the performance of neglected or postponed duties. The spirit of loyalty and good-fellowship among the officials is very pronounced. In concluding his report for 1906, Lord Cromer wrote :

'In order really to appreciate the zeal and intelligence which the various officials in the Sudan are bringing to bear upon their work, it would be necessary not merely to read their reports but to visit the remote and inhospitable localities in which their work is conducted. Their country has every reason to be proud of them, and I hope and believe that, with the exception possibly of a few individuals, it is proud of them.'

To the uninitiated the frequent changes which occur among the *personnel* of the local administration may appear unusual, and even undesirable. It is supposed that, when an official has once become accustomed to a district and has made himself known to the greater part of the people, his influence must be considerable and should not be lightly interfered with. Nevertheless few changes are effected without due consideration or ample cause being afforded ; for obvious reasons, however, no explanations are offered or deemed necessary. In one case, where an Egyptian Mamur had proved himself to be a thoroughly competent officer, and had admittedly carried out his difficult duties intelligently and, so far as could be judged, fairly, his removal to another and far-distant district, in which he had had no previous experience, occasioned some adverse comment, the official

even posing as a martyr to administrative injustice. The chief reason, as I subsequently discovered, was the large amount of personal interest which the Mamur, contrary to regulations, had gradually and secretly acquired in neighbouring properties and local enterprises, rendering his independence as a junior magistrate and administrator open to question. The aim of the Central Government is to remove all possibility of corruption or temptation from the *personnel*; and the strictest discipline as well as the closest supervision are necessary. Were even the most trivial case to be overlooked, the disease would spread like a canker. The old Egyptian rulers had been accustomed for almost a century, and until the advent of the British into the Sudan, to fatten upon the possessions of the unfortunate inhabitants whom they ruled; among them the spirit of oppression and corruption still exists; indeed, it can never be altogether repressed, although, under a strong and alert government, it can be controlled. Were this control to be in the slightest degree relaxed, the people of the Sudan would once again fall victims to the greed and injustice of their Egyptian rulers.

The mental strain entailed upon Government officials in remote districts is occasionally very severe. Sometimes a hundred miles or more will separate their headquarters from the nearest white man's habitation, and months may elapse before a friend's face is seen. The nearest telegraph office is possibly many miles distant, and the mails are but rarely received. A single officer placed in charge of a district covering perhaps some 6000 square miles may have no more than twenty or thirty native troops to assist him in maintaining order among a population of, perhaps, 15,000 or 20,000 people, composed of several distinct tribes, some of which may be at enmity with others, and among whom petty larceny is a very common crime, demanding continual watchfulness and almost as continual punishment. Murders are less common but still not infrequent; the authority of the British official alone stands between the criminals and their victims. While the general attitude of the natives towards the Government—born of a recognition of the benefits attendant upon a sound and just administration—may be, and undoubtedly is, friendly, this sentiment cannot be expected to control to any extent the

naturally suspicious and piratical nature of the people, who have been accustomed for centuries to prey upon one another, and between whom blood feuds and tribal incursions are of traditional meritoriousness.

Occasionally a punitive expedition must, perforce, be entered upon in order to vindicate the authority of Government which has been defied; and in connexion with such an undertaking the discretion of the officer in charge is put to a severe test. Headquarters would scarcely be pleased were any armed interference to be entered upon lightly; nevertheless probably any action, if taken at all, calls for urgency. An officer may entertain doubts concerning the subsequent approval of his superior, but prompt and vigorous measures may well mean the instant repression of a tribal disturbance, which, if allowed to remain unattended to, even for a few hours, may develop into trouble of far greater significance and call for wider measures of repression. Herein comes the opportunity of the responsible official to show his powers of discrimination; and it speaks eloquently for the generally dependable character of the officials employed that so few of them have been found lacking in this essential.

If the Anglo-Egyptian administration of the Sudan has hitherto proved a success, it is chiefly due to the experience which England has gained in the management of semi-barbarous peoples, to the skill with which the machinery of Government has been devised, and to the care which has been throughout bestowed on the selection of the officials on whom so great a responsibility is thrown. A summary view of the progress of the country under British rule forms a natural sequel to the foregoing account of the system by which it is governed. Lord Rosebery has declared that 'the British Empire is the greatest secular agency for good known in the world.' To realise the justice of this statement one has but to glance at the condition of Egypt to-day, and compare its peaceful prosperity with the anarchic situation of, say, 1882-4. But the transformation which has been accomplished there in the space of thirty years has been exceeded in completeness by the Sudan within one-half of that time. This beneficial change, moreover, has come

about without *réclame*, almost without remark; the channel through which the course of events may best be traced is that of the official blue books, which few people take the trouble to read.

The secret of the success achieved in the Sudan by the administration, which is but little changed in regard to its *personnel* since the commencement of its work in 1899, may perhaps be found in the strict application of Lord Cromer's policy foreshadowed at the time when the country passed under joint British and Egyptian control. Addressing an assembly of Sudanese Sheikhs and notables at Omdurman on January 5, 1899, Lord Cromer, then British Agent in Egypt, said :

'No attempt will be made to govern your country from Cairo, still less from London. You must look to the Sirdar alone for justice and good government. I do not doubt that you will have no cause for disappointment.'

This pledge has been consistently upheld, and it would be difficult to point to a people more thoroughly content with their government than the Sudanese, who have found their rulers animated by a spirit of justice and moderation entirely different from anything of the kind experienced in former times. Whatever qualms or misgivings this largely Mohammedan people may have entertained upon passing under the control of Christian rulers, were dispelled by Lord Cromer's further assurance : 'There will be no interference whatever in your religion.' There has been none ; neither has the dreaded religious question—sensitive and fanatical though the people remain—as yet occasioned any offence to Moslem subjects nor any cause for anxiety to their Christian governors. In the Sudan, as in Egypt, Islam is not only a religion ; it is a political system ; it is also a phase—and an important phase—of social life. Bearing in mind that the changes effected in the political and social customs of a Moslem people are almost invariably achieved at the expense of loyalty to the religion of Islam, the Administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan has shown much wisdom by interfering as little as possible with the customs and prejudices of the Moslem world ; on the other hand, it has sought to encourage the practice of Mohammedanism among the people, thus further acting

upon the sound judgment of Lord Cromer, who has expressed the opinion that in introducing European civilisation it should never be forgotten that Islam cannot be reformed; that is to say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer; it becomes something else.

Some critics consider that the Administration of the Sudan, by following the British policy in Egypt and making the form of government so largely pro-Moslem, has acted wrongly. They cite as an example the closing of all Government offices on Friday—the Moslem sabbath—and the opening of them on Sunday—the Christian day of rest; and they contend that this concession to Islam, far from creating a favourable impression upon the native mind, has developed in Moslem ranks a spirit of pride which leads to the belief that Islam is accepted as superior to Christianity, and that the votary of Mohammed enjoys a right of precedence over the worshipper of Christ. This contention, I think, may best be answered by pointing to the fact that though the ruling class in the Sudan is mainly Christian, the Christians are in a great minority, the proportion among the employees of the Government being less than one-half per cent., while among the population in general it is not more than between 8 and 10 per cent. It is obviously impossible to allow two holidays in a week, and in view of the immensely larger proportion of Mohammedans the preference must necessarily be given to the followers of Islam. On the other hand, all Christians can, if they choose, attend the services of their church twice on Sunday, for the office hours on that day are arranged so as to permit of this with the greatest facility. Officials are on duty for a few hours only in the forenoon, being rarely called upon to do more than glance through their departmental correspondence with a view to attending to any imperatively important matters. A special governmental order has long been in force designed to smooth the path of all Christian employees carrying out their religious obligations.

Nor would it appear that complete satisfaction has been reached in connexion with the religious instruction given at the Gordon Memorial College at Khartoum, the amount of time devoted to the teaching of Christianity being deemed insufficient. But the percentage of

Christian scholars in Sudan educational establishments is so small that it has been found impracticable to have separate religious instruction for each denomination. As a matter of fact, however, non-Mohammedan pupils are afforded corresponding instruction in their own faith should their parents so desire, and provided a teacher is available; and such is the case in all primary schools.

So far as the teaching of the Mohammedan religion is concerned, it may be pointed out that such religious instruction is only imparted to those pupils who are destined to become Kadis—i.e. religious judges—and teachers in the Sudan. Other pupils merely read the Korán, and receive no special religious education. The proportion of school-hours allotted to the study of Islamism each week cannot be regarded as excessive, amounting as it does to one hour daily during the four years that the primary course of study continues, as compared with eight hours per week for Arabic and the same for English, five hours for arithmetic, and three each for geometry and map-drawing.

Since the reoccupation of the Sudan, education has advanced with remarkable continuity along the original lines of the scheme for public instruction evolved, with care and forethought, by the late Director, Mr James Currie, C.M.G., who held the post of Director of Education for fifteen years. But one need not go back more than ten years to perceive how great has been the progress made in the number of pupils receiving instruction at the various schools in the Sudan. In 1905, the total was 2605, which showed an increase of 472 over the number of the previous year. At the end of 1913 there were 5226 pupils, of whom 5000 were Moslems. Little effort has been made hitherto to educate women, while the institution of some simple educational system among the negroid races of the Southern Sudan has yet to be tried.

Next to education the greatest success achieved has been in the direction of transportation. It is not easy to exaggerate the perplexity of the problems which confronted the Administration when, in 1899, they took formal possession of nearly one million square miles of country, a country almost as large as Argentina, the exact limits of which were still subjects of dispute with other nations—France, Belgium, Italy and Abyssinia.

Since then delimitation commissions have settled all outstanding boundary questions; and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan now presents itself as a compact and mature Protectorate, more than nine-tenths of which are wisely and justly administered, the other tenth being uninhabitable for Europeans or even Egyptians.

To hope to cover such a wide expanse of country by anything approaching a complete system of railways was obviously out of the question. There existed neither the money to pay for it, nor the population to make use of it. Nevertheless much has been accomplished, for the length of railway-track now in operation exceeds 1500 miles, whereas in 1896 there existed less than 50 miles of line, and this was merely an old and useless military track. The gross railway revenue has risen from E124,416*l.* in 1903 to E516,876*l.* in 1913, while the percentage of working expenses to gross revenue has been reduced from 110·2 to 76·7 per cent.

The navigation of the Nile has progressed almost equally well; a first-class fleet of steamers, belonging exclusively to the Government, now plies upon the waters of the Nile. No private company is permitted to carry passengers or freight in competition; but the ports are open to the shipping of the whole world, and show a satisfactory increase in the tonnage recorded. The international tonnage of vessels visiting Port Sudan—the principal port in the country—rose from 312,770 in 1907 to nearly 700,000 in 1914. Since the Government established regular mail steamers—which, in the face of many physical difficulties (of which shortage of water is the worst), are maintained throughout the year—great improvement in the carrying trade has been manifested. The rank vegetation known as ‘sudd,’ which formerly acted as a continual menace to the river navigation, has now been for the most part removed, and even where found still existing in great quantities is prevented from closing the channel to steamers passing to and fro. In 1905 the ‘sudd’ was found so obstructive, and so persistently blocked navigation on the Upper Nile, that a whole fleet of steamers had to be engaged to do battle against it. To-day one hardly hears of any serious delay being occasioned through this cause; and even the less-used channels are being freed.

Of public roads the country can now boast some thousands of miles. In 1906 there were barely 1600 miles of roads open, and many of these were merely cleared tracks, unmetalled and unbridged. To-day the mileage may probably be put at 5000, while some of the roads are so well constructed that mechanical traction over them is quite possible. Bridges of steel and of wood, wells at intervals which vary according to requirements, telephone wires stretching even through the tenantless desert, and nearly 10,000 miles of over-head telegraph wires, facilitate communications throughout the country.

Trade and industry, aided and encouraged by so many improvements, have responded well; but for the misfortune of a low Nile for the past three years the latest statistics would have afforded far better results than they do. Nevertheless, they show that the total value of the external trade has risen from E2,135,004*l.* in 1907 to E3,294,962*l.* in 1913; the value of the imports has advanced during the same period from E1,604,137*l.* to E2,109,776*l.*, while the exports have more than doubled, growing from E449,329*l.* to E1,185,186*l.*

Agriculture continues to be an uncertain pursuit in the Sudan owing to its dependence upon the rainfall in some districts, especially those of the Red Sea littoral, and to the seasonable rise of the Nile in others. For three years in succession the river has failed, occasioning much distress among the cultivators. In five years' time at the latest, however, the great Ghezireh irrigation scheme,* which, at a cost of 1,300,000*l.*, is destined to bring incalculable benefits to the Sudan by providing an abundance of water, will, to a great extent, offset the disappointments and losses occasioned by an erratic Nile. A permanent source of wealth—agriculture and cotton cultivation combined—will thus be provided, with the practical certainty that no further violent fluctuation in the prosperity of the people, who are largely dependent upon cultivation of the soil, will occur. Fortunately even with the present discouraging situation, by reason of which the expansion of the cultivated area is limited by

* Since this article was written, the outbreak of war in Europe has caused all work in connexion with this and other irrigation enterprises in Egypt and the Sudan to be suspended.

climatic conditions, the returns show that the area under crops has been enlarged, the energy and enterprise of the people proving remarkably stable. The Administration has devoted much time, consideration and money to placing Sudanese agriculture upon a firm footing. The amount of crops under cultivation in 1913 reached a total of 2,255,226 feddans * against 1,847,021 feddans in 1912.

That the material well-being of the people has improved since the establishment of Anglo-Egyptian administration seems clear from the steady advance which is shown in their ability to purchase certain luxuries, to which the majority of them must have been almost complete strangers, even so recently as a decade ago. Their tastes and requirements, it would seem, can now be satisfied, even at a time when poor agricultural seasons have to be faced. Since 1908, native purchases of imported cotton fabrics advanced in value from E391,047*l.* to E503,616*l.*; of sugar, from E133,626*l.* to E258,750*l.*; of coffee, from E37,863*l.* to E67,545*l.*; of tea, from E27,721*l.* to E39,114*l.*, and of foreign spices—of which the Sudanese are inordinately fond—from E5,438*l.* to E12,623*l.*

The steady improvement in the country's finances affords further testimony to the remarkable economic expansion of the Sudan. In 1898 the entire revenue, which had been estimated to produce E8000*l.*, amounted to a little over E35,000*l.*; to-day it exceeds E1,644,000*l.* There exists no longer any necessity for the annual contribution received from Egypt; the parent country, over a period of 15 years—from 1899 to 1913—had found an annual sum ranging between E391,790*l.* (in 1904) and E516,345*l.* (in 1911) to enable the Sudan budget to be balanced. The Government has now elected to walk henceforth alone and unaided; it is even endeavouring to repay gradually to Egypt the large advances which have been made at various times towards the cost of its economic development. The capital sum of that debt, which has been already slightly reduced, stands to-day at E5,198,700*l.*

It may, perhaps, be suggested that the Administration has acted rather precipitately in abandoning the Egyptian

* One feddan = 1·038 acres.

annual contribution ; this, time will show. The loss to the Sudan unquestionably comes at a moment which could scarcely have been worse chosen on account of the poor state of the country's chief source of revenue—taxation upon agricultural produce—the heavy expenditure upon grain for a partly-famishing people, and the payment falling due upon a portion of the new Sudan loan of 3,000,000*l.*, including the expenses of management and those of the sinking fund, both of which must be found by the Government out of revenue. The financial progress of the Sudan will, therefore, be watched with great interest for the next year or so ; inasmuch, however, as the situation is fundamentally sound, and the permanent advantages accruing from the great Ghezireh irrigation scheme approach nearer and nearer to realisation, no reason for anxiety can be said to exist.

Lord Kitchener, speaking at Khartoum early in 1912, declared : ' The future is bright, and the good administration in the Sudan, of which I am glad to see abundant proofs, will, I feel sure, result in a steady extension of the prosperity of the people.' If, since these words were uttered, a slight set-back has occurred in the wellbeing of the people for reasons already fully explained, their present position nevertheless reflects the ultimate and even the speedy result of the painstaking, cautious and eminently honest government which the country enjoys. Much has been done, much remains to do. The ' hybrid form of government,' as Lord Cromer has called it, has worked so well that not even the most pronounced pessimist can pretend that the experiment—introduced in the face of the most determined opposition upon the part of conventional diplomatists and many international jurists—has failed to justify the policy of Lord Salisbury. Probably the very unconventionality and novelty of the essay appealed to that great Foreign Minister, who, moreover, must have known something of the sterling ability of the men to whom the future administration of the Sudan was to be entrusted—Cromer, Kitchener and Wingate, a triumvirate which will assuredly go down into history as one of the most brilliantly successful regenerating influences known.

PERCY F. MARTIN.

Art. 2.—CATULLUS AT HOME.

1. *Gai Valeri Catulli Carmina*. Edit. J. P. Postgate. London: Bell, 1889.
2. *A Commentary on Catullus*. By Robinson Ellis. Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889.
3. *Criticisms and Elucidations of Catullus*. By H. A. J. Munro. Second Edition. London: Bell, 1905.
4. *Catullus*; Latin text with English prose translation. By F. W. Cornish. (Loeb Classical Library.) London: Heinemann, 1912.

THERE is a pleasant fascination in trying to form a clear mental picture of the surroundings amidst which a poet was born and bred, and in attempting to trace whether this environment exercised any recognisable influence on the direction which his genius followed, or on the forms in which it found expression. Among the Latin poets, for example, we can realise fairly well the rural conditions in which Virgil spent his youth on the great Lombard plain. In his earlier verse, amidst all the imagery which is there borrowed from Greek sources, it is not difficult to perceive also an inspiration that came from the fields and woods, the pastures and farms among which the Mincio wound its way; and the memory of these landscapes of his boyhood continued to be traceable in his poetry up to the end. Again, in the case of Horace, we recognise the lasting impression made on his young imagination by the features of his native Apulia—its thirsty summers, its flooded Aufidus, its hills, its forests and wood-pastures, its little hill-towns, and its thrifty and industrious peasantry. The poems of Catullus, dealing as they do, in the main, with the incidents of his life in Rome, afford perhaps less distinct indications of the influence of youthful associations. Yet we venture to think that from a careful study of them, in connexion with the physical features of the region of Cisalpine Gaul where he was born and spent his youth, some facts and inferences may be gleaned which go to show that early surroundings exercised a certain influence on his muse. We propose in the following pages to attempt to trace the source and nature of this influence.

The first three books on our list need no commendation from us. The commentaries of Prof. Munro and Prof. Ellis are classics in their line; and Prof. Postgate's edition of the poet supplies the best text available for English readers. The little volume of the 'Loeb Classical Library,' which includes the Poems of Catullus, gives a good Latin text on one page and on the page opposite a scholarly and elegant English prose version by the Vice-Provost of Eton. No handier edition of the poet could be desired; it should find a place in the travelling outfit of every lover of Catullus who makes a pilgrimage to Sirmio. The volume also contains the Latin text of Tibullus with a spirited English rendering by Prof. Postgate, and as if to fill up the measure of its attractiveness, it concludes with the delightful 'Pervigilium Veneris,' excellently Englished by Mr J. W. Mackail.

Among the many interesting historical associations which enhance the picturesque attractiveness of Verona, the well-founded claim of that city to be the birthplace of the greatest of Latin lyric poets is surely one of the most notable. The modern town contains few, if any, remains of Roman architecture that connect our age directly with that of Catullus. The noble arena, the ruins of a stately theatre, one or two of the arches of a bridge that still spans the rapid river, the antique gateways through which the tide of traffic still continues to ebb and flow, probably all belong to generations that lived after him. But the natural features of the district must remain much as they were when he spent his youth among them. The rushing Adige still sweeps through the town. From the heights which tower above its rapid current, the eye beholds the same noble prospect across the plains of Lombardy, to the cones of the Euganean Hills on the one side and the long range of the southern Alps on the other. No one who knows and loves his Catullus can gaze on that varied landscape without emotion. As we note, one after another, the features that were so familiar to the poet, and let our imagination dwell upon the past, his brief and troubled life, with its alternations of overmastering joy and profoundest grief, seems to unfold itself before us. We think of his boyhood and youth at Verona, where, under the roof of his father, a man of repute in the city, he must have come

into personal contact with all that was most noted in the society of the province, military as well as civil.* As we scan the varied features of the surrounding country, we can well believe that its singular loveliness could not be without some formative influence in fostering that appreciation of natural beauty, which, like a golden thread, runs through the poetry of Catullus.

In thought we follow him to Rome where, as he tells us, he eventually made his home, returning to his native district only at intervals, when a little box, selected from his travelling gear, could hold all that he needed for the visit (lxviii, 34). The vivid glimpses which the poems reveal of the gay society of his day in Rome, and the touching evidence they afford of the fluctuations of his intensely emotional nature, crowd upon the memory. They show us his abounding sociality and gaiety as a companion, the depth and tenderness of his affection for those whom he loved, the true sympathy with which he embraced his friends in their sorrows no less than in their joys; at the same time the vigour of his hatreds, or at least the strength of the vituperation with which, perhaps, he often simulated them;† and above all his passionate and tragic infatuation for the captivating but worthless Lesbia, which was at once a prime inspiration of his muse and the ultimate ruin of his life.

We recall especially that memorable journey to Bithynia, on the staff of the proprætor Memmius, where the poet hoped to replenish a purse which, he said, had come to be full only of dusty cobwebs,‡ but where the governor's vigilance frustrated his junior's intention to

* The great proconsul Julius Cæsar is said to have been a frequent guest in the house.

† See Munro (*op. cit.*, p. 75) for a reasoned argument to show that the poet's defamatory attacks on some of his contemporaries are not to be judged by modern standards of taste, but must be looked at in the light in which they would be generally understood in his day. The Roman populace, when in merry mood, were wont to vie with each other in scurrilous Fescennine verse; but the personal abuse in which they indulged was only a pastime which did not denote any real unfriendliness or enmity. Such contests in vituperation were perpetuated for many centuries. In the latter half of the fifteenth century they were signally exemplified in the sonnets of the Italian poets Luigi Pulci and Matteo Franco; and a generation or two later the most noted Scottish poets, in their 'flytings,' or scoldings of each other, exhausted the vocabulary of scurrilous epithets wherein their native language was specially rich, yet they remained good friends.

‡ xliii, 8.

enrich himself at the expense of the provincials. We can picture the consequent disappointment and disgust which led him to throw up his place on the staff and return home; his eagerness to travel and see famous places by the way, and the kindly companionship that prompted the sonnet in which he bade farewell to the comrades whom he left behind him.* More especially do we think of him at his brother's grave in the Troad, and of the anguish of that lasting grief to which he again and again gave vent in language of such passionate longing and hopeless despair.† The incidents of the long homeward voyage, as he has so graphically recited them, rise one by one into our recollection—the yacht which he purchased, built of wood from the forests of Pontic Amastris, whence in imagination he seemed still to hear the whistling of the wind through the rustling foliage of the trees from which her timbers had been cut; the sail across the rough Black Sea, through the wild Thracian Propontis to famous Rhodes and the Cyclad Isles, and thence along the shores of the threatening Adriatic—the vessel holding her course, alike in storm and calm, now with sails and now with oars, never outstripped by any other craft afloat, but coming back at last from the remotest seas to be piloted up the Po and the Mincio into the limpid waters of the Lago di Garda, where she was finally dedicated to the sailors' patrons, Castor and Pollux.‡

The Lake of Garda, now inseparably associated with Catullus, was not improbably familiar to him in his youth, for it lies only some twenty-five miles to the west of Verona. It may have been to the wealthier citizens of Verona what the coast of the Tyrrhene Sea was to those of Rome—a place where they erected villas and to which they were wont to resort for their summer holiday. Catullus' father may thus have possessed a villa on the shore of the lake, which could be easily and speedily reached by a good road from Verona. In any case, we know that the poet either inherited or otherwise acquired a residence at Sirmio off the southern coast. A more fitting abode for stimulating the noblest powers of his genius could not have been found in the whole compass of Italy. In Rome, where he threw himself, heart and

* xli.

† lxviii, 19, 91; ci.

‡ iv.

soul, into the gay life of the city, he had many distractions and anxieties. Besides the wayward course of his passion for Lesbia, so faithfully reflected in his poems, his generosity and extravagance reduced his means and increased his solitudes. But here, in his native province, far from the stir and strife of the capital and face to face with Nature in her most varied and alluring guise, he could regain the mastery of himself.

How deep was the attachment of Catullus to this retreat on the Garda Lake may best be realised from the exuberant joy expressed in one of his most delightful lyrics (xxxix), written on the spot, when he returned from the East. The poem is addressed to Sirmio, which he calls the little gem of all the peninsulas or islands that Neptune bears on lake or sea. He can hardly trust himself at first to believe that he has really left the hot plains of Bithynia, and is now once more in his beloved retreat. What can be more blessed, he exclaims, than to drop the burden of our cares and, wearied with the toils of foreign travel, to return to our own dear home, there to rest upon the bed so eagerly desired? Such a consummation is, indeed, ample recompense for all the fatigues that have been endured. Bursting into jubilant song, he welcomes his lovely Sirmio, bidding it to share in his delight and rejoice to have its master back once more, and, with that boyish love of mirthfulness so characteristic of his temperament, he calls on the water itself to swell the general chorus of glee with all the laughter that its rippling waves can send forth.

If it be asked what were the attractions of the place that could give rise to so exuberant an attachment, the answer can hardly be given in a few words, depending as it does partly on the special features of the lake and its surroundings, and partly on the habits and tastes of the poet himself. Having a keen eye for beauty of every kind, he appreciated the varied beauties of Sirmio. This appreciation was no doubt of a sensuous rather than a contemplative nature. It was mingled, too, with gratification that this lovely spot was his own home, endeared to him by its associations. But there were some characteristics of the place that would strongly appeal to his temperament; and a consideration of these may help us to understand his enthusiasm.

The Lago di Garda, the Lacus Benacus of the Romans, differs from other Italian lakes in certain features that give it a well-marked peculiarity. Its northern half, like a Norwegian fjord, is a strip of water two to three miles broad, running in a nearly straight line towards the north-east, between two ranges of mountains that rise steeply in verdant slopes from its shores. This portion of the lake belongs characteristically to the mountain region. The southern half emerges from the mountains into the plains, where it widens out into a basin some ten miles broad, encircled only by comparatively low hills. This combination of mountainous and lowland surroundings (as, on a smaller scale, in the case of Loch Lomond, in Scotland) gives the lake its most distinctive feature. At its southern end it is separated from the great Lombardy plain by the gigantic semicircle of moraine-mounds which mark the end of the massive glacier that once descended from the Tyrolese Alps, filled up the basin of the lake, and reached the plain, at that time possibly covered by the sea.

Another characteristic of Garda is the remarkable straightness of its trend. Standing on the low hills above the southern shore, we can look along the whole length of the lake and far up into the mountain country beyond. One result of this configuration is seen in the violent storms to which the lake is subject when the winds blow strongly from the snowy uplands in the north-east. Big waves then arise, which gain force as they are driven to the southern shore, where they fall with great violence on the shingle-beach. The lake is famous for the fury of its storms. Probably Virgil saw it in one of its tempestuous moods, for he describes it as 'heaving with billows and with a roar as of the sea.'*

Near the southern margin of the lake, about three miles from the shore, a small solitary wooded island rises out of the water. From a distance it seems to stand wholly unconnected with any other land. But on a nearer view it is found to be attached to the shore by a strip of alluvial ground, so narrow in some parts as to

* 'Fluctibus et fremitu adsurgens, Benace, marino?'—'Georgics,' ii, 160. In bolsterous weather sea-sickness is not unknown among the passengers in the steamboats on the lake.

afford hardly more than room for a roadway, and so low as to be more or less submerged when the level of the water at this end of the lake is raised by prolonged northerly gales.* This spit of land is a natural accumulation of considerable antiquity, which has served for many centuries as a means of communication between the island and the lake-shore. The island consists of a mass of pinkish limestone, and rises several hundred feet above the surface of the water, into which it descends more or less steeply on all sides. Its surface is clothed to the top with olive woods, which in spring are carpeted with violets, grape-hyacinths and the lesser periwinkle, that cast a flush of blue over the fresh herbage beneath the grey-green foliage of the prevailing trees.† This island, now known as Sirmione, is undoubtedly the Sirmio of Catullus. At its northern end are some Roman ruins, popularly believed to be the remains of the poet's house; but they probably belong to a later time, though, as they are placed on the most advantageous site for a commanding view of the lake and the mountains beyond, they may occupy the ground on which the dwelling of Catullus actually stood. From the summit of the island the eye takes in the whole wide expanse of the great southern basin of the lake and also the entire length of the northern fjord-like portion, with its little promontories on either side, far away into the blue distances of the interior; while above the nearer crests we catch glimpses of remote snowy peaks beyond. Owing to the southward prolongation of the lake outside the limits of the mountains, it is possible from Sirmione to see, on both sides, part of the southern front of the Alpine chain as it sweeps down to the great plain at its foot. To the west lie the foothills around Brescia, and far to the east those that rise to the sky-line north of Verona. The countless varieties of outline and diversities of colour in this vast panorama of high grounds afford to the beholder an inexhaustible source

* It was doubtless to this twofold character that Catullus alluded when he addressed his home on the lake as

'Pæne insularum, Sirmio, insularumque
Ocelle.'

† The reader will remember Tennyson's line—'Then beneath the Roman ruin, where the purple flowers grow.'

of pleasure, to which is often added another charm in the ethereal beauty of the multitudinous canopy of clouds that gather in ever-changing shapes above the mountains and cast their shadows of darkest blue over valley and lake and sharp-cut crest. Under the soft azure of the Italian sky and amidst the brilliance of Italian sunshine, the landscape is one to which there are few rivals in any part of the globe.

That the absorbing beauty of the scenery was one of the chief attractions of the place to Catullus may surely be assumed. It could not but appeal powerfully to a mind so sensitive as his was to all that was bright and beautiful in the world around him. This appeal would be enforced by the consciousness that all this transcendent loveliness lay in his own native province, not far from his birthplace, if not also dear to him from the recollection of holidays spent here in his boyhood.

But there was a feature of Sirmio which, we cannot but think, played a notable part among the charms which the place had in the eyes of Catullus. No one can attentively read his poems without observing the remarkable contrast between the tone of his allusions to the sea and seafaring and those of other Roman poets to the same subject. Whereas Horace, for example, seems to exhaust his native tongue in seeking terms of abuse to express his antipathy and disgust, Catullus utters no word of disparagement, but, on the contrary, delights to paint the beauty and grandeur of the deep, and to dwell on the pleasure he had enjoyed in sailing over its surface. His longest poem, the 'Peleus and Thetis,' is full of the spirit of the sea in all its moods of calm and storm. As the epithalamium of a sea-goddess, such a poem would naturally include references to the sea; but the poet displays such an exuberance of allusion and so great a variety of picturesque epithets as to indicate how much he was at home among the 'clear waves,' the 'salt depths,' the 'blue expanse of the sea,' the 'windy main,' the 'foaming surge,' and the 'wave lashed into white froth by the oars.*' Indeed, it would seem as if

* lxiiv, 1-18. 'Liquidas undas,' 'Phasidos fluctus,' 'vada salsa,' 'cœrula æquora,' 'ventosum æquor,' 'tortaque remigio spumis incanduit unda,' 'freti candenti e gurgite,' 'e gurgite cano.' All these phrases and epithets are crowded into the first eighteen lines of the poem, as if Catullus

he found the Latin language inadequate to convey his vivid impression of the grandeur of the sea in a storm, for he coins a new word to express the continuous torrent-like roar of the waves along an exposed line of coast (*fluentisono litore*, lxiv, 52). Again, the sonnet on the yacht which carried him back from the East could only have been written by one who had the instincts and experience of a yachtsman, and who loved his vessel as a personal friend that had braved with him all the perils of the deep. From many other of his poems similar evidence might be given of his keen appreciation of the sea.

Now the position of Sirmio—an islet, like a ship at anchor, in the midst of the largest expanse of fresh water in Cisalpine Gaul—could not but appeal to the imagination of a poet who was also a yachtsman. One is tempted to believe that it may have been by boating and sailing on this lake in his boyhood that Catullus imbibed his taste for seamanship. At his other homes in Rome, Tivoli or Verona he had no opportunity of being afloat; and one of the sources of his eagerness to get back to Sirmio probably lay in the opportunities which the place gave him of indulging in a favourite pastime. There was no such tempting field for inland aquatic sport to be had anywhere else in the country. We can hardly believe that he undertook the trouble and expense of having his trusty yacht piloted from the Adriatic Sea up into the Lacus Benacus, merely to have the gratification of dedicating it as an offering to the Dioscuri. It seems much more probable that the transportation was carried out in order that he might have the satisfaction of cruising on Benacus in his beloved eastern *phasellus*, with sails or oars as the weather might permit. It is clear that a considerable interval of time elapsed between the return of the vessel and the occasion when the poet described her achievements to his friends and pointed to her hulk quietly moored by the shores of the lake.* The final laying-up of the yacht and her

was so full of delight in the deep, and so carried away by the prospect of writing a sea-story, that he could not restrain the exuberance of his language.

* The voyage is there referred to as an old story—'*hæc prius fuere*' (lv, 25).

dedication to the sailors' divinities may not have taken place until the time came when she was considered no longer seaworthy. Moreover, we can imagine that when the poet had provided in a grateful spirit that his *phasellus* should spend a quiet and honoured old age near his home at Sirmio, he would not fail to put in her place another craft of some sort; for the spirit of the yachtsman would impel him, as long as the state of his funds would permit, to maintain the means of being afloat and moving over the surface of his 'limpid lake.'

From the way in which the southern end of the Lago di Garda extends well out of the Alpine chain, and from the position of Sirmione off the shore, the horizon visible from this place is remarkably extensive and distant in every direction save towards the north. 'The blue rim where skies and mountains meet' is so unobstructed and lies so far away that the sunrises and sunsets must be exceptionally well seen. We know that these times of the day were dear to Catullus, and we may believe that their glory as seen from his home here would be to him not the least of the pleasures of the place. From his 'fast-anchored isle' he would see the sun rise from behind the far-off slopes of the southern Alps north of Verona. When early astir on the lake, he might look on such a scene as he has vividly depicted in the 'Peleus and Thetis,' 'when the dawn mounts upward to the threshold of the wandering sun, and the morning breath of the west wind, ruffling the calm sea, urges forward the sloping waves which at first move slowly before the mild breeze, with a sound as of gentle laughter; but as the wind freshens, they wax ever more and more, and floating far away, flash back the crimson light.'* At evening, from the crest of his isle he could see the sun sink beneath the distant hills above Brescia, and the Alpine peaks, one after another, lighted up with the gleam of the after-glow. The regular succession from dawn to dusk, so impressively visible from Sirmio, would now and then, for a moment, suggest a solemn thought to the poet, as in the sad but exquisitely musical verses:

'Soles occidere et redire possunt:
Nobis, quum semel occidit brevis lux,
Nox est perpetua una dormienda.'†

* lxiiv, 269-275.

† v, 4.

But the Lago di Garda does not always wear a placid smile; and Catullus, who had sailed through so many furious seas, without ever appealing for protection to the gods of the adjacent shores,* could not fail to take pleasure in watching its surface in a storm. From a firm foothold at the top of the cliff in which the island ends towards the north—a cliff which may have been the boundary of his garden—he could look across the whole expanse of this ‘ventosum æquor.’ Nowhere else could he behold such uproar in fresh water. It would remind him of the ‘truculenta pelagi’ on the Ægean or the Adriatic Sea. As he looked northwards, the distant mountains and the upper part of the lake would probably be shrouded in grey mist out of which he would see the white-crested waves march towards him in rapid succession until they burst in all their fury against the limestone cliff below. If he retreated from this tumult to the sheltered lee-side of his isle, he could hear, three miles away, the loud roar of the breakers along the southern shore—a sound which, as he heard it among the eastern seas, he has expressed in words that seem to bring the scene vividly to both eye and ear:

‘Litus ut longe resonante Eoa
Tunditur unda’ (xi, 3).

The visitor who knows the lake only in all the loveliness of its tranquil summer beauty, smooth as glass or only gently rippled into ‘Lydian laughter,’ may find a difficulty in picturing to himself what it is at the height of a great gale from the north. But should he have any geological experience, he will find at the northern end of Sirmione impressive proof of what has been achieved by the storms of many successive centuries in battering down the solid limestone rock. Precisely as happens on a bold coast exposed to the gales of an open sea, the original sloping declivity of the islet has been cut back into a vertical cliff, with a flat platform of rock at its base. When the water is low this platform may be traversed dryshod; but, when the level of the lake is high and a strong northerly gale is blowing, the waves

* iv, 18-23. Horace, on the other hand, regarded such supplication as the normal practice of seafarers—‘Otium divos rogat in patenti prensus Ægæo.’—‘Carm.’ II, xvi, i.

sweep against the face of the cliff, which they slowly undermine. Since the glacier retired and water took the place of ice in the basin of the lake, a huge notch has thus been excavated out of the northern front of Sirmione by the bombardment of the waves. There would seem to have been an appreciable amount of loss during the last 1900 years, for some of the masonry, connected with the so-called villa of Catullus, is now at the verge of the precipice. There are probably few other places in Europe where the abrasive energy of waves generated in a freshwater lake is so strongly demonstrated.

In the neighbourhood of lofty mountains the atmospheric changes are marked by a wider range and take place with greater rapidity than is the case in lowland regions. Summer and winter are more sharply marked off from each other. Storms are more frequent; rains are heavier; and any serious fall of temperature is indicated by the appearance of fresh snow on at least the higher peaks and crests. Even in the course of a single day the changes of sky may be many, and may quickly succeed each other. The look of the landscape alters continually under these transformations of the heavens above; and thus a fresh source of beauty and charm is given to scenery that is in itself already full of attraction. The peculiar position of Sirmione is eminently favourable for watching these movements of clouds and winds, and their effects on the aspect of the mountains on the one hand and the rolling lowland on the other. Moreover, to what can be seen on land there is here added a wide expanse of water, which even more sensitively reacts to atmospheric perturbations. To a poetic eye like that of Catullus, the contemplation of these constant and almost kaleidoscopic variations in the tones and colours of the landscape, synchronous and sympathetic with the changes in the face of the sky, would be, even if unconsciously, another of the fascinations of his Sirmio.

The swiftness with which the atmospheric changes may succeed each other in that region of mountain and plain was vividly brought home to the writer in the course of a boating excursion on the southern portion of the Lago di Garda one mild day in April. There had been a slight snowfall on the loftier heights during the

previous night, but, as the day advanced, the white covering on peak and crest was growing visibly less under the warm sunshine. Huge masses of dazzlingly white cumulus cloud hung apparently motionless above the mountains, on which they threw shadows of the deepest blue; while the sunlit ridges and green slopes above the upper half of the lake gleamed with an almost prismatic radiance, that recalled the sheen of the finest Limoges enamel. The surface of the lake lay absolutely smooth and still, save when ruffled here and there into streaks and patches of darker azure by fitful gusts of air from above. Every mountain within sight was reflected on this bright mirror. It seemed as if Nature were in deep sleep, and unlikely to be roused for many hours to come. But eventually some ominous dark clouds were seen to be gathering in the north-east, whence an occasional muttering of distant thunder could be heard. These sombre masses of vapour spread over the sky with a rapidity which was in striking contrast to the immobility of the huge white clouds that seemed still asleep on the more distant western mountains. Large drops of rain and then pellets of hail began to fall, as if shot from catapults, into the oil-like surface of the water. As the storm quickly approached, the thunder grew louder and more frequent, the lightning more startlingly vivid, until the full majesty was revealed of such a tempest as can only be witnessed in a mountainous region with multitudinous echoes. The rain now fell in one continuous torrent. Flash rapidly succeeded flash, with increasing brilliance, followed and even accompanied by crashing peals, which, reverberating from the many cloud-capped ridges of the chain, gathered into one sustained roar.

‘Far along’

From peak to peak, the rattling crags among,
Leaps the live thunder! Not from one lone cloud,
But every mountain now hath found a tongue.’

It was a memorable experience to have been on the Lago di Garda under such different aspects in the course of a single day. Doubtless Catullus must often have witnessed a similar tempest during his sojournings by the lake; and, although he may not have appreciated, as

Lucretius could, the elemental grandeur of such displays of Nature's energy, his sensitive and imaginative temperament would not remain unmoved by their impressive magnificence.

But there was one portion of the scene to which he seems to have been blind. The panorama of mountains to be seen from the southern end of the Lago di Garda is always the feature of that marvellous landscape which first arrests the attention of modern visitors, and to which the eye most often and admiringly turns. Even when we bear in mind the horror of the antique world for the wildness and the dangers of mountains, it is impossible to escape a feeling of surprise that such a keen-eyed poet as Catullus should have found words in praise of the lake, but none for its great mountain-girdle. Only once does he refer to the Alps; and then it is merely to express his conviction that his comrades Furius and Aurelius would be ready to go with him anywhere, even should he decide to tramp across the lofty Alps in order to behold the monuments of Cæsar's rule, the Gaulish Rhine, and the dreadful Britons at the end of the world (xi, 1-12). The passes through the western part of the chain had come in his day to be continually traversed by soldiers and traders; but there is no evidence in his poems that, even in the times of his deepest dejection, though he may have planned a journey, he ever ventured to distract his thoughts by visiting trans-alpine countries, or even penetrated into any of the glens of the chain which were almost visible from his home. That, living face to face with such a mountain landscape yet far away from any of its dangers, he should not only express no appreciation of it but even make no allusion to its existence, seems to us one of the most striking proofs in literature of how insensible cultivated men still were to the grander types of scenery. Seventeen centuries had to pass after his time before the glories of the mountain-world began to be discovered, and a hundred years more before they were generally appreciated in all civilised communities.

There appears to be good reason to believe that Catullus wrote some of his best poetry at Sirmio. Certainly two of the most delightful of his joyous lyrics had their birth here. His rapturous address to Sirmio

and the lake, on his return from the East, drew its inspiration from the very place itself; and the poem in which he recounts his homeward voyage was penned with the favourite yacht resting near him by the shores of his lake. Probably also he composed here the touching verses in which he conveys his sympathy to his friend Manlius, who in his deep sorrow was like 'a shipwrecked man cast up by the foaming waves of the deep'; while at the same time the poet himself, by the death of his beloved brother, had been 'plunged into the waves of misfortune,' and had lost all joy in life. His longer and more elaborate poems are with probability referred to his later years. In these the numerous allusions to the sea, to seafaring and to shipwreck suggest that, although they may have been planned or even begun in the East, they were mainly written after his return, and were carefully elaborated and corrected in such uninterrupted leisure and with such inspiring surroundings as he could best secure on the shores of Benacus. Amid the fever and fret, the joys and sorrows of his short but crowded life, it was to this much-loved spot that his thoughts fondly turned, as a haven of peace and rest amid all that is beautiful in Nature. It is here too that, after the lapse of so many centuries, readers in whose hearts he still awakens a tender sympathy by the frankness, brightness and affection of his character, and in whose ears the music of his verse ever lingers, feel themselves to be specially drawn towards him in admiration of his genius, and in pity for the brief and troubled career of so rare and lovable a spirit. To the end of time this little islet of Sirmione will remain the fitting shrine consecrated to the memory of Catullus.

ARCHIBALD GEIKIE.

Art. 3.—THE GERMAN SPIRIT.

THE present war is a conflict, which admits no truce or reconciliation, between two conceptions and ideals of life. Liberty, democracy, and the moral law, are ranged in battle order against physical force, militarism, and the claims for universal domination.

The German spirit, once idealistic and humanitarian, has developed into the opposite of itself. Heine could reasonably describe the Germans as 'a speculative people, Ideologues, thinking backwards and forwards, dreamers who only live in the past or the future, and have no present.' But no longer do they willingly see in Hamlet, the dreamer who would be a man of action if only he could cease to think and ponder, their own national type and image. The successful wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-1, and the notable expansion of German commerce, have intervened. Faust, however, still remains the acknowledged symbol and mirror of their mind and character. 'Two souls, alas! reside within my breast, and each withdraws from, and repels, its brother.' It is the purpose of the following pages to show that Germany, instead of harmonising its divergent tendencies, as is sometimes claimed, has made an unholy alliance between its idealism and its realism. The ideals of the Germans have come to be brutal and material; their lust of practical power is based upon those 'vain hopes, vain aims, inordinate desires, blown up with high conceits, engendering pride,' which, according to Milton, are the motives of the apostate angel.

The conspicuous institutions of Germany are the school and the barrack. The one is the complement of the other. From the universities proceed that love of country and firm belief in its future destiny, which have permeated all classes. The professor, and above all the professor of history, enjoys an influence to a degree unknown elsewhere. Niebuhr already, and Ranke, had advocated the claims of Prussia to the hegemony of the German-speaking states. After 1850, Sybel, Mommsen, Häusser, Droysen, Giesebrecht, all writing from the Prussian point of view, fostered patriotism to the height. And they were self-proclaimed realists, applying to

history and politics the methods of natural science. They anticipated Darwin in promulgating the doctrines of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest; or rather, they accepted as supreme those laws of nature which Darwin himself subordinated to the play of moral qualities in the human sphere.

Of these historians, Treitschke was the last and most notorious. Germany is the work of Prussia; Prussia of its army; and its army of its kings. That was his theme. Ruskin indeed, studying the history of these kings in Carlyle's account of the predecessors of Frederick the Great, was troubled by 'continually increasing doubt how far the machinery and discipline of war, under which they learnt the art of government, was essential for such lesson.' Even so far back as 1645, at the Conference of Münster, the Swedish ambassador felt constrained to describe with bitter and accurate irony the philosophy of the Hohenzollern family. 'God speaks no longer to princes by prophets and dreams; there is a divine calling wherever there is a favourable opportunity to attack a neighbour and extend one's own frontiers.' But Treitschke, misapplying his Darwinism, is spared all scruple. 'The historical rôle of Prussia began in the days when this Power incorporated, one after the other, the German states for which the hour of death had sounded.' He was ever ready with his triumphant chant of *Vae Victis*: woe to the weak, unfitted to survive. 'Pure and impartial history could never suit a proud and warlike nation.' And his voice, if of the loudest, was but one among many. David Friedrich Strauss, politician, Hegelian, author of the '*Leben Jesu*,' declared that Prussia never made any but 'holy' wars—holy, since the unity of Germany was due to them. The war of 1870 was 'a work of public salubrity accomplished by Germany, France being rotten to the marrow.' All nations are rotten to the marrow who stand in the way of Prussia, or cast a shadow upon Germany's rightful 'place in the sun.'

Jena and Sedan, the crushing defeat or the crowning victory—Prussian history pivots on these. But for the disaster of Jena, Prussia could not have achieved the triumph of Sedan, could not have stood forth the appointed instrument to fulfil the 'historical mission' of Germanism. To further this mission, Prussian hegemony

in Germany was necessary; and Prussian hegemony could only be established by war. Didon, studying in the German universities at the beginning of the 'eighties, found it universally accepted that 'German unity could not have been accomplished without force and violence; it implied on the part of Prussia that policy of ruse and audacity consisting in the skilful preparation for conflict, in playing the part of the offended one, and in risking the future in a game of dice with victory.' Sedan or Jena, in this present war? 'Downfall, or World-Power?' asks Bernhardt, Treitschke's military disciple, ready, along with his nation, for that policy of adventure, of gambling risk, which Nietzsche advocated as a chief law of conduct.

War is the sum of German realism. German policy is the reflex of what occurs in the animal kingdom. The philosophical historians and their military followers celebrate the happy necessity of war with deepest fervour. They re-echo the old Greek philosopher, with his 'war is the father of all things,' and Hobbes, who discovered the natural law to be 'the war of every man against every man'—a law that was regulated by 'kings and persons of sovereign authority,' who are 'in the state and posture of gladiators' and 'uphold thereby the industry of their subjects.' The Industrial period, which is supposed, by merely trading nations, to have superseded the period of Militarism, is nothing but a state of war, barely latent. War itself is a form of industry, bringing profit.

'The one unpardonable sin,' according to Treitschke, is 'the failure to use one's might.'

'Troops always ready to act,' said Frederick, the arch-model of the House of Hohenzollern, 'my war-chest well filled, and the vivacity of my character, were my reasons for making war against Marie Therèse, Queen of Bohemia and Hungary. Ambition, interest, the desire of making a name, carried the day with me, and I determined on war.'

He could refute Machiavelli before he became master of the State, and practise his doctrine afterwards. The first principle of realistic politics is that there are no principles, except those of self-interest. There are only opportunities, and these are fugitive. He is the best diplomatist who watches for the fit occasion to attack.

War! war! 'The living God (says Treitschke) will take care that war shall always return as a frightful medicine for the human race.' 'War,' says Marshal von der Goltz, 'is the right education of the people, and the true centre of national culture.' Should Germany not be sound, then 'war,' says Treitschke, 'is the sole remedy.' Should there be any internal difficulties in the German Empire (such as the increasing power of the Social Democrats), then 'a people that wishes to maintain its equilibrium must stir itself up from time to time by war.' Roon declared that 'the question of the Duchies (Schleswig-Holstein) is not a question of right, but a question of might; and we have the might.' 'To the end of time,' says Treitschke, 'weapons will maintain the right; and therein lies the holiness of war.' Might will be right, for at once, when war is proclaimed, there is 'a new rectification of boundaries corresponding with the reality of might displayed.'

But what of the Germans, or even the Prussians, who are not connected with the army, the university, or the bureaucracy? Maximilian Harden, the well-known journalist, said last year: 'Few people think of war. We need peace too much. War would compromise the results of the considerable efforts of these forty years which have given Germany considerable power; those who reflect on this cannot desire war, and, as Germans, we do not love it for itself.' Sudermann, the second German dramatist of the epoch, calling attention to the fact that the German people, 'laborious and pacific,' has full confidence in the Emperor and the Government, expressed his conviction that Prussia and Germany, ever since the Middle Ages, have never fought but in self-defence, except when their intention was to 'constitute themselves,' as in the war of 1870-1. But what of their openly proclaimed intention to 'constitute themselves' as the 'World-Power'? Alfred Kerr, literary man and editor, still in the same year, was as realistic as you please, 'looking facts in the face'—biological facts—as Treitschke bids his disciples do:

'Nothing can hold out against historical fatalities. The German arrives, with his rich blood, and I think his hour is come. The law of life requires that the less strong shall

be eliminated; the true conquerors are the hungry. And we are the hungry. The money we have gained has given us a taste for more; the well-being we have conquered has increased our appetite. When the German looks round about the world, he finds that he has come off badly, and that what is left him is only the scraps of a good meal. But this division, in his thoughts, is only provisional.'

As 'war,' says Treitschke, 'is the sphere in which the triumph of human reason displays itself most conspicuously,' and its 'majesty consists in the fact that murder can here be committed without passion,' so the conception of the Prussian State is equally in conformity with reason. Formulated in advance by Hegel, it is idealistic; and realistic, as in full agreement with the biological law. 'Radicals,' says Treitschke, 'pretend that the State springs from the free consent of citizens. History, on the contrary, teaches us that, most usually, States are founded against the wills of citizens by conquest and domination.' 'Whoever is not manly enough to look the truth in the face, that the State above all is might, had better leave politics alone.' 'Will is the essence of the State.' And will, to Treitschke as to Nietzsche, is the 'Will to Power,' the will to conquer and dominate.

Moreover, as the German army is invincible, so the State, the Prussian autocracy, is infallible in its methods and aims. 'Thanks be to God,' cried Moltke, 'the old patriarchal *régime*, the old theory that people are to be made happy in spite of themselves, still subsists in Prussia, in spite of progress'; while Bismarck had his own way of eulogizing Prussian mastery: 'Prussia is like a flannel-waistcoat; disagreeable at first, and scratchy—but it's warm and sticks well to the skin.' Thus, there is no room for the exercise of public opinion; the bureaucracy, that third institution of Germany, supplies such information as is needed.

But there is such a thing as responsibility? Ministers are responsible to an abstraction; to the non-moral—or immoral—State. 'Austria does not want war,' said a diplomatist to Bismarck, 'and it will avoid giving you a pretext for it.' To which the future Chancellor replied: 'I have a pocketful of pretexts and plausible causes.' It

was the same in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. 'Blessed,' says Delbrück, the successor of Mommsen, 'is the hand that falsified the despatch of Ems,' and thereby provoked the war. Bismarck, later, acknowledged the falsification; and German historians approve it, in full agreement with Zarathustra-Nietzsche: 'A good cause, you say, sanctifies every war. But I say unto you: it is a good war that sanctifies every cause.' And the pledged word, the treaties signed? 'All treaties,' Treitschke declares, 'are written with the clause understood: so long as things remain as they are at present.' 'If the statesman perceives that standing treaties no longer represent the real conditions of power, and cannot attain his purpose by friendly diplomacy, then'—it must be 'war.' And further: 'The statesman has no right to warm his hands at the smoking ruin of his Fatherland with the pleasant self-praise that he has never lied. That is merely a monkish virtue.' Might is right. It is the duty of ministers to collaborate with Destiny. And the German nation, headed by Prussia, is destined to rule the world.

After 1870, no longer France, but England, was the enemy. The Crown Prince, now the Emperor, said to his French tutor: 'When the pointed helmet (Germany) and the red breeches (France) march together, gare à Carthage'—woe to England, the trading State. Since then, to his expressed chagrin, he has vainly wooed France to his side; while the historians, his masters, and the German nation at large are unable to understand why France should not be content to live upon the reputation of its past. England, the robber and pirate, is the one enemy. 'With the English,' says Treitschke, 'love of money has crushed all feeling of honour, and all distinctions of just and unjust. They hide their poltroonery behind lofty phrases of unctuous theology.' Whereas Germany openly proclaims that might is right, and that is just which is to the interest of Germany. The English 'sacrifice all to profit,' while Germany is idealistic. The British Empire is the result of chance and trickery. While it was building, Germany was 'too busy with its neighbours'—too busy with philosophy, said Heine—to notice that 'England was grabbing the world.' Germany has entered late upon its construction of a world-empire:

'In the present division of the extra-European world, Germany has always had too small a share. It is now a question that concerns our existence as a great state whether we can become a power beyond the sea. Otherwise we have the hideous prospect of England and Russia parcelling out the world; and it is hard to say whether the Russian knout or the English money-bag is the more immoral and horrible.'

It may be necessary to crush France once more, and to thrust back the menace of Muscovitic barbarism, but with England it is merely a question of the strong nation wresting an ill-gained empire from a nation that is weak and effete. For Germany is convinced of English decadence; the colonies are loosely tied to the mother-country; there is a complete inability to effect a Customs Union within the empire; above all, England cares so little for empire that her sons refuse national service under arms, refuse that sacrifice which the sons of Germany so proudly make. In short, says Treitschke, 'a State like England, which does not exercise the might of arms, is no longer a State.' The task of conquering England is easy. For now, even more than when Didon wrote in 1883, 'no German is to be found who does not consider his nation invincible by the number and worth of its soldiers, the ability of its chiefs, the superiority of its organisation and of its armaments.' For England there is nothing but hatred and contempt. Why tax Germans for the building up of German colonies? It is finer and more popular policy to employ one's money upon the increase of armaments which, sooner or later, shall set their grasp upon the English colonies, already equipped and so much better situated.

After war, the State, while not ceasing to be biological and 'beyond morality,' condescends to the peaceful conquests of German Idealism. A subdued world is to participate in the benefits of German Culture. As Treitschke promises: 'The State, the Prussian State, when supreme, will recognise that physical might is only a means to guard and further the higher goods of humanity.' Only, one remembers how Ranke, after 1870, failed to discover the 'purifying action' which, he had hoped, would result from the war. 'All menaces ruin;

religion is undermined. . . . There is nothing left but industrialism and money.' And one remembers how Treitschke, in 1895, drawing towards his end, and regarded askance by the Emperor because of certain veiled criticisms, publicly deplored the fact that:

'Everything is becoming more barbarous in morals, politics, and life. . . . Much that one thought of as associated only with the Roman Empire of the Decline is in reality brought about, in our midst, by that intensive culture of large cities which, in turn, besets us . . . One would say that the crash of arms has caused to spring up a new race of Boeotians, and is about to stifle all intelligence of the arts and sciences.'

Quite apart from the manifestations of German Idealism in action, of which we now hear day by day, it is worth while for a moment to consider this 'Culture,' so vaunted and flaunted before us. Nations, and national cultures, are interdependent. Kant (with Scotch blood in his veins) is unthinkable without Locke, Berkeley, Hume; Fichte without Berkeley; Schelling and Hegel without Spinoza, the neo-Platonists of Alexandria, and Brahminism; Schopenhauer without Buddhism; Nietzsche without Hobbes and Gobineau. There is full acknowledgment how vast is the debt of German literature, in its onward stages, to Shakespeare and Rousseau; to Scott and Byron; to Dickens. For the last forty years, German literature, assimilating Ibsen, Tolstoy, Maeterlinck, Guy de Maupassant, Walt Whitman, Wilde and Shaw, is in no way superior to, or even equally important with, the literatures of neighbouring countries. Hauptmann, its most conspicuous figure, is Slav in his inspiration. For German art, fully worthy of the name, we still have to look backward to Dürer and Holbein. Even in music, the classical period, from Bach to Brahms, has seemingly reached its close; Wagner and Richard Strauss are of the Titanic and florid period that so often heralds the decay of an art; the most interesting works of the immediate present are Russian; while the savants are laborious, methodical, and cosmopolitan, as they have ever been.

Without being conquered, the world is fully able to appreciate German thought and art. But are these 'Culture'? Houston Stewart Chamberlain, son-in-law

of Wagner, and Viennese by adoption, fervent in the praise of things German, draws a distinction between culture and civilisation. 'There is a Chinese civilisation, but not a French or a German.' Nietzsche maintained that, 'as far as Germany extends, it stifles culture.' In a pamphlet, proceeding on the lines laid down by Chamberlain, a copy of which is said to have been presented by the Emperor to Mr Roosevelt—a pamphlet in which the Emperor himself is exhibited much as a Messiah of the German Spirit—it is pointed out that it is England, and not Germany, that possesses the most definite form of culture, expressed not only in its politics and artistic movement, but still more characteristically in its methods of education, its sports, stock-breeding, domestic architecture, furniture, in brief the framework of its daily life. Whereas German culture is still to be inaugurated, is a matter of the future. And meanwhile, the anonymous author urged, let the nation aid the Emperor in creating an invincible navy. It is only because of 'the mediocrity of Teutonic taste,' that Germany neglects its duty. The one thing needful is an enormous increase of armed force, and the things of the soul shall be added to this force.

Although the sceptical elements in Kant's philosophy have allowed a not very conspicuous body of neo-Kantians to reinvestigate the problem of consciousness, German transcendental Idealism, in the land of its birth, is relegated to past history, and has no present influence. Scots and English may still examine the sounder portions of Hegel's system; but in Germany nothing remains of it but the historical fatalism that sees in material success the triumph of reason and progress, and the teaching that the hour of the third human period has struck, the hour of Germany. The radical wing of the Hegelians ended the movement, by logically developing it. D. F. Strauss saw in Christianity a myth, a creation of that human spirit in which the divine becomes conscious of itself. And Feuerbach, taking the last step, assured the Germans that man is incapable of knowing anything higher and better than himself; that it is open to him to think as he may, and fashion ideals, if he must, according to his own devices.

Thus was the German house of the spirit left empty, swept, and garnished for new-comers. Crude Materialism, a reaction against the previous Idealism, for a time held sway. Then the pessimism of Schopenhauer seized upon, and pervaded, the national mind for long years. In the late 'eighties and early 'nineties, a loudly voiced demand for a new and optimistic literature resulted in a passing triumph of Naturalism, deeply pessimistic from the first. Finally, the influence of Nietzsche, neglected, depreciated, extolled by turns, much as Schopenhauer before him, became paramount, as wholly suited to the present phase of the national mind.

This new mental and moral malady of Germany bears many names, and no definite one—Subjective Idealism, Neo-Romanticism, Individualism. Nietzsche, weak, delicate, kindly, passed from the altruistic pessimism of Schopenhauer and Wagner to the recognition of biological laws and a voluntary optimism. He would be the very opposite of that to which his nature inclined him. He would preach a gospel of joyous and adventurous force. 'It is true that man shall fix for himself his own aim.' 'The true liberty of man, the true free-thought, is that which the Crusaders learnt in the East from the order of the Assassins: "Nothing is true, all is allowable."' Once Germany, with Prussia for its model, was docile and obedient; now it is exposed to the ravages of that Individualism which rejects all laws, except of its own making, which wrongly interprets the proposition of Spinoza that anticipates the doctrine of Nietzsche: 'Every one without exception may, by sovereign right of nature, do whatever he thinks will advance his own interest.' Once Germany was idealistic and humanitarian; now 'we range ourselves among the conquerors; we meditate upon the necessity of a new order of things, of a new slavery also—for every amelioration of the type "man" in force or in happiness requires as its condition a new kind of slavery.' Once Germany patiently prosecuted the search for objective truth; now it is discovered that there is no objective truth, and 'the supremacy of the scientific mandarin' is no more to be admired than 'the success of democracy.' Once Germany was romantic, 'constantly remembering the past,' said Heine, 'and constantly brooding over the future, but

never knowing how to grasp and understand the present'; now it is—or lately was—fervently romantic anew, straining towards the future and its promise that the 'superman' shall be born, the forceful German generation that shall hold the world in thrall.

It were long to follow in detail the ravages of this new Idealism, the moral perversities due to this neo-Romantic Individualism. 'God is dead,' proclaimed Nietzsche. And his disciples, aristocrats of the spirit, *Künstler*, claim all license to luxuriate amid 'the fulness of phenomena,' and to 'live themselves out.' Religion is gone; 'good' is that which is advantageous to self; and moral values are but degrees of strength and weakness. A vague theism, a 'kingdom of God' is indeed still preached. An Eucken can revive the moral and spiritual order of Fichte; but Fichte declared that the moral order itself is God. 'We need no other, and can conceive no other.' And Eucken but presents the conception of a living and personal God as a consolation for those in deepest sorrow. Destructive criticism has given place to constructive engines of material force. Textual and historical criticism has given place to the refutation and rejection of Christian morals. There is a constant demand from many quarters that a new religion shall come into being. Mysticism, intuition, the acknowledgment that instinct—the subconscious, or unconscious—is supreme, mainly go to the making of it. Nor is any hesitation felt as to whether the subconscious may not be the source of animal tendencies rather than of divine. The ape and tiger must not die. For Nietzsche says:

'Man requires that which is worst within him, to attain that which is best; his worst instincts are the best portion of his might. . . . Man must become better and worse.' 'Here is the new law, oh my brethren, which I promulgate unto you: Become hard. For creative spirits are hard. And you must find a supreme blessedness in impressing the mark of your hand, in inscribing your will, upon thousands and thousands, as on soft wax.'

We are warned by Burke not to bring an impeachment against a whole nation. The majority of Germans, no doubt, still hold by tradition. The simple and unsophisticated among them bid us remember that the

Emperor, their 'Peace-Emperor, is 'pious.' But he has learnt the lesson of Bismarck, and is a Hohenzollern. Frederick William the Fourth, equally romantic with William the Second, declared in 1848: 'I will never permit a scrap of paper (the constitution he was offering) to interpose between the Lord God on High and myself.' The grandfather of the Emperor, returning to Berlin after the victory of Sadowa, opened the Chambers by thanking Providence for the grace which had aided Prussia to drive away from its frontiers the invasion of the enemy—the self-defence being a carefully planned onslaught, that the hegemony of Germany might be wrested from Austria. 'Take away from me my convictions,' said Bismarck, 'and you have lost your Chancellor. Deprive me of my union with God, and tomorrow I will pack up, and grow oats at Varzin.' Such religion is mystic fetichism. He, and the House of Hohenzollern, instead of regarding themselves as instruments of destiny, of God, should have considered Bacon's statement that 'it were better to have no opinion of God at all than such an opinion as is unworthy of him'; they should have remembered that God is the God not of one, but of all nations, and the God of mercy. Whereas the Emperor's famous address to his army in China was but a paraphrase of Nietzsche's 'Verily, let my happiness, my liberty, rush onward like the hurricane. My enemies will believe that it is the Spirit of Evil raging above their heads.'

As his more recent speeches show, the Emperor has studied Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who is one of those who require a new religion, of German origin, and suited to the Germans. And there are other signs that the Emperor is ready to favour and foster such a religion, since it would be the proclamation of a Teutonic Jehovah, guiding his German elect to world-victory, with the House of Hohenzollern as warrior high-priests. Or in place of Jehovah, read Odin. Renan wrote to Strauss: 'Your German race always seems to believe in Walhalla.' Heine, before Renan, declared that 'Christianity—and that is its fairest merit—has to some degree softened the brutal Germanic delight in warfare, but could not destroy it; and when once that taming talisman, the Cross, is broken, then once more rattles out the wildness of the

old warrior, the mad Berserker rage.' Then 'Thor with his giant hammer springs forth at last, and breaks Gothic domes to atoms.' He prophesied, not indeed the present war, but democratic revolution in Germany; a return to Paganism, to the ancestral religion of blood and iron, when once it was divulged that transcendental Idealism was but a veiled and godless Pantheism.

There is one religion, at any rate, common to the intellectual few, and the simple many, in present Germany. The German race is the elect of destiny, say the one; of God, repeat the other. Neo-Romanticists, racial mystics, may dream with Gobineau of the conquering Aryan race, on whose shoulders rests the future of humanity. 'That which is not German is created to be enslaved.' H. S. Chamberlain somewhat modifies the theme. The French and the Slav are also Aryans; indeed any one, if so he wills, and fitly equips himself, can be an Aryan in the spirit, as it were by an elective affinity, and await the religion that is to be. But this is all too subtle for present Germany. The Aryan, the Superman, is the German. Pangermanism is the simple and sufficient creed.

As we have it in an endless series of pamphlets, Pangermanism is frowned on or favoured by the bureaucracy, according as occasion serves. These pamphlets, and the periodical organs of the various leagues, with their lists of approving professors and magnates, are equally monotonous and nauseating. One of these organs bears, or bore, as legend and ideal aim: 'From the Skaw to the Adriatic! From Boulogne to Narwa! From Besançon to the Black Sea!' But that is little, compared with the demands put forth in the pamphlets. Take a single one for a sample, as far back as 1895, the better to secure modesty and moderation, if possible. In it we learn that the great German Confederation of the future is a national State, which includes the majority of Germans living in Europe. Its inhabitants are not exclusively German, but it is ruled exclusively by Germans. Thus by allowing only Germans to exercise political rights and to acquire landed property, the German people will regain the feeling which they had in the Middle Ages—that of being a ruling race. They, however, gladly tolerate in their midst the presence of foreigners for the performance

of lower manual labour. And thus will grow up a people 'capable of transmitting to humanity in the ages to come all the treasures of German culture.' This, at least, is more moderate than Treitschke. 'The civilising of a barbarous nation'—and all are barbarous except Germans—is the offer of alternatives, 'either to merge itself in the dominant nation, or to suffer extermination.' But then, what blessings will result to the conquered, if they choose aright! Prussia, nobly exercising its hegemony over the 'United States of Europe,' will guard Europe against the competition of Asia, and of those other United States, whose commercial rivalry needs to be checked.

The Germans are naturally systematical. France subdued, and Russia, it was to be the turn of the robber and peddler State to which we unfortunately belong. And the 'peaceful penetration' of Brazil would in good time furnish a *casus belli* against the United States. 'Never have the Germans given up an idea without fighting it through in all its consequences,' Heine declared long ago. Only there is no sign of a Moltke or a Bismarck among present Germans. 'Never have the Germans been psychologists,' said Nietzsche. They have failed to isolate and attack each single Power in turn, as they have failed to grasp the true character and resources of the nations which they would forcibly sweep aside. H. S. Chamberlain cites Luther's dictum that the Germans are 'a blind people,' and Herder's epigram that 'the Germans think much, and—not at all.' 'The German is not a good critic,' he adds. 'Acuteness is not a national possession of the Teutons.' He regrets that, 'entering recently into the history of the world,' they have not yet had time 'to ask themselves how things are going on in their immediate neighbourhood.' Till they find such time, 'they will sport on the edge of the abyss, as if it were a flowery mead.' Such carelessness is part of their character; and he finds it almost praiseworthy, since the Greeks and the Romans before them rushed to their ruin, totally unconscious 'how the pressure of events was removing them from the face of the earth, lively to the last, mighty and proudly sure of triumph to the last.' This is lyrical, after the manner of his ethnical mysticism. But he has said it.

Upon illusion, follows disillusion. How soon will the Germans awake to the truth of things? They know the Greek tragedies, and yet forget the penalty that befalls the overweening. Trained in history, they are acquainted with the rise and fall of Spain, of Louis XIV, of Napoleon, aiming at universal empire; and yet will not derive the due lesson. Napoleon they hate, as the cause of their long suffering; and, admiring, would imitate. There are blots on the moral scutcheon of all the nations; but the Germans would deliberately and consciously accomplish, on the largest scale, that which other nations have done in the past, almost unconsciously, and as it were by hazard. Machiavellians, they reprobate the growth of the British Empire, and would fain use force to wrest it away for themselves. On one occasion, at least, Treitschke deviated into moral sanity. 'The future course of human history cannot consist in the creation of a single dominant power; the ideal we should aim at is an orderly society of peoples.' But Treitschke, no doubt, meant that this orderly society should lie under the hegemony, the heel, of Prussia. In what way then, and how soon, schooled by adversity, will they confess their error? 'If the State,' he says, 'can no longer accomplish what it wills, it falls into ruin and anarchy.' Will they, at less cost than this, repudiate that national egoism, that 'will to Power,' that instinct of domination which is the fruitful mother of illusion, confusion, and lies? Will they admit at length that there is a political as well as a commercial morality; that patriotism can too often be, as Dr Johnson said, 'the last refuge of a scoundrel'? 'The Germans must be freed from within, the attempt from without is useless.' Meanwhile the friends without—lovers of liberty two of them, and the third well in the way of becoming so, friends made foes against their will—prosecute this war in order to end war, it may be; to break down the evil spirit of militarism which has beset a great people overwrought by pride, arrogance, infatuation, and megalomania.

Art. 4.—THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY.

1. *Naval Administration*. By Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton. London: Bell, 1896.
2. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Eleventh Edition. Vol. i, Art. 'Admiralty Administration.' Cambridge: University Press, 1910.
3. *The Times Book of the Navy*. London: Published by 'The Times,' 1914.

PART I.—THE POSITION OF THE FIRST LORD.

As an organ of administration, the Board of Admiralty is quite unique; and, since its constitution, powers, functions and responsibilities appear to be very imperfectly understood, it is worth while to examine them in some detail. The Board consists of a certain number—the number has varied from time to time—of Commissioners. These Commissioners are officially styled 'The Lords Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral,' or more briefly 'My Lords Commissioners of The Admiralty'; and they derive their authority to act in that capacity from a Patent issued by the Crown as often as a new Board of Admiralty is constituted. The terms of this Patent have, with certain exceptions to be presently mentioned, remained substantially unchanged since it was first issued by Queen Anne in 1709, on the death of her husband Prince George of Denmark, who had held the office of Lord High Admiral. From that time forward the office has been in commission except for a few months in 1827, when it was revived by Canning in favour of the Duke of Clarence, afterwards King William IV.

But the Patent of Queen Anne was not even in those days the sole source of the authority exercised by the Board. Her Board was not the first Board of Admiralty. The office of Lord High Admiral had been in abeyance more than once in earlier days; and, in particular, it was in abeyance—its powers being exercised by a Board—when the Battle of Beachy Head was fought on June 30, 1690. Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington, was held to have misconducted himself in that battle, and it was proposed to bring him to a Court Martial.

But it was objected that the Board of Admiralty could not order a Court Martial involving issues of life and death, inasmuch as that power had by a Statute of Charles II been reserved for a Lord High Admiral alone. To get over this difficulty a declaratory Act was passed, reciting that all powers lawfully vested in the Lord High Admiral 'by Act of Parliament or otherwise' did and should appertain to the Commissioners 'to all intents and purposes as if the said Commissioners were Lord High Admiral of England.' That Statute is still in force, but it was not passed without strong opposition; and it is worthy of note that in a protest recorded by seventeen members of the House of Lords one of the objections taken was that

'the judges having unanimously declared that the law marine was nowhere particularised in their books, whereby the power and jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral may be ascertained, so that the practice is all that we know of it, we conceive it unprecedented and of dangerous consequence, that the jurisdiction exercised by the Lord High Admiral should, by a law, be declared to be in the Commissioners of the Admiralty, whereby an unknown and therefore unlimited power may be established in them.'

It is manifest from this that neither the Patent granted by Queen Anne nor any of its successors down to the present day could in any way restrict the powers vested in the Board by the Statute of William and Mary; and those powers were expressly declared by the judges in 1690 to be 'nowhere particularised in their books,' and by the protesting Peers to be 'unknown and therefore unlimited.' As a matter of fact the Patent was framed in exact accordance with the Statute :

'Granting to any three or more of you full power and authority to do everything which belongs to the office of Our High Admiral, as well in and touching those things which concern Our Navy and Shipping as in and touching those which concern the rights and jurisdictions of Our High Admiral.'

The only substantial change which has been made in the Patent since it was first issued by Queen Anne—there are other verbal and textual changes of no great moment—is that, wherever the words 'any three or

more of you' occur in the original Patent, they now read 'any two or more of you.' The authority for this change is to be found in an Act of Parliament, 2 Will. IV, cap. 40, passed to give effect to the many reforms initiated by Sir James Graham, who was First Lord of the Admiralty in the Ministry of Lord Grey.

But the Patent of Queen Anne, together with all its successors, did manifestly effect, or at least intend to effect, one very material change. By putting the office of Lord High Admiral in Commission it substituted the authority of a Board for that of a single individual. Whatever the Lord High Admiral could do by virtue of his 'unknown and therefore unlimited' powers—whether statutory, prescriptive, customary, or what not—that also the Board of Admiralty could do, acting as a Board through any three or more of its members, and since 1832 through any two or more of them. There are of course many acts of administration which do not require the authority of the Board for their execution, and probably those which do require such authority have never been more than a very small proportion of the whole; but such acts as require the authority of the Board can, according to the Patent, only be done by two or more of the Lords Commissioners sitting and acting as a Board. In other words, a literal interpretation of the Patent, and—so far as the plain sense of the words can be taken to indicate intention—the intention of the Patent, must be held to imply that the Lords Commissioners are co-equal and co-ordinate, the First Lord or President of the Board being invested with no more authority than any of his colleagues, except in so far as he speaks and acts with the authority and at the bidding of the Cabinet, which is of course, in modern times, supreme in the last resort. According to this view the First Lord is *primus inter pares* and nothing more. If the terms of the Patent are to be strictly observed, the First Lord can issue no executive orders except with the concurrence of his colleagues or at least of one of them. Such orders were in former times signed by three Lords at least and countersigned by the Secretary. Nowadays they are signed by the Secretary, endorsed 'By order of My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,' and stamped with the seal of the Board.

Such is in ordinary circumstances the procedure as prescribed by the Patent and sanctioned by long usage. But in extraordinary circumstances it is certain that the business of the Admiralty has not for many generations been conducted in strict accord with the terms of the Patent; and that the powers, prerogatives and initiative of the First Lord have never been confined within the limits which would circumscribe them if he were, as the Patent manifestly made him, no more than *primus inter pares* in relation to his colleagues. It is in truth not the Patent which really regulates the business of the Admiralty, but a body of usage, more or less flexible and variable in character, and never reduced to precise definition in writing, which has come down from time immemorial. According to this ancient usage there has always been inherent in the First Lord an elastic power which enables him to undertake any duties which the public welfare may require. In other words, although in all ordinary circumstances the First Lord acts only in concert and after consultation with the Board, yet in extraordinary circumstances of grave emergency the First Lord is supreme and may concentrate in his sole person all the powers of the Board, which powers are, in the words of the Peers' protest of 1690, 'unknown and therefore unlimited.'

This was clearly established once for all by the evidence given before a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1861. Sir James Graham, who had been First Lord from 1830 to 1834 and again, during the Crimean War, from 1853 to 1855, said in evidence before this Committee :

'The more I have investigated the matter, the more I am satisfied that, like the common law in aid of the statute law, the power exercised by the Board of Admiralty and the different members of it rests more upon usage than upon the Patents, uninterrupted usage from a very early period.'

Asked if he would recommend any change in the Board of Admiralty, Sir James Graham replied :

'If the supremacy of the First Lord be admitted and be not contradicted, I think it is right now. If, in consequence of all these inquiries and commissions, the strict terms of the patent of equality be insisted upon and the supreme power of the First Lord be shaken or negatived, I think the system

is brought to an end and must be changed. On the other hand, if the supreme power of the First Lord, as it has been exercised for centuries, be maintained inviolate, I think it can work well as it is.'

In another answer Sir James Graham said, 'I carry it so high as this, that the First Lord must be supreme; and, being supreme, all are subordinate and co-ordinate under him.' The same experienced Minister had previously said in evidence given before a Committee on the Dockyards, 'The Admiralty can only work by the First Lord exercising power to such an extent as really to render the Board subservient to his will.'

Sir Charles Wood, afterwards Lord Halifax, who succeeded Sir James Graham as First Lord in 1855 and held that office until 1858, having previously served as Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty from 1835 to 1839, frankly avowed that he had never dreamt of reading the Patent:

'I found the practice established,' he said, 'when I was Secretary, and I have acted upon it since, without ever, I must fairly say, looking at the Patent. I should very much doubt whether any officer, First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of the Admiralty, or anybody else ever read the Patent by which he was appointed. . . . I have been guided entirely by the prescriptive usage, which is a sort of tradition in every office.'

Asked whether he concurred in the opinion quoted above as given by Sir James Graham before the Dockyard Committee, Sir Charles Wood first replied that such a case 'ought never to arise with a proper administration of the Admiralty by any First Lord,' and added that he had never contemplated any such occurrence. But on being further pressed he said, 'In extreme cases extreme remedies must be applied; and, if the Junior Lords oppose the opinion of the First Lord upon serious matters, the Board must be changed.' In his evidence before the same Committee of 1861 Sir John Pakington, who had been First Lord of the Admiralty from 1858 to 1859, gave a detailed account of two instances, in one of which he had overruled his professional colleagues—not, however, without the approval of the Cabinet and the sanction of the Queen—while in the other he had intended

to do so had he not quitted office before the matter came to maturity. In the former case, apparently in order to conform with the letter of the Patent, he instructed his secretary to obtain the signature of some one other Lord to the Minute he had prepared ; but so completely did he regard this as a mere matter of form that he rather ostentatiously declared that he never knew and was careful not to inquire how or from whom the required signature was obtained.

The Duke of Somerset was First Lord of the Admiralty at the time when the Committee of 1861 was sitting, having held that office from 1859 to 1866. He expressed the opinion that 'the Patent created a governing body that did not govern,' and that 'usage is the authority on which the power of the First Lord rests.'

'I consider,' he said, 'that the First Lord often exercised that power absolutely in regard to the most important questions. The First Lords have written abroad to Admirals of Fleets and told them to take such and such a course, in private letters of their own ; and that must be if you are to have rapid orders given, and very often, it may be, secret orders.'

This testimony is corroborated by that of Sir John Briggs (who was for many years Reader to the Board of Admiralty, and in that capacity fully conversant with all its proceedings) given before another Committee which sat ten years later in 1871. Sir John Briggs was asked, 'Were not orders constantly sent to the Fleet, sometimes by the First Lord, sometimes by the First Sea Lord, upon his single signature, in consequence of a communication from the Foreign Office ?' The reply was 'Constantly.'

The cumulative evidence here adduced seems clearly to show that, so far back as 1861, the supremacy of the First Lord was, in the judgment of four experienced First Lords of the Admiralty, essential to the proper working of the Admiralty and sanctioned by immemorial usage and prescription, notwithstanding the letter of the Patent, which knows nothing of supremacy and plainly points to equality. But here the analogy of the Treasury Patent comes in to show how completely usage and prescription may supersede the letter of a formal instrument. The 'Lords Commissioners of the Treasury' are

appointed by a Patent—which seems to date from the fusion of the Exchequers of Great Britain and Ireland—to execute the office of Lord High Treasurer. The Patent grants to any two or more of the Commissioners named in it the power to do anything that could formerly be done by the separate Commissioners for Great Britain and Ireland. Yet the Board of Treasury now never meets—it has held no meetings since 1856—and all its powers are exercised on occasion either by the First Lord of the Treasury or by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in most cases by the latter. The powers of the Board of Admiralty have undergone no such complete decay as this, nor can any one doubt that it would be disastrous if they had. But it would seem that they have long, perhaps always, been exercised subject in the last resort to the unfettered supremacy of the First Lord. It is true that Sir Charles Wood said, ‘I can hardly conceive a case in which the First Lord of the Admiralty would differ from the whole of his professional advisers on any professional subject’; but he acknowledged, as we have seen, that, if such an extreme case ever did arise, ‘the Board must be changed,’ in other words, the opinion of the First Lord must prevail. It is also true that when Sir John Pakington overruled his professional colleagues he was careful to obtain the approval of the Cabinet and the sanction of the Queen for what he proposed to do.

Perhaps in these two cases we may discern the true limits by which the supremacy of the First Lord is circumscribed. On the one hand the First Lord, equally with each and all of his colleagues, is subject as a matter of course to the superior authority of the Cabinet. On the other hand, his relations to his colleagues on the Board are just as much founded on usage and prescription as his own supremacy is; and it is manifest that the Board could not work at all unless those relations were marked by good will, good feeling, good sense and a spirit of loyal co-operation. If, then, in any grave emergency the First Lord should deem it his duty to act without consulting his colleagues or in opposition to their advice, and if, after so asserting his supremacy, his action has neither been disallowed by the Cabinet nor followed by the resignation or dismissal of his colleagues

it must be assumed, until the contrary is proved, that his supremacy has not been abused. Even so questions may be raised as to the wisdom, expediency, or propriety of his action ; but none can be raised as to his prerogative authority, long established by usage, prescription, and precedent.

It has often been represented that this supremacy of the First Lord was first established by an Order in Council passed in 1869, whereby the First Lord was represented as 'responsible to your Majesty and to Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty'; while the other members of the Board were enjoined to 'act as his assistants in the transaction of the duties,' each of them being responsible to the First Lord for the administration of such business as was assigned to them by the Order in Council. This Order was passed at the instance of Mr Childers, who became First Lord in 1868 and soon made it clear that he entertained very advanced views as to the prerogatives attached to his office. By enjoining the members of the Board to act as the First Lord's 'assistants,' it unquestionably had the effect, as was doubtless intended, of gravely and very injuriously impairing the authority and influence of the Board ; and this effect was shown in the fact that, whereas in 1866 no fewer than 249 Board meetings were held, in 1870, under Mr Childers' *régime*, only 33 meetings were held. Most of these lasted only a very few minutes, and none lasted so long as half an hour, even when the Estimates for the year were under consideration. In other words, Mr Childers practically abolished the Board and reduced its meetings to a mere empty formality.

This system was found to work exceedingly ill ; and it did not long survive the retirement of Mr Childers from office. He ceased to be First Lord in 1871, and was succeeded by Mr (afterwards Lord) Goschen. In 1872 a new Order in Council was passed, whereby the Order of 1869 was rescinded, and the members of the Board were no longer represented as acting merely as the 'assistants' of the First Lord. But, like its predecessor, this new Order recognised the First Lord as 'responsible to Your Majesty and Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty,' and made the other Lords responsible to the First Lord for so much of the business of the department

as might from time to time be assigned to them. In subsequent Orders in Council of various dates—of which one of the most important was that of Aug. 10, 1904—this responsibility and this allocation of business were defined in substantially the same phraseology; and it is now a well-established principle of Admiralty administration that the First Lord is responsible to the Crown and Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty, while his colleagues are responsible to him for such business as he may from time to time assign to them. But it is quite a mistake to suppose that the supremacy of the First Lord was first established by the rather ill-starred Order in Council of 1869. It was first textually formulated by that instrument, but it had been established long before, in fact from time immemorial. On this point there would seem to be no appeal from the authoritative deliverance of the Hartington Commission, which reported in 1890. After defining the effect of the Order in Council of 1872 in the sense above indicated, the Report of that Commission proceeds:

‘It is clearly shown, however, by the evidence given by the Civil and Naval Lords before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1861, that the administration of the Admiralty rested on the same basis previous to the issue of the Order in Council above referred to. The Order in Council of the 14th of January, 1869, in which the sole responsibility of the First Lord for the administration of the Navy was first officially laid down, merely, therefore, gave formal sanction to what had been the actual practice for many previous years.’

Finally the whole matter may be summed up in the weighty words used by the late Sir William Anson in his classical work on ‘The Law and Custom of the Constitution’ (Vol. II, Sect. v, p. 192):

‘The Lords Commissioners are nominally upon an equality. The Patent makes no distinction in their respective positions; the political chief of the Admiralty is only the Lord whose name stands first in the Commission. But in fact the First Lord is supreme for two reasons. The First Lord has for a very long time been a member of the Cabinet. He therefore speaks to his colleagues with the force of the Cabinet behind him. If the other Lords differ from him at the Board, he

can say that, unless his wishes are carried out, he will not remain a member of the Board. If, as would be probable, the rest of the Cabinet supported the First Lord against his colleagues, the King would be advised to issue fresh Letters Patent, constituting a new Commission of the Admiralty, in which other names would be substituted for those of the dissentient members of the Board.

'Again successive Orders in Council have made the First Lord responsible to the King, and to Parliament, for all the business of the Admiralty, and have, in addition, made the other members of the Board responsible to the First Lord for the business assigned to them.'

The foregoing discussion has been deliberately conducted on purely academic lines. No attempt has been made to discuss or even to glance at any recent action, whether legitimate or not, attributed to the present First Lord. The facts are not accurately known; and, even if they were, the issues raised by them would be purely personal issues, or, at most, issues of policy and expediency. On such issues, if the facts were known, there might be much to be said, possibly on both sides.

In the concluding part of this article, which will appear in the second half of this number of the 'Quarterly Review,' the 'Distribution of Business' in the Board of Admiralty will be discussed. It is a subject which was much debated a few years ago and it still appears to be imperfectly understood in some quarters. It will be treated separately because it concerns not so much the position and functions of the First Lord as those of the First Sea Lord.

JAMES R. THURSFIELD.

Art. 5.—A REVOLT OF ISLAM?

Correspondence respecting events leading to the rupture of relations with Turkey. [Cd. 7628.] London: Wyman, 1914.

TURKEY's dramatic—or melodramatic—entry upon the stage of the European conflict has, as was natural, given rise to some apprehension and many speculations. In the following pages I shall attempt, not a forecast which events might falsify, but an estimate of Turkey's qualifications for the rôle she has undertaken to play; trusting that such an estimate, based upon the past and the present, affords a reasonable index to the probabilities of the future.

The Ottoman Empire has been assigned, by those who control its destinies at this hour, two tasks, which, though closely connected, can best be understood if treated separately. The first is to create a diversion in favour of Germany by a direct attack on two of Germany's enemies, Russia and Great Britain. The Caucasus and Egypt are the fields upon which the Sultan's forces are expected to prove their capacity for making themselves disagreeable to our allies and ourselves. The task is of a purely military nature, and must be judged by a purely military standard. No one who has had the opportunity of studying the Turkish soldier on active service will deny his many valuable qualities—his gallant disdain of death in battle, his dogged tenacity of purpose, his stoical patience under hardships and privations. In all these respects he is a match for any troops he may have to meet. But war, especially war under modern conditions, is not so much a matter of martial virtue, as of organisation; and organisation implies the possession of mental abilities and material resources, in which the Ottoman leaders are conspicuously poor. This poverty has been demonstrated twice within the last few years; first in Tripoli, and then in the Balkan Peninsula. On both occasions lack of brains and money on the part of the commanders nullified all the efforts of their troops. It would be unreasonable to suppose that an Empire which failed so ignominiously in a struggle with States like Bulgaria,

Servia, and Greece, can achieve any very brilliant success when pitted against Russia and Great Britain. It is true that, in the present emergency, the Kaiser is endeavouring to make good his ally's intellectual and financial deficiencies; Prussian officers have been sent to direct the operations of the Ottoman army and navy, and Prussian gold to diminish the emptiness of the Ottoman Treasury. But the supply of both commodities, limited as it is by the Kaiser's nearer necessities, is bound to fall far short of the demand. The opportune addition of two valuable units to the Turkish fleet by the 'sale' of the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau' is also an important factor which it would be unwise to ignore. But the importance of this asset, if it cannot be overlooked, can be overrated. The fighting capacity of those vessels, however great it may be, is inexorably limited to the range of their guns, and is further circumscribed by the coal-supply. Naval guns can do little more than bombard coasts, and without an adequate supply of steam-power the best ships cannot keep up their speed. What the Ottoman fleet has already done in the Black Sea marks the extent of its value.

If we turn to the Turkish army, there also we have in its actual performance a measure of its promise. On the Russian frontier the Tsar's troops have already established an ascendancy which, when his strategists consider the moment suitable, will develop into an advance. Temporary checks there may be, and the Turks may well be able to boast of local 'victories'; but repeated disaster in the past has taught them that ultimately a conflict with their mighty neighbour can end in one way only. Enver Pasha may think otherwise; but the cumulative effect of the Turco-Russian wars from the early 18th century to the latter years of the 19th has been to instil into the ordinary Turk's heart a fatalistic faith in Muscovite invincibility. The same moral may be drawn from the operations already witnessed on the Egyptian frontier. Bands of Bedouin free-lances, richer in valour than in discipline or equipment, may raid, and even score some successes; but these sporadic performances by guerrilla hordes cannot have any decisive influence over the war. As to the regular Turkish forces, which alone might endanger our

hold on Egypt, it must be borne in mind that, besides the deficiencies enumerated, they labour under geographical difficulties which would prove formidable even to a much better organised army. Before they reach Egypt those forces will have to traverse a waterless desert. I have seen Bedouins accomplishing this feat with wonderful ease. After several weeks' march on bare feet across the burning sands of the Sahara, they would stride into camp, with a handful of dates for food, and a branch of scrub for fuel—no provision was made for water, the few wells along the route and the goodwill of God being trusted to slake their thirst. But the Ottoman soldier is not a Bedouin. The stationary life of centuries has robbed him of the nomad's marvellous endurance and frugality. His needs may be fewer than those of a European soldier, but they are numerous enough to require an efficient commissariat. It is precisely in the matter of commissariat that the Sultan's armies show at their worst; and it may be doubted whether the Kaiser can do much to cure this evil.

The second task allotted to Turkey, though indirect, deserves much more serious consideration. The Sultan's participation in the war against Russia, France and Great Britain is expected to stir up the Mohammedan subjects of the three Powers into rebellion. Nothing less is anticipated than a Pan-Islamic upheaval, stretching from the shores of the Atlantic to the slopes of the Himalayas—a general Revolt of Islam. The Mohammedan inhabitants of Turkestan, Afghanistan, Hindustan, Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, Morocco will rise in their millions, at the call of the Caliph, and hurl themselves upon the Christian invaders of Asia and North Africa; and the Commander of the Faithful, from his palace in Stambul, will behold the vast ocean of the Moslem world swell at his bidding and overwhelm the Unbelievers under its waves. To what extent the Kaiser pins his faith to such a cataclysm, we have no means of knowing. But many of his Turkish allies are firmly convinced that this will be one of the results of their move. Many Turks, both Young and Old, have for years past been amusing themselves with the vision of a Pan-Islamic Empire under their suzerainty; and secret missionaries have

periodically been sent forth from Stambul to all the cardinal points of the Moslem world to preach this gospel and to prepare the soil for a general Jihad. Under Abdul Hamid these efforts partook of the spasmodic and desultory character that pervaded all his activities, and were tempered by the timidity, or the appreciation of realities, that always paralysed his policy. But the more enterprising and less experienced spirits which have since the Revolution steered, or failed to steer, the ship of the Ottoman Empire have displayed in this direction also their characteristic energy, ambition, and utter inability to distinguish between solid facts and the iridescent fancies of a feverish dream.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the stuff this dream is made of is wholly imaginary. The idea of a Revolt of Islam is not an offspring of the uncreative Turkish mind. The Turk has only tried to nourish a plant which originally sprang from the fertile soil of Arab idealism and still derives its sustenance from Arab faith. I have had occasion to test the vitality of the Pan-Islamic tree, to see its flowers and to speculate upon its possible fruits, during the Tripolitan war. The Arab tribesmen who came out of the Sahara to fight the Italians came full of a fine religious fervour. In fighting the invaders of Tripoli they believed they were fighting the enemies of Allah. To them the campaign was not a merely local and isolated enterprise, but an incident in a general crusade of the Faithful—one act in a great drama destined to find its climax in a liberation of the whole of North Africa from the hands of the Infidel. They gave expression to this conviction by calling the expedition a 'Holy War' and themselves 'Holy Warriors'; and they proved its sincerity by their wonderful readiness to die in witness thereof. Nor was there any dearth of apostles eager to fan their zeal and keep the hope of ultimate triumph burning.

I had the good fortune to gain the friendship of one of these enthusiastic preachers—a very remarkable personality of the Peter-the-Hermit type. He had devoted his life to going to and fro in the earth and walking up and down in it, scattering the promise of redemption in all Moslem hearts wherever they might be found. He had already been twice across the Sahara

from Morocco to Egypt. He had been in the Caucasus, in Afghanistan, in India. When I met him in the Turco-Arab camp outside Tripoli he had just arrived on foot from Alexandria, having covered the distance in ninety-four days, which included stoppages at all the Turco-Arab camps on the way. At each place he halted for a few days, not to rest, but to preach and fight. He carried across his back an Italian rifle, at his side an Arab scimitar, and on his shoulder a flag with a significant device—a green globe representing Africa, and some red patches over it representing the Moslem provinces under Infidel occupation. Alongside this blazon was embroidered the text, 'Nasrun min Allah wa fethun karib' ('Victory (is) from God, and the conquest near').

I could not have found a more competent exponent of the Pan-Islamic dream, or a more clear-sighted critic of its strength and its weakness. All his statements were enlightening, and one of his most emphatic prophecies (he laid claim to prevision of the future) has already found a startlingly accurate fulfilment. He described the nations of Europe as so many brigands who said, 'Islam is asleep; let us go in and take all we can.'

'But,' he added, 'wait and see. The day of retribution is at hand. In a few years, very few years—I will give it to you in writing, if you like—there will be a great European war, Italy fighting Austria, Germany fighting France, England fighting Germany. Then is our time for a general sweep.'*

He claimed to be the spokesman of millions of Mohammedans who thought as he thought, and felt as he felt. That the claim was well founded I ascertained from numerous conversations I had with Arabs of all sorts and conditions. But, on the other hand, I also ascertained both in Egypt and in Tunis that the distance which separates aspiration from action is as wide in Islam as it is in Christendom. Every Moslem country evinced a profound sympathy with the Tripolitan struggle for freedom; and that sentiment found practical

* These were his exact words, uttered at the beginning of 1912. See 'The Holy War in Tripoli,' by G. F. Abbott, p. 283.

expression in a variety of ways. But it is most instructive to note that it did not express itself in any attempt at rebellion against Infidel rule. Neither we in India and Egypt, nor the French in Tunis and Algeria, suffered from the agitation which the Italians created in Tripoli; the seismic disturbance, contrary to anticipation, produced no sympathetic shock outside the Tripolitan area. Why?

There are two principal reasons—one positive and the other negative. The positive reason is the satisfaction of all those Moslem populations with Christian rule—a satisfaction based upon a shrewd appreciation of the practical benefits of that rule, and one that can co-exist with much sentimental discontent, without being seriously affected by it. Observers who read the nationalist newspapers of Young Tunis, Young Egypt, and Young India are often misled into the belief that the able editors of those journals are ripe for sedition. No graver error, or one betraying a more fatal ignorance of human nature, could well be made. Even if the writers of those articles mean what they say (which is far from being always the case, though the writers themselves may think it is), few of their readers are impressed otherwise than in a febrile way by them. No true Mohammedan, if he were offered the choice between the two ideals, would choose Infidel rule. But we are not living in an ideal world. The average African and Asiatic has this fundamental quality in common with the average European—he knows on which side his bread is buttered. They have never experienced under Moslem domination the personal freedom, the equality of justice, the security of life and property, the protection against disease and famine, the commercial prosperity, which they experience now under the British and French flags; and they know it. One of the main arguments I heard advanced against the Italians by the leaders of the Arab resistance in Tripoli was not the religion of the invaders, but their poverty and their inability to do much more for the Arabs than their Turkish rulers had done for them. I am not concerned here to judge the soundness of the argument, but only to state it, as being significant. And its significance was enhanced by the fact that the men who put it forward would then go on to contrast these

shortcomings of the Italians with the wealth and administrative competence of the English and the French on either side of Tripoli. Indeed, a number of Tripolitans had appealed to France to take them under her flag.

This appreciation of material advantages, though keenest among Arabs of culture and substance, is just as noticeable among the most ignorant and indigent. One instance will suffice. On the Tripoli-Tunis frontier there is a rain-water cistern built by the French. On my return from the desert, I pointed it out to my camel-driver, who was not aware of its existence. After quaffing some of the clear liquid—so different from the mud he was used to on the other side of the border—and making certain noises of satisfaction with his throat and lips, he said, ‘Praise be to Allah, and to the French Government. Ah, sir. The French can think; they are not like us or the Turks!’ In addition to these practical advantages which it shares with ours, I found the French administration popular for a quality which ours lacks. The French appeared to me to have found their way to the Arab’s heart, as well as to his head. I have found in Tunis a *camaraderie* between alien rulers and native subjects which, after some experience of Anglo-India and Anglo-Egypt, struck me as a most exhilarating novelty.

This sound estimation of the beneficent and liberal nature of French and British rule has already, since the outbreak of the war, manifested itself in the loyal and cordial support which both Powers have received from their Moslem subjects. Fifty thousand African Arabs are at this moment fighting for France, and fighting as cheerfully as any other citizens of the Republic. We have to acknowledge with gratitude, and a perfectly legitimate self-gratulation, the devotion of British Moslems from one end of the Empire to the other. Such men of light and leading in Islam as the Agha Khan and the Nizam of Hyderabad have given magnificent tokens of the spirit which animates them and their followers. All the Mohammedan communities in India have hastened to renew to the Viceroy their expressions of hearty adherence to our cause, and to add to them expressions of unqualified disgust at Turkey’s action. Egypt has

done nothing to justify the hopes based upon her by the Sultan and his advisers, while from farther south the Mohammedans of Sierra Leone, through their religious ministers (imams), send spontaneous messages of loyalty, in which we are told that they are incessantly praying that Allah may grant victory to England. They, being honest folk unversed in the frothy sophisms with which our journalists confuse our and their own minds, candidly explain, as the Agha Khan has also done, that the ground of their attachment to the British throne is not sentimental but practical. 'Some of us,' they say, 'have had the privilege of travelling to foreign parts, and from our experience of the treatment received by natives at the hands of their foreign rulers, especially the Germans—whose destruction may God expedite—we cannot but come to the above conclusion.'

The negative reason why Moslems in general have not responded to the Caliph's call is an absence of cohesion which renders any common movement impossible in the Mohammedan world. Islam still is, to a very large extent, where Christendom was in the Middle Ages. It possesses that unity of creed which rendered the Crusades possible. But this religious unity is accompanied neither by political coherence nor by community of culture. It is a far cry from the educated graduate of Oxford or Paris to the Bedouin of the Sahara. The Turkish Sultan, by virtue of his position as Caliph, and as the head of the greatest Moslem State still free, might have supplied a rallying-point to the scattered forces of Islam. But he has always failed to do so. The causes of that failure are even more instructive than the fact itself.

First comes a difference of temperament which marks off the Turk from the Arab as sharply as the extreme type of Teuton is marked off from the extreme type of Latin. There can be, and there is, no sympathy between the stolid, taciturn, slow-moving Turk and the impulsive, talkative, nimble Arab. The depth of the mental and moral chasm that separates the two races becomes apparent whenever and wherever representatives of each are brought into physical proximity, as was the case in the Tripoli camp. There I had a daily demonstration of its existence and of the mutual distrust and dislike

that resulted therefrom. The Turks despised the Arabs for their excitability, and were despised by them for their own stupidity, want of dash and initiative, and general incompetence—an incompetence particularly galling when accompanied by arrogance. The antipathy was shared by every Arab I came across, but it found most eloquent utterance among those Arabs who had come under European influence and were able to contrast the sloth they saw in the Turkish headquarters with the conditions which prevailed in Tunis under the French. Tunisian male nurses could find no words with which to express their disgust at the chaos of the Turkish hospitals; and a Tunisian who had served for some years in the French army stood aghast at the sight of the ill-clad, ill-fed, slovenly, uncared-for Ottoman troops.

Equally instructive was the Turk's indifference to, or rather unconsciousness of, the contempt he inspired. Nothing was done to bridge over by tact the chasm fixed by nature. The result was perpetual animosity, which at times developed into dangerous friction. All this was only a fresh illustration of the Turk's familiar want of imaginative comprehension—the want which has always caused him to fail as a leader of alien races. What was new was a feature imported into the picture since the Revolution. The Old Turk, whatever his deficiencies might be, was at least a True Believer; his piety made up, in a measure, for his stupidity. The Young Turk had accentuated, in the eyes of his Arab comrades, the inherited arrogance and unintelligence, by adding to it a religious indifference which in some cases amounted to rank infidelity. During the four months I spent among them, I saw only three Turks (all three men over fifty) pray; and I heard an Arab sheikh give vent to a horrified suspicion that there were among us Turkish officers who denied the existence of God. There is reason to believe that this attitude is not confined to the Arabs of North Africa—it is general among all the Arab populations, from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Even the dreamers who dream of a Day of Redemption and Retribution are shrewd enough to see that the Turk is not the man appointed for the task. The prophet whom I have already quoted summed up this feeling to me in these weighty words:

'There are many Pashas in Stambul, but not a single wise man among them. One pursues an English, another a German, a third a French policy—and they all take bribes. No; that is not the sort of people to do the great work. We want men with a Moslem policy—men who have faith in Allah. And these men are to be found in the Sahara, not in Stambul.'

The Tripolitan campaign, far from drawing the Arab closer to the Turk, had the opposite effect. The Turks had there a chance of earning Arab loyalty. Through the causes mentioned, they missed it. One result of their failure was the collapse of Arab resistance to the Italians, the disintegration of the forces which a common hope had brought together, and a bitter disillusion. Another result, equally important with reference to the present situation, was a deepening of the sense of the Turk's unworthiness and weakness. The Tripolitan fiasco was an object-lesson which has sunk deep into the heart of the Moslem world. The Holy Warriors carried away from the Ottoman headquarters an ineffaceable impression of Ottoman incompetence and infidelity. Nor is this impression likely to be modified by the knowledge that the Turkish armies at the present hour are controlled by Christian generals, and that the summons to the Faithful which has gone forth from Stambul was dictated by a commander whose name is Wilhelm. Enver Pasha and his friends realise this as keenly as they fail to realise other important facts. Hence the clumsy attempt to persuade the Arabs of Syria that the Kaiser has embraced the faith of the Prophet—an attempt which affords but another proof of the Turk's ludicrous under-estimation of Arab intelligence. In this connexion I may cite a little incident that occurred in Tripoli. We had there four young German officers who had come out to help the cause, and incidentally, to promote German prestige in the Moslem world. In the very first engagement in which one of these gentlemen participated he was barely saved from death at the hands of an Arab warrior, who, suddenly discovering that the officer in a Turkish headgear was an infidel in disguise, turned his rifle upon him.

I have dwelt on this point at some length, because it appears to be vital in a consideration of the effects of

Turkey's participation in the struggle. Another point equally relevant to this inquiry is the fact that the Sultan's title to the Caliphate has never been accepted without question by the Arabs, and that his claim to act as the guardian of the Holy Places of Islam has often been disputed by force of arms, as well as of argument, by rival claimants in Arabia. Not very long ago the region of Mecca and Medina (Hejaz) was the theatre of another of these chronic efforts to rid it of Turkish domination. To understand Arab sentiment on the subject it is sufficient to bear in mind that the Ottoman Padishah's claim to the position of the Prophet's 'Successor' (Khalif) is based entirely upon conquest, that it derives no sanction from any Power higher than the power of the sword, and that it is of comparatively recent origin. Until 1517 the Caliphate was in the hands of the ancient Abbasid House, which held it by right of inheritance—a purely spiritual trust entirely divorced from temporal authority. That year the Sultan Selim the Grim wrested from the Mamluks Egypt, Syria, and the Mecca and Medina districts of Arabia, and compelled the representative of the Abbasids, who lived at Cairo, to make over to him the title of Caliph, and to surrender the sacred heirlooms which had been handed down in his family for centuries. From this it will become obvious on how precarious a foundation rests Turkey's pretension to act as arbiter of the destinies of the Moslem world. The position could only be maintained so long as it could be defended by the same weapon by which it was conquered. Turkey, by her entry on the battlefield, is now imperilling, together with her political existence, her spiritual leadership. It should be our endeavour to profit by her action, and to turn her mental aberration not only to our own strategic advantage but to the permanent benefit of Islam. I venture to urge that the present situation should be clearly visualised in all its bearings at once, and that no time should be lost in deriving all the good that can be derived from it. The situation is favourable in itself; but it is only by vigorous effort that it can be made fruitful.

The Prime Minister, speaking at the Guildhall Banquet the other night, was at pains to assert that whatever

doom might overtake the Ottoman Empire, the Holy Places of Islam would be carefully protected from foreign interference. The statement was timely, and the action which it indicated was in the right direction. But if our Government's plans do not go as yet beyond the negative stage of non-interference with the Hejaz, it is high time that they should do so. We need a positive policy with regard to the Near East; we have needed such a policy for too many years. The moment has come to exchange a hand-to-mouth diplomacy for constructive statesmanship. The materials for such construction are ready to hand. In the Arab-speaking world we have millions of True Believers who resent the Turk's usurpation of the Caliphate, and more than one individual who, adequately supported, could replace him. In addition we have the same millions ready, if properly assisted, to shake off the Turkish yoke—a yoke which, with the spread of European education in Syria and Egypt, they have learnt to despise more even than they hated it formerly. A European Power which would attempt to substitute Christian for Ottoman domination over those populations would be simply playing into the Kaiser's hands. But a Power which would come forth with a programme of Arab independence, backed by the material means for carrying it out, would find its hands strengthened by an enormous accretion of influence throughout the world of Islam. The severance of the connexion between Cyprus and Turkey, and the deliverance of the Cypriots from the millstone of the tribute they hitherto paid the Porte, is one of the good fruits which the Turkish move has already yielded to the British Empire. But it is quite an insignificant boon compared with the benefits, strategic, political, and moral, which the British Empire could reap by utilising that move for the purpose of creating a free Arabia, and thus giving to the call to arms issued from Constantinople a practical interpretation calculated to confound its authors.

G. F. ABBOTT.

Art. 6.—THE ATTITUDE OF ITALY.

PRINCE VON BÜLOW, in a book* which appeared only a few months before the war began, described the Triple Alliance as a conservative league, instituted with the object of preserving the *status quo* against the 'revolutionary' tendencies characteristic of the foreign policy pursued by most of the other states of Europe. These 'revolutionary' tendencies resolve themselves into two maxims of foreign policy: first, that so far as possible a state should be co-extensive with a nation; secondly, that where this is impossible owing to the incapacity of any nation to govern itself, it should not be divided between two or more dominant States. Ever since the wars of Napoleon spread the doctrines of the Revolution throughout the Continent, all those states on the one hand which accepted the principles of popular government, and on the other hand all those nations which were not co-extensive with a sovereign state, have aspired to put these maxims into practice. The history of the wars of the 19th century is very largely the history of the efforts to achieve this purpose. The cause of nationality has marched from triumph to triumph; and, if Europe is not yet completely reconstructed on national lines, it is due less to the strength of the opposing forces than to the mutual jealousies and conflicting claims of those who share the same ideal, and to the general fear of provoking a conflagration the economic damage of which would be out of proportion to any political advantages obtainable.

In the first part of the 19th century Turkey and Austria were the only two European states definitely opposed to the ideal of Nationalism; but Germany, as soon as she had achieved her own national unity and independence, denied the maxims cited above as universally applicable, as she refused to concede the principle of popular government. Pan-Germanism is more imperial than national in aim; and by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine Germany definitely committed herself to the conservative policy of upholding the *status quo* against the national aspirations of France. The defensive

* 'Imperial Germany,' by Prince Bernhard von Bülow.

alliance made between Germany and Austria in 1879 arose out of the need of mutual assistance against their common and numerous foes. The adherence of Italy to the alliance three years later has never ceased to be criticised both at home and abroad; for Italy is nationalist and democratic *nata e sputata*; her foreign policy should naturally be more 'revolutionary' than that of almost any other European state. But Italy had need, above all else, of a long peace in order to be able to consolidate her national unity and to achieve the social regeneration of her people. This, among a number of contributing causes, among which were a mistrust and jealousy of France, was the prime cause of Italy allying herself with the central Empires; and, as von Bülow remarks, 'to desire peace is, in the language of international politics, to desire the *status quo*.'

In the last quarter of a century the growth of German power gave rise to an inflated ambition to become the most powerful state and empire in the world; at the same time, as regards Austria, the ever-increasing pressure of nationalist claims caused her to contemplate striking at her enemies before they were prepared to strike at her. So the Triple Alliance gradually assumed in regard to the central Empires an aggressive character; and for this reason England descended from her position of splendid isolation and ranged herself against them. Italy continued to remain a member of the Alliance for the same reasons as those for which she entered it, for her attention was more occupied with the 'Austrian Question' as a possible disturber of the peace of Europe than with the ambitions of Germany. Then came the Balkan wars; and, as soon as it became patent that their results had robbed Austria of her last hope of solving peacefully her most grievous national problem—the Southern Slav question—Germany seized the opportunity of forcing on the conflict which was to decide whether or not her ambitions were to be realised. Thereupon Italy, which had ranged herself with Germany and Austria chiefly in the desire to avoid war, found herself faced with the alternatives of either breaking with her allies or fighting for a cause diametrically opposed to her political principles. The question was not difficult to decide. The balance of material interests at stake was

all in favour of the first alternative; and the undeniable fact that Germany and Austria were the aggressors furnished Italy with a technical as well as with a moral excuse for standing aside. It is one thing, however, to break with one's old allies, another to turn round and make war against them. Nevertheless many people regard Italy's declaration of neutrality as only a step towards joining in the war on the side of the Triple Entente. Whether this will prove to be the case or not only time can show. Meanwhile it will be instructive to examine what Italy is thinking and saying on the matter, and to state what can be gathered from the Press and from a daily intercourse with Italians of all classes.

Just as there are three alternative policies possible, so there are three distinct parties in the country between which the controversy rages. The various parliamentary groups, which more or less correspond to the different bodies of public opinion in the country, have each registered their opinion. On one hand, an alliance between the extreme Clericals and the extreme official Socialists has pronounced in favour of neutrality *usque ad finem*. The reasons of the former are not Christian charity, but a hope in the righteous chastisement of infidel France and in the triumph of Catholic Austria. It is useless to argue with them that the war against Germany is a war against Nietzscheism, the most formidable foe of Christianity, or to plead that the chiefest need of Catholicism in Austria is to be freed from the shackles of State control. The Socialists, for their part, desire peace at any price as a logical consequence of their principles of international solidarity; and it is not unlikely that the negation of patriotism is the bond of union between them and the Clericals, for there are grave suspicions that another and possibly weightier reason why the latter desire Italy to remain neutral, is the sectarian hope that Italy will be excluded from the peace congress, while the Pope will succeed in being represented.


At the opposite extreme is the party which advocates war at any price. It is composed of Futurists, Reform Socialists, Republicans and Nationalists. The Futurists bark louder than they bite; 'la guerra per noi è la sola igiene del mondo!' The Reform Socialists and

Republicans are idealists. They appeal to duty rather than to material interests. In a recent manifesto issued over the signature of Signor Bissolati, leader of the Reform Socialists, it was urged eloquently and fervently that it was the duty of Italians to stand up and fight on the side of nationality and democracy; that it would be shameful to receive Trent or Trieste at the hands of a victorious France without making the smallest sacrifice to deserve them; and that, for the honour of Italian arms, it is necessary to reverse the verdicts of Custoza and of Lissa. The Republicans use very similar arguments, though, true to their Mazzinian traditions, they lay particular stress on the prime necessity of making another step in advance towards uniting all Italians under one flag. Their appeal is not without effect, especially in Rome and in the Romagna and in those provinces which have not forgotten the Austrian oppression.

Unfortunately for the success of this propaganda, the majority of Italians are too much the calculating and practical children of this world. Before embarking on a war to liberate Trent and Istria, they want to be sure that success would mean material advantage, that the lives gained by adding the populations of these provinces to the kingdom of Italy would more than balance the lives lost in the enterprise. Italians displayed in the Risorgimento an admirable capacity for idealism, but the bulk of them need to be fed on something more solid than ideals. Now the Nationalists—who form the backbone of the war-party, and who date their origin from the need, recognised by a number of young Italians a few years ago, of giving Italy a backbone—claim to offer their countrymen, if they would only decide to make war without further delay, some solid material gain besides. Their strength lies in the fact that they are represented in all the more important political groups. They have an important following among the younger generation, and, as the Press is largely in the hands of young men, they have gained, if not the control of the most important newspapers, at least the right of using them for airing their opinions. The vast majority of them are in favour of war; and this explains the fact that the majority of the more

influential newspapers appear to be of the same opinion. But the opinion of the majority of the Press must not be taken to mean the opinion of the majority of the electorate.

Signor Giuseppe Bevione, member of parliament for Turin, who with Signor Federzoni may be considered joint leader of the Nationalist Party, published lately in the 'Stampa' a series of admirable articles on the theme of Italy's neutrality and the necessity of joining in the war. After setting forth the Nationalist creed, which is scarcely Nationalist in the ordinary sense of the word but is rather faith in the supreme importance of national prestige and national strength as a reacting influence on the economic and moral well-being of the people, Signor Bevione enters upon a discussion of the practical issues at stake. Italy must show herself before the world disciplined and organised and capable of making supreme sacrifices. She must make a military reputation. She must not only see to it that the war leaves her mistress of the Adriatic, but that the Adriatic becomes essentially an Italian sea. It is not sufficient to occupy Valona, the strategic key to the Adriatic; nor even to make sure that Trieste and Pola, predominantly Italian, become united to the motherland. Dalmatia and the Islands, which owe all that is best in them to the civilising influence of Venice, must also be redeemed. So it is the business of Italy to anticipate the invasion of the Serbs and to confront Europe at the peace congress with the logic of an accomplished occupation. She must stand shoulder to shoulder with Englishmen in Egypt against Turkey, so that she may earn the right to a modification of the Egypto-Libyan frontier in her favour, to permanent possession of the Dodekanese and to a share in any eventual partition of Turkey. The defeat of Germany and of Austria—Signor Bevione goes on to say—is not so certain that Italy can afford to stand aside. Latin civilisation, superior to Teutonic, runs the risk of being submerged for a time; and it is Italy's interest to stand as champion of Latin civilisation. The break-up of Austria is of paramount importance for the future peace of Europe and for the hope of a peace unsoiled by a senseless race of armaments. The victory of Austria means that Austria will obtain predominance in the



Balkans; the defeat of Austria—unless Italy gains by the valour of her arms a permanent and powerful position on the eastern shores of the Adriatic—means that Russia will gain that predominance. Italy must see to it that neither of these alternatives is realised. Austria must be defeated and dismembered; and Italy, aided by Greece and Roumania—both nations strongly akin to Italy—must make herself the bulwark against excessive Slav influence in the Balkan peninsula. The spread of Italian influence will moreover react favourably on Italian trade. It must not be forgotten too—it is argued—that Italy's entry into the field would hasten the end of the war, and that its prolongation would inflict greater economic losses on the country than would the cost of a campaign. Lastly, Italy, prepared for war, would be in a position to bargain with France and England for substantial concessions in return for her help—a favourable loan, for instance, and the cession, if not of Tunis, at any rate of Obok (Jibuti).

So much for the Nationalist thesis. Unfortunately it leaves out of account one vital element, of the truth of which the majority of Italians are only too conscious—namely, that Italy is not yet grown-up and would overstrain herself if she attempted to assume all at once such enormously increased responsibilities. The army and navy are now no doubt in excellent trim, but—it is argued on the other side—what if the Dual Alliance made a concentrated effort against their former ally? Such a move would facilitate the advance of the French, but meanwhile the result might be disastrous for Italy. Italy is not in a condition to suffer even a temporary blow; and to divide her forces between Egypt, Dalmatia and the Veneto would be courting misfortune. The unwisdom, too, of acquiring Dalmatia, supposing it were possible, is patent. As the vast majority of the population is Serb, its acquisition by Italy would only stir up trouble for the future, at the best resulting in a 'senseless competition of armaments.' The best bulwark against the 'Russian peril' is to be found in the Balkan states themselves. To suppose that Greater Serbia will come under Russian influence is to fall into an error, which history has demonstrated already three times to the shame of British statesmen. Wellington insisted in 1829

on restricting the frontiers of Greece, for fear that the new kingdom should fall under Russian influence; Palmerston insisted, against the advice of Cavour, on the division of Roumania in 1856 for the same reason; and Disraeli, for fear of Russia, upset the treaty of San Stefano at the expense of Bulgaria. Yet not one of these little states has failed to pursue a policy strictly in accordance with its own interests and independent of Russia. The only effect of the various restrictions has been to fan the flame of Balkan unrest. Apart from this question, and disregarding the chance of disaster, it is doubtful whether Italy could stand the strain of a great war. The war in Tripoli, successful as it was, proved that Italy's stamina is not great. It is still more doubtful if the economic benefits which would accrue from hastening the conclusion of hostilities would outweigh the economic cost of a campaign; and, as things stand at present, neither France nor England is willing to purchase Italy's aid by material assistance.

The majority of the nation are aware of these facts and, without wishing to commit themselves to anything so rigid as a policy of unconditional neutrality, they would prefer peace, provided that it does not injure their vital interests or frustrate the realisation of their more pressing hopes.

In an article which appeared lately in the '*Corriere della Sera*,' Signore Borgese, author and journalist and one of the ablest and most popular of political writers in Italy, summed up the practical aims which Italy hoped to achieve as the result of the war. They are modest enough. First, a relatively stronger position in the Mediterranean in comparison with France; secondly, an indisputable predominance in the Adriatic; thirdly, a political understanding with England. Considering the many common interests of the two countries, such an understanding should not be difficult to negotiate. The second is realisable, whatever the result of the war, on the one hand by a timely occupation of Valona, and on the other by keeping intact and heightening the efficiency of Italy's naval and military forces. If Austria emerges victorious, she will at any rate not be in a position to veto Italy's permanent occupation of Valona; and the possession of that port is enough to guarantee Italy's

predominance in the Adriatic. On the other hand, if Austria and Germany are severely beaten, there will be no obstacle to Italy's command of that sea. If the peninsula of Istria is allotted to Germany or Servia, the possession of Valona will guarantee Italy's position. But Italy hopes that Istria—apart from the possibility of her being able to occupy it peacefully, so to speak, in the event of Austria losing authority over it before the actual termination of hostilities, which is not altogether an improbable supposition—will be handed over to her, not in reward for anything she may have done, but in homage to the claims of nationality and in consideration of the interests of future European peace. In this case, the time would not have come for Italy to spend money on the fortification of Valona, for with the possession of Pola it will be many years before the Serb navy will be in a position to rival hers.

In regard to the Mediterranean, the relations between Italy and France have never been very cordial. The section of the people inspired by Pan-latinism is insignificant. France is considered to be animated by jealousy of Italy's progress and by fear that the day is not far distant when Italy will take her place as leader among the Latin nations. Moreover, the Italian character does not mix well with the French. Accordingly, many Italians do not conceal their pleasure at the prospect of emerging unscathed from the perils of a great war, while France is expending her blood and treasure so profusely. The efforts of France to enlist Italy on her side have been interpreted, not as a sign that the Triple Entente is in need of another ally, but as due to a desire to see Italy make sacrifices proportionate to those which France is making. The influential Bolognese journal, 'Il Resto del Carlino,' has even suggested that the reason why France has as yet done comparatively little in the Adriatic is the desire not to weaken her fleet in relation to that of Italy; and the 'Stampa' of Turin has declared that for the same reason the forcing of the Dardanelles is not to be hoped for, as the task would fall to the lot of the French. Altogether Italy's rivalry with France is a powerful argument in favour of a continuance of a policy of neutrality, and in the meantime of reorganising and

equipping her army and navy to a degree of efficiency never before attempted.

This middle policy of a conditional neutrality, 'armed and vigilant,' is supported by the large and heterogeneous body of citizens represented in Parliament by the so-called Liberal Party, which is actually the party in power. They require a new cause to arise before Italy commits herself to war. They are particularly jealous of Italy's honour. The Italians are a very self-conscious race, and they bitterly resent the charge so often made against them abroad—at one time perhaps not undeservingly—that they are an unscrupulous people. They are anxious to live down this evil reputation; and they consider that to declare war against their old allies on a mere pretext and without the presence of some new cause, such as the failure of Turkey to prevent the Pan-Islamite Campaign from spreading into Libya, would be a dishonest action. The government in the hands of Signor Salandra may be trusted to keep Italy's honour bright. Signor Salandra has gained the confidence of the mass of the people; and the country is congratulating itself that at last it has a Government on which all can implicitly rely. If the Government decides on war, it can in its turn rely on the people to make all the necessary sacrifices, gladly and willingly. For the present—and the majority of the Italian people note the fact with relief and satisfaction—everything points to an indefinite continuance of the policy of 'armed and vigilant neutrality.'

Art. 7.—THE WAR IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER.

I.—BY LAND.

IN the article which appeared in the October number of this Review the chief events of the war were reviewed up to the end of September. At that period a great battle had raged without intermission for more than a fortnight on the heights north of the Aisne from its junction with the Oise to Berry au Bac, and thence eastwards along a line passing south of Rheims across the plain of Champagne and through the forest of the Argonne to the neighbourhood of Verdun. The line then curved southwards along the heights east of the Meuse to the vicinity of St Mihiel, where the French and Germans faced each other on opposite banks of the river, and, again turning eastwards, traversed the undulating district of the Woëvre to the Moselle at Pont à Mousson. Intermittent fighting was also proceeding along the frontier of Lorraine and in the Vosges, which still continues, without, however, having exercised any direct influence on the main operations, the scene of which has lain throughout to the west of the Moselle. The enemy's forces in Belgium, which had previously been employed in containing the Belgian field army based on Antwerp, and in covering the lines of communication traversing that country, had been concentrated for the attack on Antwerp, in which a force of artillery, stated to comprise two hundred guns including numerous howitzers of large calibre, was also employed.

The retreat of the Germans from the Marne had been so hurried that it seemed likely at first that the heights north of the Aisne were being held merely as a rearguard position to cover the reorganisation of the main armies, and the preparation of a defensive position further north. It soon became evident, however, that the position was of great strength, and was occupied in force with a view to stubborn defence. Further to the east, the enemy's retreat, which had been conducted with more deliberation, ceased on reaching the line already indicated. The utmost efforts of the Allies failed to make any material progress on any part of the front. What at first appeared to be a rearguard action on a large

scale developed into a general engagement of great intensity along a front of 180 miles. It was not a hastily entrenched position that the Germans held. It had been prepared deliberately and with consummate skill during their advance to the Marne.

This preparation, during an offensive movement, of an entrenched position in rear on which the army may fall back in case of defeat, forms a distinctive feature of the German system, and constitutes a novelty in war. The method has been followed on every occasion. During the advance to the Niemen at the end of September, a position was prepared on the East Prussian frontier, armed with heavy artillery and occupied by *Landsturm* troops and detachments from the fortress garrisons, before which General Rennenkampf's army was detained for a month after winning the battle of Augustovo. Entrenchments were constructed along the frontier of Posen and Silesia before the end of September, in anticipation of an offensive movement to the Vistula; and the army which fought at Warsaw in October was provided with a position in the rear which it was prevented from occupying by the vigour of the Russian pursuit, and the movement of a large force of cavalry from Novo-Georgiewsk against its left flank. The invariable provision of rallying positions by the Germans might seem out of harmony with the doctrine of the offensive with which they are imbued, and which has been carefully inculcated by their whole system of training; but it is in accordance with the thoroughness which characterises all their methods, and the foresight with which they provide for every possible contingency.

The attack on the position between the Oise and the Moselle, the defence of which was materially aided by heavy siege artillery set free by the fall of Maubeuge, was persisted in by the Allies with great gallantry for many days. The character of the fighting has been said to resemble siege warfare. Ground gained by the Allied troops was promptly entrenched; and a step-by-step advance ultimately resulted in the opposing trenches being, in places, only separated by one or two hundred yards. At a few points the enemy's advanced trenches were carried, but the main position proved unassailable, owing to the skill which characterised

the defensive arrangements. Wire entanglements were lavishly used; guns commanded the approaches from concealed positions; and machine-guns hidden in short lengths of trench projecting from the general line brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground in front. The enemy, true to the principle of the offensive and the teaching of their drill-book, met attack with counter-attack. It would, indeed, be incorrect to describe their attitude as defensive; it was a persistent and determined offensive. It may be concluded from the reports that they were normally the assailants. The entrenchments acted as a base from which assaults were suddenly delivered across the narrow intervening space. This kind of fighting has characterised the campaign throughout. It is novel, because the kind of situation from which it originated necessarily marks the close of tactical operations at manoeuvres. It was not, indeed, altogether unforeseen, though it has surpassed in its development and duration anything that was imagined. It may be regarded as the outcome of the use of entrenchments in the attack which our Field Service Regulations recognise; though, curiously enough, the German drill-book is silent on the subject.

Although a battle between entrenched armies bears some resemblance to siege warfare, it is quite dissimilar in several important respects. A besieged army is cut off from all outside sources of supply. It is entirely dependent on its own resources, which must ultimately become exhausted. If, for the moment, we regard the German army as being on the defensive at the beginning of October, it will be evident that it was by no means in a state of being besieged. Its communications with Germany were open for the supply of food, stores, and reinforcements. Its freedom of movement was restricted only by the Allied army in front. On the other hand, it had not the advantage conferred on a besieged army by the encircling defences of the fortress, which provide facilities for meeting attack from every quarter. Hence, when the Allies failed to make any impression on the enemy's position by frontal attack, they sought for a vulnerable point elsewhere. The northward movement west of the Oise was initiated with the object of enveloping the flank and threatening the lines of communication.

It is unnecessary to discuss the details of this operation, of which little is known. It failed because the Germans were able to bring up troops as fast as the Allies for the prolongation of their line. The struggle of each army to outflank the other ultimately resulted in the line of battle reaching the sea, which both prevented further extension and put a stop to the attempts of either side to outflank the other.

It would be hard to say whether the Allies or the Germans have derived more advantage from this extraordinary situation. As regards the tactical situation it may be said, broadly, to militate against the side acting offensively because it has prevented outflanking operations, which seem alone to promise decisive success under present-day conditions. In this respect it has been disadvantageous to the Germans, who have maintained the offensive throughout. On the other hand, it enabled the Allies to bring their naval power into play, by which the defence of their left flank was materially strengthened. From the strategical point of view the Germans benefited by the transfer of the bulk of their army to a position which directly covers their main line of communication through Belgium, both supply and retreat being thus facilitated. Should retreat become necessary, their right flank will derive security during the operation from the proximity of the Dutch frontier. From the Allies' point of view the change in the situation was unfavourable in two respects. It made any enterprise against the enemy's lines of communication impracticable, and it deprived them of the direct retreat into the interior of France which enabled them to wrest the offensive from the Germans early in September.

The extension of the line of battle towards the north was the cause of another important change in the situation. During the earlier stages of the campaign the Germans had contented themselves with masking Antwerp by a detachment of sufficient strength to keep the Belgian field-army shut up in the fortress, and to prevent it from attacking their line of communication passing through Brussels and Louvain. Later on, the necessity of reinforcing the army in France obliged them to withdraw their regular troops from Belgium, their place being taken by *Landwehr* and *Landsturm*.

The Belgians, finding themselves opposed by inferior troops, seized the opportunity to adopt a more active attitude; and reconnaissances which were made in some force resulted in minor encounters in various localities. The retreat of the enemy from the Marne was the signal for a vigorous offensive, which threw the Germans back to Louvain, and seriously threatened the railway, which was one of their chief lines of supply. This display of activity proved that the Belgian army was not a negligible quantity; and, when the line of battle in France began to approach the Belgian frontier, the necessity of ridding themselves of the menace to their right flank became evident to the Germans. The troops in Belgium were rapidly reinforced; the heavy siege artillery, of which Austrian howitzers formed part, was brought up; and the place fell after ten days' attack, the details of which need not be described.

The fall of Antwerp was a serious loss to the Allies, because it deprived them of the co-operation of the Belgian army against the German flank and rear during the subsequent operations. Except for immunity from these attacks, it conferred no immediate material advantage on the Germans. Owing to its peculiar situation it cannot be used as a base for naval operations at any time without violating the neutrality of Holland, which holds the approach from the sea. It is not, indeed, to be supposed that the Germans would hesitate to use the neutral waters of the Scheldt if it suited their purpose to do so; but they are unlikely to provoke the hostility of the Dutch while their hands are fully occupied with the Allied army in the west and with Russia in the east. The moral advantage resulting from the possession of Belgium's last stronghold was, however, considerable. It made their military occupation of the country effective; and it gave them, prospectively, the coveted 'window on the sea,' which they hope to retain till the conclusion of the war, and to make the base of further conquests in the future if the result of the present war should not satisfy all their ambitions.

The downfall of cherished ideas is apt to cause a reaction. The speedy destruction of the modern forts which formed the outer defences of Antwerp, and which

were generally believed to be proof against artillery, succeeding similar experiences at Liège, Namur, and Maubeuge, has caused popular opinion to swing to the opposite extreme, and to suppose that the days of permanent fortifications are ended. This sudden revulsion of opinion seems premature. The triumph of the modern howitzer over the armoured fort must be regarded as an episode in the long contest for supremacy between guns and armour. Each improvement in guns has necessitated a corresponding advance in protective structures; and hitherto—on land at least—the gun has always come out second-best. At sea the conditions are different. There is a limit to the size of ships, and, consequently, to the combined weight of guns and armour that can be kept afloat. The result has been that the gun has emerged triumphant, because victory can be won only by offensive action; and a ship which, though able to resist the enemy's shells, could not carry guns to penetrate his armour would be useless in war. On land the weight of defensive structures is not so rigidly restricted; and the variety of materials that might be used is only limited by the power of invention. On the other hand, the weight of the gun must be within the capacity of the existing means of transport under service conditions. The 28 cm. Austrian howitzer owes its presence in the field to the invention of motor transport, and in weight it has probably reached the practicable limit. It also needs a concrete platform which takes long to construct; and its immobility debars its use in positions where it would be liable to capture. The 42 cm. German howitzer is permanently mounted on a railway truck of special design; and its sphere of action is, therefore, confined to existing railway systems of standard gauge.*

There are other considerations which must be borne

* A description of the 42 cm. howitzer appeared in the 'Engineer' of Nov. 20. These howitzers may, conceivably, have been employed in the attack of Maubeuge and Antwerp, but there is no direct evidence of their having been used at all. The 28 cm. howitzer could have effected all that has been attributed to the larger piece; and there is some evidence of its having been used at Namur. The largest German field howitzer has a calibre of 21 cm. and a maximum range of about 8000 yards. The high-explosive shell weighs 260 lbs. For transport the gun is dismantled and placed on a special wagon. Baulks of timber are carried to form a firing-platform.

in mind. A fort, much more a cupola, is not a large target for high-angle fire at long ranges; and adequate arrangements for observation are necessary to make the fire effective. There is no doubt that the defences of Antwerp and the other fortresses successfully attacked had been carefully reconnoitred by enemy spies in peace, and the ranges ascertained. These places, Antwerp especially, abounded in spies, who are believed to have helped materially to direct the fire. The means for denying a possible enemy such advantages are obvious.

The defence of a modern fortress depends largely on the use of mobile armament and the provision of adequate entrenchments for the infantry of the garrison in the intervals between the detached forts. If suitable and timely preparations had been made, it is likely that the defence of Antwerp might have been considerably prolonged. The Germans deferred attacking for so long that the Belgians appear to have thought they did not intend to attempt the enterprise. Up to the day before the bombardment of the outer forts began, the official reports from Antwerp displayed this optimistic attitude. The work of entrenching was, in consequence, begun too late, with the result that it was very far from completion when the infantry attack began to develop. The trenches were not only inadequate in profile, but faulty in design; and, while the firing line was much exposed in the front trenches, the cover provided for supports and reserves was quite insufficient. The enemy's artillery made the position practically untenable before their infantry came to close quarters. When we consider how successful the French and British troops have been in holding hastily constructed entrenchments against attacks of unprecedented violence, we can imagine what might have been achieved at Antwerp had proper foresight been exercised and the requisite engineering skill been available. The gallantry of the Belgian infantry could not compensate for the defective nature of the defences.

Those who may imagine that the days of permanent fortification are ended will do well to reflect on the part which the eastern defences of France, especially the section between Verdun and Toul, have played in the war. They compelled the Germans to adopt the circuitous line of invasion through Belgium, entailing disadvantages

which have had a material effect on the course of the campaign. The violation of Belgian neutrality brought the Belgian and British forces into line with the army of France. The Belgian resistance, which owed its efficacy to the fortress of Liège, gave time for the concentration of the Allied armies. The long lines of communication have proved a source of serious embarrassment, and their exposure by the advance to the Marne contributed materially to the victory of the Allies, and obliged the Germans to relinquish the offensive. The enemy's position was insecure until the prolongation of their right flank covered the lines of communication, while this great extension of their line obliged them to keep an immense army in France when troops were badly needed in the eastern theatre of war.

The Belgian field-army made good its retreat by the strip of territory which lies between the Dutch frontier and the Scheldt, and formed up on the left of the Allies' line between Dixmude and Nieuport, where it has sustained repeated and violent attacks. The German force released by the fall of Antwerp was probably between 60,000 and 120,000, the former figure being that given in a statement published by the Press Bureau. The Berlin war-news gave its strength as 200,000 men, which is doubtless one of a series of fictitious statements designed to mislead and impress the Allies, which were published at that time. In this category may be placed the announcement that the objective of the German attacks was Calais, to which wide publicity was given, this being quickly followed by the publication of an article by General Baron von Ardenne, in which a speculative scheme for the attack of England from the Channel ports was discussed. It seems reasonable to suppose that these and other threatening rumours which gained currency at that period were expected to cause nervousness in this country, and to induce the Government to keep troops back for home defence which were urgently required to reinforce our army in France. The idea of an advance on Calais was, moreover, calculated to capture the imagination of the German public, and to arouse the ardour of the troops. It is hard to find any other hypothesis to account for the sudden importance

attached to the possession of Calais, which the enemy might have appropriated without opposition at any time during September.

A battle cannot be won, nor can a war be brought to a decisive conclusion, merely by the capture of a geographical objective. Victory in battle implies the rout of the portion of the enemy's forces engaged and the destruction of their *moral* to an extent that will prevent their being reorganised so as again to become an efficient fighting force for a considerable time. A decisive issue to a war can only be attained by destroying the enemy's armies, and by breaking the spirit of the government and the nation, so as to prevent new armies being raised such as those the French placed in the field during the latter part of the war of 1870-71, and to obviate unorganised resistance in the form of guerrilla warfare. It is evident that the mere conquest of the coast-line would not achieve any of these results. In battle a geographical objective may be assigned to define the direction of an attack, and to insure the co-operation of different bodies employed in its execution, and the concentration of their efforts on the attainment of one specific object. Calais is obviously too remote to fulfil any of these purposes.

An attack on England by sea from the Channel ports would require the defeat of the British Fleet as a necessary antecedent. A surprise attack, by evading the Fleet, could not be effected, because among other reasons it would be impossible secretly to assemble the requisite transport. For the purposes of a raid by aircraft the Channel coast would afford no special facilities to compensate for the enormous sacrifice of life which the enemy's efforts have entailed. Such an enterprise could be attempted with almost equal ease from Belgium, the difference in distance from the probable points of attack being inappreciable. Nor does it seem that the coast would be a suitable situation for an aerial base, owing to its exposure to a surprise attack by hostile aircraft, which might approach undetected over the sea.

The enemy's violent and persistent offensive between La Bassée and the sea has doubtless been partly inspired by the desire to drive the Allied forces out of Belgium with the view of completing the occupation of the

country, and, more especially, making their possession of Antwerp secure for the reasons already assigned. These are political and not military objects. From the military point of view the Yser canal would, no doubt, be desirable as a submarine base for operations in the Channel. But such a base has already been established in the Bruges canal, whither several submarines are believed to have been transported in sections by rail. The open harbours at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais would seem to be less suitable for the purpose on account of their being more exposed to attack by destroyers. These are, however, secondary objects, and, as such, subordinate to the main object, the destruction of the Allied army.

It is a feature of this great battle that for several weeks the principal fighting has taken place on the flanks of the line; in the west between La Bassée and the sea, and, in the east, within an area comprising the eastern heights of the Meuse and the Argonne forest. In these localities the battle has raged continuously, and often with desperate violence; while the fighting in the centre, both east and west of the Oise, has been intermittent in character, and of a less determined nature, except for occasional outbursts such as that which occurred early in November in the neighbourhood of Vailly. It is evident that both sides attach considerable importance to the operations on the eastern flank; and it may be of interest to consider the probable reasons. The locality would not seem to offer any particular attraction to either combatant as a scene for decisive efforts. The French are embarrassed by the line of the Moselle, strongly fortified from Metz to Thionville, which affords complete security to the German left flank, while the line of fortifications extending from Verdun to Toul offers a serious impediment to a German advance.

The Verdun-Toul defences have been an obstacle to the accomplishment of the enemy's plans throughout the campaign. When the Allies were driven back to the line of the Marne, the northern portion of the defences was uncovered by the field-army; and the Germans seized the opportunity to make violent attacks on Verdun, and on Fort Troyon, the second fort in the chain of *forts d'arrêt* connecting Verdun with Toul,

which is unduly exposed to attack on the south side. These attempts happily proved abortive, and the timely success of the Allies on the Marne retrieved the situation. It may safely be concluded that the Germans designed to open fresh lines of communication through Metz, and to acquire a secure base of operations on the Moselle, which derives great strength from the fortresses of Metz and Thionville. These modern fortresses are linked together by intermediate redoubts, the whole forming a stronghold of the first importance. The reduction of the Verdun-Toul defences was clearly essential to this design, which, had it been accomplished, would have materially strengthened the enemy's position in France by securing an advanced base of supply close to the scene of operations, connected with the interior of Germany by a well-designed and efficient railway system. It would also have opened up secure lines of retreat should necessity arise.

While this was probably the chief aim of their efforts, with a view to offensive operations, the enemy were also probably influenced by the necessity of defending their line of communication through Luxemburg, which would be imperilled by a French offensive based on Verdun. The Trèves-Montmédy railway passes, within seventeen miles of the Verdun forts, through a tunnel, the destruction of which would cause the Germans serious embarrassment. It is perhaps unnecessary to observe that the enemy's operations on this flank are materially assisted by the fortress of Metz, which forms a strong *point d'appui*, and by the network of strategic railways behind it, by which reinforcements can be brought up from Germany or transferred rapidly from other parts of the great battlefield.

The operations on the western flank have been characterised, since the fall of Antwerp, by a persistent German offensive, directed chiefly against three points in the Allies' front—Dixmude, Ypres, and La Bassée. Some political reasons which may have contributed to the selection of the La Bassée-Nieuport line for the main offensive operations have already been noticed, but we must conclude, on military grounds, that the real object has been to crush the left of the Allies' line, with the ulterior object of rolling up the remainder of their left

wing, which would then be exposed to attack in flank. Outflanking operations being prevented by the sea, the next best expedient was to destroy this portion of the front, which might be expected to be specially vulnerable owing to its unhomogeneous composition. The localities against which the main attacks have been directed are those where the Allies' armies join. The defence of such localities is apt to lack cohesion on account of the divided command and responsibility, and it may be weakened by jealousy or lack of mutual confidence between the troops. If such were indeed the enemy's design, it has been signally foiled by the loyalty with which the Allied commanders have co-operated, and by the *camaraderie* which exists between the soldiery of the three armies. Ypres, which has been the objective of the most violent and determined attacks, is tactically weak, as it forms a salient projecting in front of the general line.

Although fighting has been almost continuous along the whole front of three hundred miles from the Moselle to the sea, the part between the La Bassée canal and Nieuport, forty miles in extent, may be regarded as the scene of a separate battle. Against this point the Germans concentrated not less than half a million men, comprising the pick of their active corps. This moderate estimate gives an average strength of seven men per yard of front. The distribution of the troops would not, however, be uniform. Strong forces would be concentrated in the localities selected for the main attacks, the strength along the remainder of the line being reduced to that required to make a sufficient demonstration to hold the Allies' troops in their position and prevent the despatch of reinforcements to the points of real attack. If we assume that an average of three men per yard will suffice for the latter purpose, and allow an average of five miles front each for the main attacks, we arrive at a strength of nearly fourteen men per yard in the three localities, Dixmude, Ypres, and La Bassée, available to drive the attacks home. These three attacks were not simultaneously pressed on every occasion. An analysis of the official reports shows that in the course of sixteen days in which the severity of the fighting indicated that the enemy were making a genuine attempt to break through the line, the attack was 'violent' in all three

localities on five days, and in two of the localities on four days, while on the remaining seven days only one locality was the objective of serious attack. The British force, which had to bear the brunt of many violent attacks, may safely be said to have been outnumbered, at one period, to the extent of at least five to one.*

The consistent failure of attacks pressed home by greatly superior forces has been a feature of the campaign in France. Local successes have been gained repeatedly, of a magnitude which might have been decisive under the conditions of former battles, but without exercising any material effect on the general situation. We do not know enough of the details to do more than conjecture the causes of this change. One may be found in the vast extent of front in comparison with former battlefields. A success which, in former days, would have affected the entire front and compelled a general retirement, has a merely local effect in relation to the extensive line of battle, and is remedied by a readjustment of, perhaps, a few miles of the front. There are several specific instances which support this view, of which one may be quoted. The capture of Messines by the enemy on Nov. 1 might well have decided a battle such as Gravelotte, where the French fought on a front of about eight miles, somewhat less than the distance between Ypres and the Lys. To quote 'Eye-witness,' the loss of this tactical point merely necessitated 'a slight adjustment of our flank and centre.' Another cause may perhaps lie in the rapidity with which reinforcements may be brought to threatened points by means of motor transport. An attacking force which succeeds in penetrating the position may find itself confronted by reserves, enveloped on the flanks by the adjoining portions of the line which have bent back by the assault, and enfiladed by machine-guns. The situation frequently results in the lost position being almost immediately regained. Referring to the German attack on Nov. 11, the severest that our troops sustained,

* Sir John French's despatch, published on Nov. 30, proves that this estimate is far below the mark. During the period 20th—31st Oct. the British had an average strength of only 1·6 rifles per yard of front. The 3rd Corps, with a front of 12 or 13 miles, had less than one rifle per yard available.

'Eye-witness' says: 'Such was their resolution and the momentum of the mass that, in spite of the splendid resistance of our troops, they succeeded in breaking through our lines in three places. . . . They penetrated for some distance . . . but were counter-attacked, and enfiladed by machine-guns, and driven back into the trenches.' And again, in connexion with the fighting on the following day: 'Immediately on our left the French were strongly attacked and driven back a short distance, our extreme left having to conform to the movement, but our Allies soon recovered the ground they had lost, which enabled us to advance also.'

These are only examples of events which have occurred daily since the battle began on the Aisne. Ground is gained at one point and lost at another. Sometimes the lost ground is recovered almost immediately by the speedy arrival of reinforcements. At other times it remains in the enemy's possession till the morrow because adequate reinforcements take longer to arrive owing to distance or lack of motor transport. Or again it may remain an object of contention for days. The material point is that the local reverse leads to no decisive result. It is remedied either by successful counter-attack, or by local readjustment of the line. During two months' fighting there has hardly been a change in the general line that could be indicated on the largest-scale war maps in general use.

It is hard to imagine how a battle of this kind can be brought to a decision, when the troops on both sides are able to endure incessant bombardment and repeated infantry attacks by day and night. Its experience furnishes an unexpected vindication of the paradox enunciated by the philosopher-strategist Von Clausewitz nearly a century ago—that the defensive is the stronger form of war, but a decision can only be attained by offensive action. The offensive shatters itself against the entrenchments of the defence, gaining, perhaps, a momentary advantage. Then a counter-attack drives the assailant back, only to be shattered, in turn, against the opposing trenches. There is infinite carnage but no decisive result. A period of quiescence supervenes while both pause to recover and refill their depleted ranks. The story is then repeated.

The experience of this battle, and of the war generally, proves conclusively that, when armies are equal in respect of fighting efficiency, it is futile to hope that frontal attack will lead to decisive results. There has been a tendency on the part of some military writers to deride the traditional preference of the Germans for enveloping tactics and their distaste for frontal attack, forgetting that the principle of envelopment is directly inculcated by our own Field Service Regulations. Every decisive success obtained during the war of which detailed information is available has been obtained by envelopment, or threatened envelopment, of the enemy's flank. The rapid advance of the enemy on Paris, the victory of the Allies on the Marne, and those won by the Russians at Lvoff (Lemberg), Lublin, Rava Russka, and on the Vistula in October, were all due to tactical or strategical pressure on one or both flanks.

Except for the battle on the Marne we must, in fact, turn to the east to find decisive victories. The Russian battles have all been manoeuvre-battles; and the Russian commanders have shown themselves capable of handling the immense forces which distinguish this war from all previous wars with a skill that neither the Germans nor the Austrians have approached. The first phase of the campaign was characterised by strategical operations similar to those of Napoleon in the campaign of 1814 in France. The Russians concentrated the bulk of their forces alternately against the Austrian armies in Poland and Galicia, defeating them successively in the three battles of Lvoff, Lublin, and Rava Russka, and pursued the remnants beyond the river Wisloka almost to the forts of Cracow. A pause in the active operations then ensued, towards the end of September, at which point our review of the operations in the eastern theatre of war begins.

Alarmed at the success which had attended the Russian arms in every quarter, except for the temporary reverse sustained at Osterode in East Prussia, the Germans, about this period, began to concentrate important forces on the frontiers of Posen and Silesia, and, by throwing advanced bodies of troops across the Warta, to threaten an offensive movement on the Vistula.

The Russian General Staff appears to have ascertained the enemy's plans about Sept. 22, when the further progress of the army beyond the Wisloka was arrested. Subsequent to that date the official communiqués preserved complete silence concerning events in Galicia and Poland, till, on Oct. 1, a statement was issued at Petrograd announcing that considerable German forces had been concentrated in the Petrokoff and Kielce districts, against which the Russian cavalry, supported by infantry detachments, were operating vigorously. It soon became evident that during this period of silence, and for some days afterwards, the Russian army in Galicia was being withdrawn behind the San, while the main armies were assembling behind the Vistula from Sandomir to Warsaw. These movements were covered by a large force of cavalry, which came into contact with the enemy approximately on the line Lodz-Petrokoff-Kielce. Meanwhile General Rennenkampf, commanding the Russian army of the north, who had retreated to the Niemen before von Hindenburg's advance, defeated the latter in the battle of Augustovo on Oct. 3 after many days' severe fighting in the forests and marshes of Western Russia, and drove the enemy back to their entrenchments, which had been previously prepared on the East Prussian frontier. These entrenchments had been armed with heavy artillery, and partly occupied by *Landsturm* troops and detachments from the fortress garrisons. The East Prussian frontier being thus secured, von Hindenburg, with part of his army, proceeded to Poland to take command of the main army operating against the Vistula.

The operations which followed were on a scale of unprecedented magnitude. Irrespective of the forces in North Poland and East Prussia, which exercised no direct influence on the principal operations, the front on which the Austro-German armies advanced was three hundred miles in extent, reaching from the Vistula below Warsaw to Marmaros Sziget in the Carpathian Mountains. Eliminating the area south of the Dniester, where the operations were of a secondary and disconnected character, there remains a front of 230 miles along which the ensuing battle was violent and continuous. This main theatre of operations may be divided into three sections,

the northern extending from the lower Vistula (below Warsaw) to the Pilica, which became the scene of the decisive operations; the centre, from the Pilica to the Vistula above Sandomir; the southern extending thence to the Dniester. The northern Austro-German army was stated (unofficially) to comprise twelve army corps, with two cavalry divisions, amounting to about 500,000 men and 2000 guns, chiefly German troops. The army of the centre was of nearly equal strength, composed chiefly of Austrians. The southern army was entirely Austrian, and was said to be 300,000 strong with, probably, 700 guns. To ensure co-operation between these vast armies, the German General Staff assumed supreme control of the operations, superseding the Austrian General Staff, who had, indeed, shown little ability during the earlier phase of the war. German officers were also appointed to the principal commands.

The German design was probably to obtain possession of the western districts of Poland and Galicia up to the Vistula and the San, and to secure the line of these rivers, with the fortresses of Novo-Georgiewsk, Warsaw, Ivan-gorod, and Przemysl, with the view of holding it against the Russians during the winter. They also, no doubt, intended to gain the line of the Narew by forces operating from the East Prussian frontier; but this plan was defeated by the successful defence of the fortress of Osowetz at the end of September, and by the operations of a Russian force in the direction of Soldau.

The enemy's offensive was admirably timed, and the attack began simultaneously along the whole front of 230 miles on Oct. 15. The defeat of the northern army in front of Warsaw was completed on Oct. 20. At about the same date the left wing of the army of the centre was driven back to Glovacheff, where a stubborn resistance was maintained till Oct. 26. The right wing was driven from the Vistula, and Sandomir was occupied by the Russians on Nov. 3. Its retreat was followed two days later by the retirement of the Austrians from the San, on the banks of which they had hitherto fought with great obstinacy.

It would be impracticable to examine these operations in detail. The essential points to note are that the prolonged resistance of the army of the centre led to

its separation from the northern army, and that the tenacity with which its right wing maintained its position till Nov. 3 caused its left to be thrown back, necessitating a retreat in a south-westerly direction towards Czeszochowa and Cracow, and increasing the gap between it and the northern army. The information available leads to the conclusion that the retirement of the Austrians from the San was in a great degree due to the retreat of the army of the centre.

The battle of Warsaw, which decided the first phase of the campaign, was distinguished by the ability displayed by the Russian commanders in handling large bodies of troops, and the skilful use made of the railway system east of the Vistula. The bulk of the army was assembled some distance behind the screen of the river, on the railways leading to the city, while the remainder stubbornly opposed the German advance on the left bank, falling back to within a few miles of the outer forts, and inducing the enemy to deploy. Meanwhile reinforcements were brought up by rail, a column crossed the river about Goura, twenty miles above Warsaw, while a large body of cavalry issued from Novo-Georgiewsk, which the Germans had neglected to mask. Assailed in front and on both flanks, the Germans were driven in disorder as far as Skierniewice before they could make a stand. Thence they fell back more deliberately to the frontier, blowing up the roads and bridges, and destroying the railways, thus making effective pursuit impossible.

The separation of the northern German army from the army of the centre seemed to offer the Russians an opportunity for defeating them in detail by manoeuvres similar to those which they had employed successfully in September at Lublin and Rawa Russka. There can be little doubt that they entertained this design, but were prevented by the wholesale destruction of the communications, which made rapid movement impossible and enabled the enemy's armies to make good their retreat beyond the Warta, the northern army between Thorn and Kalisch, and that of the centre on Czeszochowa and Cracow. After several minor engagements, the Russians began to close in about the latter place from the east and north-east by Nov. 15; while in the north

their cavalry, on Nov. 9, reached the line Nieschawa-Slupce, close to the frontier between the Vistula and the Warta. Here their progress was arrested, though a Cossack detachment contrived to penetrate to the vicinity of Pleschen on Nov. 10, where it damaged the German strategic railway. Two or three days later a new German offensive movement began to develop on both banks of the Vistula, extending southwards towards Kalisch, before which the Russian cavalry was obliged to retire. On the Kalisch-Wielun front the enemy were retiring towards the frontier. Between Czestochowa and Cracow they attempted an offensive movement, but were driven back to an entrenched position previously prepared, where fighting was still going on at the time of writing.

This situation marked the beginning of a new plan of operations which the German General Staff had matured during the retreat from the Vistula. By destroying the road and railway communications they gained time to effect an important redistribution of troops with the aid of the strategic railways which run parallel to the frontiers of East Prussia, Posen and Silesia. A considerable force, probably comprising the bulk of the German army corps with the addition of some Austrian corps and the whole of the cavalry, was rapidly concentrated between the Vistula and the Warta. A relatively small force was left about Kalisch and Wielun, while the bulk of the Austrian armies occupied the entrenched position between Czestochowa and Cracow, and extended south to the Carpathians. North of the Vistula, troops were railed from East Prussia to Thorn, with the view of taking the offensive on the right bank of the Vistula in order to ensure the left flank of the main army against attack. The design was to force the northern Russian army to accept battle under unfavourable conditions, and, if successful, to gain possession of Warsaw and the line of the Vistula, thus accomplishing part of their original plan. Defeat in the battle would entail the retreat of the Russian army in South Poland, and endanger its line of supply and retreat through Kielce, Radom, and Ivangorod. The situation was, in fact, similar to that which would have arisen in October if the Russians had retained their position in Galicia

while meeting the German offensive in Poland. They avoided it on that occasion by relinquishing the pursuit of the Austrians, and concentrating their armies behind the Vistula and the San.

The German offensive movement developed rapidly. On Nov. 17 the Russian advance guards were falling back on the River Bzura, which, rising near Kutno, flows through Lowicz and falls into the Vistula at Wyszogrod, twenty miles below Novo-Georgiewsk. On the same date the enemy's advance guards had passed Lenczyca, moving in the direction of Piatek, which is south of the Bzura and twenty miles west of Lowicz. The main armies came in contact about Nov. 18, and a desperate battle ensued, which was still undecided at the time of writing.

The entrenched position on the East Prussian frontier to which the Germans retired after their defeat at Augustovo had been prepared during the advance to the Niemen, with the same skill and ingenuity that has been shown in the construction of entrenchments in the western theatre of war. The method of defence adopted by the enemy was similar to that followed in France, being characterised by violent and persistent counter-attacks on various points of the Russian front, which was also, no doubt, heavily entrenched. The Russian official statements, always reticent, gave little information concerning the details of the month's fighting which ensued; but such indications as there are point to the attitude of the Russians having been, in the main, defensive until the enemy became exhausted and discouraged by unsuccessful attacks. A portion of the position was then captured on Nov. 3, near Vladisloff, twenty miles south of the Niemen; and the Germans were ultimately obliged to fall back to a second line of entrenchments among the Masurian lakes, from which they are unlikely to be dislodged, except by pressure on their lines of communication, until the frost makes the lakes and marshes which abound in this region passable for troops. The advance of the Russian force operating in the Soldau district, by threatening their line of retreat, would soon compel a retirement; but the resistance has been stubborn, and the situation, at the time of writing, was obscure.

In the East, as in France, the Germans have the advantage of possessing heavier guns, which play an important part in the attack and defence of entrenched positions. Guns which are outranged and outclassed are useless in battle. They are unable either to subdue the enemy's artillery, or to approach near enough to shell his trenches effectively. Troops thus badly supported are at a great disadvantage both for attack and defence. During the first fortnight of the fighting on the Aisne the Allies were much embarrassed by the superior weight of the enemy's shell-fire, to which their artillery was unable to reply; but the balance of gun-power was subsequently rectified in some degree by the arrival of naval and siege guns and howitzers. The transport of heavy artillery in Poland was no doubt much impeded by the damage done to the communications by the Germans during their retreat.

It has already been remarked that the appearance of the German heavy gun in the field has been due to the invention of motor traction. In many other respects the petrol motor has caused new developments which have, at times, materially influenced the course of the war. The Germans, remarkable for the thoroughness of their preparations during peace, have, from the outset, made the fullest use of the invention. Armoured motor-vans have been extensively used for the transport of troops under fire; and cavalry employed on reconnaissance have been invariably supported by infantry transported in this way. With adequate roads the infantry easily keep pace with the horses, and are fresh when the time for action arrives. It would seem likely that, in European warfare, mounted infantry may disappear, with its attendant disadvantages of fatigue to man and horse, the deduction from its fighting strength consequent on the necessity of leaving at least one-third of the men in charge of the led-horses, and the immobility of the latter, which prevents their following the course of an action in order to be accessible when required. Motor transport has also been freely utilised for the transfer of troops from place to place in rear of the line of battle, and for carrying reinforcements rapidly to threatened points. The foresight of the Germans in making extensive provision of motor vehicles before the outbreak

of the war seems to have given them an advantage over the Allies at the outset; but the disparity in this respect has since been rectified in a great degree by the use of motor omnibuses and other improvised conveyances.

It is perhaps unnecessary to refer to the use which has been made of mechanical transport for the conveyance of supplies, except to observe that the supply of the immense forces now in the field by means of horse transport would have been precarious, if not impracticable. The rapidity which has at times characterised the movements of large bodies of troops would certainly have been unattainable by the older methods. The appearance of the motor in war has caused the destruction of roads by an army in retreat to assume increased importance; and the effectiveness of such measures has been materially enhanced.

So little information is available regarding the part played by aircraft that it is only possible to indicate in general terms the uses to which they have been applied. As adjuncts to heavy artillery for purposes of observation, they appear to be almost indispensable. Howitzers firing at long ranges from concealed positions have been enabled to obtain the range after one or two shots by means of information transmitted by observers from above. Observation from stations on the ground, or from buildings or temporary erections, is so inefficient that ranging entails great expenditure of ammunition and loss of time. It has been stated by 'Eye-witness' that on days when aeroplanes were unable to fly, the fire proved so ineffective that it was abandoned.

The value of aircraft for reconnaissance is too obvious to need mention, were it not that there has been a tendency to invest it with undue importance. Owing to danger from artillery and rifle fire aeroplanes are compelled to maintain an altitude from which only masses of troops can be observed. Numbers cannot be estimated with any accuracy, nor can guns be distinguished from transport. It is impossible to ascertain whether villages, woods, or other cover are occupied; and in certain circumstances considerable bodies of troops can be concealed from observation. It is likely that reconnaissance by aeroplane can be of little use except to determine the

positions of considerable forces in open country, and to detect large movements of troops. The idea that aircraft will supplant cavalry even for reconnaissance is clearly erroneous, while their offensive power is restricted to dropping bombs, of which the efficiency is uncertain.

There are some well-authenticated instances of offensive action between hostile aeroplanes; and it is obvious that an army whose aircraft establish a superiority over those of the enemy will have a great advantage. The French and British pilots appear to have gained such an ascendancy. 'Eye-witness' has stated that during the transfer of the British force from the Aisne to the Belgian frontier our aeroplanes kept the air free from hostile aircraft for several days, and thus screened the movement from observation.

The battle of Warsaw affords a typical instance of a situation in which effective reconnaissance by aircraft would be of the utmost value to the commander of the attacking army. Cavalry, even had the Germans been superior in that arm, could not have ascertained what was happening beyond the broad waters of the Vistula. The failure or negligence of their air-service on this occasion resulted in their being left in complete ignorance of the extensive movements of troops behind the river, which led to the envelopment of their front and flank. It has been suggested that they relied on spies, who abounded in the Polish capital, to keep them informed of the Russian dispositions. Even should that be so, the omission to corroborate the information by means of air-reconnaissance is hard to understand. It has been characteristic of the Germans throughout the war to make use of all available means, legitimate or otherwise, for the attainment of their ends.

At the end of four months of war, the situation may be summarised as follows. In the Western theatre of war the Germans have concentrated their principal efforts and the bulk of their armies in the endeavour to destroy the Allied armies of France, Belgium, and Great Britain. It is believed that, during part of November, their forces amounted to some fifty-two army corps, comprising nineteen of their twenty-five regular corps, equivalent to about two and a quarter million men.


These vast forces have been hurled with fruitless violence against the entrenched positions of the Allies, with result that their best troops have sustained enormous losses. Their offensive now appears to have been suspended in consequence of the withdrawal of part of the forces to meet the threatening situation in Poland. Meanwhile the Allies are waiting on events and unlikely to squander their forces in frontal attacks, futility of which has been proved. Delay, which is in their favour, is likely to prove fatal to the Germans who have committed themselves to the impracticable plan of attempting the offensive in both theatres of war with insufficient forces.

In the Eastern theatre of war two principal battles are being fought, one between the Vistula and Warta, and the other on the line Czeszów-Cracow extending southwards to the foothills of the Carpathians. The former will probably decide the future course of the campaign. If, as seems likely, the Germans should be defeated, they will be obliged to fall back on the defensive towards their own frontier. If the Russians should win the battle, they must retire behind the Vistula, abandon their offensive in south-west Poland and Galicia. The Germanic Allies would then endeavour to pursue their original plan of holding the line of the Vistula and San during the winter, and attempt to obtain a favourable situation in the West with augmented forces. Russian victory in the battle between Czeszów and the Carpathians is a necessary antecedent to the liberation of Cracow, preliminary to the invasion of Silesia or Moravia. The operations in East Prussia may be regarded as secondary to those in Poland. The defeat of the Germans in the latter region would ultimately entail the abandonment of East Prussia.

W. P. BLOOM

II.—AT SEA.

THE outstanding and most obvious feature of the naval war has been the losses of ships, officers and men which we have suffered; ten cruisers, large and small, a torpedo gunboat and three submarines have been sunk—on





misadventure—with a sacrifice of life so great that we have not realised its extent.* Is it, therefore, to be concluded that we have been injured seriously in a military sense? Have our chances of winning the eventual victory which will reassure our command of the sea decreased as the war has progressed?

The record of the war on the seas suggests some preliminary reflections. There is a vital and essential difference between military and naval power. A nation fortunately situated geographically as we are can, after some months' delay, create new armies, enlisting men, commissioning officers, providing equipment. It is not a rapid process, but it has already been shown that it can be done even by a democracy with political conditions unsuited to the organisation of violence and its effective direction. On the other hand, unless hostilities last longer than they can possibly last owing to economic circumstances, naval power cannot be improvised; with the battleships and cruisers which a country has built or building when hostilities open it must win or lose.† This is the first point which is usually ignored; army deficiencies can be made good by a maritime country which possesses complete or partial control of sea communications; naval deficiencies, except in respect of details, cannot be supplied, since it takes six years to train a junior officer, almost as long to produce a skilled lower-deck rating, three years to build a battleship, two years to complete a cruiser, and about twelve months to construct a torpedo vessel—destroyer or submarine. There is also another consideration. Armies fight for positions; navies fight that their merchant ships may use the seas without molestation.

If we bear in mind these distinctions, it is not surprising that the progress of the war has been marked by a succession of battles of first-class importance on the continent, directly bearing on the ultimate issue of the

* Down to Nov. 11 the British naval casualties amounted to 4,327 killed, 473 wounded, and 973 missing, apart from the men of the Royal Naval Division interned in Holland. The high proportion of killed will be noted; in modern naval war few are wounded, but many drowned. The blowing up of the battleship 'Bulwark,' owing apparently to an accident, can hardly be regarded as a war casualty. Over 700 lives were lost.

† This statement does not apply absolutely to destroyers and submarines, as under favourable industrial conditions they can be constructed rapidly.

war, while at sea there has been no engagement between the various fleets involved in hostilities which can by any possibility influence our fortunes. The explanation lies on the surface. Both our enemies, though possessing considerable naval power—war shipping with a displacement of over one million tons—have not so far disputed in any serious degree our use of the seas. We have been able to continue our trade with our allies and the neutral countries of the world. We have been in a position to mobilise no mean proportion of the effective manhood of the Empire, and to draw upon the military resources of India, and transfer these men either to England for a period of final training or direct to the battlefields on the Continent. Nor is this all. By the active employment of our naval power, we have been in a position to keep from our enemies what we have chosen to describe as contraband and conditional contraband, while they, on their part, have been unable to effect any limitation of our supplies of material to be employed in the prosecution of the war. The naval issue has so far gone by default. This is not to say that, at its 'selected moment,' the German High Sea Fleet will not sally forth and accept the challenge which the Grand Fleet has so repeatedly offered. Whatever may or may not happen in the Adriatic, it is impossible to doubt that, when circumstances are considered favourable, the main forces of the German Navy will be exerted, for German officers and men, as many incidents have shown, are lacking neither in seamanship, courage, nor strategical ability. But in the meantime, with the Russian Fleet on the east and the British Fleet on the west, the Germans have chosen to evacuate the seas in our favour; and we have been reaping all the advantages of sea command and translating them into economic and military power.

Incidental naval actions have occurred. Despatches have been published—after long and unexplained delay—describing the successful scooping-out movement in the Bight of Heligoland; British and German submarines have been operating freely; mines have robbed both navies of ships; an engagement has taken place off the Chilean coast with sad results; and British, Russian and French men-of-war have been surprised and destroyed at Zanzibar and Penang.

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Before an attempt is made to examine any of these events, none of them, so far as our fortunes are concerned, contributing in any appreciable degree to the eventual issue of the war, it may serve a useful purpose to set out the main losses which the several navies have suffered, the dates when the different ships were launched being stated in each case :

BRITISH.

Cruisers :

Ships.	Lost.	Tons.	Launched.	Crew.
Good Hope . .	By gun-fire, Nov. 1 . .	14,100	1901	880
Aboukir . .	Torpedoed, Sept. 22 . .	12,000	1900	755
Cressy . .	Torpedoed, Sept. 22 . .	12,000	1899	755
Hogue . .	Torpedoed, Sept. 22 . .	12,000	1900	755
Monmouth . .	By gun-fire, Nov. 1 . .	9,800	1901	537
Hawke . .	Torpedoed, Oct. 15 . .	7,350	1891	544
Hermes . .	Torpedoed, Oct. 31 . .	5,600	1898	456
Amphion . .	Mined, Aug. 6 . .	3,440	1911	320
Pathfinder . .	Torpedoed, Sept. 5 . .	2,940	1904	268
Pegasus . .	By gun-fire, Sept. 20 . .	2,135	1897	234

Gunboats :

Speedy . .	Mined, Sept. 3 . .	810	1893	85
Niger . .	Torpedoed, Nov. 11 . .	810	1893	85

Submarines :

AE. 1 . .	Foundered, Sept. 14 . .	725	1912	24
E. 3 . .	Destroyed off Germany, Oct. 18	725	1911	24
D. 5 . .	Mined, Nov. 3 . .	550	1909	24

Armed Merchantmen :

Oceanic . .	Wrecked, Sept. 8 . .	7,333	—	—
Rohilla . .	Mined, Oct. 30 . .	4,240	—	—

FRENCH.

Gunboat :

Zelée . .	By gun-fire, Oct. 22 . .	680	1899	100
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Destroyer :

Mousquet . .	Torpedoed Oct. 28. . .	298	1902	62
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Torpedo-boats :

347 . .	Collision, Oct. 9 . .	98	1906	26
338 . .	Collision, Oct. 9 . .	97	1906	20

RUSSIAN.

Cruisers :

Pallada . .	Torpedoed, Oct. 11 . .	7,775	1906	573
Jemtschug . .	Torpedoed, Oct. 28 . .	3,050	1903	340

Armed Merchantman :

Prut . .	By gun-fire, Oct. 29 . .	5,500	—	—
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JAPANESE.

<i>Cruiser :</i>		Lost.	Tons.	Launched.	Crew.
Ships.					
Takachiho	.	Mined, Oct. 17 . . .	3,700	1885	357
<i>Destroyer :</i>					
Shirataye	.	Wrecked, Sept. 4 . . .	380	1905	70

GERMANY.

<i>Cruisers :</i>					
Yorck	.	Mined, Nov. 3 . . .	9,050	1904	638
Megdeburg	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 27 . . .	4,500	1911	373
Köln	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 28 . . .	4,350	1909	379
Mainz	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 28 . . .	4,350	1909	379
Ariadne	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 28 . . .	2,660	1900	275
Hela	.	Torpedoed, Sept. 13 . . .	2,040	1895	187
Emden	.	By gun-fire, Nov. 8 . . .	3,544	1908	361
Königsberg	.	Bottled up, Oct. 30 . . .	3,550	1906	322

<i>Gunboats :</i>					
Itlis	.	Captured at Tsing-tao, Nov. 6	900	1898	125
Juguar	.	" " Nov. 6	900	1898	125
Luchs	.	" " Nov. 6	900	1899	125
Möwe	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 9 . . .	650	1906	81
Tsing-tao	.	Interned, Aug. 17 . . .	168	1903	45
Vaterland	.	Interned, Aug. 17 . . .	168	1903	45

<i>Destroyers :</i>					
V. 187	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 28 . . .	650	1910	82
S. 126	.	Torpedoed, Oct. 6 . . .	487	1901-2	55
S. 119	.	By gun-fire, Oct. 17 . . .	420	"	"
S. 118	.	" " . . .	420	"	"
S. 117	.	" " . . .	420	"	"
S. 115	.	" " . . .	420	"	"
S. 90	.	Driven ashore, Oct. 20 . . .	396	1899	56
S. 124	.	Sunk after collision, Nov. 23	463	1904	56
Taku	.	Captured at Tsing-tao, Nov. 6	280	1898	50

<i>Submarine :</i>					
No. 15	.	Run down, Aug. 9 . . .	250	1909	24
No. 18	.	Rammed, Nov. 23 . . .	650	1912	27
[Several other German submarines are believed to have been lost.]					

Armed Merchantmen :

Cap Trafalgar	.	By gun-fire, Sept. 14 . . .	9,854	—	—
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 27 . . .	5,521	—	—
Bethania	.	Captured, Sept.	4,848	—	—
Markomannia	.	Captured, Oct.	2,840	—	—
Spreewald	.	Captured, Sept. 12 . . .	2,414	—	—
Græcia	.	Captured, Oct.	1,697	—	—
Königin Luise	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 5 . . .	948	—	—
Ophelia	.	Captured, Oct. 17 . . .	—	—	—
Itolo	.	By gun-fire, Sept.	165	—	—
Rhios	.	By gun-fire, Sept.	150	—	—
Soden	.	Captured, Sept.	150	—	—

AUSTRIA.

Cruisers:

Ships.		Lost.	Tons.	Launched.	Crew.
Kaiserin	Eliza-	Sunk by her own crew,			
beth	.	Tsing-tao, Nov. 6	4,000	1890	418
Zenta	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 16	2,300	1897	305

Gunboat:

Temes	.	Mined, Oct. 23	440
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Torpedo-boat:

19	.	Mined, Aug. 17	78	1886	28
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All the vessels torpedoed, except the Russian Cruiser 'Jemtchug' and the French Destroyer 'Mousquet,' were destroyed by Submarines.

The British losses of warships, apart from submarines, include only one vessel less than ten years old—the 'Amphion,' while the 'Pathfinder' almost comes within that period, having been launched on July 16, 1904. Of the other vessels two were 13 years old, two 14 years, one 15 years, one 16 years, one 17 years, two 21 years, one 23 years. According to German calculations, a cruising ship remains effective 15 years; and on this assumption the toll in ships has not been heavy, though the sacrifice of life has been grievous. Our allies have suffered the loss of only one ship of consequence—the 'Pallada.' Turning to the enemy, the Germans are the weaker, apart from the 'Hela,' by 7 cruisers which were of value as war units, and the Austrians by two ships more or less obsolescent; the Germans have also been deprived of 6 gunboats, 11 torpedo craft—probably the number is larger—and eleven merchant ships which were performing war duties.

An examination of the casualties of the war leads to the conclusion that the process of attrition has far more seriously affected the striking power of the German than that of the British Fleet. The effect of this has been to increase still further our margin of superiority, since it follows that if the weaker Power loses more ships than the stronger, the latter gains no inconsiderable further advantage, particularly if on the outbreak of war, as in our case, the stronger Navy had a greater number of ships on the eve of completion for sea. In his letter to Prince Louis of Battenburg on the latter's resignation of the position of First Sea Lord, Mr

Churchill referred to 'The enormous impending influx of capital ships, the score of 30-knot cruisers, the destroyers and submarines unequalled in modern construction which are now coming to hand.' In his speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet the First Lord referred again to the growing strength of the Navy :

'At the end of nearly a hundred days of war the Navy, . . . in spite of losses of ships of no great consequence, of officers and men irreparable—the Navy, in spite of losses, is actually and relatively stronger at every point and in every branch compared to our enemies than it was on the first day war was declared, and it is stronger most particularly in those branches of the Naval service which all the circumstances of modern war prove to exercise the most powerful influence upon the struggle.'

While we do well not to minimise our losses, it is very necessary that they should be studied in true perspective. Any admiral can preserve his command intact if he does nothing ; but, if he exerts himself to bring economic pressure upon the enemy, it is inevitable that casualties will from time to time be reported. In order to hit the stomach of the enemy—for this is the task confided to the British Navy—he has to expose his own head ; and science has given the foe, acting on the defensive, new means of stealthy attack. The loss of a few cruisers on the part of a great naval Power with overwhelming strength is as nothing compared with the injury which is day by day inflicted upon an enemy dependent more or less upon oversea supplies. He may show few signs of exhaustion during the first few months of war, but the effect is cumulative. We may be assured that, as the war progresses, Germany and Austria will suffer more disastrously from the silent pressure of the British Navy than from the active operations of the allied armies. The latter strike blows which cause heavy loss of life, but the vacant places in the ranks can for a long period be made good from the reserves ; there is no means of easing the economic situation which is created by naval pressure. The reserves of Germany and Austria-Hungary in food and raw materials, and particularly raw materials which are necessary for the making of new armaments, are in the present situation obtainable

only from oversea. The British Fleet, in association with the fleets of France and Japan, denies safe passage ; and consequently there is no possibility of relieving the situation in these two countries in so far as it is affected by a shortage of supplies.

It is no object of regret that no naval battle should have occurred either in the North Sea or in the Mediterranean. It would be foolish on our part to complain because the enemy has yielded to us the fruits of command of the sea without calling upon us to pay for them—fruits which he can never hope to regain. There is a tendency to underestimate the value of the victories which our sea power has been winning from day to day and week to week. In naval history there is no record of conquest so triumphant as that which the last four months have provided. The oversea trade of Germany and Austria, which rivalled our own, has been brought to a standstill ; profits are not being made, and the goodwill of the enemies' business men is disappearing. German and Austrian shipping has been either captured or driven off the seas ; and it is doubtful if the mercantile marines of these two countries will ever recover the position which they occupied prior to the war. The German flag has been swept off the Pacific ; Kiao-chau, on which over 20,000,000*l.* had been spent, and the other Pacific colonies, have passed from German control ; of the colonial empire, which was the pride of the Kaiser's subjects, all that remains are isolated territories in Africa, which in due course will have to be surrendered. We can, therefore, look back upon the progress of naval events since the war opened at the beginning of August with feelings of satisfaction almost unalloyed.

There have, however, been incidents in the naval campaign which have occasioned disquietude. So far the public has been provided with no explanations of several events, and has been left to draw its own conclusions from meagre statements issued from time to time. In the first place the escape of the German cruisers 'Goeben' and 'Breslau' in the Mediterranean still remains a mystery. It has been announced that the disposition of ships made by Admiral Sir A. Berkeley Milne, the Commander-in-Chief of the British force, has been approved by the naval authorities. The court-martial

which was demanded by Rear-Admiral E. T. C. Troubridge, who was in command of the First (Mediterranean) Cruiser Squadron, has resulted in a full and honourable acquittal. Neither officer has been held to blame for this unfortunate incident, which apparently had no slight influence in leading Turkey to join in the war. In the second place, no statement has been forthcoming to explain why ships of such large size as the three Cressys, with crews numbering 1,459 officers and men, were employed in performing patrol duty, which could as efficiently, if not more efficiently, have been done by smaller ships offering a smaller target and carrying much smaller crews. Nothing, moreover, has been stated officially in explanation of the absence of a screen of destroyers on this occasion. It has been affirmed that the small craft were driven into port by the high seas which were running. If this were the fact, it is regrettable that no official statement has been made, and that the nation has been furnished with no reasons in excuse for these ships being left to cruise under conditions so perilous. In the third place, public anxiety has been aroused by the action off the Pacific coast when three British cruisers—the 'Good Hope,' 'Monmouth' and 'Glasgow'—were engaged by three German ships with disastrous results.* The British ships were older, slower and less powerfully armed. The disparity in armament is revealed in the following statement :

GERMAN SQUADRON.	
Armament.	Weights of Shells.
16 8·2" guns	4400 lbs.
12 5·9" "	1212 "
10 4·1" "	350 "
36 3·4" "	756 "
Total weight of metal thrown by German guns .	6718 lbs.

BRITISH SQUADRON.	
Armament.	Weights of Shells.
2 9·2" guns	760 lbs.
32 6" "	3200 "
10 4" "	310 "
21 12 pds. guns	252 "
Total weight of metal thrown by British guns .	4522 lbs.

* It seems clear from the report of Captain John Luce, of the cruiser 'Glasgow,' that only one small cruiser, and not three, was with the flag of Vice-Admiral von Spee.

When it is borne in mind that the British vessels were far less heavily armoured as well as armed, and that with the 'Glasgow' they fought with the afterglow of the sunset silhouetting them and at a range of about seven miles, at which their guns must have been comparatively ineffective, the deplorable loss of the 'Good Hope' and 'Monmouth' is a result which might have been foreseen. It has been stated by the Admiralty that the battleship 'Canopus' had received orders to join Sir Christopher Cradock's squadron, but it has also been admitted officially that she was not present to assist in defending the British flag; and so far—for good reason or bad—no statement has been issued in explanation of her absence.

The Admiralty's claim, advanced by the First Lord in the House of Commons on Nov. 27, that nothing can be revealed at present in connexion with these incidents which could profit the enemy, must be admitted. On the other hand, will the passage of time and subsequent revelations prove that the naval authorities have taken the nation into their confidence to as great an extent as they could have done without injury to our interests? A time of war is no occasion for captious criticism, but, when thousands of officers and men have been called upon to sacrifice their lives, there is a natural anxiety for the most complete assurance, which can only come with fuller knowledge, that their lives were not sacrificed in vain or unnecessarily. The real point is, whether, without jeopardising British naval interests, a fuller revelation could not have been made of the facts.

It is no mere accident of war that the large ships which have been sunk by the Germans on these several occasions were all vessels which were either obsolete or obsolescent. The nation will do well not to conclude, in the absence of more complete details than are at present available, that the strategical arrangements of the Admiralty have been at fault or that the officers in command have been to blame for losses sustained. Judgment must be suspended. When the history of the war comes to be written, the sinking of these ships and the sacrifice of so many lives will be attributed, there is reason to anticipate, in the main to two correlated causes. In the first place, it has been necessary to maintain a force of overwhelming power and high

efficiency in the main strategical theatres—in the North Sea and the Mediterranean—where the issue of the war will be decided and where the British and French Fleets have been able to exert economic pressure on the enemy. These dispositions have exhausted the resources of modern ships at the disposal of the naval authorities of the two countries, and there have remained only older craft for what must be regarded as the incidental operations of war on the seas. The policy of concentration could not be abandoned in order to supply the deficiencies in the outer seas directly traceable to the policy of economy which was forced upon the Admiralty during the years of peace.

This is no time for party polemics and recriminations, but there are facts which should not be ignored. What is the truth? The Unionist Party, with more or less consistency, urged in the House of Commons that our naval preparations were being made on an inadequate scale. The Unionist Party represented a minority of the electors of the United Kingdom. The majority not only was opposed to larger appropriations to the Fleet, but on the eve of the war was displaying increased irritation at the fact that year by year so much money was voted for the Fleet. So recently as November 1913, the delegates who attended the annual meeting of the National Liberal Federation, under the presidency of Sir John Brunner, passed, not by a majority, but unanimously, a resolution protesting against the existing scale of expenditure upon the Navy. This meeting was attended by representatives from every part of the country, and not a voice was raised in opposition to this resolution. In the following month a deputation of thirty-nine members of Parliament waited upon the Prime Minister in order to reinforce the arguments which had been advanced at Nottingham. In view of subsequent events it may be of interest to recall the names of these members.

Baron de Forest.
Sir W. P. Byles.
Mr Arthur Ponsonby.
Mr J. A. Murray Macdonald.
Mr G. Harvey.

Mr W. H. Dickinson.
Sir John Jardine.
Mr S. L. Hughes.
Mr Hector Morison.
Mr G. H. Radford.

Mr H. Chancellor.
 Mr A. C. Morton.
 Sir W. P. Beale.
 Mr P. A. Molteno.
 The Hon. F. McLaren.
 Major McMicking.
 Mr T. E. Harvey.
 Mr F. Kellaway.
 Mr A. Marshall.
 Sir S. Collins.
 The Hon. R. Denman.
 Mr J. A. Baker.
 Mr D. M. Mason.
 Mr Leif Jones.
 Dr Chapple.

Mr H. Manfield.
 Mr H. Nuttall.
 Mr E. Jones.
 Mr P. Alden.
 Dr Addison.
 Mr A. Rowntree.
 Mr J. M. Henderson.
 Mr H. J. Glanville.
 Mr J. W. Pratt.
 Mr J. A. Bryce.
 Mr D. V. Pirie.
 Mr W. M. R. Pringle.
 Mr A. MacCallum Scott.
 Mr T. Lough.

By this action, the above-named members singled themselves out for special reprobation; but the views which they held were those which a large number of members expressed on every possible occasion in the House of Commons. Most of the Liberal Party and almost all the members of the Labour and Nationalist Parties protested against the scale of naval expenditure demanded from Parliament year by year. Fortunately the majority of them were more intent upon obtaining the fruits of the Parliament Act than anything else, and were content to postpone the day of reckoning with the Government until the Home Rule, Welsh Disestablishment, and Plural Voting Bills had been put upon the Statute Book. Let it be admitted that the Government, in its successive Navy Estimates, not only went beyond the wishes of its supporters in the House of Commons, but had driven to exasperation by its standard of naval expenditure—the sum rose to 51,500,000*l.* this spring—the majority of those electors throughout the United Kingdom on whose good opinion its continuance in office depended.

Now that war is in progress, we are paying in ships and in valuable lives the penalty of economy. The cruisers which were not built are the cruisers which we now need. There is no incident in history more astounding than the failure of the people of this maritime empire to realise what sea-power means to them. Reference has already been made to the action of the majority in the House of Commons and the opinions which were

held by the vast proportion of the electors of the United Kingdom. Even the Unionist Party, which criticised the Government's proposals for the Navy, lacked the courage to come out boldly in advocacy of a standard of two keels to one against the next greatest naval Power. The oversea Dominions, which are now pouring out their men and treasure with magnificent generosity, failed to recognise the peril which threatened them. The Imperial Squadron which was advocated five years ago at the Imperial Conference—being then described as fleet units—had no existence when hostilities opened.* Five years were lost; and, when the crisis came, there was no squadron of battle-cruisers and scouts to take up the task of patrolling the great trade-routes and hunting down the German cruisers which have succeeded in doing so much damage to British shipping. Had the Admiralty had at their disposal, for these operations in the outer seas, six or eight battle-cruisers, each mounting eight 12-inch guns and of high speed, the 'Good Hope' and 'Monmouth' would never have been destroyed. Had the naval authorities possessed eight or twelve cruisers of the Town class, the old cruiser 'Pegasus' with her crazy engines would have never been caught broken down at Zanzibar and been converted into a shambles by the gunfire of the 'Königsberg,' and the careers of the 'Emden' and other German cruisers would have been shortened. As has ever been the case in our history, economy in war preparations, during the years of peace, has proved the grossest extravagance in time of war; and unhappily the price has had to be paid, not by those who were responsible for the economy, but by those who realised where it tended.

The lessons which the naval war has taught are the value of speed and the importance of numbers. In the Bight of Heligoland twelve large ships, because they were swift, could operate in the enemy's waters though they were known to be infested with submarines. The same moral was reinforced by the sinking of the slow cruisers in the North Sea. Owing to

* Australia and New Zealand, it should in fairness be added, did build some ships. The latter Dominion's battle-cruiser assisted in the smart engagement—the first of the war—in the Bight of Heligoland, and the Commonwealth's small cruiser 'Sydney' sank the 'Emden.'

their high speed and the immensity of the seas, the German cruisers which have been harassing our commerce succeeded for many weeks in eluding action; and even now only two of them have been rounded up. Although it is too early in the war to reach any final conclusion as to the menace of the submarine, a succession of incidents has already suggested that it is neither invincible nor invulnerable, and that the surface ship has in high speed, gun power, and the ram an effective means of reprisal. 'More frigates'—fast sailing ships of small size—was the continual cry of Nelson in the last century; we may be sure that it is the cry which our admirals are now making. Speed is the weather-gauge of modern war; and, so far as we have been called upon to suffer losses, the reverses have been due to rejection of the two Nelsonian maxims—'More frigates' and 'Only numbers can annihilate.'

It is impossible to ignore the losses which we have incurred, but there is solid satisfaction to be drawn from the inevitable conclusion that nothing has happened which can affect adversely our fortunes upon the seas. Despite incidents which are regrettable, the naval organisation has triumphed to an extent which we had no reason to expect; and we have been supplied with convincing proof that in two important factors we are supreme. The Board of Admiralty has worked with energy and success; and the officers and men of the fleets at sea have shown that, though the ships have changed and many new and embarrassing conditions of naval warfare have been introduced, they are still instinct with the same spirit that gave into our keeping the trident over a hundred years ago.

ARCHIBALD HURD.

III.—IN SERBIA.

THE fog of war, which lies so heavily upon all Europe since the beginning of last August, has naturally obscured the eastern campaign which Austria-Hungary so lightly undertook against Serbia. But greater events nearer

home must not allow us to underestimate the influence of the Balkan situation upon the conflict as a whole. It deserves our attention for various reasons. In the first place the Austro-Serbian dispute, and the Southern Slav problem which underlies it, formed the *causa causans* of the European war; and its final settlement, in whatever form, is one of the most essential preliminaries to a stable peace in Europe. Secondly, Serbia has rendered very signal services to the common cause of the allies; for throughout the opening months of the campaign she has held at bay four Austrian army corps which might otherwise have been employed in Alsace or in Belgium, and which might perhaps even have turned the scale at a critical moment. It was Serbia's need which brought Russia into the field, just as it was the fate of Belgium which finally decided our own intervention; and it is becoming more and more obvious that, just as Germany regards Belgium not merely as a right of way but as a permanent acquisition, so Austria-Hungary aims at the complete subjugation of the two Serb kingdoms.

When Austria-Hungary arrogantly announced her 'punitive expedition,' many persons in this country jumped to the hasty conclusion that Serbia was doomed, and that her resistance would be overcome long before Russia could come to her aid. They may perhaps be excused for thus underestimating Serbia's capacity as a military power, for her reputation had been clouded by the regicide of 1903; her achievements in the first Balkan war—at the battles of Kumanovo and Monastir—had been persistently belittled or ignored by blind admirers of Bulgaria; and the very scanty records of the second Balkan war, which reached these shores, failed to give any adequate idea of Serbia's exploits at the Bregalnitz. Even those who had formed a juster opinion, might fairly be excused for imagining that the exhaustion produced by her recent wars with Turkey and Bulgaria would seriously affect her powers of resistance in a war against one of the great Powers. In thus arguing, however, they forgot not merely the extraordinary recuperative force of the Serb peasantry, but above all the intensity of the national feeling which nerved the nation to resist. Rightly or wrongly, every Serb has for years past regarded a conflict with Austria as

inevitable; and it is no secret that Serbia's efforts to perfect her army in the four years which elapsed between the Bosnian annexation and the Balkan war had defence against Austria rather than aggression against Turkey as their objective. To the Serb, then, the war means a struggle for existence against an irreconcilable foe, and at the same time for the liberation of his enslaved kinsmen from a foreign yoke.

While, however, the war is for Serbia a national war in the most literal sense of the term, there are very obvious limits to her resources, and even the greatest gallantry cannot hold out against overwhelming odds. In the first Balkan war the Serbs succeeded in putting 356,000 men into the field, exclusive of the last line of defence, which was employed upon internal lines of communication. Despite their losses against the Turks, it is calculated that the forces with which they opposed Bulgaria amounted to 348,000, a number of new drafts having been hurriedly enrolled in the interval. During the last year a new division, that of the Vardar, has been raised from the population of the newly acquired territory; but, after all necessary allowances have been made, it would still not be safe to estimate the effective forces of the Serbian army during the present war at a higher figure than 350,000, though doubtless another 50,000 or 100,000 would have to be accounted for, before the final resistance could be quelled.

The Serbs are weak in cavalry, though the few regiments which they have are of good quality; but the hilly nature of the country which they have to defend explains and minimises the defect. It is more than atoned for by their infantry, which has repeatedly shown powers of endurance and an *élan* of which any army in the world might be proud. This is still further strengthened by the almost ideal relations which prevail between officers and men—a feature which must have impressed every one who has visited their camps and shared their mess. The great difficulty has always been, not to spur them on, but to hold them back. Men to whom Marko Kraljević, the hero of their national ballads, is no mere myth, but a heroic reality, heading their columns on his white charger and waving them on to victory—such men are not to be judged by the ordinary

standards of modern warfare. But perhaps their most formidable arm is their artillery, which is not merely material of the very first class, but is served with deadly precision and efficiency and quite unusual mobility. The Serb gunnery officers have learnt all that the most proficient Frenchmen can teach them. Their medical and sanitary arrangements compared very favourably with those of their Bulgarian allies during the first Balkan war; and it is to this that must be ascribed the far larger proportion of recoveries from wounds and the relatively greater immunity from epidemics among the Serbians. Those who judge armies by the goose-step or by parade uniforms will not have much praise for the Serbian army (though it may be worth mentioning that its field-service kit is one of the smartest in Europe); but as a fighting machine, seasoned by the rough-and-tumble experiences of two recent campaigns, it cannot be valued too highly, within the limits prescribed by a country of four million inhabitants.

The data, without which any final verdict upon the present campaign is impossible, are still lacking, and it would therefore be rash to attempt anything more than a mere outline of events. It is known that the Serbian Government and General Staff had long regarded aggression on the part of the Dual Monarchy as a grave possibility; but it is equally certain that the authorities were taken unawares by the events of last July. Immediately after the declaration of war the seat of government was transferred from Belgrade to Nish; and the army was concentrated round Kraguyevatz, in the very centre of the country. Indeed, it appears to have been taken for granted that the Austrian mobilisation would completely outpace the Serbian, and that vastly superior Austrian forces would occupy Belgrade and Valyevo, the strategic keys of the north and west, before the Serbs could be ready for resistance on any large scale. The fact that after nearly four months of hostilities the Austrians have only accomplished one-half of the programme which they originally hoped to achieve within a fortnight, should prevent us to-day from excessive pessimism in judging the situation.

The first efforts of the Austrians were of necessity directed towards effecting a crossing over the rivers Save

and Danube, which form the northern boundary of Serbia. They were, however, successfully frustrated by the Serbs, who had of course made a very careful study of the vulnerable points along the entire river front, and were thus able to place artillery in selected positions, in which the superior height of the southern bank secured them a distinct advantage. Over a fortnight passed without a single Austrian soldier effecting a crossing; and thus the Serbian army was ready long before the first serious advance took place. On Aug. 12 the Austrians crossed the Save and the Drina in N.-W. Serbia, at that point where the junction of the two rivers forms a kind of peninsula of flat and fertile land. On the 16th and 17th there was desperate fighting on the line between Shabatz and Lesnitsa, in which the invaders received a severe check; and on the 21st the battle was resumed on a still larger scale, the decisive position being at Cer (Tsér). On Aug. 25 the Austrian forces were finally routed and driven back in great confusion across the Drina into Bosnia. It is calculated that at least 200,000 men were engaged on either side; the Austrian casualties were especially heavy, and large stores, and over 60 guns, fell into Serbian hands. The town of Shabatz was reoccupied, but was found to have suffered severely from the same methods which the Germans have applied with such success in Belgium.


At this stage two of the Austrian corps were transferred northwards to Galicia, and the offensive against Serbia was abandoned for the moment. Throughout August, however, the Austrian guns bombarded Belgrade at regular intervals, and many important buildings were destroyed or seriously injured. This treatment of an undefended town—a town, moreover, in which so much of the resources and civilisation of the little kingdom are concentrated—unquestionably formed part of a deliberate system. Roused by such continuous provocation, the Serbs planned a daring coup. On Sept. 10 they succeeded in crossing the Save under cover of night, stormed the town of Semlin in Syrmia, and silenced the guns which commanded Belgrade. Some weeks earlier, in combination with the Montenegrin forces, they had assumed the offensive along the southern frontier of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on Sept. 14 succeeded in occupying the

strong garrison post of Vishegrad, formerly the Austrian point of departure for the Sandjak of Novibazar.

Such aggressive moves on the part of Serbia compelled the Austrians to resume the offensive. Reinforcements were poured into Bosnia, and on Sept. 9, after three days' fighting, a large Austrian army forced its way across the Drina from a line stretching from Bjelina to Zvornik. Strengthened continually by fresh troops, they at first forced the Serbs to retire; but the latter in their turn hurried up further reinforcements. The battle of the Drina, as it has been collectively called, lasted for three days longer (Sept. 15-17), and ended in the rout of the Austrian right and a second complete ejection of the invaders from Serbian soil. The effort had, however, necessitated the evacuation of Semlin and a complete withdrawal from Syrmia. A week before, the Serb population of that district had welcomed the Serbian army with enthusiasm; and now the returning Austrians took a terrible revenge, with the result that crowds of fugitives made their way into Serbia and put a further strain upon the scanty resources of the little kingdom.

Their second great victory, however, encouraged the Serbs to resume operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Montenegrins occupied Fotcha, and a joint column advanced to within ten miles of Sarajevo. But the defences of the Bosnian capital are very strong; and this attack was mainly a piece of bluff, intended to impress the native population. Sarajevo can only be seriously threatened from the north, and this involves a strong offensive movement through the north-east corner of Bosnia. Such a move would have been attended by great danger for the Serbs, in view of their lack of reserves, the increasing difficulty of communication with their base, and the ease with which the Austrians could push up reinforcements from Croatia. If the plan was ever seriously considered, its abandonment became inevitable from the moment when the third Austrian offensive began; and this in its turn has rendered retirement from the neighbourhood of Sarajevo necessary.

Since the beginning of October precise information with regard to the Serbian campaign has been scantier than ever. The Austrians appear to have brought up



Pronunciation: — c-ts, č-tch, š-sh, ž-French j.

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additional heavy guns, and after weeks of almost hand-to-hand fighting occupied the hills of Gutchevo, between Shabatz and the Bosnian border. Their numbers have been gradually increased by new levies, until they are believed to amount to 5 or even 6 army corps; and the Serbs, after falling back upon Valyevo, have at length found it necessary to evacuate that town altogether and to take up a strong defensive position in central Serbia, with the town and military arsenal of Kraguyevatz as their centre.

It is impossible to attempt any estimate of the losses of the campaign. The Serbs have admittedly suffered far more severely than in either of the Balkan wars, and their scanty medical resources have been strained to the uttermost. On the other hand, the Austrian casualties have been appalling. According to a seemingly authentic report which has reached the 'Morning Post' from Budapest, the campaign against Serbia is officially, though not publicly, admitted to have cost the Dual Monarchy up to the end of October 791 officers and 37,647 men killed, 2219 officers and 90,736 men wounded, and 118 officers and 17,087 men missing—in other words, a total of 148,598! Such is the heroic record of the Serbian army, whose destruction is likely to strain the resources of Austria-Hungary to the uttermost.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

Art. 8.—RECRUITING, AND THE CENSORSHIP.

THE military situation, so far as this country is concerned, gives ample food for thought. In some respects it is satisfactory, in others not. The War Office merits high praise for the celerity and smoothness with which our Expeditionary Force was mobilised, concentrated and despatched to the Continent, prepared in every respect to take the field. The Fleet was ready even before the declaration of war, and has, with comparatively slight loss, performed its difficult and dangerous task of holding the seas. Above all, the officers and men of our army in the field have shown a degree of self-sacrifice, courage and endurance unsurpassed in the most glorious pages of our military history, and, in conjunction with our Allies, have succeeded in stemming the tide of invasion which had engulfed Belgium and threatened the existence of France. All this is so much to the good; it is matter for legitimate satisfaction. Indeed, we were so agreeably surprised at the efficiency displayed, at our readiness for war, so far as the Expeditionary Force was concerned, that we have never ceased to congratulate ourselves upon it since. It has saved at least some portion of that self-complacency which is our national besetting sin, and has half obscured the unpleasing fact that we are, as usual, in a spasm of belated anxiety, only doing our best to 'muddle through.' Forewarned was not, in our case, forearmed; the warnings were in plenty, but they were unheeded or ignored. We were caught unprepared, and we are now improvising an army in the middle of a war.

Nothing is to be gained by recrimination now; and, although Ministers who have ruled the country for the last eight years must bear the principal blame for the present difficult and even dangerous situation, the Opposition cannot escape its share. The Unionist party, as a whole, have indeed striven manfully to prevent the reductions in our naval and military forces to which benighted pacifists sought, only too successfully, to coerce their leaders; but they never came out clearly—as did a few members like Col. Weston—in favour of any measure which could give us real security. To the pleadings of the war-worn veteran who has just been laid to rest in St Paul's, Conservatives were only a shade less deaf than

Liberals. But it is necessary to point out the results of the policy which has been pursued, and to consider the difficulties in which we are now involved.

To begin with, the whole scheme of defence launched some years ago, after so much 'hard thinking,' has proved utterly inadequate and has had to be abandoned. One of the first things the Government did after the outbreak of war was to send for Lord Kitchener;* and the first thing Lord Kitchener did was to call for a million of men, not for home defence but for service abroad—a demand which has since then been largely increased. What becomes of the repeated assurances so comfortably, we might say unctuously advanced, that an Expeditionary Force of 160,000 men was all that could be required? The Territorial Army was to consist of some 300,000 men (it never reached nearly that figure before the war); that number has now been exceeded by at least 50 per cent. Its duties were to be those of home defence—to guard the coast and repel raids or even invasion; this limitation has been abandoned, and a large proportion of the men have volunteered for foreign service. Many of its units have gone to our dependencies and foreign possessions; others are fighting in Belgium, and more will doubtless go. They have, in fact, become the reserves of the Expeditionary Force. And all this rearrangement has had to be made in the midst of war, a war in which we are struggling for national existence hardly a hundred miles from our own coast. Has the parable of the Foolish Virgins ever received more damning illustration?

On what grounds, again, it may well be asked, was the number of the Expeditionary Force fixed at just 160,000 men? What military problem was this number designed to meet? What particular enemy was to be faced? The answer was given by that especially 'hard thinker,' Lord Haldane, only a short time ago when, in the debate on the Army Annual Bill 1913, he said:

'The six divisions, the 160,000 men, of the Expeditionary Force owe their origin to no calculation of what sort of an army we should require on the Continent or in any other place.'

* Incidentally it may be remarked that, if the Ulster imbroglio did nothing else for us, it at least gave us Lord Kitchener in our time of need; for it may be presumed that, but for Col. Seeley's resignation, the present Secretary would now have been wasting his energies in Egypt.

It can hardly, then, be called a miscalculation, for there appears to have been no calculation at all. Whatever it was, we have paid and are paying bitterly for it. Our little army—numbering, at first, little over half the promised total—was flung, like a ‘forlorn hope,’ into the breach; and it has suffered the losses of a ‘forlorn hope.’ By this time its losses amount to about the full number of men originally sent to the front. That it escaped complete destruction at the outset was due, not to the non-calculations of the late Secretary for War, but to its own extraordinary fighting qualities, which barely averted a disaster more crushing than any that has hitherto befallen the British arms. Had we been able to put only half a million trained men in the field, that risk need never have been run. Since the first woeful inroads upon its strength during the retreat from Mons, that little force has displayed, in the battles on the Marne and the Aisne, a recuperative vigour and a courage in attack which are nothing short of marvellous; while, in the defence of Ypres, it has withstood day after day, night after night, and week after week, the repeated and concentrated attacks of overwhelming armies. A more magnificent example of stubborn endurance in defence and of courage and vigour in counter-attack has never been displayed. But at what a sacrifice of noble lives has the victory been won! We do not envy the feelings of the politicians—if indeed they are capable of remorse—when they survey the results of a blind and cheese-paring policy which condemned that thin khaki line, daily growing thinner, to bear a brunt which required at least thrice its strength.

That crisis over, the immediate danger staved off, we have now, after nearly three months of fierce and incessant fighting, another problem to solve—how to get, and how to train and equip, the armies which will be required to wear down the resistance of a brave, skilful and resolute enemy. How to *get* them, first; the rest, we may assume, will follow. A fine response has been made to Lord Kitchener’s demand—a response the like of which has never been made in this country before. Speaking at the Mansion House, the Secretary for War avowed that he had no complaint to make on this score; and again, in the House of Lords, on Nov. 26, he expressed

himself as satisfied with the results. But at the same time he made it clear that he would want more, many more men; and, when the time came, he would make the appeal. Is he so sure, then, and can we be sure, that they will come when called; or will he, like Glendower, call in vain? The future safety of the country, and the durability of the peace that will end the war, depend upon the answer to this question. Recruits are coming in now, Lord Kitchener tells us, at the rate of 'approximately' 30,000 a week. That is well, so far as it goes; but at this rate it will take between eight and nine months to collect another million of men, and it will be a year or fifteen months before a considerable proportion of these will be ready to take the field. That is not the way in which this war can be brought to a successful termination; at all events we cannot contemplate without dismay the idea that the summer of 1916 may find us still engaged. Nothing is so futile as to go on indefinitely dribbling-in reinforcements merely to make good losses. If it is true on land, as Nelson held it to be at sea, that only numbers can annihilate, at this rate we shall never have the numbers. We shall manage to defend positions, to repel attacks, perhaps even to make some progress, but we shall never win the decisive victory. A year hence we shall be holding trenches in Flanders as we are to-day. For the Germans can play this game as well as we; and, unless the Austrians desert their allies, or the Russians completely crush their opponents—which is too much to hope for within many months—they will continue to do so.

The fact to be faced, then, is that we want a great many more men; and the problem is to ascertain what causes hinder us from getting them, or from getting them quickly enough. We can perhaps afford a long-drawn conflict better than our opponents; but, even if we were to think of ourselves alone, we cannot contemplate without the gravest anxiety the economical and other effects of a prolonged struggle. But we are not to think of ourselves alone. War is not raging in this country; it is raging, with all the disastrous results of a ruthless invasion, in France, Belgium, Russia and elsewhere. It was a most unfortunate suggestion—for which certain Ministers are not devoid of blame—

that we can look forward with equanimity to a three years' war. The statement is unwise if limited to ourselves; it is absolutely untrue if we consider our allies, and the last thing we should do is to speak or act as if we did not consider them. On every account, we must strive to finish the job as quickly and as completely as we can, and remember that 'only numbers can annihilate.'

The Government have done well to institute a house-to-house enquiry, with a view to ascertaining what number of able-bodied men may still be relied on to come forward if required; though the implication, that they may not be required for some time, if at all, is, if the foregoing considerations are correct, likely to create an unfortunate impression. But this is not enough. In view of the efforts that are being made, both by individuals and by organisations like the Central Committee, to bring home to the backward portions of the community a sense of their duty to the country, it is very desirable that information should be accessible—not necessarily for publication—as to what districts, towns or villages, and what sections of the people have hitherto failed to produce their proper quota of volunteers. The withholding of such information seems to be part of the secrecy which has enshrouded so much that might well be known. As things are, the efforts referred to are often wasted or misdirected. Meetings are held and stirring addresses delivered in places from which practically every available man has volunteered; others, in which there has been little or no response to the call, are neglected. Civilian assistance in the work of recruiting, as in other matters, seems to be disregarded or even snubbed by the War Office; although, as has been frequently pointed out in the 'Spectator' and elsewhere, it is or may be, if properly informed and directed, of the greatest use. So long as the voluntary system is maintained, and recruits, in large numbers, have to be persuaded to come in, civilian assistance, through the spoken or written word, is in fact indispensable. The military authorities can bring no such pressure to bear.

In some respects the military authorities themselves are, it would appear, to blame for the falling-off in the number of recruits. At one time men were coming in, no doubt,

faster than they could be handled, housed, or equipped. Having never foreseen, or rather having deliberately refused to provide for, the possibility of a war requiring millions rather than thousands of men, the War Office found itself naturally unable to cope with the sudden demand for all that appertains to the training and equipment of large numbers. They were in risk of being 'snowed under,' so to speak, by recruits; they therefore raised the standard and otherwise checked the supply. But military enthusiasm is like a syphon; so long as you let it run, it runs; once checked, it may be difficult to restore the flow. We do not presume to judge of military details, but surely the importance attached to height is, in these days, mistaken. A short man may perhaps be at some disadvantage in a bayonet charge; he is, on the other hand, less likely to be hit by bullets. Girth and depth of chest—to speak of physical qualities only—would seem to be far more important than height; and to insist on a standard which would exclude Goorkhas and Japanese from a fighting force appears absurd. However, by this and other means the supply of recruits was checked; and the result has been unfortunate. The impression was given that men were not wanted; and such an impression is not easy to eradicate. It is hard to see why the War Office should not have adopted—should not even now adopt—some such plan as that ably advocated in the 'Spectator,' by which all fit men who offer should be accepted at once, but should return to their homes and work, with a retaining fee, till arrangements can be made for them, when they should be summoned to join the force, civilian aid being called in to assist, and what training is possible being given before they join the camps. But, even under Lord Kitchener, the War Office seems slow in adapting itself to novel circumstances.

The attitude of the business community in the grave difficulties that have come upon them is worthy of high praise. They are making, and are evidently ready to make in future, great sacrifices for the common weal. They have, in general, done their best to encourage their employees to enlist and to facilitate such action; and the straits to which they must have been put can only be guessed, but not fully appreciated, by the outsider.

At the same time it may be doubted whether the motto 'Business as usual' has not been too widely advertised, or pressed too far. Business must be carried on, for the sinews of war depend upon it, and unemployment on a large scale would exhaust our resources. So long as we retain command of the sea, we may and should take full advantage of it and, for the welfare of the whole, carry on our affairs. But business cannot, in the circumstances, go on 'as usual'; and the emphasis so widely laid on the maxim tends to obscure the fact that our *first* business now is not to trade but to beat the enemy. It is not 'business first and war afterwards,' but the other way about. In this connexion far too much, in our opinion, has been made of the 'War upon German Trade.' However justifiable it may be to push our wares in markets from which German goods are temporarily excluded, that is not the object for which we went to war; and the world-wide publicity that has been given to this aim, the energy with which it has been advertised in certain newspapers, will inevitably lend credence to the reproach constantly levelled against us by German writers, that the chief motive of our action has been jealousy of their commercial success. Regarded, moreover, from the economical point of view, the cry rests upon a very unsound basis. Trade captured in this accidental way, and not resting on real superiority or greater cheapness of the goods concerned, will not long outlast the war; and the advantage hitherto enjoyed by Germany, if it is due to higher skill, better advertising methods, or any other permanent cause, will speedily be recovered, with the result of serious dislocation and loss to businesses whose energies will have been wrongly directed into lines in which they were unable to compete on equal terms. The worst of it is, however, that, while we are thus wasting our energies on a delusive aim, the enemy is straining every nerve to win a victory in the field which, as a secondary result, would shatter our trade for ever. The whole agitation has and must have a most detrimental result upon recruiting. The ordinary man engaged in industry, manual labour, or business of any kind, is misled into thinking that his first duty is to keep the works going or the shop open. If he is hesitating whether to go or not, this motive will turn

the scale; if he is inclined to shirk, he will have a pretext for shirking. Let us do what business is necessary; but the less these cries are heard, the better.

A great deal has been said about the playing, or rather the watching, of games, especially football, as a hindrance to recruiting. Vast crowds of lads and young men, estimated at 350,000 on a single afternoon, troop to these spectacles, and not only during the time of play but from one week to another are absorbed either in watching or in thinking about the performances of their favourite champions, to the detriment of national interests. Appeals to the spectators, recently made upon the football grounds, have produced, in most cases, little or no result. In estimating the truth and force of the complaints, it must be remembered that the football crowds consist, for the most part, of men engaged in more or less exhausting labour during the rest of the week. Sundays and Saturday afternoons are their only time for recreation. For many it would no doubt be better that they should play themselves, rather than look on; but a very large proportion do not require physical exercise. Amusement and relaxation are what they want, and they get little enough of it in their lives. If the motto 'Business as usual' is to be observed, if our great industries are to be carried on in war-time—as indeed they must be—it is difficult to see that many of these hand-workers can be spared. In those industrial centres where arms and ammunition, uniforms, etc., are manufactured, it is obvious that the men cannot enter the army; and in some such places it is understood that appeals for recruits have actually been discouraged by superior authority. Of the mining districts much the same may be said; the coal must be won, and the men must work to win it.

After making all these allowances, however, it is probable that there are a good many men in the football crowds who are not really required for necessary industries; and on them the moral effect of these gladiatorial shows must, from the point of view of national interest, undoubtedly be bad. But the question arises, what would they do if the matches were stopped? It is surely absurd to suppose that for want of amusement they would flock into the army. If they were men

of the volunteering type, it is not football which would have kept them away; and, if there were no football, they would mostly take to something worse. Upon men like these we must bring other means of persuasion to bear. On the whole, therefore, we cannot help regarding the outcry against football matches as mistaken or at least excessive. At all events, if the matches are stopped, the results are likely to be disappointing. Moreover, it would be obviously unfair to stop football, while allowing golf, racing and other pastimes to go on just as usual.

A much more serious hindrance to recruiting is the ignorance and consequent apathy still prevailing in many places, especially in some rural districts, in villages and small towns.* In such places meetings and addresses of the ordinary type seem to be of little use. All appears to depend on the presence of one or two active residents who bring their energies to bear on individuals. In a certain Yorkshire village, last September, the doctor (R.A.M.C. retired) was drilling between twenty and thirty men; from the upper part of the dale, beyond the range of his activities, one man only had volunteered. In a southern county, a series of eloquent addresses, delivered at largely-attended meetings, produced next to no results. Facts of this kind must be within the experience of every one who has interested himself in the matter. As to the feeling of the country at large, we may take it that, where the nature of the struggle is understood, there is no lack of readiness to enlist. Such replies as are occasionally given—'We don't care whether the Germans come or not; we couldn't be worse off than we are now'; or 'King or Kaiser, it's all one to the likes of us'—may be regarded as eccentricities, not to be taken too literally. But the fact is that, to a vast number of inhabitants of these isles, war is not a serious national business, and one war is very like another. Between the South African war and that of to-day they make no distinction. It is something going on in 'furrin parts,'

* Of pure ignorance the following story (first-hand) may serve as an example. A wounded but convalescent private in a Hertfordshire village was discussing the war with his friends. One of them—not a rustic but an artisan—asked him, 'What sort o' barracks have you got out there?' 'Barracks?' he replied, 'what do you mean?' 'Well, after a day's fightin', you goes back to barracks, I suppose, don't you?'

with which the ordinary man is only remotely concerned—an affair of interest to the soldiers alone.

There is nothing to surprise us in this attitude of mind. For ages our people have seen nothing of invasion; for more than a century even the fear of such a thing has been unknown. When they are told of the dangers that would arise from a permanent German occupation of Belgium, they do not understand, or they refuse to believe. This is partly due to want of imagination, but far more to the pernicious fallacy that underlies our military system—with its strange disproportion between the Foreign Service Army and the Territorial Force—the fallacy that this country can and should be defended within its own shores. It is not within our borders but across the seas that our defensive battles are to be fought. But the fallacy clings, and the man who has imbibed it says, 'We've been told we only want 300,000 men to stop any invading force that could land. You've got half as many again now. What do you want with more?' And what are we to say of that other still more deadly delusion, that it is time enough to begin to drill your men when war breaks out; it will only take six months to turn them into soldiers! Six months! and meanwhile what may happen? The piteous appeals for 'men, more men' that occur every day in the letters from the front published in the newspapers teach us what we—or rather our soldiers abroad—are paying for the delay. But the ordinary man at home, who has been lulled into lethargy by these false prophets of politicians, replies, when the appeal is made, 'Time enough! The fleet's all right'; or 'If the Germans land, I'll come—not before.'

If the ideas of national defence and military duty which have been inculcated for years past are to blame for much of the reluctance which is now seen, the unduly optimistic tone adopted by many newspapers, the blatant headlines, the exaggeration of small successes, the minimising of reverses, even the speeches of some of our public men, increase the difficulty of recruiting by diminishing the appearance of necessity. It is, we venture to think, a pity that the First Lord of the Admiralty constantly attempts to minimise the losses that we have suffered at sea. He deplures, in a perfunctory way, the

loss of life; the ships, we are always told, don't matter, or matter little. But they do matter; the loss of a ship like the 'Bulwark' matters a good deal. And even Lord Kitchener, in expressing, as he has done more than once, his satisfaction at recruiting, adopts an optimistic tone which is, to say the least, not stimulating. We do not want to scare the public; but neither do we want to reassure them too much. We hold our own in Belgium, it is true, but that is far from being enough. There is still cause enough for anxiety; and the decisive victory, short of which we cannot be satisfied, is still far off, and demands greater efforts than any we have yet made. But what is likely to be thought by the man in the street when he reads in the columns of one of the most widely read of our daily papers, under the name of a correspondent who, it is to be presumed, 'draws' the ignorant public, a report like the following:

'Of this German retreat from Northern Belgium there is no doubt. The German right is smashed like a fallen wine-glass. The retreat is no less than a rout. Their rifles, their stores, some of their guns, and even some of their wounded comrades the Germans have left behind in their rush from this fatal battlefield—which has been rated as the most stubborn and bloodthirsty of the whole war. The flooding of the German positions, a natural piece of strategy which German generalship seems to have most blunderingly overlooked, came only as a climax of disaster, not as the root cause. The Germans' chance was well on the wane before that. Their generals had butchered man after man, battalion after battalion, in striving to cross the Yser Canal by brute force, and all without success. They were lying like beaten dogs, licking their wounds, when the floods came upon them.'

The execrable taste of the last sentence will not escape observation, but the delusive effect of the whole passage is deplorable. And this precious piece of would-be picturesque journalism was published on Nov. 6, just before the opening of the tremendous attack which culminated on Nov. 11. 'What do you want with more soldiers,' says the man in the street, 'if the Germans are getting beaten like that?'

Mr J. A. Grant, M.P., writing to the 'Times' on Nov. 24, avows his opinion, formed after three months' experience, that

'the reason more men do not join is that they see no necessity for doing so . . . These men form their opinion from the public press, with the result that they have the conviction that this matter with Germany will be easily and victoriously settled in a few months. They read of nothing but victories for the Allies . . . The true proportions of the struggle are seldom, if ever, presented to their minds. The natural result is that only a fraction see the necessity of enlisting.'

For this mistaken optimism, however, it is not fair to blame the newspapers alone, or even chiefly; they get their news principally from the Press Bureau, and what they publish must have the approval of that body. It is the Press Bureau that sets the tone; and, if the tone is mistaken, as we believe, the responsibility is mainly theirs.

On the other hand, it can hardly be doubted that neither the War Office nor the Admiralty has sufficiently realised the stimulating effect of vivid narratives setting forth the gallant deeds of the army, and especially of individual regiments or battalions. It is well known that the story of the brilliant charge made by the London Scottish at Ypres led immediately to an enormous increase in the numbers anxious to join that regiment. But that charge was no isolated or exceptional event; many other regiments have distinguished themselves in a similar manner. The difference is that we hear nothing about them, or the action is related without any mention of the corps by which it was performed, or perhaps it crops up casually weeks afterwards through a Brigade Order published in a local paper. One such Order, in which the splendid performance of the 1st Loyal North Lancashires, the Northhamptons, and the 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps on Oct. 23 is described, was published by the 'Times' on Nov. 17. As the 'Times' very truly says, 'The simple publication of General Bulfin's Order . . . would have done more for recruiting in Lancashire than all the perfunctory posters issued at great cost by the War Office.' Again, on Nov. 23, Sir Henry Lucy called attention to a letter of the 'Times' correspondent describing 'one of the most wonderful bayonet charges that have been seen during the war,' and pertinently asked, 'Why should the name of this company of heroes be suppressed?' He surmises that the Censor struck it out,

or that the correspondent, knowing it would be struck out, omitted it; and he adds: 'The result is cruel injustice to gallant men, grave discouragement to others in the fighting line, and the ignoring of a splendid opportunity of inciting recruiting at home.' It would be easy to multiply examples of this mistaken reticence, but these may suffice. It is absurd to suppose that the enemy is unaware what regiments he has in front of him, or of their strength or character. The information we desire could be of no use to him, and would be of great use to us.

Apart from these questions of the Press and the dissemination of news, a serious drawback to the recruiting campaign is to be found in the physical and other conditions of service, including in these the state of the camps and other centres where the men are collected, the accommodation and food provided, the want of uniforms and equipments, etc. To say that these conditions, at the outset, left much to be desired, would be putting the matter far too mildly. There was no excuse for the state of things which existed, as a rule, till recently, except that it was only part, and an inevitable part, of our general unpreparedness. The War Office cannot be blamed—the responsibility for this, as for other shortcomings, lies elsewhere; and we are happy to believe that accommodation and other arrangements, though still far from perfect, are much improved. But that they have acted as a drag upon recruiting there can be little doubt. Soldiers, both officers and men, expect to 'rough it,' but they may at least claim to be kept warm and dry and to be decently fed; and this for a long time was not the case. Not only were they disgusted, but their health suffered. Writing a month ago ('Times,' Nov. 9), Mr G. Pragnell, chairman of the Employers' Territorial Association, said:

'The greatest drawback to recruiting is dissatisfaction with the management. I find this feeling exists among miners, agricultural labourers, factory hands, and bank clerks alike. . . . The state of things in the training camps is now known all over the country. These conditions are quoted against me wherever I go. . . . For our good lads and true surely the best is not too good, instead of giving them the same menu of poor food day after day, verminous bedding, all sorts and conditions of clothing supplied by voluntary

contributions, and practically nothing in the shape of entertainment.'

He recommends that the War Office should hand over 'the accommodation, sanitation, food, clothing and recreation of all the training camps in Great Britain' to a committee of business men. But no; here again the military authorities ignore the willing civilian, and prefer, overworked as they must be, to do the job themselves, with the result of indefinite delay, damage to the men's health, and discouragement of recruiting. The 'Daily Chronicle,' on Nov. 6, pointed to the rejection by the War Office of the offer of help from the Board of Education as most unfortunate, and proceeded :

'Refusal to accept local and civilian help in non-military matters has been at the root of most of the mismanagement; and we fear that the unfavourable reports from enlisted men are still a main obstacle to recruiting.'

It is only right to mention in this connexion the splendid work of the Y. M. C. A., which has supplied recreation tents, books, games, writing materials, etc., with temperance canteens, thereby doing much to relieve the inevitable boredom of camp-life, to keep the men happy, and to counteract the temptations which surround them.

The state of things in the camps, to which we have referred, is only, we may hope, a temporary drawback. A more serious obstacle is to be found in the pecuniary arrangements—the rate of pay, the allowances for wives, children and other dependants, the provision for widows and orphans, and for disabled men. The question is a complicated and difficult one; and to enter upon it in detail would involve too long a discussion. Moreover the Government has already made some concessions to public feeling in favour of generosity; and, as an impartial commission has been appointed to consider the whole matter, it will be well to await their report.* But certain general considerations may be offered.

Representatives of the working classes, supported by the 'Daily Citizen' and by Mr R. Blatchford in the 'Clarion,' have put forward a programme which at least

* We may refer here to a short but striking paper by Mr G. N. Barnes, M.P., in the 'Review of Reviews' for November.

has the merit of simplicity. They demand '1*l.* a week for the widow of every soldier and sailor killed; 1*l.* a week for the mother dependent on every soldier and sailor killed; 1*l.* a week for the wife of every soldier and sailor engaged in fighting; 1*l.* a week for every soldier and sailor permanently maimed by fighting.' Apart from the question of expense, which would be very heavy, this scheme would not really be fair, for the positions occupied by recruits before they join vary enormously, and the sacrifices they make, from a pecuniary point of view, are very different. The flat rate advocated would be excessive in the case of the agricultural labourer; it would not adequately compensate the artisan earning 2*l.* or 3*l.* a week, or the dependants of a clerk with a salary of 150*l.* a year. There does not appear to be any sufficient reason why a sliding-scale, on broad lines, should not be arranged, more or less corresponding to the income previously received by a recruit. Again, it has already been pointed out that, so far, no improvement upon the existing very haphazard scale of compensation for permanent injuries has been adopted or at least published by the Government. A serious discouragement to recruiting would be removed by a satisfactory arrangement under this head. The dread of returning disabled from the war, minus an arm or a leg, or otherwise condemned to be a burden on the family instead of its support, must be present to the mind of every recruit.

Further, the prospect of what may happen, at the end of the war, to men who return whole, is by no means attractive. The invitation to 'enlist for the war only,' and the promise of discharge as soon as it is over, were no doubt meant to encourage recruits, but they may have a different result. Many firms have promised to reinstate employees who volunteer, but such promises will be very difficult of execution. It will hardly be possible to turn off substitutes who have been doing the work satisfactorily for a year or more; and such men cannot be expected to regard their engagements as merely provisional. In any case, whether the substitutes are discharged or the returned employees left out in the cold, much hardship will ensue. The Government ought to undertake to continue the full rate of pay to men discharged at the

end of the war, until at least they have had reasonable time to obtain employment of a character more or less similar to that which they enjoyed before it began.

Finally, we must remember what consequences follow from the Voluntary Service system which we have deliberately adopted and for the present seem determined to follow. It is not, to our mind, the right system, but this is not the place to discuss at length a question so important and so wide. Much has been said, and may justly be said, on both sides. By the voluntary system we get, no doubt, a splendid army, for it is an army of (in a sense) picked men, and it avoids certain dangers such as militarism. But it is a wasteful system and a very unfair one. It is unfair because it throws all the burden of national defence on the public-spirited, unselfish and patriotic portion of the community, leaving the selfish and the sluggish, the laggards and the wastrels, to enjoy the protection of better men while saving their own skins. It is horribly wasteful, from the national point of view, because it is the adventurous and the energetic, the courageous and the imaginative who suffer, who sacrifice life or limb or health in their country's cause, while the less worthy remain at home to propagate the race. The loss to the community in the most precious lives is inestimable. On the waste and extravagance inseparable from the attempt to improvise an army in time of war, and on the terrible risk of defeat from unreadiness, it should be needless to insist.

However, there the system is; and all we can do at present is to make the best of it. But we must face its consequences, its inevitable requirements; and the first of these is that we should act as generously as possible towards those who are willing to risk their lives on our behalf. So long as the duty of national service is not recognised in law, the State is merely a competitor with self-interest and other motives. Not only good feeling and the sense of obligation but prudence and common sense dictate that we should remove every pecuniary obstacle or discouragement, and deal generously, even lavishly, with our defenders. Both the rate of pay and the rate of allowances and pensions are at present utterly

inadequate. It is absurd that the soldier should have to give up, out of his miserable shilling a day—which is already otherwise reduced—two-thirds or more for those he leaves at home. The man with a wife and three children at home gets only threepence a day for himself. It is no abuse of words to characterise this as a simple scandal. The wonder is, not that we get so few men under these conditions, but that we get so many. We are astounded at the sense of duty which impels a million of men to leave their homes in order to fight for a country so stingy and so ungrateful. It is all very well to prate of duty and patriotism, but man cannot live by patriotism alone, and the discharge of duty too often leaves the patriot penniless. From motives of mere efficiency, apart from other reasons, and in order to obtain the forces necessary to save the State, we must alter our attitude in this respect. So long as we limit ourselves to volunteers, we must make it worth their while to come, or at least relieve them so far as possible from pecuniary loss. Lives are not to be valued in money, but to stint money to those who are willing to risk death in the service of their country is a policy at once mean and foolish, which the country will assuredly condemn.

We have already referred to the Press Censorship—meaning by this not only the Press Bureau but the control over news exerted by the Admiralty and the War Office—as having worked in a way inimical to recruiting. The relations of these bodies, their spheres of action, and the composition of the Press Bureau, are all somewhat obscure. It is a power unknown in these islands since the 17th century. Frankly we do not like it. We submit to it because the freedom of the press has been carried, in recent wars, to a stage at which it became dangerous from the military point of view; but we require that it shall be as little irksome as possible, that as much information as is compatible with military exigencies shall be published, and above all that the regulations shall not infringe the constitutional rights of citizens in a free country.

To begin with, the pretension put forward by the Solicitor General in the House of Commons on Nov. 12 cannot be tolerated for a moment. After referring to

the danger if the Press Bureau were assumed to be the creature of the Government, he went on :

'Therefore criticism of the Government or of particular members of the Government was a thing which he should never stop, unless the criticism was of such a character that it might destroy public confidence in the Government . . . or cause distress or alarm to the people by leading them to think that affairs were really in a very serious state.'

The full scope of this remark may not have been realised or fully considered by the speaker, but it is obvious that it implies a control to which we cannot and ought not to submit. Who is to draw the line between criticism which destroys confidence in the Government, and that which does not? And will not the tendency of a censor who is a member of the Government obviously be to draw the line in his own favour? Every criticism of governmental action or inaction does, so far as it goes, and so far as it is justifiable, weaken confidence in the Government. Confidence is good, if it is merited, not otherwise; and criticism, even to the extent of destroying confidence altogether, may sometimes be necessary. Where should we have been in the Crimean War, but for outspoken criticism which eventually overthrew the Government of Lord Aberdeen? And it ill becomes a member of that party, whose criticisms of the Conservative Government during the Boer War were certainly aimed at destroying its power and reversing its whole policy, to arrogate the right of suppressing criticism, fair or unfair, now that his party is in office.

For the sake of an undivided country, we may well be thankful that a Liberal Government had to initiate and now has to carry through this war. The Opposition has promised its full support; it has fulfilled and will continue to fulfil the pledge; but it does not abdicate the right of criticism where it deems it necessary in the interest not of party but of the State. Moreover, if criticism destructive of confidence is to be put down, why does not the censor begin with assailants like Mr Ramsay MacDonald and Mr Bernard Shaw? These gentlemen have levelled at Sir Edward Grey criticisms which, apart from the handle they have given to our

enemies, were eminently calculated to destroy confidence in the Government, in the person of one of its most responsible Ministers. Still more reprehensible were the attacks made by Mr Keir Hardie on the country and the Government, and his sneers at the King, to which the attention of the House was called by Mr Edward Jones on Nov. 17. But the Government has not moved. Two of these gentlemen are members of parliament, and the third, we must suppose, is a licensed buffoon.

Finally, the Solicitor General asserts his right to suppress criticism which may cause distress or alarm by leading people to think that affairs are in a serious state. Sir Stanley is very careful of the feelings of the people, but what if affairs *are* in a serious state? Is it not better that the people should be distressed and alarmed than that they should be lulled into false security by official reticence or optimism? This people is not very readily distressed or alarmed; indeed their tendency is quite the other way, and a little anxiety would sometimes do them good. Mr Bonar Law did good service by protesting in the House, on Nov. 24, against the statement of Mr Solicitor, and his words deserve to be recorded:

'I wish (he said) to make this clear, that it is the right, not only of every member of this House, but of every newspaper in this country and of every speaker on every platform, if he honestly believes that a member of the Government is incompetent or is not properly doing his work, to try to get rid of that member, even though his trying to do so does create a want of confidence in the Government. . . . I thoroughly recognise that exceptional powers that could not be tolerated in other times must be given. But I feel most strongly that the Government should not ask for greater powers than are necessary, and that they should be most careful to show by their speeches, as well as by their acts, that they recognise the limitation of the powers which are given them, and that they do not intend to interfere in any shape or form with legitimate criticism.'

It was doubtless partly due to this protest, along with others, that the Government accepted, at the hands of Lord R. Cecil, amendments in clause 1 of the Defence

of the Realm Consolidation Bill which removed its objectionable features, and placed proper limits on the censor's powers.

So much for the question of legitimate criticism under the censorship. It may be assumed that this will not give further trouble. But there is cause for astonishment that, while putting forward a claim which, we take it, has now been withdrawn, the Government has been so slow to exert its undoubted powers to put down sedition, the advocacy of treason, and vehement discouragement of service in the British army, such as has recently been witnessed in Ireland. The ultra-Nationalist press has become increasingly disloyal, and editors who were out at elbows three months ago are now in affluence. The opportunity is too good for German agents, backed by German gold, to neglect; and reports from Ireland indicate that opinion in many parts of the country, which at the outset was, at the worst, indifferent, is now frankly pro-German. This is not surprising when Irish papers publish week by week such matter as follows:

'The spectacle of the National Volunteers with English officers at their head and the Union Jack floating proudly above them, "defending" Ireland for the British Government may appeal to the gushing eyes of Mr John Redmond, but his eyes are not likely to be blessed with that apotheosis of slavery' ('Sinn Fein,' Aug. 8, 1914).

'Stop at home; this is the spot on which to fight for our rights . . . Better to die fighting on Irish soil for Irish rights than die as a hired assassin to destroy the rights of other peoples' ('Irish Worker,' Sept. 12).

'A desperate attempt is being made to turn the majority from their path, to lead them to the foreign shambles that English trade may flourish and England's arms dominate the earth . . . No Irishman will join the army; no volunteer will ever fire a shot except for Ireland' ('Irish Volunteer,' Oct. 3).*

* Other quotations, showing 'an increasingly pro-German bias,' and ending with one from 'The Irish Volunteer' for Nov. 7—'Our only path to the glorious and happy Ireland of our aspirations lies through the downfall of the British Empire'—will be found in an article by the parliamentary correspondent of the 'Times,' Nov. 24.

150 RECRUITING, AND THE CENSORSHIP

The following leaflet has recently been widely distributed :

' ENGLAND WANTS MEN.

' Lord Kitchener is confident that he can entrap, cajole, gull, and enforce 100,000

IRISHMEN

to enlist in the demoralised, decadent, crime-stained, blood-sodden

BRITISH ARMY.

The Irish people, however, mindful of their inalienable heritage to

COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE,

will, by every means in their power, prevent—by force, if necessary—one single Irishman from selling himself, body and soul, to the only enemy Ireland has in the world, England. Germany is now at war with England but not with Ireland. England wants the Irish to save them from ruin. Will you help to save the thrice-accursed British Empire from ruin, or will you help to strike a final blow at the biggest fraud, the hollowest sham, the world has ever known ?

' Irishmen ! The Home Rule Bill is only sop—the crumbs that fall from the table of the rich man, Dives—England, to the beggar, Lazarus—Ireland.

' Don't believe the foul lies that the subsidised so-called "Irish Press" is circulating about the Germans. Remember, it is only a few years since the Irish were stigmatised in the jingo Press as Thugs and Murderers ! Remember the order issued during the last year of the Boer War by Lord Roberts, that where the railway line had been tampered with by the Boers the houses for a radius of 10 miles were to be burnt ! Remember the famine of '47, when England deliberately starved nearly two millions of men (Irish) and drove another million and a half in exile ! Remember the Manchester Martyrs ! Remember the doing to death in prison of the men of '67 ! Remember Howth Sunday, July 26th, 1914, when "Our" Army deliberately fired on the unarmed citizens in revenge for the beating they got from the unarmed volunteers and Boy Scouts !

VOLUNTEERS,

if the war is prolonged England will be in a state of starvation, and will seize all the Irish food stuffs—then the Irish will starve.

HOLD THE HARVEST !

England wants men, but by God ! she will not get Irishmen !'

What is the Government doing, we ask? A fortnight ago Sir Stanley Buckmaster declared that he had not seen any of the seditious newspapers. He appears to have eyes for nothing but English news and English criticism. And what of Mr Birrell? He was asked in the House whether he had seen these papers. He replied that he had been reading them for the last six weeks. 'And done nothing?' retorted his interrogator. The criticism which this inaction deserves would perhaps be regarded by the censor as calculated to 'destroy confidence' in the Irish Secretary. But this could hardly be, for was there ever any confidence in Mr Birrell to be destroyed? We are almost sorry for Mr Redmond, who figures with his former supporters as 'Judas.' Such is the union of hearts which we were assured was to follow upon Home Rule. If Mr Birrell will not act, are there no laws of treason and sedition? Will not even the new Defence of the Realm Act work in such a case?*

That the conduct of the censorship has caused grave annoyance in the circles most friendly to this country in the United States is well known to all who have watched the Transatlantic press. The complaints from America fall under several heads—lack of information, unwarrantable delay in the transmission of news, and suppression of important facts. From the first of these troubles we suffer as much as do our cousins in the United States. Why, for instance, do we hear scarcely anything of the fighting in East Africa, severe as it has evidently been? Why, again, were the despatches about the fight in the Heligoland Bight kept back for some six weeks?

As to the second complaint, American journalists appear to admit that things have been much better during the last two months. But under the third head grave charges have been made. To those brought forward by Mr Corey, correspondent of the 'New York Globe,' to the effect that 'despatches have been altered for the purpose of hiding the truth and blackening the enemy's character,' the 'Times' referred in its issues of Oct. 24-27. We should have been inclined to treat such

* Since these sentences were in type, the military authorities have, we are relieved to see at length intervened.

a charge with silent contempt but for the fact that Mr Corey adhered to it in a letter published on Oct. 27, and that it was supported in the 'New York Evening Post,' a widely read and respectable paper. In a leader issued on Oct. 25 that journal says :

'That the British censorship of the war news has reflected credit neither upon the intelligence of the officials nor upon their reputation for fair play, is daily becoming more evident. . . . The censorship may not be responsible for the deliberate falsification of the official German despatch of Sept. 11, which we printed in our issue of Oct. 10 ; but, if not, this merely transfers the blame to the newspapers which printed the despatch, or to the news association which supplied it. We have reason to believe that the German press is justified in asserting that this is not the only case in which official despatches have been altered to German disadvantage.'

We quote this passage not, it need hardly be said, with any idea that the charge is true, but because it is an attack upon our honour under which we ought not to sit quiet. Silence in such matters may be dignified, but it is not wise. If these charges are not refuted, they will be believed ; and the good opinion of this country, now so widely held in the United States, will receive a severe shock. We venture to think it is high time that the Government, or, at all events, the Press Bureau, should take the matter up, sift it to the bottom, and authoritatively refute so odious an accusation.

It is, however, most unfortunate that the charge of suppressing important facts should have lately received support from the grave error of judgment—we can regard it as nothing less, and need regard it as nothing more—involved in the concealment of the mishap which befell the navy off the coast of Ireland on Oct. 25. There was reason, perhaps, for the similar concealment by the Japanese of the loss of the 'Hatsuse' in the Russo-Japanese war ; for the Japanese navy was numerically inferior to the Russian, and it was possible to conceal the fact from the enemy till the war was over. But in our case the attempt at concealment was doomed to failure from the outset. The accident was witnessed by the crews of many other vessels, including that of an Atlantic liner

plying between New York and Liverpool. Such an event was bound to be talked of far and wide, whether it got into the English papers or not. On the return of the liner to New York, it *was* talked of, with the result that about three weeks ago the news was in all the New York papers. There lies before us a copy of the 'New York Tribune,' in which several circumstantial accounts by eye-witnesses appear. An enquiry sent by the 'Tribune' to its London correspondent elicited the reply: 'Matter referred to is news which we were not and are not permitted to send.' Of course the event was soon afterwards known in Germany; and we have also before us a copy of the 'Vossische Zeitung' for Nov. 24, with the heading 'Ein englischer Dreadnought vernichtet' ('Destruction of an English Dreadnought') in large type on its front page. A telegram from Rotterdam of the same date confirms the news; and the 'National Tidende' of Stockholm for Nov. 23 gives full details.

How ill-judged and hopeless was the attempt to conceal the fact may be conceived from these occurrences. The most unfortunate feature of the affair is the result which the belated disclosure must inevitably have upon the public mind. It is not open criticism which sows distrust and want of confidence; it is the feeling that the public is not allowed to know what it ought to know.

The reason for such misguided conduct can only be either the 'military exigencies' to which Mr Asquith referred on Nov. 17, or the desire to avoid giving cause for 'distress and alarm' (as the Solicitor General put it), or finally the fear that the event might reflect discredit on the Admiralty. None of these reasons is good. By no possibility could the phrase 'military exigencies' be stretched to cover the case, especially considering the superiority of force on which the First Lord insisted so buoyantly the other day. As to the public, disasters are apt only to stiffen the backs of Englishmen; the loss of a single ship, if known at once, would not cause a tithe of the 'distress and alarm,' not to say suspicion, likely to be caused by the attempt to hush it up. We are loth to attribute the error of judgment to the third cause; and, if it is to be so attributed, the idea is just as mistaken as the action itself. Everyone knows that

such accidents may happen in the best of navies; everyone knows that, if mines are about, ships are liable to strike them and go down; and no one could have expected to find mines off Lough Swilly. Neither Admiral Togo nor the Japanese Admiralty was blamed for losing the 'Hatsuse'; nor would the English people have blamed the Admiralty for the accident to the 'Audacious.' They are, we believe, too sensible and too generous for that. What we do blame the Admiralty for—and we blame them severely—is for attempting to blindfold the public.

The note which follows, by an influential Anglo-American, will show how the matter is regarded in the United States; and, seeing how much depends on the public opinion of that country, we cannot but think that his views merit thoughtful consideration.

THE CENSORSHIP AS IT APPEARS TO THE UNITED STATES.

Of all the neutral powers, by far the most important for Great Britain to keep on good terms with is the United States. But the relations between these two Powers are, at the same time, peculiarly exposed to the risk of misunderstandings. In the early days of the war the appearance of Japan as a combatant sent through America a thrill of uneasiness; day by day the measures taken with regard to American shipments to neutral ports are watched with the greatest anxiety. The self-denial of Japan in restricting her activities to her own waters has allayed the fears that she might establish herself in a position in the Pacific dangerous to American interests; and the careful diplomacy of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and the fairmindedness of the American people as a whole have enabled the interference of England with American commerce so far to be carried on without arousing popular protests. But this does not alter the fact that at any moment trouble may crop up and the United States may make enquiries, perhaps more annoying than dangerous, into Great Britain's war measures, and may display a reluctance to grant her the facilities she needs for purchasing military necessities and borrowing money. It is therefore worth while for the British Government to do what

it can to preserve American sentiment as it is at the present moment, overwhelmingly on the side of the Allies.

That sentiment, it must be realised, is not by any means entirely the result of a somewhat mythical kinship. It is based on reason and on a settled conviction that Germany was the aggressor, and that Great Britain in particular had good cause for entering the fight. The famous White Paper has been sold, for example, by the 'New York Times' by the thousand; and Bernhardt's works have had an equally phenomenal circulation, with fortunately a very different result. So far as descendants of British stock are concerned, Americans are predisposed in favour of the Allies; but one-ninth of the population looks back to Germany or Austro-Hungary as the fatherland, and, as is so often the case in private life, the very relationship of the Anglo-Saxon element makes it critical and jealous for the good name of its cousins.

So far, every Englishman living in the United States can acknowledge with gratification and gratitude that the life-and-death struggle of his native country has been followed with the deepest sympathy. The Germans have made active but clumsy efforts to turn the tide of sentiment in their favour, and have used the most specious methods to make their own appear the better cause. They have started newspapers; they have hired public debaters in the market-places; they have engineered professedly humanitarian movements to stop the fight before the Kaiser is crushed. Above all, they have spread broadcast the most astonishing statements about the events and the methods of the war. Hitherto Englishmen in the United States have done nothing to combat their efforts. They have deliberately held their hands, not because they were unwilling to do all they could to forward their country's cause, but because they regarded the German activities as futile and believed them to react against their own side. Englishmen have been able to boast that, no matter what the enemy said, the facts were their vindication, and that the ordinary news, as it came from British sources, carried with it its own proof of authenticity.

But recently this confidence has received a severe

shock. The censor, or the naval and military authorities, by failing to understand the nature and effects of publicity, have cut the ground from under the British champions' feet. In the early days of the war the censorship was blundering enough. A special despatch for which a newspaper was paying heavy cable tolls would come mutilated to one office, and complete to another. Names and dates would be deleted in one message, only to be left untouched in an almost precisely similar one. Purely descriptive articles about engagements which had happened weeks before would be held up, and the most harmless speculations would be reduced to an unintelligible collection of words. Important speeches like those of Mr Asquith and Sir Edward Grey were kept back for thirty-six hours, for no conceivable reason. It must be understood that, in making these charges, the newspapers were not in any way complaining of the proper activities of the censors. They fully realise that, in such times as these, there are matters which no Government can permit to be published; and they are willing to do nothing to prejudice the plans of the generals. Indeed one New York newspaper, at any rate, was completely informed of such a stirring piece of news as the gathering of the great fleet of transports at Quebec and the sailing of the expeditionary force, and yet refrained from publishing it because it was hardly the thing to do. But they do feel annoyed that they have not been permitted to receive legitimate and harmless news for which they have paid, and have been at the mercy of amateur censors, who cannot agree among themselves as to what intelligence is contraband and what is not.

These complaints, however, are of more concern to the professional newspaper man perhaps than to the people at large. The average reader knows nothing of the secrets of the prison house, and will accept one despatch as readily as another. But it is not a matter of indifference that the newspapers of America should be offended by the treatment they have received. On them depends the opinion of the public at large; and some of them, in centres with a large German population, have every temptation to side against the Allies. It is the reasoned conviction of the justice of the British cause, the hatred of German 'culture' as displayed at

Louvain and Rheims, the horror of the mutilation of Belgium and the dread that something of the same sort may befall England herself, which have kept them faithful to the Allies.

Far more serious than all this are the blunders and the shortsightedness which the censorship has displayed in connexion with the defeat of Admiral Cradock and the sinking of H.M.S. 'Audacious.' The United States heard of both these disasters from sources entirely independent of the Admiralty, and is still waiting for the official confirmation of one of them. Naturally enough, when a naval battle takes place off Chile, it is impossible to hide it from the people of the United States. It was hardly less improbable that the sinking of a battleship in view of a crew, which visits New York regularly, would remain a secret in that port. Yet it was days before London would admit that anything had gone wrong in the Pacific; and six weeks after the loss of H.M.S. 'Audacious' the British Government still refuses to announce it.

Is it any wonder that Americans are amazed at the pusillanimity of a system which can produce such results as these? They are amazed and distressed as well. The 'New York Sun' could come out with a leader headed 'John Bull Ostrich,' and could assert that 'John Bull metamorphosed into an ostrich is one of the strangest sights in history'; but in that very article it could express the belief that the knowledge of such disasters would only stiffen the back of the British race. With no possible strategic reason for hiding the truth, why, ask the Americans, try to hide it, and what conceivable advantage have you in pretending to ignore what all the world knows?

Moreover by this policy of secrecy the censors have discredited everything else they do. Early in the war the Germans announced the sinking of nineteen British battleships, and the Englishman laughed and asked where was the official confirmation? He cannot do that now. If the New York 'Staats Zeitung' or 'The Fatherland' to-morrow announced that Admiral Jellicoe had been blown up, he could not turn to the latest cables from London and prove the falsehood of the statement by showing that they did not admit it. When the

censorship was imposed, a pledge was given that every scrap of news, bad as well as good, should be revealed, unless there were good and definite reasons against it. That pledge has been broken. Naturally enough other misgivings are now appearing. For example, was the whole truth told about the Antwerp adventure? Is there some radical defect in British naval architecture, which sent the 'Good Hope' to her fate? Are some of these stories the Germans spread about trouble in Egypt absolutely baseless? Is or is not the recruiting at home, particularly in Ireland, progressing as well as could be wished?

America, as a whole, asks such questions in no captious spirit. The news of the loss of one British ship after another has come as a blow to a good many Americans, who are proud to boast themselves Englishmen by birth. It has hurt their pride in a way which has astonished them not a little; and they ask for an explanation, for the actual truth, with real anxiety. How can the Englishman at home now answer them? Once he was proud in the assurance of the integrity of his Government; once he could boast that, the harder the blows of fortune, the tighter would Britain shut her teeth and determine to fight the matter out. Now he can only keep silence, or say that he does not understand what his Government is thinking about. It is a humiliating attitude to be obliged to assume; it is still more humiliating amid a nation disposed in the main to be so friendly. It is above all humiliating because it is so unnecessary, and because there would be no people so willing to accept explanations as the people of the United States, if only it could believe that it was honestly getting the truth.

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Art. 9.—THE NEW AMERICAN HISTORY.

1. *A History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War.* By J. B. McMaster. Eight vols. New York and London : Appleton, 1883-1913.
2. *Guide to the Study and Reading of American History.* By E. Channing, A. B. Hart, and F. J. Turner. First Edition, 1896. Revised and augmented edition. Boston and New York : Ginn, 1912.
3. *Economic Beginnings of the Far West : How We Won the Land beyond the Mississippi.* By Katharine Coman. Two vols. New York : Macmillan, 1912.
4. *The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848.* By G. L. Rives. Two vols. New York : Scribner, 1913.
5. *The Development of American Nationality.* By C. R. Fish. New York : American Book Co., 1913.
6. *From Jefferson to Lincoln.* By W. MacDonald. New York : Holt, 1912.

WHEN John Bach McMaster brought out the first volume of the 'History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War,' in 1883, the prevailing historical opinions of his countrymen were based upon books of which few are to-day accepted as reliable, and upon general assumptions that are now questioned or supplanted. He began his studies in a period when the men who had fought the Civil War were still dominating American thought. He has outlived their generation and their epoch, for, as they died, younger historians, trained in Europe and unscarred by the abolition schism, began to rewrite their times. Yet these eight large volumes, to which Prof. McMaster has devoted his life,

and which are now complete, stretch across this revolution in ideals and understanding, and are a coherent whole, modern in their views to-day. When the first of them appeared there began a new period in historical writing in America.

Thirty years ago, the period that lay between the close of the second war with England and the outbreak of the Civil War (1814-1861) was the dark age of American history. No impartial historian had traversed it. The explanations given by politicians on the stump were still accepted as history by their followers. Men of the North, who as schoolboys had declaimed the fervid peroration of Webster's speech for the Union, were in middle life convinced that slavery was closely related to original sin and that the war was only a wicked rebellion. The veterans who had fought with Lee and Jackson, and their children, were hardened in the belief that selfish sectionalism and criminal aggression by the North were the key to all their history. There was no acceptance of fundamental facts in 1883, and no unity in interpretation. School histories were written for the North or the South; none could circulate throughout the nation. And indeed men were only just beginning, in 1883, to speak or to think of the United States as a nation.

That he foresaw the drift of American thought, and wrote the first great history that travelled with it, is Prof. McMaster's greatest title to fame. Out of his volumes can be gathered the facts that illustrate the modern view. Other historians have added to his facts, and formulated theories based upon them, but none has greatly changed his drawing of the picture of the half-century preceding the Civil War. In that half-century, as we now see it, are to be found the bases for the nationality of the United States, whose existence men disbelieved in 1883.

The Peace of Ghent, in 1814, left the United States bankrupt and disunited. Its population, under ten millions, sprawled along the Atlantic seaboard, pushing slightly west of the ridge of the Alleghanies, but it was local in its life and in its views. It had been plunged unprepared into the English war by enthusiasts from the frontier. From the war itself it had gained nothing,

but from the peace in Europe which came within a few months of the treaty of Ghent it derived permanent advantage. With Europe at rest it was no longer worth while to bully the United States; the vexed question of the carrying trade ceased to vex when Europe could resume her own carrying. Freed from the disturbing forces of European politics the United States could develop quietly at home. The unproductive war was followed by so active a period of home development that it has always been easy to argue *post hoc propter hoc*, and to attribute the growth to the 'second war of independence.' A truer explanation finds in the distress and suffering of the war the cause for active migration and pioneering, out of which came in the six years following the return of peace the six new States of Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819), Maine (1820), and Missouri (1821). The boundaries of occupation were enlarged; the problems of wilderness-reclamation were forced upon government; a new economic democracy was born; and the transition from provinces to nation was begun.

Nearly every American problem of the next fifty years can be connected with the conquest of the frontier. The backwoods communities of 1815 were in the Ohio Valley, but they differed little from earlier backwoods in the mountains of Virginia or Carolina, or along the Susquehanna or the Hudson or the Connecticut. Direct contact with nature was the prime condition; and the trees, the swamps, the thick virgin sod, the food supply, and the diseases were similar whenever Americans broke into the wilderness. The first two decades were the same whatever the region. Until the first children had grown to manhood the pioneers lived a life of unrelieved fatigue. Economic and social equality were compulsory. There was rarely much money or much that money could buy. Food and shelter were easily obtained, and were nearly all that could be obtained. Not until the accumulations of years had provided means for permanent improvements and for paying off the debt of occupation could the frontier regions begin to differentiate according to local resources or social influences.

At the close of the War of 1812 most of the United States was agricultural and not far removed from pioneer

conditions. Along a few of the main rivers, near Boston, or New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore or Charleston, were communities that had developed settled habits; but their proportion to the whole population was small, and the pioneer farmer was still the typical American. The rush of settlers to the West in the next few years enlarged the pioneer area and, through the admission of new States, impressed its influence upon the central government. That differentiation within America was approaching was rarely foreseen; that differentiation from Europe had occurred was patent to all.

A new consciousness of American independence showed itself in the doctrine which James Monroe announced in 1823, after the revolution in the colonies of Spain. The threat that a European congress might be called to consider the restoration of these colonies by the same allied force that had put down liberal movements in France, Spain, and Naples alarmed both the American and the British governments, although for different reasons. George Canning wanted to save the South American trade, which a restoration of the Spanish colonial system would destroy. James Monroe voiced the nervousness of his countrymen lest the destruction of republican governments in South America should be the precursor of an attack upon republicanism in the United States. It was a not uncommon belief of Americans that monarchical Europe dreaded the success of democracy in America and longed to overturn it. From such a background came the doctrine that has remained the fundamental American policy since 1823. Unreasonable in many details, but founded upon the defensible premiss that whatever may injure a country is its proper concern, the Monroe doctrine warned the Powers not to molest the American republics, and asserted an isolation of American interests and a leadership of the United States in America that expressed the new consciousness of independence. If the doctrine had been questioned it could never have been maintained, because of the structural weakness of the United States and its sparse population. But America was more conscious of its independence than of its limitations.

The decade following the enunciation of the Monroe doctrine witnessed various events that confirmed its

premiss. One may scrutinise the earlier treaties of the United States in vain for evidence that American influence shaped their terms, but in a series of treaties made about 1830, in the Presidency of Andrew Jackson, the republic made good its claim to respectful treatment. The European wars had done much damage to Americans, who were maltreated by all the belligerents. Great Britain was the defendant in most of the cases, since her universal naval presence had given to her Orders in Council vast power for harm. But these claims had been forfeited when the United States chose to try the arbitrament of war. Against France, Spain, Holland, and Naples, however, were claims that had not been cancelled by war, and were pressed by the United States with increasing seriousness as the legitimate governments of Europe solidified themselves in the twenties. Jackson collected the claims a little later, and so managed their political effect upon his followers that they were generally regarded as a tribute to the strength and influence of the United States.

During Jackson's first year in office, in 1830, occurred other events that further stimulated a growing sentiment of nationalism. The political quarrel between southern men and eastern men, old as the government and embittered by the factions of the English war, crystallised in the great senatorial debate between Webster of Massachusetts and Hayne of South Carolina. The forces of nationality had been growing quietly. The Supreme Court had voiced the supremacy of federal law over the States, but most of the States still thought of themselves as supreme. Webster made popular the notion of national supremacy. His followers in the North and West accepted his theory first for party's sake. Two years later, when Hayne's own State tried to 'nullify' * a tariff law, its act strengthened the conviction elsewhere that Webster's view was right. In the next

* In 1832 South Carolina, vexed by a protective tariff, declared that the Tariff Act was unconstitutional and void, thereby attempting to 'nullify' it. Jackson prepared to use force against the State in order to execute the law, but Congress hurriedly modified the Act and removed the grievance. The proceeding adopted by South Carolina became known as 'nullification'; its importance lay in the fact that it involved the question of State rights as against the Federal authorities.

thirty years, the 'Reply to Hayne' became a northern classic, a text for schools, a part of northern thought.

Jackson brought much of the West to accept this view by his vigorous treatment of 'nullification.' Elected as the spokesman of the frontier democrats in 1828, he realised their feeling for the general government, forestalled nullification by a threat of force, and served both his own party and the nation by his policy. By 1830 the generation of men that controlled America was forgetting the separatism that dated from the colonial period. The last of the framers of the Constitution to die was Madison, who lived until 1837. Men who knew neither British rule nor State freedom were coming into control; and every act of the general government served to strengthen it as the kernel of American life. The opposition to the nascent nationalism came from a region just beginning to realise itself as possessing special economic interests and at variance with half the States.

Calhoun of South Carolina, twice Vice-President and long a senator for his State, was among the earliest to notice this sectional divergence and to prepare a political remedy to meet it. In his youth he had been as national as any. He was one of the young enthusiasts who forced the English war. He had advocated a Federal Bank, internal improvements at the public cost, and a tariff so adjusted as to afford protection to American manufactures. He had warned his colleagues in Congress against a narrow and restricted view of public powers. So late as 1824 he favoured these things, but in the next four years he became aware of the sectional drift that was separating the North and the South. As between the nation and his State, he was for the latter; and during the years of Adams's presidency he formulated the philosophic basis of separatism and nullification. When, in 1828, the tariff was again revised under the influence of northern manufacturers and Clay's western converts to the 'American System,' Calhoun used every strategy to defeat the measure, and failing in this undertook to organise his State in opposition to it. He might have precipitated the nullification episode in this year had not the probable election of Jackson to the presidency induced him to give the government one more chance. From his angle the tariff had become a sectional measure,

enacted by a corrupt alliance of its beneficiaries, in defiance of the Constitution and to the damage of the South. He hoped that under Jackson the policy would change peaceably ; but change it must, if his section was to receive fair play.

The forces of nature had much to do with the sectional unity of the South and its divergence in character from the North. Here was the region of America's distinctive exports, tobacco and cotton. The cultivation of the former staple had been profitable for many generations and had induced a type of life based upon it and its source of labour. The negro slave was introduced into America at a time when ethical opinion had nothing to say against the institution of slavery, and when the great nations of Europe were ready to derive a profit from either the use of the slaves or the traffic in them. Slavery had existed in every colony, but it had been generally unprofitable in a society in which the pioneer was the typical member. The work of the pioneer was individual, calling for strength, enterprise, initiative, and a degree of industry not to be expected from a half-savage who worked under compulsion for a master. Save as house-servants, slaves had little value in most regions. The cost of supervising the negroes and keeping them to their tasks was so great that only where their labour could be administered wholesale was their employment profitable. In pioneer agriculture nothing was done wholesale. Only in the culture of tobacco or rice, in the early days, could profits be found large enough to justify the use of labour so inexpert ; and in these only could plantations be organised large enough to systematise the labour and use the negroes cheaply.

In the tobacco plantations of Virginia was devised the best method for the utilisation of the slaves ; but even here, in the generation after the Revolution, public opinion had regarded slavery as a misfortune. The democratic humanitarianism of the 18th century made it hard for those who demanded the rights of man for themselves to justify the holding of human chattels. The 19th century began in the United States with the belief that slavery was 'in the course of ultimate extinction,' but with forces at work that already threatened to

reverse the course. The invention of Whitney's machine for cleaning cotton opened a new vista of cheap clothing for the masses and brought prosperity to those quarters of the globe where cotton could be raised. So great were the profits that no labour was too costly to be used, while negro labour appeared to be at its best in the cotton-fields. The cotton plantations grew rapidly, increasing the price of slaves and piling up accumulations of capital for reinvestment in lands and slaves. The South was started on a new career.

The first phase of the American occupation of the continent was pioneering; and, while the pioneer generation lasted, there was substantial uniformity, North or South. The sectional divergence began with the second phase. Throughout the second English war there was a western solidarity that stretched from the outposts at Detroit to those at New Orleans. Jackson's democracy was the expression of the simple aspirations of this region and this generation. But, as the area in which cotton could be raised passed out of its pioneer chapter, it changed its character.

The pioneer was poor. He had little capital and few slaves, and reclaimed his farm with the work of his own hands. Behind him came the cotton-grower with a stock of slaves and free capital for investment in the cleared land. It was unusual for the planter to clear his land himself; he bought instead of the original pioneers, consolidating the clearings of several, and put his slaves to work. In many sections of the South it is possible to trace in the recorded deeds the process of occupation. Small holdings, many in number, with a free white working population, come first. Large holdings, with slave labour directed by a few white owners and overseers, come next. So long as the plantation flourished, it inevitably tended to grow in size, for the profits from slaves depended upon the degree of organisation and division of labour that prevailed; and, other things being equal, the larger the plantation the greater the profit.

But the effect of the plantation upon the plantation community was inevitable. It could not support a dense population. Its owners were surrounded by their negro labourers, in fear of whom they always lived. The cultivation of the soil was wasteful, with single cropping

and no fertilisation. The planters' capital was immobile because it was tied up in the ownership of the labour supply. As years went on, a social organisation of landed gentry appeared, which controlled the economic system of its region and monopolised the fields of government and law. The poorer whites lived in the social shadow of their superiors. It was a charming aristocracy and an omnipotent one. Uncontaminated by trade, based upon land, used to big ventures, and independent in mind, its political leaders could speak with a twofold authority—that which came by election and that which they attained at birth.

By 1830 the cotton region had pushed across the Old South (east of the Alleghanies) into Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and even Texas. Slave labour, with all its limitations, was its chief support; and whatever attacked its labour threatened its very existence. In the debate over the admission of Missouri in 1820 the plantation region had shown a disposition to demand more territory into which to take its slaves, and had served notice that the institution of slavery, far from being 'in the course of ultimate extinction,' was the financial foundation of the South. As the institution became more prosperous the South ceased to talk of its abandonment, came to defend it as a lamentable necessity, and ended by proclaiming it as a divine institution provided for the benefit of both races. Calhoun had seen this prosperity, had foreseen that it would invite attack, and had sought to organise a political machine upon it, to protect it. The census showed that the plantation was less effective in developing population and wealth than was the free industry of the North. Exactly half of the States (of which there were twenty-four in 1830) permitted slavery within their limits, but these were falling behind the other half that rejected it. Control by majority vote would leave the South in hopeless minority; the tariff, which was subject to majority control, warned the South what it might expect. For the benefit of the populous northern States all were compelled to bear the burden of a protective tariff. The South marketed its crop abroad and bought its supplies outside the tariff wall. Calhoun and his allies attributed the prosperity of the North to the tribute thus exacted, and were not placated by the

argument that whatever benefited one section benefited all, at least indirectly. Calhoun hoped that under Jackson, elected by an alliance of the West and South, the tariff policy would be reversed, and so in 1828 he put off the application of his theory of redress.

North or South the generation of the pioneer was the same, and brought solidarity throughout the West until the middle 'twenties. The successors of the pioneer gave to each region its permanent character; and the investment of the surplus savings of each region shaped its growth. In the South capital went into plantations and slaves. Further north cotton could not be grown; no crop was profitable enough to carry the burden of slaves; and the surplus went into dwellings, barns, stock, roads, towns, and all the other paraphernalia of a diversified industrial community.

Every year carried the North-West farther from the South-West in character. The prosperous northern farmer used his savings to pay off his mortgage, then to build him a better home than the log house in which his first children were invariably born. He perhaps bought more fields and enlarged his agricultural plant; but, as he passed into later middle life, he was more likely to turn his farm over to a son to cultivate—the other sons could find cheap land for themselves everywhere—and to retire to the country seat where he lived upon his income, talked politics, and devoted himself to the development of his community. The southern planter was prone to build up his great plantation and then, as wasteful methods brought its soil to the margin of declining crops, to sell it and buy newer and fresher land. He spent less on permanent improvements than the northern farmer because he knew that cotton culture consumed the land itself. In the wake of the large plantations, at their zenith of prosperity, came sales of land, breaking up the large estates into smaller holdings, cultivated by poorer men who lacked the capital or initiative to become planters and could afford no better lands. When the southern region was beginning to decline through soil-exhaustion and the emigration of the great planters, their northern contemporaries were replacing the log houses with finer dwellings, building barns, beginning to fertilise their acres, and developing

country seats in which capital resided and from which economic and political influences radiated throughout the community. The county town became a centre of propaganda for manufactures and railroads, while the retired farmers who dwelt therein had their savings ready for investment. The northern frontier, in its second generation, became wealthy and populous, intersected by railroads, canals, and turnpikes, at a time when its southern neighbour was crying for railroads which it had no capital to develop and was passing piecemeal into the hands of the poor whites. The planter, at the crest of his prosperity, saw in slavery a profitable economic institution. The decennial censuses, however, told a story of sectional divergence which was throwing the bulk of population and wealth, the cities, the railroads, the banks, and the factories, into the region that owned no slaves.

This sectional divergence was perceived by a few of the shrewder leaders before the United States in general grasped it. By accident the number of States remained evenly divided between the slave and the free until 1850; but the free States possessed a power to control that excited the apprehensions of the leaders of the southern States. From the early 'thirties these had seen that the shift of the South from a belief in the ultimate extinction of slavery to an advocacy of it could not remain unnoticed. The rise of a positive abolition movement was a threat against their peace. Just how far slavery could be affected by adverse national action was not clear, but they saw their only safety in controlling the national institutions. Calhoun's theory of nullification was advanced to enable the South to escape the domination of the weightier section. Threats of secession or resistance accomplished their purpose for a time. They aroused the sympathies of northern Moderates. Only twice between 1828 and 1860 did the Democrats, dominated by southerners, fail to secure the presidency; and in every issue that appeared before Congress the leaders of the South carried their main points. National politics were shaped by the slavery struggle; and from 1840 to 1860 it seemed that the history of the United States was only the history of a controversy about slaves.

The writers who have followed Prof. McMaster, whether associated with him or not, have restated the facts of the period of slavery struggle and given to that period a different aspect. In 1896 two scholars at Harvard University, Edward Channing and Albert Bushnell Hart, then less widely known than they are to-day, published a 'Guide to the Study of American History,' in whose pages were given references to the literature of their subject. From their bibliographies the slavery issue obtrudes itself as dominant with the historians even as late as 1896. In 1912 a second edition of this handbook was brought out, twice the size of the first and reinforced by an extensive literature of a phase of history that the first edition had hardly noticed. This second edition of the 'Guide' is not only the best manual for the reader tracing his way through American historical literature, but it reveals the displacement of those ethical canons of historical interpretation which made slavery the keynote of American history by new canons which are largely economic.

Prof. Turner, who was teaching in a western university when the first edition of Channing and Hart appeared, has been the leader in forcing upon American historians the importance of economic history and the significance of the frontier. He published his basic essay* upon this theme in 1893. He applied his theory to the history of the 'twenties in 1906 in his 'Rise of the New West'; and, although he ceased to teach in the West in 1910, being translated to Harvard, he remains the leader of the newest movement. No one is to-day combating his generalisation that the influence of the frontier was the most important single factor in the first century of American history. Not only is slavery being treated from a different side, but its relative consequence has changed and it has come to be regarded as itself something of a symptom rather than as a great first cause. Recent books by Prof. Coman and Mr Rives give substance to the newer views. The 'Economic Beginnings of the Far West,' by the former, sketches the process by which the United States has become a

* 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History,' in *Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report*, 1893.

Pacific power, and is built upon the frontier theory of Prof. Turner. It is the most convenient summary of the occupation of the lands beyond the Mississippi, to the significance of which the contemporaries of that occupation were oblivious.

Few historians have noted the fact that the United States of the 'thirties took a different view of its future from that which it displayed in the 'fifties. At the earlier date the western boundary of the republic was along the western edge of the old Louisiana province, the Rocky Mountains. California was, and was expected to remain, Mexican soil. Oregon was indeed embraced in a claim contested with Great Britain, but it lay so far beyond the limits of habitation that men who talked seriously of its ultimate occupation were held to be jesting. So late as the close of the Mexican War, in 1849, a President of the United States questioned the practicability of holding the Pacific Slope.

The Indian policy, worked out by the federal government during the 'thirties, was possible only because of this view of an America extending to the mountains and never likely to go beyond. The so-called American Desert lying between the state of Missouri and the Rockies was by this policy devoted for ever to Indian occupation. It was made a crime for any American to cross into the Indian Country without a license. Americans in the days of Andrew Jackson thought of themselves as extending in agricultural occupation to the western border of Missouri and limited there by the Indians and the desert. For many Americans, who had accepted the teachings of Joseph Smith and the Mormon Church, this belief was buttressed by divine sanction, since through Joseph the Prophet had come a 'revelation' directing him to carry the Gospel to the Indians, and to erect the enduring 'Stake in Zion' at the western edge of the United States, at Independence, Missouri.

The independence of Texas, the settlement of the Oregon dispute, and the annexations that followed the Mexican War gave to the United States its present Pacific frontage and aroused permanent interest in that part of the continent that lay beyond the Indian Country. Emigrants crossed the plains by thousands, beating their paths wide and deep, and learning through

their experience in crossing the American Desert that it was not uninhabitable, but might even maintain a people of its own. The United States of the 'fifties, after the expansion, had enlarged its borders, was conscious of a great mission, and had discovered that the problems which statesmen had thought they had solved still awaited solution. The bitterest stage of the slavery controversy was reached when the status of the new territorial acquisitions in the West and South-West demanded the attention of Congress.

Prof. Coman summarises in her two volumes much of the investigation already made upon the economic beginnings of this region, whose vast potentialities changed the outlines of the American future. Mr Rives, with greater detail, applies himself to the study of one of the contributing factors—the annexation of Texas and the war that followed.

Texas became a thorny topic when its people gained their independence in 1836. It was a cotton country and held slaves. Its people, following the law of American migrations, came from the nearest settlements, which were necessarily southern. The abolitionists forgot that all the West had been won by such expansion, read into the events a content that fitted their theories, and prevented the admission of Texas as a State until 1845. They so distorted the facts that Texas has only recently taken its proper place in the tale of western expansion. Few of the general writers have written in the new light, but where they have, as Prof. Fish has done in his brilliant sketch of 'The Development of American Nationality,' their story is not that with which the last generation was familiar. In Prof. MacDonald's 'From Jefferson to Lincoln' the old story is told well, with clearness and accuracy of statement, but with little realisation of the fact that adherence to the surface of events falls far short of satisfying those who feel that American politics have been mainly the outgrowth of economic conditions.

The economic basis is to-day dominant in the interpretation of American history. The frontier was the weightiest element in the first century of independence and has not yet ceased to exert an influence. Next to the frontier the determining factors of the period before

the Civil War were the necessary development of the central government, the effects of railroad construction, and the consequences of negro labour in the cotton-field.

It is true that the United States began with independent communities. As the colonies made good their independence in the 18th century they took the form of separate republics, acting jointly for certain purposes through congressmen, who were little more than ambassadors, but regarding themselves as severally supreme. Only the anarchy of the 'critical period' (1783-1789) induced them to surrender their freedom and to give to a central government powers adequate to its existence; and few of the generation that made the Constitution realised its full implication. Not until trade between the States became common and conflict between State and national laws arose, did that realisation come. Webster popularised the notion of a supreme nation, just as Calhoun saw the need to hold fast to the theory of State sovereignty. Webster had on his side statesmanship and constitutional theory. He had more than this—the facts of life.

Perhaps the greatest fact leading to nationality as a condition rather than as a theory was the possession of a landed estate by Congress. The great cessions of western land claims, made by the States for the purpose of forming a common fund out of which the debts of the Revolution should be paid, and out of which new States should be formed as population spread, led Congress into acts not compatible with any theory of State supremacy. The Indian ownership, in which most of the land lay at the time of the State cessions, had to be removed; and public treaties strengthened the authority of the general government year by year. The occupants of each new cession were the wards of the Government, not of any State. For years, in many cases, they lived under arbitrary control. Before Great Britain had developed her modern colonial system, Congress had devised the parallels to the crown colony, the colony with representative institutions, and the colony with full autonomy and responsible government. One by one these colonies were admitted by Congress into membership in the Union. But no State so created could look back to a past in which it had itself been a sovereign body. Of

the thirty-one States in the Union in the autumn of 1850, eighteen had been admitted by Congress; and fourteen of these had been created by that body from a beginning in the public lands.

By the middle of the century, Congress was the creator of statehood for half the country. It maintained a postal service. Its little army kept the peace with the Indians. Its customs-laws constituted a gigantic Zollverein that marked the States off from all the world. With every decade, more of its people were proud of the nation and regarded the State as only an administrative subdivision. The facts of life could not but exercise a powerful influence upon notions regarding law or policy. When Webster was Secretary of State in 1852 he saw this fact, and tried deliberately to turn public attention towards the nation as an entity and away from State or sectional jealousies by assuming a firm attitude in foreign affairs. And in the beginning of the Civil War another Secretary of State thought to heal internal dissension by provoking quarrels with Great Britain, France, or both. The development of the frontier kept every generation repeating the old process of reclamation, and renewed continually the youth of the United States. The duties of the general government forced it to become a nation for many purposes, whatever its constitutional relation to the States. A revolution in communications between 1830 and 1860 created a nation in the economic sense of the word.

It is said, on somewhat unreliable authority, that a mass meeting in Baltimore, in the middle 'twenties, voted to build a railroad to the Ohio River, and then voted to send a committee to England to learn what a railroad was. In 1828 the last living signer of the Declaration of Independence lifted the first spadeful of earth in the construction of this road, and thus brought the United States into touch with that industrial revolution that separates the 19th century from all preceding time. The country entered upon railroad construction with more enthusiasm than knowledge; and by 1840 its achievements began to tell upon life. The first railroads were local undertakings, conceived as means to supplement existing highways and to connect urban regions with their agricultural environs. Not until after 1840 did

these local lines begin to form through-circuits by the accident of intermediate connexions. Boston and Albany were among the earliest important cities to be connected by rail; but their iron links were followed during the 'forties by others which, before 1850, created in the Eastern States railroad lines parallel to and supplementing the more important rivers, the canals, the great turnpikes, and the seacoast itself. The foundations of a railroad system were laid in the East before the Mexican War was over. In the year of its termination, 1848, the first through-route of consequence was opened in the West.

Railroad enthusiasm was contagious; and nowhere did its progress affect society more than in the newer regions where transportation was the means of life. The frontier community cared first for the land system, by which its members might easily secure title to their freeholds. It cared next for its credit system, by which they could borrow the capital with which to buy the land, stock it, improve it, and endure meanwhile. When the crops began to ripen, transportation was the condition upon which ultimate prosperity depended; and wherever rivers or lakes failed to provide cheap means for moving bulky crops artificial improvements were loudly demanded. Throughout the West railroads appeared likely to meet an old and unfilled need; and everywhere the railroad promoter had his day between 1837 and 1857.

The financial results of the railroad movement upon the United States have not yet been described in full. No earlier enterprises had called for capital in so great amounts, and no private individual or combination could finance them. State and federal treasuries were at first the sources from which it was hoped that funds might be drawn. The latter proved obdurate, but the former voted millions for prospective roads, many of which never materialised. Riotous speculation was checked by panic in 1837, after which the growth of the joint stock company was steady, and the entry of commercial influence upon the legislative floor began.

The experimental western railroads were begun in the 'thirties and pushed on in spite of the panic, until in 1848 a line running south from Sandusky, on Lake

Erie, met a line running north from Cincinnati on the Ohio River, and the first through-railroad of the West was born. From 1848 until the financial panic in 1857, each year witnessed larger investment and longer construction, until upon the eve of the Civil War there were 30,000 miles of track in the United States, of which a full third were within the north-western States alone.

No other section was so greatly changed in its internal relations as was the North-West by its railroads. In the East and Middle States 10,000 miles hardly afforded a single important new trade route. In the South 10,000 miles only began to connect the tidewater plantation States with the cotton region west of the Alleghanies. But north of the Ohio River the third 10,000 miles changed the forces of geography and the history of the region. Here in the North-West the first settlement had been along the Ohio River, and from the Southern States. The people traded along the shores of the Ohio and the Mississippi. A second wave of immigration came to the North-West by way of the Great Lakes, and colonised the northern boundary, reproducing the social conditions of New York and New England. The watershed between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes divided the North-West into two dissimilar halves, and maintained a permanent political cleavage until the railroads crossed its slopes and broke down the barrier. By 1860, from Buffalo, Cleveland, Sandusky, Toledo, Detroit, and Chicago, railroads ran southward to Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Louisville, Cairo, and St Louis; and the crops of the North-West began to leave the watercourses of the rivers and follow the railway routes to market. Geographic sectionalism began to weaken, and with it the balance of power in the United States shifted.

The South-West was as enthusiastic as the North-West in its advocacy of railroads, but went little beyond advocacy. The plantation system provided little free capital for investment. The prosperous planter was compelled by the scheme of his economic life to invest his savings in more slaves, for which he must buy more land, for which he must buy still more slaves. The railroad promoter found him sympathetic but without ready funds. Much of the money for southern roads was provided in the North or in Europe; the southern

community lacked the local roads, built by indigenous savings, that had already covered the North-West with a close net of tracks before the South had even sketched out its railroad system. Railroads brought with them population and wealth, and carried further the economic divergence between the North and South which had aroused the concern of Calhoun even before the first railroad was built.

The economic development of the United States, and particularly that of the Middle West, was scarcely noticed by the older generation of historians. The railroads did not work revolution in the East or South at once. But, when they undid the work of nature and bound together in the North-West dissimilar sections, they laid the foundation for the destruction of every southern hope. Nationality was one of their immediate consequences—not a nationality of legal theory but a nationality of business fact. State lines cut no figure in the new trade that followed the artificial channels and was administered by cities that controlled the strategic points. Any political sectionalism became inconvenient for business. Reliance upon the nation was easy for a region which had sprung originally from federal activity and had developed a trade that knew no State lines.

While the needs of government were expanding the functions of the United States in the 'forties and 'fifties, and the development of a railroad system was bringing economic influences to emphasise the drift towards nationalism, the consequences of negro labour in the cotton-fields were continuing to hold the South to a uniformity of life and a simplicity of demand that were at variance with the trend of both North-West and East. A small aristocracy controlled the destinies, economic, political, or social, of the whole South. Negro labour was exploited for its profit. The presence of the negro compelled a system of policing society that no other region knew. While the negro remained, it was believed that no better method of control than slavery could be found. The southerner knew what his abolitionist antagonist often forgot—that the negro was not a black-skinned white man, but was instead a semi-barbarous man, unfitted for independence in a

community whose standards were set by whites. Even the southerner who decried slavery saw no alternative to it. And slavery itself was but an incident; the great fact was the presence of the negro on any terms.

Tied in its bondage to negro labour and the plantation system, the South could neither change its habits nor develop with the rest of the Union. It was forced to see the population of the rival sections grow more rapidly than its own could grow. It was forced to watch a community based upon free white labour build itself railroads and towns, factories and schools and colleges, increase its representation in Congress, and expand over the free lands of the West. All that the future held for the South was more divergence, more subordination to an unsympathetic majority, more heckling by an ethical party that was attacking the institution of slavery on moral grounds. The economic forces that produced secession and drove the South to revolt in order to protect the anachronism of human slavery were too strong to be resisted. The southerner who thought he was standing for the Constitution 'as it was' was no further from the fact than the abolitionist who thought it safe to turn three million slaves loose upon society.

The older writers founded the anti-slavery movement upon humanitarian considerations. They had no explanation for the conduct of the South but that of a predisposition towards iniquity. The newer writers, guided in large measure by a school of young southern scholars, who have studied the plantation and know its significance and cost as the planters never knew it, find in the economic divergence caused by slavery the reason why the South failed to keep step with the North-West and East in their march from independence through sectionalism to a real nationality. Contemporaries could not see the inevitable as it is seen to-day. The unification of the North-West, which is the key to an understanding of the 'fifties, was not realised until too late.

The political parties were distressed by slavery as early as the 'thirties, and failed to meet the needs of economic development squarely until long after the Civil War was over. Until after 1850, when the lands acquired

from Mexico were organised as Territories or States, the leaders in both parties were men whose careers dated from close to the second English war. Calhoun, Clay, and Webster were yet leading; Benton was not yet displaced. But behind them were younger men in both great parties who could not remember a time when a slave issue had not existed, whose political life was confined to the years of controversy. Immediate abolitionists and secessionists were only waiting for the death of the older and steadier leaders to urge radical policies on both parties. Under the control of the older men they agreed that the Compromise of 1850* should never be reopened, and that slavery should be excluded from further controversy by common agreement. But their consent to this policy of silence was forced, and their constituents would not abide by it. Within a few months of the passage of the Compromise the agitation about slavery was more bitter than it had ever been, while the nearly simultaneous disappearance of Clay, Calhoun, Webster, and Benton removed the brakes.

Northern opinion was stirred up by the anti-slavery tract, 'Uncle Tom's Cabin,' which, in the form of a novel, portrayed the facts of slavery as the North saw them. The resentment of the South at what it regarded as a gross caricature added to the bitterness. The last remaining unorganised territory next came into the political whirlpool. All sections were clamouring for a Pacific railroad in the early 'fifties; and the organisation of New Mexico, with the admission of Texas and California, had provided a way across the continent. This route could never suit the Middle or Northern States, nor be acceptable to the rising commercial community around Chicago. Stephen A. Douglas, spokesman of the upper Mississippi Valley and senator from Illinois, saw the dilemma. There could be no northern road unless the Indian Country could be divided into Territories and the tribes removed from the neighbourhood of the route. But

* The older statesmen induced Congress to pass in 1850 what they regarded as a permanent compromise upon the subject of slavery in the territories west of the Rockies. The South received a stringent law for the return of fugitive slaves; the North received the admission of California as a Free State; the status of remaining territories was left for future adjustment.

there could be no division into States until the Indians had ceded their lands. Moreover, the creation of new States or Territories would certainly revive the slavery debate which had broken forth upon every similar occasion since 1820. If the Indian Country remained closed to whites, there could be no railroad; if it was opened, there could be no political peace.

The device of Douglas to secure the opening of the middle region, Kansas and Nebraska, without too much disturbance of either North or South, was based upon a doctrine of popular sovereignty acceptable to all the West, in accordance with which any region ought to have the right to settle its own attitude toward slavery without federal interference. But his device, instead of avoiding opposition, gave birth to a new party which, although unheard-of in the beginning of 1854, elected half the members of the House of Representatives in the following November. No other such political revolution has occurred in the United States. The new Republican party, thus called into existence in opposition to the further extension of slavery which the Kansas-Nebraska Bill made possible, had its strength in the North-West. Step by step the Republican party consolidated itself between 1854 and 1860. Its first success, in the former year, indicated the unpopularity of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, and gave to the party confidence, a hope of permanence, and converts who saw in its growth preferment for themselves. It ran a popular hero of the Far West, John C. Fremont, for President in 1856; and, though it lost the election, it polled more than a third of the popular vote, with no aid at all from the South. It was a sectional party to oppose a sectional interest; and its success forced a greater degree of sectionalism upon its Democratic opponents. In 1858 its cause was further aided by the determination of the Supreme Court to attempt a settlement of the slavery question. The decision in the case of a negro slave, Dred Scott, announced that Congress had no right to legislate at all upon slavery in the Territories, and that the Missouri Compromise * itself was unconstitu-

* Under the Missouri Compromise of 1820 slavery had been forbidden to enter the territories of the United States (then bounded on the west by the Rockies) north of 36° 30', North Latitude. The Kansas-Nebraska Bill

tional. This added to the Northern fire and brought new members to the party that believed the South was engaged in a conspiracy to control the nation. Abraham Lincoln, in the following year, clarified the public mind upon the great issues, as he pursued his rival Douglas from district to district. 'A house divided against itself will not stand,' he asserted with homely directness; and his further teaching showed why it was unlikely either to fall or to remain divided. He broke the alliance of the West and South upon which Douglas had relied, and with it he destroyed the last hope of the pro-slavery South within the Union. His election to the Presidency in 1860 occasioned the secession of the South.

It has been customary to regard slavery as itself a cause. With clearer light and less passion, it is to-day coming to be regarded as only the consequence of the deeper race problem, which was itself the result of the suitability of a large part of the Southern States for the culture of cotton. If the North had known the South, it would have known too much to endorse the attack of the abolitionists in all its violence. Sectional feeling aggravated the consequences of differentiation; and a Civil War became inevitable. Living historians are now approaching a common ground for the study of that war. The economic foundations upon which McMaster began to build a generation ago are accepted by all. And it is becoming clear that not only was the development of the frontier the force that precipitated slavery reorganisation upon the United States every few years, but that the passing of one great frontier, the Old North-West, into its second generation, with its towns, its factories, and its railroads, created for that section a balance of power, and gave to it the tendencies that saved the Union. Other political movements native to the upper Mississippi Valley have appeared since the Republican revolt, but to-day, as in 1861, the Middle West remains the heart of America.

FREDERIC L. PAXSON.

repealed this restriction and evoked loud political outcry. The opinion of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott Case tended to show that the Missouri Compromise restriction had been invalid from the beginning.

Art. 10.—THE NOVELS OF EDITH WHARTON.

The Greater Inclination (1899); *A Gift from the Grave* (1900); *Crucial Instances* (1901); *The Valley of Decision* (1902); *The Descent of Man* (1904); *The House of Mirth* (1905); *Ethan Frome* (1911); *The Reef* (1912); *The Custom of the Country* (1913).*

MRS WHARTON'S books, from the earliest to the latest, are more than a collection of penetrating and finely finished studies, they are linked episodes in one continuous adventure, the adventure of her rare and distinguished critical intelligence. She is a writer who has never, so to say, relapsed into a settled life. As an artist she seems to have cared little, perhaps she has not cared enough, to sit still and receive impressions passively. Her choice has been less to watch the drifting images than to seize and to question them. She has waylaid all manner of dramatic moments in widely various scenes, not merely in different lands under different skies, but in a large diversity of mental and moral climates. She has made many experiments, and has been drawn aside into not a few digressions, some of which have seemed to break, a little too abruptly, the forward march of her work. Yet her restless movement has never been wayward, for it has been directed by a single intention; and it is precisely this that has brought her work to the brilliance it has latterly reached, not merely of lucidity and precision, but of quick colour and expressive charm. Her intention has clearly been to leave no image and no moment uncriticised, to analyse every impression and to interrogate every conclusion; and the timely moral pointed by her work is the dependence of the reason and beauty of literary form upon this activity.

Mrs Wharton, then, seizing her material, the treasure of an unwritten story or study or novel, has shown that the way to begin is to rend the precious stuff in pieces. The meaning of the delight which an artist finds in this initial process is plentifully misunderstood. The blade of analysis is commonly regarded as destructive; and the writer who rejoices in its use as openly as the author

* The first-named work is published by Mr Lane; the second, third and fourth by Mr Murray; the rest by Messrs Macmillan.

of Mrs Wharton's earlier volumes is certain to be taxed, if not with mere malice, at least with the failure to discern the warm penumbra of humanity which envelops beauty with its most appealing grace. It would be far more reasonable to measure the force with which the grace has been felt by this determination to insulate and lay bare its elements. The writer well knows the object and the possible reward of his violence. The treasure is torn to bits in the knowledge that it will presently re-dispose itself ideally. It will strain towards the right shape, the shape that the haphazard chances of life had prevented it from assuming. Rescued at last from the accidental and the alien, the unwritten book begins to find its form. Its essential germ, whatever it may be, is one and unique. Its unity may be that of a figure, a life, a vista of circumstance, a set of relations—in any case it is indivisible; and as soon as it is extricated it expands anew and is ready for its full and logical expression. This at least is its response in the mind of the novelist, the mind in which an infused idea becomes, not an argument, but an acted drama on a set stage. In another mind the flowering and fruiting of the idea, though not less lively, will be different. There is a seed of indestructible fertility in anything that has really been understood, and if its growth is secret, there is nothing mysterious about the manner in which it is induced to branch.

Thus it is that, looking back from Mrs Wharton's later command of large and intricate design, we may recognise it as the direct result of an incessantly inquisitive criticism. Her earlier and shorter pieces are like a series of serried question-marks, each confronting some selected case or moment of life, every one of which is called upon to stop and explain, in the fewest words, its precise significance. Its significance, accordingly, dictates the fashion and the scope of the small drama; and, as the author's hand grows more and more assured, so the chosen themes, the moments detained in their flight, begin to make more elaborate and difficult claims. The readiness to put questions is not always the same, it must be conceded, as the readiness to wait for answers; and, as to that, we may sometimes find that this insatiable interrogator darts ahead of her subject, at a pace faster

than any at which life can respond. Life, it is true, will move on the whole as fast as we please; but, though it reacts to the acute question with delight, it cannot be expected to summarise its answer in a flash, and at times the space of a flash seems to be all it gets from Mrs Wharton. Her difficulty here is simply the extraordinary ease with which she discovers fresh problems to be elucidated. There is one gift we could occasionally wish for her, and that is the gift of forgetting that there are more picturesque chances and incidents in the world than one—the one for the moment under our eyes. As it is, she now and then seems, in her earlier volumes, to dismiss her story while it is still asking for a further hearing; not because she can get no more out of it, but because of the other clamorous stories awaiting their turns.

At the same time, if Mrs Wharton's touch, in some of her books, has been unduly light, another explanation is discoverable. Almost invariably she has used the short story for the comedy of irony, to which indeed the short story more particularly lends itself. Her odd cases, queer motives, awkward episodes, have generally been such as displayed themselves in that particular light. Now there is nothing in the world which irony so much and so rightly fears as over-emphasis. It has a horror of blackening the telling line or of carrying the expressive gesture too far; and, in recoiling from that excess, it may easily make the more sophisticated mistake of not carrying it far enough. Moreover irony, though it works without a qualm or a doubt in the comedy of situation, can never be quite so sure of itself where it is called upon to irradiate the portrait of a character. Situations, conjunctions of human beings, are more definite and controllable than human beings themselves; and, where but few resources of character are called into play by the action, irony can keep it in hand without difficulty. Character itself, character directly faced and studied, more readily eludes it.

The titular piece in the volume called 'The Descent of Man' is an instance to the point. A serious but all too adaptable man of science happens upon certain books of a familiar sort, books which have won an immense popular success by their exploitation of the yearnings of an uncritical public for something it can regard as

scientific and philosophical, without danger to its intellectual complacency. The professor amuses himself with the ironical production of a book of this kind. The immediate issue is obvious: the professor's irony will be so fine that it will not prevent his book from obtaining precisely the same success as the effusions he set out to parody, the author himself falling thereby for the first time under the spell of popularity and its rewards. We wait to see what further and rarer stroke Mrs Wharton has in store for us. But no: she will not prolong a matter which, given the lively and sensitive consciousness of the professor, we feel would have gone further. With the amount of character she has given him (and the situation required no less) he would no doubt have had more to say.

On the other hand, to take an instance from the same volume, the story called 'The Other Two' shows its small circle perfectly described. Here again there is no surprise for the reader, for we see from the first that the climax is to be the embarrassing assembly, round her tea-table, of Mrs Waythorn's three husbands, the one in present possession and his two discarded predecessors. But here Mrs Wharton's question, still to call it so, is a simple one. She starts no problem of character and of the effect on it of circumstances, as in the case of the professor. She simply asks: What would such a scene be like?—and evokes the neatest and completest of answers. So too in the matchless 'Mission of Jane,' where a disaffected couple are finally united in tenderness by their common, but scrupulously unspoken, dislike of their terrible adopted daughter, the thing is conceived, not as an adventure in psychology, but as an incident to be viewed in one long glance of amusement. To this class belong the happiest of these stories, such as 'The Rembrandt,' 'The Pelican,' 'The Angel at the Grave,' in all of which the men and women, hapless and perplexed as they are, arise directly from their own histories. Their histories preceded them, and they have only to act them out. Where Mrs Wharton has reversed the process and found her drama by exploring minds and characters of a certain cast ('The Recovery,' 'The Moving Finger,' 'A Coward,' to name some examples), the scene is apt to result less

fortunately. Character, of the sort that requires for its exhibition no more room than the miniature stage of some twenty pages, is obviously character closely pruned, character rigorously simplified for the sake of a single dominant feature. On these terms its movement, in such pieces as those just mentioned, appears both a little constrained and a little vague, as though it were still conscious of the sacrifice, in variety of temperament and interest, which it has been called on to make. Mrs Wharton, in short, has succeeded better in transposing groups of people, concatenations of incident, into the key of the short story, than in doing the like with the looser agglomeration of the human mind.

The inference to be drawn is evident. If character, so summarised and foreshortened, seemed inclined to be unmanageable, it was tacitly asking to be treated on a larger scale. It was asking, that is to say, for the opportunity of acting and reacting against its like, of showing the stuff of which it is made by confronting other moving and living forces. The opportunity for this is the opportunity for the novel. The short story is the breaking of a wave upon a fixed rock; it cannot perhaps treat the subject which shows a reciprocal clash, the shock of two meeting waves. If this is so, it would be natural that a writer of Mrs Wharton's speculative and critical imagination should not readily regard the world as a motionless foil for the display of a single impulse. She would rather watch the difficult and highly modern minds which interest her, in their more or less embarrassed conflicts with each other and with the living world of manners. In other words, she would write novels; and in fact it is in her novels that her work has reached its ripeness. Of these the actual first lies outside the line to be followed here. 'The Valley of Decision' was of the nature of an experiment by the way, an excursion into what is called 'historical' fiction. It was an experiment which in such hands could not be uninteresting, though its sedulous avoidance of the commonplace note of romance does not quite secure it against occasional theatricality. But as a curious and careful study of the Italy of the eighteenth century it demands a different sort of criticism. From the point

of view adopted in these pages it is 'The House of Mirth' which ranks as Mrs Wharton's first novel.

The breadth and the fulness of this book are doubly remarkable. In the first place, in spite of a certain flaw in the structure, to be mentioned presently, there is no sort of constraint about the execution. It is handled with straightforward freedom, and makes its points with evenness and clarity. But 'The House of Mirth' also takes us at a stride into the question, hardly raised by its predecessors, of the social and organised (or anti-social and disorganised) life which Mrs Wharton now proceeded to use for her purposes. America, in fact, and in particular New York, appears as it had not yet appeared in her work. The 'crucial instances' of her earlier books were not, on the whole, specifically American. They were types of some of the difficulties to which the victims of modernity are heirs, wherever among modern conditions their lot may happen to have been cast. Many of them, no doubt, were naturally rooted in American soil, but in these America is merely an assumed background, conditioning the action without taking part in it. In 'The House of Mirth' New York is no background; it is an urgent and voluble participator in the drama. It is an actor, indeed, so vehemently alive that Mrs Wharton's easy and immediate control of such exuberance is a triumph of stage-management. 'The House of Mirth' is thoroughly the novel of a novelist; it shows, that is to say, no sign whatever that its author had been accustomed to find her subjects in momentary glimpses that did not ask for broader development. She re-focusses her sight, apparently without effort, to include one of the most remarkable spectacles in the history of manners—the sudden unfolding of a social growth fertilised by vaster streams of private wealth than the world has ever yet known. The glittering show which we associate with the name of Fifth Avenue may, for the service of art, leave something to be desired. But its very intractability is so vividly marked, in a world in which social definitions are everywhere becoming vaguer, that it clearly challenges art to the attempt to make use of it.

The evident difficulty is that the growth has been too sudden to strike us as organic. A living society, as

we understand the word, can draw its being only from a stored inheritance of traditions; and the leading feature of this particular New York is its freedom from any discernible debt to the past. This, no doubt, is a superficial view of the matter, for we are presumably not prepared to regard the millionaire as a miraculous and unrelated species. The millionaire and his hierarchy have had their own origins; and evolution is not the less natural for being rapid. The structure of this singular House of Mirth is therefore no more meaningless than any other; and the novelist who could expound its meaning by showing the continuity which it must have with its mysterious past would have a brilliant subject to his hand. Unfortunately the novelist, as things are, is scarcely in a position to do this, cut off as his experience is likely to be from the conditions of life which have brought about these huge accumulations. He cannot see the new society as the inevitable outcome of ancestral forces, for the necessary links lie in a region which it is usually forbidden him to tread, the region densely veiled from him under the name of business. Till that veil is rent he must chiefly be struck by the passion with which this society has flung itself into the attempt to buy everything that can be bought, and its amazing success in doing so. For the romance of expenditure this is all very well, but the novel of manners looks for something more coherent. No picture could be made of a promiscuity which streams beyond the limits of any frame that might be imposed upon it. A writer like Mrs Wharton, who touches nothing but to give it finality, could treat Fifth Avenue's indiscriminate raptures in only one way. Her Trenors and Dorsets and van Degens, scattering their millions on both sides of the Atlantic, do not and could not give her a subject for direct study; but it is a different matter when she annexes and uses them for particular issues. If it is difficult to see what they mean or how they were created, what they are devouring or supplanting is less obscure. Mrs Wharton accordingly pictures, not the Trenors themselves, but their disturbing impact upon other and more impressionable surfaces.

In 'The House of Mirth' it is Lily Bart whom they devour, or rather whom they so mould and train that

when, by what might have been the fortune of her life, they cease to find a use for her, she can only drop helpless by the way. Lily's fineness of grain, her central independence of spirit, perpetually prevent her from harvesting the profit which her cultivation of the Trenors and their like brings under her hand. The fruits of her dependence have a certain grossness of texture which always makes her, when choice has to be made, neglect to appropriate them. She pays for her fastidiousness by finding herself abandoned by the vivid crowd; and she pays for her courtship of the crowd, so carefully taught her by nearly all the conditions of her life, by discovering that her independence is only strong enough to destroy and not to re-make her. In the wavering drama of Lily's hesitations her independence is represented by the one friend who is both near enough to affect her and critical enough to have kept himself free on his own ground. Selden knows, and she knows, that if she is to create an existence of finer values for herself it can be only with his help. Yet between them they fail; and Lily, cast off at last by the crowd for her failure to treat with them consistently on their own terms, does not, at the moment of need, find the outstretched hand. So her drama must necessarily end; for, in the middle of a world which with all accuracy knows what it wants, there is no time for hesitation to feel its way and grow tentatively into strength. This we can easily recognise; but Mrs Wharton appears, in arranging her effects, to have assumed a little too much for the pace and stress of the hurrying world. That Lily must drop out is clear; and doubtless her subsidence would be rapid. But that her disappearance into obscurity should seem so little remarked, that she should vanish without more splash, is difficult to reconcile with the conspicuousness of her preceding triumphs, especially as her reluctant exile is no further in space than from the palaces of one street to the boarding-houses of the next. We feel that it would take even the Trenors more time than Mrs Wharton allows them to ignore Lily so completely, with the splendour of her beauty languishing within five minutes' walk. If this only means that we do not know the race of Trenors as Mrs Wharton knows them—which indeed is likely—there was then all the more need to

convince us securely. But except at this one juncture there seems no detail wanting to our knowledge of Lily's tyrannous world, so direct is Mrs Wharton's use of sharp descriptive strokes. Nothing could be more unobtrusively right than the way in which the gilded crowd surges over the picture, and parts, at the due moments, to give place to the sensitive quiet of the scenes between Lily and Selden with which the book is exquisitely punctuated.

In 'The Custom of the Country' Mrs Wharton has lately resumed the question of New York for a different purpose. Here again we have the crowd; but this time the crowd reacts, not merely against a personal episode in its midst, but against old traditions of life and manners which it half imitates, half defies. One such tradition, very finely-flavoured if a little exhausted by age, is close at hand, occupying the actual ground which has produced the more flamboyant crop. The dignity and discretion of this old New York, it is easy to see, will be a frail protection when it is called upon to deal with the insurgent new-comers, and it is likely enough to find itself disconcerted. There will be an eventful story to tell when, cleaving her way through new and old alike, with a determination that grows with her growing perception of her needs, appears Undine—Undine who has emerged from the newest of all, from the resounding void of the Middle West, with her dewy loveliness and her pair of forlorn and bewildered parents. The Middle West is rich enough to float Undine to New York, but it is her unaided beauty that carries her on from that point and that scars a great disturbing track across lives as firmly rooted, as broadly civilised, as her own is unattached and unconditioned. Undine has nothing and is nothing but her beauty, with just the wit to enable her to perceive that there are worlds where noise and expense are not taken as the measure of all values. If the strongholds of secluded dignity cannot be bought, beauty such as hers can reduce them. Washington Square soon falls; and the Faubourg St Germain, when its turn comes later on, holds out not much longer. Undine may droop for a moment in the rarefied air of these retreats, but she easily re-asserts herself. In the encounter between her futility and the concentrated significance of old

fashions and old manners, it is she who slips away unscathed, possessing as she does nothing more sensitive than her beauty. It is the trained and inherited power of living and feeling that alone knows how to pay and that consequently pays the whole price. Undine is free to regard herself as misjudged and ill-treated, and to carry her undimmed radiance back again to the world she understands.

Each of Mrs Wharton's later books has represented a new difficulty mastered, and the particular trophy of 'The Custom of the Country' is not to be missed, especially when it is placed side by side with 'The House of Mirth.' The story of Lily Bart, as we then see, is to the story of Undine as a tapestry unrolled to a picture painted in far-reaching aerial perspective. It is not a question of a difference in lively quality. The figures of the earlier tale are as distinct and vivid as those of the later, and their gestures are as free. The difference is that in 'The Custom of the Country' they have air and light and space all round them, that as we watch them they seem able to move towards us and retreat away from us, whereas the procession of 'The House of Mirth' passes across its pages at a constant distance from the spectator. The way of the procession is not necessarily, for that, an inferior way; it has its own appropriate and decorative completeness. But the fable of Undine, with its much more elaborate study in contrasts, needed a stage deep as well as wide. The shallower scene is enough for the seething rout to spend its money in; the shapely structures of a world which is openly based upon its past demand a setting in which the gradations of distance are as carefully indicated as the foreground. In 'The Custom of the Country,' for all its big sweep from continent to continent, the eye is never distracted by the flutter and flash of Undine's restlessness, for it is constantly aware of the spreading social landscape in which she ranges so irresponsibly. It is in particular the spectacle of French life, the life that is lived behind the huge-portalled house-fronts in the narrow streets of the 'Faubourg,' and the life that passes in what Mrs Heeny, Undine's irrepressible *masseuse*, pleasantly calls the 'Shutter country,' which absorbs the gaze with its deep layers of distinction and monotony and expressive

composure, of immemorial ignorance of the world coupled with the finest expertness in manipulating the fabric of existence. Its contrast at every point with Undine's inarticulate and barbaric innocence, which the ransacked spoils of a dozen climates leave exactly as blank as before, is worked out, filled in, rounded off with a precision that shows not a single touch mistimed or out of place.

'The Custom of the Country,' in short, is a fine book, but unluckily it is all too good for Undine. It is difficult to see, given the lines on which Mrs Wharton has treated the action, how it could have been otherwise. Undine, as a mere bubble of rainbow tints, may possibly have substance enough to wound and destroy, though it is perhaps doubtful whether we can quite accord all that Mrs Wharton claims for beauty so unsupported by any gifts of character whatever. At any rate, if this empty shining fairness is to be endowed with such importance, it is clear that we must be made to see it at every turn and be conscious of it at every moment. It must fill the air for us with the very same revelation of glowing light that bewitched its victims. But Mrs Wharton for the most part chooses to look in the opposite direction; that is to say, she makes us chiefly see with Undine's eyes and watch her beauty as it is reflected in the intent gaze of her adorers. So and in no better way could we be convinced of many a vision of enchantment, but the workings of Undine's mind are altogether too rudimentary to help us out in her case. Undine, being nothing but an exquisite object, should surely have been treated exclusively as an object. This is no doubt a somewhat subversive reflection to throw out in passing, for it of course implies a point of departure and a way of approach to the story entirely different from those which Mrs Wharton has chosen. Where in this case she could have found a controlling and unifying centre is a question it might be inconvenient to tackle. But it seems as though Undine's triviality could not otherwise be made strong enough to carry the piled-up irony of her career through such a series of glittering scenes.

Mrs Wharton has only once, outside these two novels, used America in the sense in which it is used in them. This was not when she wrote 'The Fruit of the

Tree,' although in fact that story never leaves American soil. There she reverted to the subject which arises out of a particular equivocal case, a case which may happen to be American but is not necessarily so. It is treated with much less assurance than Mrs Wharton had shown in its immediate predecessor, 'The House of Mirth.' She seems to fasten on her theme with some uncertainty, and in consequence to leave it both incomplete and rather diffusely amplified. But 'The Fruit of the Tree' may be passed over here because it puts us in touch with a side of Mrs Wharton's imagination which we shall presently find far more clearly and richly illuminated. Meanwhile, directly facing the full glare of the relentless American light, comes the grim little story called 'Ethan Frome.' Here indeed is American life of a tougher substance than that of Fifth Avenue, life as tightly wedged in its snow-piled mountain-valleys as the other drifts aimlessly. In such a setting the simplest notes fall sharply on a wintry silence which seems to be waiting for unrelieved and fantastic tragedies like Ethan's. The bitter futilities which imprison Ethan's existence close on it again faster than ever after his one crowning and vain attempt to bring passion, if not to life, at least to death. Not only is the gift of death denied to Ethan and Mattie, but they may not even live in an undesecrated memory of their single contact with beauty. By the long anti-climax of their fate memory itself is corroded; and it is the mean indignity of pain, not its sanctity, which is thrown upon Ethan's tragic powers of endurance.

There is no prescribing the limitations of a talent which never tires of the enterprise of criticism. Mrs Wharton's art, trained on all the refinements and sophistications of modernity, rose in 'Ethan Frome' to meet suggestions of an entirely new kind and instantly singled out their peculiar demand. We can see in the finished tale exactly what this demand was and how easy it would have been to overlook it. Ethan's history was just a flash of inarticulate passion, thrown against the blinding whiteness of the New England winter. There are no half-tones in such a life, and nothing for the writer to do—so it might seem, but to give with as few strokes as possible the huge monotony of the

snow and the brief storm of Ethan's rebellion. The story would need only the telling juxtaposition of two such intense effects. It would be a drama, but a drama of landscape, the dumbness of these village tragedies being such as to make them appear but a part, even a subordinate part, of the scene—mountain or field or forest—which witnesses them. We have had a good deal of this decorative treatment of village life, and America seems to have had still more; but we have not had much of the sort that Mrs Wharton gives us. 'Ethan Frome' is not in the least a study in *genre*. Its landscape is there, and there with all vividness, but it is behind it. The action in front, the strange calamitous issue, has its perfectly independent movement. It is not described for the sake of the picturesque scene; the scene is described, the snow blazes, for the sake of the action. How, then, was Ethan's story, where there is so little that can happen and so much less still that can be spoken in words, to be made to stand out and take the eye with its own dramatic value? This, as Mrs Wharton has seen, is the appeal of the story to such art as hers, for which a mere 'landscape with figures' would be too easy to be interesting. She meets the appeal in a manner more difficult to define than to recognise and admire.

What is it, in fact, which makes the slightest, most trivial incident seem, under certain hands, to glow with an inner light, to appear unique and final and incomparable with anything else, so that we do not think of weighing or measuring it by any general standard? The little characteristic episode, chosen by the novelist to illustrate some development of a situation, may become, if it has this quality, a poem of delight, where, if the quality is lacking, we are only irritated by the transparency of the novelist's art. The great master of this particular subtlety is undoubtedly Tolstoi, with his extraordinary power of absorbing the whole of our attention with a few light touches, till the scene evoked grows important and urgent, a thing to be watched breathlessly, even though it may be no more than the picture of a stable-boy saddling a horse or a child amusing itself with a box of paints. Whatever it consists in, this power is at work in 'Ethan

Frome.' The tiny incidents which lead gradually up to the strange catastrophe are magnetised and luminous and *quick*. We do not feel that Mrs Wharton, in telling her story by means of such small homely events, is using a clever artistic restraint; we feel, on the contrary, that the events—a tramp through the snow, the breaking of a glass dish, the carrying of a trunk downstairs—are the natural and sufficient channels of great emotion. How is it done? The question touches what is perhaps the central and most distinguishing gift of the true novelist, his power of so completely identifying himself with the character through whose eyes he is seeing that his field of vision, both in extent and in particularity, is exactly no more and no less than that of the man or woman he has imagined. Mrs Wharton, in the few and simple pages of 'Ethan Frome,' has shown more conclusively that she possesses this power than in anything else she has written, for she has written nothing in which she has so rigorously denied herself all other help.

But all this time, though we have seen Mrs Wharton with gathering assurance approach her task from different sides, we have not found her concentrating her whole mind upon a certain part of it which she was bound to undertake in time. The novelist's task is a complex of more or less distinguishable problems; and in any single fiction, of the kind capable of sustaining such criticism, we can point to one of them as that which the writer has had principally to treat. The problem which Mrs Wharton at last reached in 'The Reef' is that of the squarely faced, intently studied portrait; and the portrait she produced is surely on the whole the most compellingly beautiful thing in all her work. She has never been more happily at home with her material—for her material has never been of finer paste—than she appears in creating the figure of Anna Leath. Anna, indeed, gives us the sense that she had all along been waiting for Mrs Wharton, assured that the time would come when the one person who could do her justice would be ready to take her in hand. They were made for each other. Anna's answering lightness and softness and warmth vibrate instantly to Mrs Wharton's touch—pressure so perfectly timed in its rhythm that the movement of hand required to exert

it is barely perceptible. There are moments in 'The Reef' when it seems impossible that Anna can continue to satisfy demands which grow ever quieter and more searching; yet the more her capacity is taxed, the more sensitively she responds. The security with which Mrs Wharton is able to count on her is, of course, the measure of what she has put into her; and this is perhaps more than a critic, who sees Anna from our side of the Atlantic, can hope to recognise completely. Anna is American in every syllable of her history and to the last recesses of her consciousness—that is certain; but she is an American that represents no antithesis to Europe. She is rather, for the most part, the affirmed and intensified expression of just the qualities usually supposed to be the legacy of long-settled traditions. Only an American—not to attempt a more precise definition—could be as fragrantly, as exquisitely, as *painfully* civilised as Anna, with her heritage of sensibility, her anxious discriminations, her devious and shadowy shyness. We can follow her sympathetically through all this; but her minutely stippled discretion baffles us in the end by what we can only call its impossibility. Anna is characteristically and exasperatingly impossible; and the English mind, practised in all the uses of indifference and compromise as the lubricants of daily life, will never quite understand how she can be at once so keenly enlightened and so profoundly ingenuous. But Mrs Wharton understands, and threads the whole glowing labyrinth of Anna's mind without an instant of hesitation.

Anna would make a drama, joyful or deplorable as the case might be, but certainly absorbing, out of any train of circumstances on which she might turn her brooding attention. The lightest appeal would rouse her courage and her loyalty, the simplest *cas de conscience* would call into play the whole armoury of her doubts. Mrs Wharton has boldly produced a case which is far indeed from straining Anna's resources in the matter of double-edged spiritual scruples. There is plenty to agonise her in the difficult question which she has to answer in 'The Reef.' The question there is what becomes of her relation to Darrow, the relation which has finally asserted itself as the most substantial fact

in her dream-beset life, when she finds she must adapt it to a view of him in which he seems unrecognisable. Her feeling for him does not change; the trouble would be less if only it would. But that is not the way of emotion, which, as Anna has to learn, will never show the least inclination to save us trouble. It will not obey established facts, or lose its brightness on the mere proof that the spring which fed it has been deflected. Darrow remains fully himself at the same time that, in the light of his hapless adventure with Sophy, he appears other and strange; and Anna finds on her hands two separate strains of impulse in regard to him which must somehow be fused into one. Perhaps it is impossible; perhaps she can just manage it. What is certain is that Sophy's more lucid simplicity, her clearer eye for decisive action, put to shame the luxuriance of Anna's hesitations. Sophy can act swiftly and self-forgetfully, where Anna can only torture herself with questions which after all refer to nothing but the saving or the losing of her own happiness.

If in 'The Custom of the Country' the spacious brilliance of the scene is too much for Undine's tenuity, something of the sort, transposed and reversed, has surely happened in 'The Reef.' The difficulties which Anna is called on to deal with are handed over to her in a form hardly worthy of her genius, and with a certain abruptness which betrays Mrs Wharton's tendency to reap her harvest before it is ripe. It was in this case of the first importance that the opening scenes should establish, beyond possibility of question, the inherence of Darrow's passage with Sophy in the texture of the whole history. We must not only, that is to say, see Darrow and Sophy thrown together at the start and be convinced of the steps by which they became involved in their adventure, but we must be quite certain, when we pick up their fortunes again later on, under Anna's warm gaze, that they really are the same Darrow and the same Sophy that we saw before. The fact is that on this point we are not entirely reassured. Darrow himself is in any case a somewhat pale figure, the least animated of the company; and if the marks which he bears of the past are too slight, it may be because Mrs Wharton has scarcely succeeded in giving him

substance enough to show them. But with Sophy it is different. Sophy, romantically established and occupied under Anna's roof, in the pale serenity of the French autumn, is too graceful a figure in her tremulous bravery for us to be doubtful about her. She is not the boyish young adventuress, wind-ruffled and rain-brightened, whom we met on Dover pier in the first chapter. This does not, of course, mean that she might not have been—that she would never have done what she is described as doing, or that, if she had, the young adventuress would not have been softly transmuted by the silvery light of Givré. But Sophy at Givré does not strike us as having undergone any transmutation—she is merely a new acquaintance; and it is only by an arbitrary act of authority on the part of the writer that the events of the prologue become the discoveries which Anna has presently to find a place for in her mind.

The prologue, with the use to which it is put, has, in short, to be conceded to the author of 'The Reef,' without too close enquiry as to whether she has earned it; and perhaps after all it is conceded with no great effort. For as soon as the shift is effected, and Anna has taken her place as the centre of vision, the action is all absorbed into a certain mood and borne forward with a particular momentum in which the difficulties of the transition are soon forgotten. The mood is expressed in the romantic beauty of the old house, its worn and wan and experienced distinction, not mellowed and enriched by its long past (as an old English house would be) so much as patient under the weight of it and still capable of anxious thought. Anna brings to Givré her own simpler generosity of charm; and the youth around her, the youth of her engaging young step-son and her delicious little daughter, the new sensitive youth of poor Sophy, steeps the drama in the freshest of atmospheres and gives the impulse of poetry to its movement. These chapters are undoubtedly the finest that Mrs Wharton has yet written. With the scene so prepared, the air so alert with the intelligence of life, the presence of apprehended pain and disaster must instantly be felt. Words are hardly needed; knowledge comes with chance glimpses, a turn of the head, a negligent movement, the slightest possible deflections

from the natural and the expected. Doubts and fears emerge, and the whole train of consciousness, lapsing in a new direction, gathers pace and becomes distress and bewilderment, without the necessity for one violent stroke or emphasised effect. Here, then, is yet another and a new attainment of Mrs Wharton's fiction. She so rounds and fuses her subject, she throws over it the light of so receptive and intent a mood, that when once the development is started it carries itself through to the end, moving as one mass and needing no further impulsion.

The part played, in maintaining this equable flow, by Mrs Wharton's use of striking and picturesque imagery, is too remarkable to be passed over. Imagery is commonly regarded as a kind of applied ornament, giving variety and relief to plain narrative; but it has a better justification than this when it is used as a structural part of the narrative itself. Mrs Wharton has the rare gift of thinking naturally in images; they are not to her an added grace, but an immediate dramatisation of a simple statement; and since a line of drama will always carry more weight than many lines of mere description, a pictorial symbol, so employed, economises time and effort, supports and advances the narrative as well as adorns it. 'The Reef' would give very many examples of this treatment of imagery, its impressment into the service of story-telling; though of course its practical help in any particular case cannot be measured without the full context. An isolated quotation only illustrates the vivid aptness of the picture, but it is worth illustrating:

'After that she no longer tried to laugh or argue her husband out of his convictions. They *were* convictions, and therefore unassailable. Nor was any insincerity implied in the fact that they sometimes seemed to coincide with hers. There were occasions when he really did look at things as she did; but for reasons so different as to make the difference between them all the greater. Life, to Mr Leath, was like a walk through a carefully classified museum, where, in moments of doubt, one had only to look at the number and refer to one's catalogue; to his wife it was like groping about in a huge dark lumber-room, where the exploring ray of curiosity lit up now some shape of breathing beauty and now a mummy's grin.'

In the English-speaking world there are always plenty of voices ready to explain to a deliberately trained and practised artist like Mrs Wharton the certain risks and likely failures of her method of work. Such a writer will be well-accustomed to hear that imagination is chilled by excessive attention to finish and design, that many of the greatest novelists have been careless of technical niceties, and that imperfect life is, at any rate, better than dead perfection. These assertions, undeniable and undenied, are not in themselves a great contribution to criticism, but they do, of course, point to a general truth of more interest. A writer ideally needs both a certain detachment from his material, so that he may grasp it as a whole, and also complete immersion in it, so that he may be aware of it with every nerve, never consciously using his powers of divination and deduction. Without the ability to stand over and away from his structure he can neither knit it firmly nor expose it squarely; but he cannot give it expressive value, the flush of life which is its very reason for existence, unless he has the affinity of long habit with the stuff he is working in. Of these two sides of the novelist's task it is obviously the first on which Mrs Wharton is most at home; her books are the books of an imagination far more easily stimulated to work than induced to ruminate. Their curious lack of anything that could be disengaged as a philosophy of life, a characteristic synthesis of belief, is no doubt their weakness from one point of view, just as their fine clear-cut outline is their strength from another. The mind that has never, so to say, compromised itself with life, that has kept its critical integrity entirely out of the way of imaginable superstition, must naturally pay for its fastidiousness in some sort; and it may well pay by the loss of the fullest possible intimacy with the stuff of character—especially of social character as opposed to individual—an intimacy more lightly won by the uncritical mind which does not know how to use it. There is accordingly a certain amount of Mrs Wharton's work which shows the general defect of the *tour de force*—a defect, not of sinew or bone, but of vein and marrow. Such are the penalties of a talent whose leading qualities are swiftness and acuteness. But it is precisely in the case of a talent

like this that summary inferences are most misleading, for its future can never be predicted. As time goes on its power is revealed by the fact that it begins to add to itself, right and left, the very virtues which appeared furthest from its reach, and to produce work which has gained in every respect, in freshness and vigour as in controlled flexibility, over its earlier experiments. This has been the history of the work of Mrs Wharton; and, because it has not only had a history but is constantly making one, always attacking new positions and never repeating either a failure or a success, it is work of the kind most of all interesting to criticism, work of which, in the middle of its course, nothing can be foretold but that its best is yet to come.

PERCY LUBBOCK.

Art. 11.—THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY.

1. *Naval Administration*. By Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton. London: Bell, 1896.
2. *Naval Policy, A Plea for the Study of War*. By 'Barfleur.' Edinburgh and London: Blackwood, 1907.
3. *Letters of Lord Barham*. Vols. II and III. London: Navy Records Society, 1911.
4. *The Spencer Papers*. Vol. I. London: Navy Records Society, 1913.

PART II.—THE DISTRIBUTION OF BUSINESS.

IN the first part of this article it was shown from evidence tendered to a Select Committee of the House of Commons (1861), that there has always been inherent in the First Lord of the Admiralty an elastic power which enables him to undertake any duties which the public welfare may require. In other words, the First Lord may in any grave emergency act on his own initiative without waiting to consult the Board. Further, this inherent power of initiative extends so far that, if the First Lord comes to any decision which normally requires the assent of the Board, he can either call on the members of the Board to acquiesce in it or insist on their resigning their places if their assent is withheld. The exercise of this power is, of course, quite inconsistent with the letter of the Patent by which the Board is appointed. But the usage which sanctions it is probably quite as old as the Patent itself. It may be conjectured that it had its origin in the high personal prestige and commanding professional authority of the First Lord first appointed under the Patent of Queen Anne—an instrument, it will be remembered, which has come down without material alteration, save in one particular, to the present day. This was Admiral Edward Russell, Earl of Orford, the victor of La Hogue. The spirit of naval discipline is embedded in the very marrow of the British naval officer, and runs from top to bottom throughout the whole hierarchy of the sea service. A great seaman like Russell would easily establish his ascendancy over his professional colleagues, and would probably make short work of their opposition if ever they ventured to oppose him.

Be this as it may, it is easy to show that the usage recognised by the enquiry of 1861 was in full force nearly three-quarters of a century earlier. In 1795 the second Earl Spencer was First Lord of the Admiralty, the First Sea Lord being Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, the great strategist who afterwards, as Lord Barham and First Lord of the Admiralty himself, directed the final stages of the campaign of Trafalgar with such masterly sagacity. It was decided by Ministers, Spencer concurring, to recall Admiral Sir John Laforey, then commanding a fleet in the West Indies. On the Board being called upon to ratify this decision, Middleton declined to affix his signature to the order of recall. Spencer at once treated this refusal as an indication of Middleton's determination 'to withdraw from office' and defined the position thus :

'The idea I entertain of the constitution of this Board and of the manner in which the business of it should be carried on, is, that in every measure determined upon and officially proposed to the Board by the First Lord, every member of the Board is considered as ready to take an active part by his signature; and, though the responsibility unquestionably rests on the First Lord, the other Lords are always understood to concur in his measures. I must therefore desire in the present instance (one of too much importance to be passed over lightly), that you will declare your concurrence in the recall of Sir John Laforey by signing the order which has been prepared.'

Middleton forthwith replied by resigning his seat at the Board, and his resignation was accepted. In truth Spencer had virtually demanded it. There had been a good deal of friction between the two, and probably neither was reluctant to part company from the other. In any case Spencer's letter clearly shows how he regarded his position and its prerogatives. His responsibility was undiluted and his authority supreme. But, presumably in deference to the letter of the Patent, it would seem to have been the usage in his time for his decisions to be ratified by the signatures of at least two other members of the Board, and in all important cases by that of the First Sea Lord. Further, he held that no member of the Board could withhold his signature when called upon by the First Lord to affix it. That was

tantamount to a dissolution of the Board; and in Middleton's case such a refusal entailed his resignation.

By a strange irony of fate it was reserved for Middleton—now Lord Barham—to embody the usage as defined by Spencer in his own practice in a still more extreme form, and virtually to reduce the signature of other members to a mere formality. He became First Lord of the Admiralty in May 1805 on the resignation of Lord Melville. By this time it had become the usage for orders issued by the Board to be signed by at least three Lords. But Barham rarely signed such orders himself; and the required three signatures were commonly affixed by deputy, being generally countersigned by the Secretary and thus invested with the full authority of the Board. But on one memorable occasion Barham did sign an executive order and signed it alone. The story is well known how Bettesworth, sent home by Nelson in the 'Curieux' with news of Villeneuve's movements, reached the Admiralty late on the night of July 8, when Barham had gone to bed. It is said that, when called in the morning and Bettesworth's news was communicated to him, the old man—he was then in his 80th year—was furious at so many hours having been lost at such a crisis. But he sat down there and then and drafted a hasty minute, which he forthwith embodied in a letter to Cornwallis, then blockading Brest, instructing him to make the dispositions which resulted in Calder's action with Villeneuve. This letter is dated July 9, and it concludes, 'Official orders will follow as soon as possible.' But Barham added in a postscript, 'Time is everything,' as who should say, 'Don't wait for the official orders but take this letter as your authority.'

The official orders, to precisely the same effect though somewhat more formal and explicit, did follow as soon as possible, for they are dated the same day. But there is no evidence that they went by the same ship as that which carried Barham's letter; nor, so far as I can discover, is there any evidence that Cornwallis received them before the crisis was over. On the other hand, there is direct evidence that he received Barham's letter and acted upon it without an instant's delay. For in a letter dated 'Noon, 11th July, 1805,' he wrote

to Barham, 'I have this moment had the honour of receiving your lordship's letter, and I have sent the necessary instructions,' and so forth. It seems certain, then, that Cornwallis acted on Barham's letter alone and did not wait for the official instructions, which both men would appear to have regarded as a formality superfluous in the circumstances. Barham's colleagues, who signed the official order—for once, in their own autograph and without the intervention of the Secretary—were Admiral Gambier and Lord Garlies, the First and Third Sea Lords. Gambier was Barham's nephew, and Garlies was not a man of much weight. 'We know,' says Sir John Laughton, 'of nothing in the lives of either Gambier or Garlies which [should] lead us to suppose that they would venture, on such a point, to dispute their chief's opinion.'

Later in the same year Barham gave a still more striking, albeit less memorable, illustration of his readiness in emergency to act solely on his own initiative and responsibility, without consulting the Board at all and indeed with a definite intention of concealing from it what he had done. In November Lord Keith, commanding in the North Sea, reported that two French frigates had escaped from Flushing; and Barham apprehended that their purpose was 'an attack on our African settlements and trade.' Accordingly he wrote privately and with his own hand to Lord Gardner, then in command at Cork, giving him detailed instructions how to act in the circumstances by detaching a force to the African Coast. At the end of his letter he said, 'Whatever relates to this service to be directed to me as private, until your Lordship receives a confirmation of these orders from the Board. The vessels employed to be mentioned in your disposition of ships as "cruising to the westward."' However, the French frigates were soon reported as having returned to Flushing, and there the matter ended. No official orders were ever issued; and Barham subsequently instructed Gardner to return the private letter containing his secret orders. Probably the Board never heard of the transaction.

I have cited these illustrations of the doctrine expounded in the first part of this article not merely on account of their great historical interest but because

they carry back the usage and practice of the Admiralty, as ascertained in 1861 in a period of profound peace, into the very crisis of a great war. I now turn to another branch of the same subject, namely, the administration of the Admiralty as affected by the successive Orders in Council in force since 1869. The Order in Council of Jan. 14, 1869—obtained by Mr Childers for the purpose of enabling him to carry out the reforms he contemplated—appears to have been the first of its kind to define the business of the Admiralty and regulate its distribution among the several members of the Board. But the definitions it contained were no new departure, except as regards the unfortunate phrase which required the members of the Board, other than the First Lord, 'to act as his assistants in the discharge of the duties' assigned to them—a phrase which disappeared once for all in 1872 when the Order in Council of 1869 was rescinded. We have seen that, according to the Report of the Hartington Commission, 'the administration of the Admiralty rested on the same basis previous to the issue of the Order in Council' in question. This statement would seem to apply not merely to the general definition of business but to its detailed distribution among the several members of the Board. Moreover, it has been the custom of late years, and perhaps from a very early period, for the First Lord to draw up from time to time and subject to frequent revision an office document defining, in accordance with the Order in Council in force for the time being, the detailed duties assigned by him to each individual member of the Board. I do not know when this custom first originated, but I can cite an early instance of it.

When Lord Barham became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1805, one of the first things he did was to draw up his own 'Distribution of Business.' I quote the following extracts from it :

'Business of the Board.'

'The First Lord will take upon himself the general superintendence and arrangement of the whole.

'First Sea Lord.'

'The Senior, or first professional Lord, will do the same when the First Lord is absent.

'His duty will be to attend to the correspondence of the day, but more particularly to that of the ports and all secret services. . . . He will, with the approbation of the First Lord, dispose of the movements of all ships on home and foreign stations and give orders and instructions to the Admirals, Captains, and Commanding Officers on service. . . . He will attend particularly to the equipment of all ships and vessels of every description, and examine frequently the Navy weekly progress for that purpose.'

I need not examine in detail the several Orders in Council which have been issued since 1869, nor the several schemes for the 'Distribution of Business' which have from time to time been associated with them. Their interest is now mainly historical, and does not affect the present argument, except at one or two points which will be considered in due course. A critical and even polemical analysis of them will be found in the volume entitled 'Naval Policy, a Plea for the Study of War'—the work of a very distinguished flag-officer whose identity is now quite transparently veiled under the pseudonym 'Barfleur.' But the Order in Council of Aug. 10, 1904, which is still substantially in force, demands closer consideration. Together with the 'Distribution of Business' associated with it it became at the time of its promulgation a subject of acute controversy, the echoes of which have not even now entirely died down. The controversy turned, however, not on the powers and responsibilities of the First Lord—which were defined once for all in 1869, though they had existed in the same large measure from time immemorial—but on those of the First Sea Lord. The two documents taken together are alleged by their critics to have greatly magnified the office of First Sea Lord, and to have given its incumbent a supremacy over his colleagues alike undue and unprecedented. Let us see how far this was the case.

The Order in Council of 1904 did certainly differ from its predecessors of 1872 and 1882—which were both textually rescinded by it—in one important respect, inasmuch as both of the latter, but especially the first of them, defined in general terms the duties to be assigned to the several members of the Board, so that the assignment of these duties was not left solely to the discretion of the First Lord. In the Order in Council

of 1904 such discretion was within certain limits reserved to the First Lord, apparently for the first time. He himself was, as before, to 'be responsible to Your Majesty and to Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty.' But, instead of defining the duties of the other Lords, the Order went on to declare 'the First Sea Lord, the Second Sea Lord and the Fourth Sea Lord to be responsible to the First Lord of the Admiralty for the administration of so much of the general business connected with Your Majesty's Navy, and with the movement and condition of Your Majesty's Fleet, and with the "Personnel" of that Fleet, as shall be assigned to them or each of them, from time to time, by the First Lord;' and 'the Third Sea Lord and Controller to be responsible to the First Lord for the administration of so much of the business relating to the "Matériel" of Your Majesty's Navy as shall from time to time be assigned to him by the First Lord.' It does not appear, however, that the First Lord of the time—the Earl of Selborne—exercised the discretion accorded to him in any way contrary to precedent. I give below in parallel columns the duties assigned on the one hand to the First Sea Lord under the 'Distribution of Business' framed in pursuance of the Order in Council of August 1904, and on the other those assigned to him under an earlier 'Distribution of Business' dated Jan. 1, 1904, and therefore framed before the Order in Council of Aug. 10, 1904, was issued. The latter is much more detailed, but many of its particulars do not concern us here. One great difference is that in the later Distribution all questions of discipline are removed from the province of the First Sea Lord altogether, and in other respects that officer is relieved of many more or less routine duties, so as to leave him free for the more efficient discharge of those higher duties which, under both Distributions, are made his special province and responsibility. There is one other important and, according to some critics, vital difference, on which I am about to comment.

October 20, 1904.

January 1, 1904.

FIRST SEA LORD.

FIRST NAVAL LORD.

1. Preparation for War: All large Questions of Naval Policy and Maritime Warfare—to advise.

1. Maritime Defence, Strategical, and all large Questions of Naval Policy—to advise.

The duty will be to maintain

ORD.

FIRST NAVAL LORD.

and Sea-Going
its Organisa-
tion; the Dis-
cussions of all
in or in Fleet
the Intelligence,
Naval Ordnance

2. Ships in Commission and in Fleet Reserve.

3. Distribution and Organisation of the Fleet.

4. Appointments of Commanders under Captains.

5. General Supervision of Intelligence Department (including Naval Attachés) and of Mobilisation of Fleet.

6. Complements of Ships.

7. Discipline—General and Special Questions.

8. Courts Martial and Courts of Inquiry.

9. Hydrographical Department.

10. Signals.

11. Collisions.

12. Slave Trade.

13. Naval Ordnance Department (except as provided under *Controller*).

14. Prize Questions.

15. Leave to Officers and Men in Sea-going Ships.

Distribution of responsibility for 'the Fighting Going Efficiency of the Fleet' appears, in so words, in the later Distribution for the first time. To some critics, of whom 'Barfleur' is the most distinguished representative, they make an immensity of difference. 'The First Sea Lord,' says 'Barfleur,' 'is made solely responsible for the fighting and sea-efficiency of the fleet. This is an entirely new measure, which virtually makes him supreme over all colleagues, since those words cover everything.' Under the previous Distribution the First Sea Lord was made responsible for 'Ships in Commission in Fleet Reserve,' that is, for all ships likely to be employed in war. Do not these words also cover everything and make the officer in question equally supreme—if he chooses to exercise such supremacy—over all his colleagues? To be responsible for all ships likely to be employed in war is surely to be responsible for their fighting and sea-going efficiency; and, if the officer in question cannot discharge this responsibility in person, he must, it would seem, discharge it through his colleagues and to that extent be supreme over them.

In other words, there would be on the hypothesis of 'Barfleur' no responsibility at all involved in the words last quoted, although the very purpose of the Distribution which contained them was to define the responsibility of the several members of the Board affected. Moreover, the Order in Council of 1872 and that of 1869 both made the First Sea Lord responsible 'for the movement *and condition* of Your Majesty's Fleet'; and, if the word 'condition' does not mean 'fighting and sea-going efficiency,' it almost passes the wit of man to discover what it does mean. Finally, we have seen that, in the great days of naval administration and naval victory, one of the greatest of First Lords declared it to be the duty of the First Sea Lord to 'attend particularly to the equipment of all ships and vessels of every description and examine frequently the navy weekly progress for that purpose.' Far from the First Sea Lord being made responsible for the first time in 1904 for the 'fighting and sea-going efficiency of the fleet,' he was actually charged with that specific responsibility by Lord Barham in 1805; and not perhaps even then for the first time, for no one was more deeply versed than Barham in the usages and traditions of the Admiralty.

But it is urged by the critics that not only do the words in question establish the supremacy of the First Sea Lord, but that that supremacy is actually confirmed and declared by a Note appended for the first time to the Distribution of October 1904, which runs thus:

'It is to be understood that in any matter of great importance the First Sea Lord is always to be consulted by the other Sea Lords, the Civil Lords, and the Parliamentary or Permanent Secretary; and he will refer to the First Lord for any further action considered necessary, such as, for instance, bringing the matter formally before the Board. It is, of course, understood that all Members of the Board will communicate direct with the First Lord in accordance with immemorial custom whenever they wish to do so.'

Lord Selborne was the author of this Note, as he was of the whole document to which it was appended. I will make no comment on it myself, but will quote Lord Selborne's own comment on it in the last speech which

he made in the House of Lords as First Lord of the Admiralty. The date is March 21, 1905 :

‘It never occurred to me that anybody would object to that note. It was not intended to introduce any new procedure into the Board of Admiralty, but to describe exactly what always has gone on at the Board of Admiralty. I go further and say that, unless that went on, the Board of Admiralty could not do its work. How is it possible for the First Sea Lord to advise on questions of policy unless his colleagues, with their responsibilities, are in constant friendly communication with him? It is the way the work is always done. How is the Fourth Sea Lord to provide for the proper coaling of the Fleet unless he knows what policy is in the mind of the First Sea Lord as to the distribution of the Fleet? How can the Civil Lord see that proper barracks, docks, and other buildings are provided unless he is kept constantly in touch with the First Sea Lord in respect of any possible changes of policy? All this note is meant to indicate is that what has always been done should be done, and that on all questions of great importance—and the word “great” is used very advisedly—there should be constant communication and conference between the Sea Lords.

‘Then it is supposed that, when I say that the First Sea Lord will refer to the First Lord for further action considered necessary, that is as much as to say that the question cannot be brought forward before the Board by the First Lord unless with the concurrence of the First Sea Lord. Nothing could be further from the fact. It has always been possible for any member of the Board to bring any subject absolutely independently before the First Lord; and I go further and say that any member of the Board has a right to claim that any question he chooses shall, with the concurrence of the First Lord, be brought before the Board formally for settlement. Until I saw the public comments, it never occurred to anybody inside the Board of Admiralty that this described anything but the constant, immemorial, necessary usage. If there is a difference of opinion between the Sea Lords, it is the First Sea Lord naturally who will bring the matter to the First Lord. There never was a First Sea Lord more steeped in the traditions of the Admiralty as to the Navy than Lord Walter Kerr; there never was a First Sea Lord more conscious of his responsibility for maintaining the full rights of the Board; there never was a First Sea Lord less likely to try and impair the authority of his colleagues or to fail in respect for their separate and independent position. If there was a

difference of opinion between the Sea Lords which could not be settled, they always went to Lord Walter Kerr, who came to me and said, "This point we are obliged to refer to you." Therefore this note does nothing more than indicate what has always been the custom.'

It only remains to add that, after ten years have elapsed, after the whole policy of 1904 has passed under the review of four successive First Lords of the Admiralty, Lord Cawdor, Lord Tweedmouth, Mr McKenna, and Mr Winston Churchill, and after the office of First Sea Lord has been held by Sir Arthur Wilson, Sir Francis Bridgeman, and Prince Louis of Battenburg, in succession to the great administrator who held it in 1904 and now holds it once more, the Distribution of Business, modified from time to time in many of its details, still assigns to the First Sea Lord responsibility for 'the fighting and sea-going efficiency of the Fleet.' The Note appended to it now runs as follows :

'It is to be understood that in any matter of great importance the First Sea Lord is always to be consulted by the other Sea Lords, the Civil Lord, the Additional Civil Lord, and the Parliamentary and Permanent Secretaries ; but each member of the Board and the Parliamentary and Permanent Secretaries will communicate direct with the First Lord.'

I have now established two propositions. The first is that the First Lord, being responsible to the Crown and Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty, is *ipso facto* supreme and may in virtue of that supremacy act on occasion on his own initiative, with or without the concurrence of the Board, the letter of the Patent notwithstanding. The second is that the First Sea Lord, being in a sense the *alter ego* of the First Lord—he was explicitly so designated by Barham in 1805—is and always has been so far invested with authority over his junior colleagues that no 'matter of great importance' can be brought to maturity, or perhaps even initiated, without his cognisance, nor, subject to the final decision of the First Lord, without his concurrence. These propositions, however, unimpeachable as I have shown them to be in themselves, are not to be taken as covering the whole situation. The supremacy of the First Lord is limited on the one hand by the superior authority of the Cabinet,

and on the other by the fact that, if he acts arbitrarily on his own initiative or if he demands the concurrence of his colleagues in measures of which they strongly disapprove, he may be confronted with their resignation in a body—a situation which in the majority of cases, if not in all, would assuredly lead to his undoing. In like manner the more limited but still real authority of the First Sea Lord over his junior colleagues is checked and controlled by the supremacy of the First Lord.

That is, perhaps, as far as we can take the matter from a strictly constitutional point of view. Subject to the limitations above defined, it is hardly possible to say that any act done by the First Lord or, within his more limited province, by the First Sea Lord is outside the constitutional prerogatives of either office, although its policy, its wisdom, its propriety, its conformity to the traditions of the Department and the sentiment of the Sea Service might be open to grave question. Individual action, although constitutionally quite legitimate, might easily be very ill-advised. In the first part of this article it was pointed out that the relations of the First Lord to his colleagues—and *mutatis mutandis* the same may be said of the First Sea Lord—are just as much founded on usage and prescription as his own supremacy is; and it is manifest that the Board could not work at all unless those relations were marked by goodwill, good feeling, good sense, and a spirit of loyal co-operation.' Thus the Board works best when it works harmoniously, and its voice is most respected when it speaks collectively and therefore anonymously. This is a very important point in its relation to the Sea Service at large. The Sea Service has long learnt to look up to 'My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty' as the supreme authority it is proud to obey, not to any individual member of the Board. It is accustomed to take its orders from the Board, and, when by its obedience to them it has earned praise or reward, it is content that the Board should award them. Individual members of the Board may come and go, but the Board itself is an abiding and venerated authority throughout the Navy. That is the immemorial attitude of the Sea Service, and it is not expedient that it should be lightly disregarded.

JAMES R. THURSFIELD.

Art. 12.—THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM.

1. *La Neutralité Belge et l'Invasion Allemande.* Par Maxime Lecomte et Col. Camille Lévi. Bruxelles et Paris: Lavauzelle, 1914.
2. *Sylvain van de Weyer.* Par Théodore Juste. Bruxelles: Maquardt, 1871.
3. *The Memoirs of Prince Talleyrand.* By the Duke de Broglie. Vols. iv and v. Translated by Mrs Angus Hall. London: Griffith & Farran, 1892.
4. *Le dernier Bienfait de la Monarchie.* Par le Duc J. V. A. de Broglie. Paris: C. Lévy, 1900.

THE work of MM. Lecomte and Lévi is remarkable for the prophecy contained in its preface.

‘Si un rapprochement franco-allemand était possible, on ne pourrait qu’encourager et féliciter les hommes de cœur, épris d’idées de paix et de sentiments d’humanité, qui croient à la possibilité de ce rapprochement et s’efforcent de travailler à sa réalisation. Mais on est obligé de penser que ces esprits distingués se laissent décevoir par une illusion et ne voient pas les indices multiples qui montrent que, loin de se rapprocher, les deux grands peuples entreront à nouveau en conflit armé dans un temps plus ou moins prochain.

‘Si ce conflit se produit, il paraît certain qu’il ne sera pas provoqué par la république française, qui est pacifique, qui ne nourrit aucune pensée d’agression. La terrible crise éclatera le jour où le gouvernement allemand se verra dans la nécessité d’obéir à la pression du parti de la guerre, et de donner satisfaction aux besoins d’expansion de la nation, qui trouvent leur formule exacerbée dans les revendications des pangermanistes. . . .

‘La France, en dehors de ses sentiments et de la foi due aux traités, a un intérêt évident au maintien de l’inviolabilité du territoire belge. L’Allemagne, au contraire, semble avoir la conviction, comme bien des faits tendent à le prouver, que son intérêt supérieure en cas de guerre avec la France lui commande l’invasion de la Belgique.’

So convinced of this were MM. Lecomte and Lévi that they published this important volume, examining the history and resources of Belgium, and the methods by which Germany might carry out her imputed purpose. ‘Rem acu tetigerunt.’ They point out the enormous railway development in Germany on the frontiers of Belgian

Luxemburg, and they demonstrate that the violation of Belgian neutrality was thus a certainty of the near future. The consequences of such action they examine with detailed care, and they accurately predict the course of events. In fact, the book might have been written last September, with scarcely the alteration of a comma.

In 1911, according to our authors, there was some intimation conveyed to the Belgian Government that, if the defences of the country were not increased, it would certainly be invaded by one, if not both combatants, in the event of war. This warning should have made it certain that Germany would invade Belgium. It was her interest to do so; and, now that the moral barrier had broken down, by everyone's apparent admission, what was there to prevent her? We cannot help confessing that the complaisance of Europe before Austria in Bosnia and Italy in Tripoli had given some colour to the contention that there was no real force in 'scraps of paper.' Such a scrap of paper it was which proclaimed the neutrality of Belgium. What was its history?

It was an antiquarianism to style the troops drawn from the country between France and Holland, who fought at Waterloo, 'Belgians.' Throughout modern history the name 'Belgica' had disappeared from the map. Its place was, roughly speaking, taken by Flanders, Brabant, Hainault and other counties, and North-western France. Cæsar had placed his Belgæ between the Seine and the Rhine, but the word reappeared in the days of the Renaissance with a restricted meaning. 'Les provinces Beligiques' of Charles V were those parts of his northern dominions which, bordering on France, were comprised in the ancient hunting-grounds of the Belgæ. It is almost an accident that Belgium is not called Gallia or Francia; for Charles might as well have termed these lands his Gallic or his French provinces. Yet the name has always persisted. Boileau speaks of 'le lion belgique.' Grotius terms the country 'Belgica Hispanica,' and the people 'Belgæ.' Heylin in the early 17th century treats 'Belgium' as a synonym for Low Germany: Cockeram, about the same time, defines 'Belgeans' as 'People of the low countries, Somersetshire, Wiltshire and Hampshire.' In 1790 were proclaimed the 'United States of Belgium'; but rather, one concludes, because it was a

vague designation, appropriate to a federal union. In the same sense, Dumouriez was appointed to command 'l'armée de la Belgique'; and the Convention addressed the population as 'le peuple belge.' On the expulsion of the French in 1814 it was therefore natural that Baron de Vincent, who administered the Government for the Allies, should be termed 'Governor-General of Belgium.' And the classical tradition secured its spontaneous acceptance as the name of the new Kingdom * in 1830.

In 1814, Holland, like Sweden, had required compensation for her twenty-five years of suffering on behalf of Europe. A strong Holland was desired by Britain as a security against France. Sweden obtained Norway; and to Holland were allotted the Belgian provinces of Austria.† Parliament was to meet alternately in a Dutch and a Belgian town; religion was to be free, and the Netherlands constitution was to be maintained unless modified by common consent. There do not appear to have been any subsequent acts of special oppression alleged on the part of Holland, except that French was not recognised as an official language, and that the electoral system was unfavourable to the populous southern districts. But the explosion of the three days of July in Paris produced a sympathetic disturbance in Brussels, Namur and Liège—renowned, this last, for its turbulence in the time of its prince-bishops. The revolution hung fire, nevertheless. General Chassé held Antwerp in a firm grip. Brussels was half-hearted. The extreme south alone remained implacable. And there was a fundamental weakness in the motives of the revolt.

There is an almost Irish atmosphere of irony about the Belgian insurrections. Like the Brabantine revolt of 1790 against the Emperor Joseph II, the movement of 1830 had for its core the obstinate resistance of Catholicism to a secularist policy of toleration. Joseph II had established a secular college at Louvain; William of

* Why we English term the country Belgium, and not Belgia, is as mysterious as the reason why we suddenly adopted the suggestion to style platina 'platinum.' It is 'la Belgique' in French, 'Belgica' in Spanish, 'Belgien' in German, but 'Belgio' in Italian. In Davis' 'Dutch Nation' (1851) the name of Belgium is apparently never mentioned.

† Pitt's original plan was to give Belgium to Prussia. Castlereagh preferred to strengthen Holland. 'Hansard,' Nov. 2, 1830, col. 40.

Holland deprived Catholicism of its privilege. Both deeply wounded the sentiment of their subjects. Each movement derived its *elan* from the opposing force of secularist republicanism. Each coincided with a revolutionary movement in France. Each drew strength from the anti-monarchical elements which fermented on the French frontier. They resembled, shall we say, a coalition between Mr John Redmond and Mr Frederic Harrison. There was thus in the very nature of the insurrection more than a seed of weakness. But, at the cost of some thousand lives, its volunteers thrust the Dutch out of Brussels.

These events found Britain in the crisis of the Reform agitation. Canning was dead. The British Ministry was bemused with boroughs.* Van de Weyer, the Belgian delegate in London, collected an audience of Whig members of parliament, and, emboldened by their sympathy, informed Lord Aberdeen that to respect the treaty of Vienna was to declare war on all revolutionary movements. Less than a month later, his Whig audience was in power; five or six of them were in the Cabinet. The independence of Belgium had become a Whig tenet. Van de Weyer's biographer gives the chief credit for its achievement to one who is seldom blessed by small nationalities—Viscount Palmerston; but it rightly belongs to another. Louis Philippe could not be indifferent to the necessity of supporting the Belgian movement. Apart from his personal wishes, his insecure position made it necessary to satisfy French sentiment. Greater Holland, formed to checkmate France, must be weakened by the secession of Belgium. It was more than his throne was worth to fail to accomplish this severance. The king gave his whole mind to the task; all the more energetically, as Belgium was precisely the field in which France could assert herself with the maximum effect. At first Count Molé appeared anxious to prevent the severance of the kingdoms,† and not unwilling to favour a Federal Union, with the Prince of Orange as ruler

* Greville reports ('Diary,' ii, 189, 240) that 'The country cares not a straw for Belgium or for anything but Reform' . . . 'not one of the papers has made a remark on [the demolition of the Belgian fortresses]—nothing will do for them but Reform.'

† Ellenborough's 'Political Diary,' Sept. 5, 1830 (ii, 353).

of Belgium.* But with the progress of events, bolder counsels prevailed. And the king sent to London one more truly his Prime Minister than the Laffittes, Soult and Casimir-Périers, who succeeded one another in Paris, namely Charles, Prince of Talleyrand-Périgord.

The wonderful skill with which Talleyrand (then seventy-eight) secured his ends is of itself an education in diplomacy. He was expected to intrigue; accordingly, intrigue was what he carefully avoided. But he knew to a hair's breadth the character of each minister with whom he had to deal; and his success was the result of accurately adjusting known means to known ends. Austria, Prussia and Russia were in favour of Holland; Palmerston was anti-French. Yet the only result achieved by their joint action was to effect the desires of Louis Philippe.†

Two factors of which the Prince availed himself to the utmost were the Reform agitation, which rendered English opinion favourable to Belgian Liberty, and ready to see a sympathetic neighbour in the monarchy of July: and the advantage of the interior position, which rendered the Eastern courts incapable of effective or concerted action. Before the fall of the Wellington ministry (in November 1830), Holland appealed to the Powers to maintain the Union of 1814. This was a fatal, though a natural error. The revolt had no munitions and few resources, and its leaders were in constant recrimination. Van de Weyer, considerably later, wrote (December 1833)—‘l'on ne sait ici ce qu'on doit le plus admirer, ou de notre jactance ou de notre incapacité.’ And, when a revolutionary shouted to him, ‘We have had enough talk; we want *du sang!*’—he could answer, ‘Oui—du sens commun!’ To delay was, for Holland, to resign. Nevertheless the Dutch moderation was well received. Wellington was ready on Oct. 2 to propose to France ‘the suppression of anarchy’ in Belgium, though Peel’s sagacity induced the Cabinet to adopt the less aggressive wording, ‘the composing of

* Ellenborough’s ‘Political Diary’ (ii, 360, 387).

† Guizot attributes to him even ‘zeal’ in the congenial work of undoing what had been accomplished against France at Vienna (‘Mem.’ ii, 266). One popular historian writes of the ‘dotage’ of Talleyrand at this juncture!

troubles.* Aberdeen told Talleyrand that it would be a great mistake to suppose that, if the dismemberment of the Netherlands was allowed, the peace of Europe would not be disturbed.† The speech from the Throne (Oct. 26) lamented that the enlightened administration of the King of Holland should not have 'prevented his dominions from revolt,' and referred to the concerted efforts which were being made 'to restore tranquillity.' It seems certain that Aberdeen and Wellington never contemplated the division of the Dutch kingdom. It is true they responded cautiously to the Dutch overtures; and Grey asserted in 1832 that they had left the partition a *fait accompli*. But, as Aberdeen at once declared, an 'administrative' separation (or Home Rule) was all that the Tory Cabinet had contemplated.‡ In fact, that was all that the Belgians at first dreamt of. It is therefore misleading to assert, with M. Emile Bourgeois,§ that on Oct. 15 it was settled between Aberdeen and Talleyrand that there should be no European intervention between the Belgians and their king except for the purpose of peaceful mediation. All that was settled was that no immediate assistance should be given to Holland to restore its control.

From Wellington's own despatch|| to Aberdeen of Oct. 19, 1830, it is clear that no irrevocable determination had been taken to enforce a partition. Mediation was a preliminary only, and did not exclude subsequent forcible action. In fact, we shall immediately see that 'armed intervention' between the Belgians and their king was in the sequel resorted to—only it was against the king that it was directed! Ellenborough mentions no such agreement as M. Bourgeois cites, although a Cabinet

* Ellenborough's 'Political Diary,' ii, 380.

† A great effect had nevertheless been produced on the Cabinet by the failure of the Dutch attempt on Brussels. The despatch of Nesselrode, printed by Talleyrand ('Mem.' iii, 251), clearly shows the change in the British attitude. See Wellington's 'Despatches' for the earlier language.

‡ Cf. Keibel, 'Hist. of Toryism,' 231, citing Wellington's letter to Croker, Sept. 30, 1833; and Wellington, 'Despatches,' 3rd Ser. vii, 254.

§ 'Cambridge Modern Hist.' vol. x. See Talleyrand's account of the interview, 'Ambassade à Londres,' p. 27.

|| Wellington, 'Despatches,' 3rd Ser. vol. vii, pp. 310, 311, 'Are we to be accused of apathy, because we do not *at once* get under arms, in a cause in which we have not yet tried negotiation?'

was held on Oct. 20; more conclusive still, neither does Talleyrand. On Nov. 2, Sir R. Peel was still maintaining that we were greatly concerned in the maintenance of the connexion between Holland and Belgium,* although on Nov. 3 he was disclaiming reannexation, and talking of 'other solutions.'† Even Louis Philippe wrote on Nov. 11, 1830, that 'force could not be used' to bring about the consent of Holland to the separation.‡ Talleyrand, towards the end of November, reports with elation that the British Government 'has been induced to recognise' that Belgium must be irrevocably separated from Holland. This, he observes, was a great success for French policy; and we entirely agree. But it is quite inconsistent with any decision having already been taken on Oct. 15 to use force in no circumstances to maintain any kind of Union. Equally inconsistent with such a decision is Ellenborough's note on Oct. 28 that 'the ambition of the Belgians will induce them to attempt to form a separate State.' The obvious *parti* of the Tory Government was to declare boldly in favour of Holland and the maintenance of treaties. It would thus have extricated itself from Reform embarrassments by appealing to the country to support it in maintaining the bulwark erected in 1815 against France. At any rate, it would have gained time, and obliterated the unfortunate effect of Wellington's precipitate declaration against all reform whatever.

But the Wellington Government missed the opportunity. They summoned a Conference, and so hurriedly, that Aberdeen actually affixed the seals of office to the necessary documents the day after he had resigned them, on Nov. 17.§ The Conference met under Whig auspices, and within a month it had given judgment against the Dutch, and in favour of Belgian independence (Dec. 20, 1830). It is incorrect to declare, as M. Bourgeois does,|| that this was 'a council of arbitration' appointed by the Conference already assembled in London to discuss the affairs of Greece. It was assembled *ad hoc*; great difficulty arose as to whether it should sit

* 'Hansard,' Nov. 2, 1830, col. 92.

† *Ib.* 177.

‡ Talleyrand, 'Mem.' iii, 262.

§ 'Hansard,' Jan. 26, 1832, c. 842.

|| 'Camb. Mod. Hist.' vol. x, 485.

in London or Paris; it was not to arbitrate but to mediate;* it was appointed by no other Conference. Talleyrand still speaks on Dec. 17 of 'attaining the end I was above all most anxious to secure—the dissolution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands'†; for the adhesion of Great Britain, though a great thing, was not enough. But he was forcing an open door. On Dec. 20 was signed the famous Protocol establishing the independence of Belgium. Neutralisation was not yet mentioned.

Lord Grey had always opposed the Union,‡ and he now had the opportunity, grateful to a prophet, of making his gloomy vaticinations come true. Palmerston, his Foreign Minister, if he distrusted France, was quick to see how a collision with the Citizen King in support of a Dutch autocrat would damage the cause of Reform. And Talleyrand rightly judged that, 'in London, the Conference would sign whatever France and England wished.' The advantage of the 'interior position' was conclusive. It enabled Talleyrand and Palmerston united to 'brusquer les choses' again and again. But why did Prussia and Russia do so little for Holland? Russia was doubtless occupied by Polish difficulties, but they had not yet attained their full development. Prussia was neither weak nor preoccupied. MM. Lecomte and Lévi suggest the fear of France. France had certainly recovered from 1815; she was a force in Europe; but she was not its arbiter. Her weakness was a constant source of embarrassment. 'It is not easy for a negotiator to adopt a high and firm attitude, when at any moment he may be asked, "Does your government still exist at the present time?"'§ Ellenborough saw clearly that she could not go to war—'for fear of a republic.' 'In the name of wonder,' Princess Lieven wrote, 'why should all the other Powers submit to her pleasure?'|| If the world stood in awe of France in 1830, Leipzig and Waterloo might as well not have been fought. It may be conjectured that the cautious attitude of the Northern Powers was partly due to nervousness. Talleyrand hinted in private

* See Wellington, 'Despatches,' vii, 487—'The mediators, . . . assuming to themselves in Oct. 1831 the character and quality of arbitrators.'

† 'Memoirs,' iii, 293.

‡ 'Hansard,' Nov. 2, 1830, col. 40.

§ Talleyrand (iii, 293); cf. ib. iv, 203.

|| 'Corr. with Earl Grey,' ii, 140.

conversations at a Partition of Belgium, by which Britain might seize Flanders, leaving the interior to France. It is not necessary to suppose him serious; had it been a serious project, he would not have gossiped about it. But it may have been enough to frighten Bülow and Matuszewic.* It was better to rob William than to aggrandise Louis Philippe.

But it is impossible to avoid the impression that there was some reason for Prussian inaction which is not disclosed. The cholera (Ellenborough's explanation), the King's lethargic disposition,† difficulties of communication, indifferent diplomacy, bad information‡—these are too many explanations. The real reason remains hidden, unless it was sheer blundering incapacity. Metternich's remark is just—that 'the Netherlands affair is an affair ruined *ab ovo*.'§ Prussia should have taken an energetic line at first; nothing could put matters right subsequently. The inaction of Russia is equally difficult to explain. Guizot imputes it to the pacific mentality of the Emperor Nicholas;|| which only shows that explanation is impossible.

Austria viewed this sudden departure from the Treaty of Vienna with nothing but horror. But the King of Holland 'had launched his bark in storm'; it was difficult for the 'allies' to support him against the 'confederates.' This is an attitude reminiscent of Greek chorus; but no doubt the Three Courts resented his obvious desire that they should pull the chestnuts out of the fire for him.¶ Metternich lays stress, moreover, on

* The idea seems to have been seriously mooted to Talleyrand by Sebastiani ('Mem.' iii, 285), and is dismissed by him as absurd. But on June 22, 1831, he refers to it as a real possibility—and even (in one version) calls it his 'favourite idea' (iv, 151). And Aberdeen, in a very interesting Note of Jan. 18, 1831, speaks of 'Talleyrand's notion of partition' (Wellington, 'Despatches,' 391).

† 'At Berlin,' says Dalberg, 'the King alone refuses to go to war' (Tall. 'Mem.' iv, 217). 'The K. of Prussia would have to place himself at the head of the army—and just see how completely that would upset all his habits!' said a courtier. Bresson, however, says that his whole entourage was composed of 'excellent persons who were anxious only to end their days in peace.' Talleyrand, 'Mem.' v, 331.

‡ Prussia, according to Talleyrand ('Mem.' iii, 238), was at first determined to act only along with Great Britain.

§ 'Memoirs,' v, 411, Metternich to Martinitz, Nov. 13, 1832.

|| Guizot, 'Memoirs,' ii, 78.

¶ Cf. Metternich's 'Memoirs,' vol. v, p. 224.

the 'exaggerated' care which the Three Courts have taken to prevent any alliance between France and England. He imputes it to them as a grave mistake. Once their fear became known, the Two Courts played on it. 'If fear is a bad counsellor, it is still worse to *show oneself afraid*.'* But, beyond that, the *personnel* of the Conference was mediocre. Its members were as wax in the hands of Talleyrand, backed for party reasons by Palmerston.

'Les plénipotentiaires des Trois Cours se sont laissé enjôler par des considérations anglaises et françaises, que je suis le premier à vouloir ménager—mais non pas aux dépens du bon droit et de la saine logique.' †

'Je plains les individus qui ont comprise cette conférence, . . . les représentants de l'Empereur étaient placés à l'arrière-plan, et . . . les représentants de Russie et celui de Prusse, surtout le dernier, n'ont fait que caresser le Cabinet britannique, sans avoir égard aux principes ou aux convenances de leurs cours.' ‡

More important than all, the Three Courts were far from the scene of action and from each other; and they had no sea-power at hand.§

The neutralisation of Belgium was excogitated subsequently (by Talleyrand) as a means of dissolving frontier difficulties which arose when the precise boundaries of the new kingdom came to be determined. It was an *arrière-pensée*. The boundary question was provoking, and did not interest him. Neutralisation was an expedient serving to cut the Gordian knot. He expected it to prove solid; and indeed it stood the strain of one Franco-Prussian war. He feared for it only if there should again arise 'a wild and revolutionary France.' It was proposed, discussed and accepted in one day, after a

* Metternich to Schwarzenberg, Oct. 13, 1832; 'Memoirs,' v, 405.

† *Ib.* vi, p. 146. Metternich to Apponyi, Dec. 3, 1831.

‡ Metternich, vi, 271. Princess Lieven also observes ('Corr. with Earl Grey,' ii, 86)—'We have no superabundance of cleverness in the Diplomatic Corps in London.' Later (Oct. 4, 1830), she observes—'Matuscewits is running all over the country, and shooting—staying with the Wiltons for ten days—when, with such important events pending, he ought to be staying quietly in London.'

§ Cf. Metternich, vi, 148, 417, and *passim*.

long and exhausting conference ('Mem.' iv, 52). Two days later, Talleyrand writes, Prussia would not have signed such a protocol. Guizot speaks of 'la neutralité si péniblement obtenue et si combattue par la Prusse' ('Memoirs,' ii, 266). No doubt it was imitated from the neutralisation of Switzerland, established in 1814.

M. Dollot,* indeed, thinks that the solution had already appeared, in germ, in 1634. Richelieu in that year proposed to the States-General that the Catholic Low Countries should be erected into a republic under the joint protection of Holland and France. This would have been the precise opposite of neutralisation; for it would have committed Belgium to continuous warfare with the enemies of those two countries. In 1663† de Witt mooted to Louis XIV the project of a federal republic—it was to be a Republic of Flanders—on the Swiss model; but we cannot see any anticipation in this of the idea of permanent neutralisation. In 1715, indeed, the true conception of a neutralised Belgium was put forward by France;‡ The country was to be perpetually withdrawn from the horrors of war, and could neither be attacked nor attack. But Holland preferred material guarantees; and nothing came of the project.

Meanwhile the boundaries sketched out by the protocols of Jan. 9 and 20, 1831, proved unacceptable to the Belgians. Lord Ponsonby was sent to Brussels to urge them, but the Belgian demands now rose higher; the Conference retracted its 'unalterable' resolution, and decided to give Belgium Luxemburg and Maestricht. Holland's compliance was overtaxed, and the King absolutely declined to accept these new terms. Conceiving himself liberated from the armistice§ which had accompanied the opening of the Conference, he invaded Belgium in August. The Prince of Orange conducted a brilliant campaign, and the work of the

* 'Neutralité de la Belgique,' Paris, 1902. Cf. Dumont, 'Corps Dipl.' vi, 1, 80-85.

† 'Neutralité de la Belgique,' p. 155.

‡ *Ib.* p. 415.

§ An attempt was made to prove the Dutch guilty of duplicity in the breaking of the armistice; the truth seems to have been that Palmerston forgot one letter, and put another in his pocket (his easy-going method, which nearly involved him in ruin in the Urquhart affair). The Armistice had, in the first instance, been greatly desired by the Dutch, as a pledge of encouragement. Falck to Wellington, Oct. 22, 1830, 'Despatches,' iii, 317.

Conference seemed thrown away. The course which commended itself to the diplomatists was to oppose the Dutch forces by a French army. Within sixteen years of Waterloo, a French Marshal (Gérard) entered the Netherlands as an invader.

Scarlett, a cool and detached observer, was surprised at the influence of the French, and could only account for it on the principle (of 'The Tale of a Tub'), that the new Ministry intended to do just the reverse of everything its Tory predecessors had done. That does not suggest a *fait accompli*. He attributed the armed intervention, on the authority of 'a great Whig,' to mere petulance; 'the Dutchman was not willing to obey orders.'* Even Brougham,† on Aug. 5, 1831, was writing to Grey, suggesting that Britain should press Prussia to be firm; for, if France once entered Belgium, she would not withdraw. The endless 'conferences' were 'mere cloaks for chicane.' Grey took very little notice of him; on Jan. 1, 1832, he wrote to Brougham lamenting that 'these d—d Russians are doing all they can to throw the whole Belgian affair into confusion.' And Holland‡ (Dec. 31, 1831) tells Brougham that the Cabinet has agreed that pressure should be put on Prussia in the *opposite* direction! Adroitly invoking the neutralisation of Belgium, Talleyrand had instigated the demolition of the Belgian fortresses, which Britain had insisted on erecting in 1815 at a cost of 7,000,000*l*. The plenipotentiaries of the other Powers resolved to recommend demolition—on the ground of expense!—and solemnly communicated their resolution to Talleyrand for his concurrence, which was obligingly accorded.§

The Dutch victories had nevertheless done their work. The Conference revoked its irrevocable resolution, and on paper restored Grand Ducal Luxemburg, Limburg and Maestricht to Holland. At the same time (Nov. 26, 1831) they guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium within its restricted limits. This (renewed in 1839) is the

* 'Memoirs of Lord Abinger,' 156. Both Grey and Palmerston seem to have developed a personal animus against the 'obstinacy' of King William of Holland in declining to recognise the arrangements which the Conference had made for him.

† 'Autobiography,' i. 123.

‡ *Ib.* 450.

§ Cf. Lords Aberdeen and Londonderry, 'Hansard,' Aug. 9, 1831, col. 979; also 'Hansard,' July 26, c. 317; July 28, cc. 462-3.

celebrated 'scrap of paper' signed by Prussia, with other Powers. It was a guarantee not altogether welcome.

'It has been,' remarked Aberdeen, 'for a long time past, the acknowledged policy of this country to be extremely scrupulous of guaranteeing anything; and we have always been particularly anxious to avoid guaranteeing anything that we are not to do ourselves. When we had bound ourselves to act in conjunction with other powers, we had frequently found that the onerous part of the guarantee was too apt to fall on us alone.'

In Aberdeen's opinion the guarantee, made to avoid war, would render war unavoidable.* Wellington† saw that 'it was absurd to talk of a guarantee of neutrality—there could be no permanent guarantee, save what the means of warlike resistance afforded.'

Affairs dragged on for another year. The King of Holland, supported by his people, would not give in. During those years of European upheaval, one spot at any rate existed where monarchy was secure. Greville notes 'a curious state of things in Holland—nothing but loyalty and enthusiasm; adoration of the Orange family; everybody satisfied with the government, and no desire for Reform!' At last came the startling *coup* of a new French invasion, and the capture of Antwerp stoutly defended by Chassé (Dec. 1832). Lord Durham's faithful biographer gives him the credit of this impetuous proposal. But the true source is patent, and not very creditable.‡ The ministry of Soult was desperately unpopular. It needed *éclat*. It secured it. Thiers wrote (Oct. 11, 1832) to Talleyrand that 'this parliamentary exigency has become quite irresistible, and it is absolutely necessary to satisfy it. . . . Everyone wants Antwerp. If we obtain it, we shall have an assured majority. . . . We only want it for three days.' The Duke de Broglie wrote in the same strain on Oct. 12. Thiers, Guizot and Broglie were saved, at the cost of two thousand Dutch and French corpses. The Duchess of Berry would have saved them anyhow.§

* 'Hansard,' Jan. 26, 1832, c. 890. Cf. Feb. 7, 1832, cc. 11, 14.

† 'Hansard,' July 26, 1831, col. 319.

‡ M. Bourgeois ('Camb. Mod. Hist.' x. 488) attempts to justify it by 'a new attempt on the part of the King of Holland to reconquer Belgium.'

§ Talleyrand, 'Memoirs,' v, 26, 36.

It is not the case that this clearance of the Dutch from Belgium (that country meanwhile remaining in occupation of territories assigned by the Powers themselves to Holland) was 'deputed' to Britain and France by the Powers.* On the contrary, the Russians formally withdrew from the Conference of London,† reporting to their Court 'the grave circumstances which by changing the character of the pacific mediation to which they were summoned no longer admit of their associating themselves with the work of their colleagues.' Austria and Prussia, although, like Russia, willing to put pecuniary pressure on Holland, were totally averse from warlike action. Durham was indeed sent out to Petrograd to induce Russia to join the Western powers in taking forcible measures;‡ but Russia would hear of nothing beyond releasing Belgium from her financial obligations to the Dutch. And even this complaisance was probably due, not to Durham's eloquence, but to the continued assumption by Britain of liability for the Russo-Dutch loan.§

Holland had not been fairly treated. As Aberdeen pointed out, the alleged principle of non-interference, and of 'allowing Belgium to manage its own affairs,' was extended precisely so far as the concerted Powers thought fit, and limited exactly as they chose.¶ Impartial people like Greville recorded that 'The King of Holland has all along very justly complained of the proceedings of the Allies towards him, which they justify by necessity (the tyrant's plea).' Less disinterested authorities thought the same. 'It cannot be denied,' admits Talleyrand,¶¶ 'that the King of Holland had some just grounds for complaint, when it is remembered that the Belgian

* 'Camb. Mod. Hist.' x, 543.

† Talleyrand, 'Memoirs,' iv, 30. Cf. Dalling's 'Palmerston,' p. 137, and Metternich, 'Memoirs,' vol. v, *passim*.

‡ 'Correspondence: Grey and Lieven,' ii, 357.

§ 'Memoirs of Herries,' i, 145. 'For a valuable consideration, Nicholas alienated his eventual right of independent action in an European question of the first magnitude, putting himself under the control of Henry John, Viscount Palmerston, and his Lordship's lawful successors in Downing Street.'

¶ Hansard, June 24, 1831, col. 208. Wellington had warmly encouraged the Dutch at first: W. to Falck, Sept. 14, 1830, 'Despatches,' vii, 261.

¶¶ 'Mem.' iii, 299.

provinces were ceded to him in 1814 in exchange for the Dutch colonies of which England had taken possession. But,' he adds with Christian resignation, 'it was for England to get round that awkward corner.'* Lord Grey, in a very ill-tempered note, nearly quarrelled with Princess Lieven (Dec. 14, 1831) on the subject. His cold conceit and spite, his perpetual talk of his patience having limits, wrung from her at last the rebuke—'Why is it the Whigs alone who are to have innate intelligence? . . . I think that Holland has every title to respect, and from all of us.'† 'How much better it would be,' she resumes, 'if you were the Grand Turk? Admit that the Whigs in general have a great predisposition for turning autocrats!‡ Talleyrand himself was inclined to agree with Dalberg that a strong Holland, with a good navy, was a more important asset to France than Belgium!§

In a lengthy document the Conference, taking more credit than it deserved for the purity of its intentions and the excellence of its morals, declared that if Holland had rights, so had Europe, and that of these the Powers themselves were the interpreters. These assertions may usefully be compared with the declaration of the Dutch Government (July 12, 1831) that:

'la paix générale ne doit être achetée au prix de l'honneur et du bien-être de la Hollande seule, principe opposé à l'intérêt même de la paix générale, qui ne pourrait que se trouver gravement compromise par le sacrifice d'un peuple soumis aux lois et fidèle à ses institutions à une population qui a rompu les liens sociaux et qui ne respecte pas les droits d'autrui.'

'Too often,' the Conference pompously remarked, 'the Cabinet of the Hague surrounds itself with illusions.' 'Yes,' the Dutch negotiator replied, 'if to be persuaded that a legitimate king, who is forced to abandon to rebels the greater part of his territories, is neither obliged nor entitled to sacrifice to them the safety and independence of his own people, be an illusion; then, certainly, it is one which the Netherlands

* The Duke of Dalberg emphatically agreed with him. *Ib.* iv, 230. See also Aberdeen, Wellington's 'Despatches,' vii, 461: 'Holland has been cruelly treated in the whole of this Belgian affair.'

† 'Correspondence,' Sept. 6, 1832.

‡ *Ib.* Sept. 15.

§ Talleyrand, 'Mémoires,' iv, 217.

Government entertain, and will endeavour to make the basis of their policy.'*

In 1838, William I's persistence met with its reward. Grand Ducal Luxemburg was restored definitely, with Limburg, to Holland, as the Conference had directed. The Dutch thereupon at last accorded formal recognition to Belgium. All this is now ancient history. Holland herself would probably think twice, and three times, before desiring a reunion with Belgium. The benefits of consolidating a genuine national sentiment, and allowing it a free development, are triumphantly demonstrated to-day by the amazing vigour and the glorious tenacity with which the Belgians have defended themselves.

Belgian neutrality became a cardinal principle in European diplomacy. France was presumed to be its only menace. But the tension of 1867 and the events of 1870 left Belgium safe. In spite of Lord Stanley's futile efforts to eviscerate the guarantee by representing it as inapplicable except by the joint action of all the guaranteeing Powers, and of his insistence on the insertion of the express word 'collective' when the neutrality of Luxemburg was similarly guaranteed in 1867, it was clear that Britain was prepared to defend these countries single-handed. The notorious 'draft treaty' of Cernay between France and Prussia, published by Bismarck in 1870, provided for a free hand to be accorded by Prussia to France in Belgium. Whatever credit attaches to that document, its publication gave the opportunity for British opinion to be emphatically expressed. It was not a bellicose Ministry that was in office; on the contrary. It was settling the Alabama claims; it was abandoning the dogma of indelible British allegiance; it was pursuing a settled policy of non-intervention. But it was quite plain about Belgium. The distich—

'Let France, let Prussia, break her word—
And lo, our hands are on our sword!'

well expressed its attitude. A treaty was entered into with both belligerents, engaging to come to the help of

* The Dutch case, like that of Sweden against Norway, has never been adequately put in English. The reader may refer to Lord Aberdeen's speech of Jan. 26, 1832, and Lord Elliot's of Aug. 22, 1831. See also a remarkable speech by Baring, Aug. 18, 1831.

either if the other invaded Belgium. This policy remained unshaken. Belgium advanced by rapid strides; she acquired a colonial empire; she disputed with Turkey; she would have fought in China. Still, we remained the guarantors of her existence. On that first Sunday in August, when word arrived of the attack on the Grand Duchess of Luxemburg, we knew that the next step would be the invasion of Belgium, and that for us the die was cast. Germany may have thought that a Europe which condoned the trivial breach of treaty by Austria in 1908, and the technical breach of treaty by Italy in 1911, had no more regard for 'scraps of paper.' But she found that, as Broglie wrote in 1831,—'there is not a single soul bold enough to come forward and declare that we ought to violate the good faith of treaties.'*

The suggestion was made in 1814 to reconstitute the Kingdom of Lorraine.† A writer cited by Dollot observes:—'Identity of origin, common modes of life and language, local antiquity, reciprocity of material interest—all unite to summon Belgian and Batavian to knit together ancient family ties by establishing a powerful State, which, stretching along the Rhine, should embrace the Palatinate, and have for its southern limits Alsace, Lorraine and Champagne.' It would since 1870 be possible to add Alsace and Lorraine themselves; and by the further addition of Switzerland a strong Lotharingian Empire or Federation would be secured. A powerful State it would be, which comprised Antwerp, Amsterdam, Brussels, Rotterdam, Strassburg, Berne and Basel. And it ought to prove as great a guarantee of European stability. Differences of race and language would not seriously matter. The Swiss talk three or four languages, and profess at least two religions. Belgium itself is divided between Flemings and Walloons; and its difficulties with Holland were really of a religious character. A modern Lorraine may well be the best solution of international difficulties, so far as Western Europe is concerned.

TH. BATY.

* Talleyrand, 'Memoirs,' v, 198.

† Dollot, 'Neutralité de la Belgique,' p. 527.

Art. 13.—TURKEY IN THE GRIP OF GERMANY.

WITH a singular lapse into veracity the German Imperial Chancellor stated in his opening speech to the Reichstag on Dec. 1, that 'the most recent ally in battle who has been compelled to join us is the Ottoman Empire.' Never perhaps has a country taken sides in a war, from which all its interests bade it hold aloof, under such ruthless compulsion as that which was exerted upon Turkey by Germany and the small group of reckless adventurers who govern Turkey at her bidding. After three months of constant prevarication and gross breaches of neutrality endured by England and her Allies with unexampled patience and leniency, the rulers of Turkey threw off the mask at Germany's behest; and, whilst Turkish raiders invaded Egyptian territory, Turkish men-of-war, under German command, opened fire without a word of warning on undefended Russian ports in the Black Sea. The appearance of the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau' in Constantinople waters after their escape from the Mediterranean, and the constant stream of German officers and German gold which poured into Turkey throughout September and October, no doubt played a great part in hastening on the final catastrophe. But, if the match was then set to the train, the train itself had been carefully laid by Germany for many years past. Indeed it had been laid by the Emperor William himself, when just sixteen years before, after paying a state visit to the Sultan Abdul Hamid at Constantinople, he ostentatiously proclaimed himself at Damascus, on Nov. 7, 1898, the protector, not only of Turkey, but of the whole Mahomedan world. In a speech which fell on strangely indifferent ears in Europe, but was carried far and wide along the whispering galleries of the East, William II declared that 'His Majesty the Sultan and the 30,000,000 Mahomedans who, scattered over all parts of the earth, venerate him as their Khalif can ever rely upon the friendship of the German Emperor.' It was, except in point of time, but a short step from that pronouncement to the telegram in which William II conveyed the other day to the Crown Prince the glad tidings that the Sheik-ul-Islam at Constantinople had proclaimed the *Jehad* or Holy War against the Allied Powers.

Of all the various developments of the Kaiser's 'world-policy' in which, as I pointed out in the October issue of the 'Quarterly Review,' the origins of the present war must be sought, none has been so decisive a factor as the peculiar relationship which grew up between Turkey and Germany under his auspices. None also marked a wider departure from German policy under Bismarck.

After the Franco-German war of 1871 the main object of Bismarck's policy was to consolidate the position he had achieved for the new German Empire, and above all to avert the possibility of any hostile combination of Powers against Germany. What he would have preferred, and what he sought for some years not unsuccessfully to secure, was a close understanding between the three great military Empires of Central and Eastern Europe, Germany, Austria and Russia. But the 'Three Emperors' Alliance' broke down under the strain of the disturbances in the Balkan Peninsula in 1875 and 1876, and of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-8. After the Congress of Berlin, when the manner in which Bismarck discharged his duties as an 'honest broker' almost inevitably gave umbrage to Russia, he decided, rather reluctantly, to make a close alliance with Austria the corner-stone of his policy. But he remained none the less determined to avoid being dragged into a conflict with Russia, especially over questions connected with the Near East, where his chief concern was to preserve a dexterous equilibrium between the contending ambitions of Russia and Austria. German diplomacy had hitherto played a very modest part in Constantinople itself; and he realised that Germany could no fill the preponderating part which he contemplated unless she secured for herself there a position of more substantial authority.

Circumstances soon favoured him beyond his own expectations. British intervention had saved Constantinople from occupation by the victorious Russian armies at the close of the Russo-Turkish war; and, so long as Lord Beaconsfield's Government remained in power, British influence prevailed almost unchallenged in Turkey. But with the advent of Mr Gladstone's administration in 1880 the situation was suddenly and completely changed. Even if the Sultan had been willing to forget

the Midlothian campaign, the attitude which the new British Government immediately assumed in regard to the Greek and Montenegrin questions, of which the settlement under the Berlin Treaty still remained in suspense, quickly convinced the Turks that they could no longer reckon upon British support.

Bismarck at once saw his opportunity. Germany stepped into the place which we had vacated as the 'disinterested' friend of Turkey; and, in all the international negotiations of which Constantinople was then the pivot, she laid herself out not only to mitigate differences between Austria and Russia, but also to capture the confidence of the Sultan by a discreet championship of Turkish interests, which gratified his *amour propre*, without compromising in any way her own freedom of action. One good turn deserves another. In return for Germany's diplomatic countenance, the Sultan asked for a German military mission to reorganise and equip the Turkish army on the Teutonic model; and he delighted to bestow his patronage on German rather than on British or French trade and industry. Young Turkish officers were sent to receive their technical education in Germany; German bankers opened branch offices in Constantinople and found lucrative investments for the Sultan's Privy Purse. Germany's voice began to carry more weight than any other in the Turkish capital. But Bismarck never forgot that the part he wished to play at Constantinople could only be played safely and successfully if it were generally recognised that Germany had no territorial ambitions in the Near East, and that, as he once put it, the Balkan peninsula would never be considered 'worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier.'

It was upon these lines that German policy in Constantinople continued to move so long as Bismarck was in power. But they were lines too modest to satisfy William II.

The idea that the German race would some day find a Promised Land in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia was itself far older than William II's schemes for a 'World Empire.' It had floated in many a German mind long before the Hohenzollerns revived an imperial Germany under Prussian auspices. The great Moltke, who in his

youth had accompanied the Turkish armies during the wars against Mehemet Ali, had brought back with him the conviction that the Turkish Empire was doomed to perish, and that Germany—meaning at that time Austria as the premier State of the old Germanic Confederacy—ought to be in at the death. It was essential for her to hold the mouths of the Danube, for down the valley of that great German river lay the road to Constantinople and Western Asia. The revolutionary movement which swept over Germany in 1848 produced a curious wave of sentimental Pan-Germanism; and, even earlier, democratic writers of many different schools, Friedrich List and Lassalle, Ritter and Oppert, dreamed of German homesteads repeopling and cultivating the ancient kingdoms of Nineveh and Babylon.

This, however, was only the 'false dawn' of modern and militant Pan-Germanism. It was not till the paramount position which the new German Empire had acquired on the European continent ceased to satisfy the growing appetite of a later generation, that the Germans began to 'hear the East a'calling.' The Professors as usual led the way. Dr Sprenger, a distinguished Orientalist, sang the praises of Mesopotamia as the richest land of ancient times and a field for German colonisation and culture second to none in the world. Dr Kärger laid hands metaphorically on the whole of Asiatic Turkey; and, as soon as the Sultan conceded to the Germans the construction of the first 'Anatolian' railway, the cry was raised that Germany must of course obtain grants of land for colonising purposes, so that 100,000 German settlers, armed and drilled with true German thoroughness, should be there to defend the fruits of German culture against foreign greed. The economists expatiated on the vast natural resources of Asiatic Turkey, waiting only to be developed for the benefit of German commerce and industry—corn and wine; great mineral deposits; vast oil-fields to be tapped, right down to the Persian Gulf; fertile plains which would yield all the cotton required for the German market. Anglophobe politicians talked of a 'new India' for Germany, which would give the deathblow to British India, already tottering to its fall. Military fire-eaters were assured by Prof. Sachau that it was the dream of every Turk to see the Ottoman

armies led by German officers, schooled to victory, against the hereditary Russian foe. A fair-sized bookstand would not hold the literature which has sprung up to show the boundless possibilities that lay before Germany if she would only stretch forth her hand to grasp the prize.

William II's imagination had not, perhaps, travelled quite so far when he came to the throne, but, even as Prince William, he had keenly studied the reports which reached Berlin from the energetic head of the German Military Mission, General von der Goltz, who was one of the earliest advocates of a forward German policy in Turkey—the same General von der Goltz who as Field Marshal has now returned to Constantinople to represent the German Emperor with his latest ally, Sultan Mahomet V.

Within a year of his accession, William II decided, against Bismarck's advice, to pay a State visit to Constantinople. It was a remarkable and a fateful visit, for it gave rise to one of the first serious differences of opinion between the old Chancellor and his young sovereign, and it brought him into immediate contact with an Oriental ruler whose singular personality exerted a lasting influence upon him. We are apt to remember only Abdul Hamid's inglorious downfall and to forget the remarkable part he played during a reign of over thirty-two years. Yet his sinister shadow is still projected on to the world's stage to-day.

Raised to the throne in 1876 by one of many palace conspiracies, Abdul Hamid found the Ottoman Empire reduced to absolute bankruptcy by the wild extravagance of his predecessors, and threatened both by internal turmoil and by foreign aggression. The insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina had led to a war with Serbia, itself merely the precursor of a much more formidable and disastrous war with Russia. Without any education in the European sense of the term and with no experience of public affairs, Abdul Hamid found himself confronted with a situation which might well have staggered a veteran statesman. His immediate predecessors had allowed all real power to pass out of their hands, so long as the Pashas who ruled the Empire from the Sublime Porte were willing to minister freely to the Imperial pleasures and caprices. But he believed in his own star

—he called his favourite palace Yeldiz Kiosk, i.e. the Palace of the Star; and he had some of the greatest qualities of an Oriental despot as well as many of the worst.

From his childhood he had become an adept in all those arts of flattery and duplicity which are bred in the atmosphere of the harem, whilst the memories of palace conspiracies amidst which he had grown up made him a constant prey to suspicion and fear. As a Turk of the old school once told me, his power was rooted in corruption and delation. But on the other hand his natural gifts were undeniable. He had a retentive memory; he was quick of apprehension; he knew how to read human nature, especially its worst sides; and he played on its weaknesses with consummate skill. He had remarkable powers of fascination when he chose to exercise them, and like some medieval Italians, whom he in many ways resembled, he was capable of genuine and almost tender kindness as well as of extreme cruelty and treachery. Unlike most Ottoman rulers, he was a very hard worker, and had an extremely shrewd notion of the value of money. He was, perhaps, more cautious than bold, but with indomitable tenacity of purpose he combined an alertness of mind and a versatility of resource which enabled him to adapt his methods to the exigencies of the hour without ever losing sight of the end he had in view. Above all things he was determined to be master in his own house, and to be Sultan in deed as well as in name; and, if he could not hope to retrieve altogether the fortunes of the Sultanate as a temporal power, he conceived the idea of seeking ample compensation in the revival of the spiritual power of the Khalifate.

It was in itself no mean or hopeless ambition, for, though the Mahomedan nations, too fatalistic to change their ways and too proud to yield, were gradually crumbling away under the impact of modern civilisation, Islam was still a great vital force which lacked concentration rather than energy. When Abdul Hamid was a child, a pious Fakir greeted him, it is said, as 'Amir-el-Mouminin' (Prince of the Faithful) who would one day not only reign as Sultan, but also resuscitate as Khalif the ancient power and glory of Islam. Ever

since the conquest of Egypt by Sultan Selim I, to whom the last puny descendant of the Abbaside Khalifs surrendered the symbols of his spiritual sovereignty, the Sultans of Turkey have borne the title of Khalif and Protector of the Holy Places of Islam. Not all Mahomedans recognise the validity of the Turkish claim to the Khalifate, for many hold that the Khalif or Vicegerent of the Prophet should be of the same blood as Mahomet. Abdul Hamid's predecessors had ceased to lay much stress on their spiritual authority; and, when Turkey was formally admitted into the concert of European nations, they had even adopted in their intercourse with the Western Powers the title of Emperor of the Ottomans in preference to that of Sultan.

The Fakir's prophecy, however, had sunk deep into Abdul Hamid's soul. In the early years of his reign, when, to the disgust of all his Turkish Pashas, he entrusted the Grand Vizierate to a Tunisian, he intimated that in the world of Islam there were no nationalities, and that the Sultan, as Khalif, was entitled to call into his service the best Mahomedans, wherever they could be found. It was as Khalif not less than as Sultan that he protested vigorously in 1881 against the French occupation of Tunis; and it was as Khalif quite as much as in virtue of his titular rights over Egypt that he sought to intervene in 1882, first between Arabi and the Khedive and then between the Khedive and England, before and after the British occupation of Egypt. In both cases his intervention was ineffective, but the mere attempt gave him prestige. More spade work was required, and to this he applied himself with his wonted pertinacity and resourcefulness.

Yeldiz Kiosk became the centre of a widespread Pan-Islamic propaganda. Agents were sent out to preach in all Mahomedan countries the greatness and glory of the Ottoman Khalif; and Mahomedans from all parts of the world were encouraged to come and lay their grievances at the foot of his throne. Amongst more remote countries, India was one of the first to which Abdul Hamid devoted his attention after the change of British policy towards Turkey. A newspaper—the 'Peik Islam'—was actually printed in Yeldiz Kiosk for the diffusion of Pan-Islamic ideas amongst Indian Mahomedans; and, if its success

was at first slender, it did not fall on altogether barren ground. Nor did he disdain to cultivate closer relations on the basis of common Islamic interests even with Mahomedan rulers who were by no means prepared to recognise the Khalifate of Constantinople. The Amir of Afghanistan, for instance, calls himself *par excellence* King of Islam. The Sultans of Morocco have always claimed complete independence, spiritual as well as political, from Constantinople. The Shahs of Persia are Shiites, and therefore detestable heretics in the eyes of the Turks, who are Sunnis almost to a man. Nevertheless, as against Christendom, Islam constituted a common bond between them, which Abdul Hamid knew how to strengthen to his own greater glory.

Still less did he neglect to raise the Horn of Islam within his own dominions. The revolt of the Christian nationalities, which had already led to the dismemberment of European Turkey, had taught him to distrust the old policy of tolerant indifference which, under the early Ottoman Sultans, had allowed the subject races to retain, with a large measure of ecclesiastical autonomy, their ancient traditions of national independence. The reforms which the Concert of Europe was constantly prescribing were, he conceived, bound to quicken in the remaining portions of the Turkish Empire the same forces of disintegration which had already resulted in the liberation of Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. While opposing from the very first a stubborn *vis inertiae* to the execution of all reforms, Abdul Hamid laid himself out systematically to strengthen his hold on the heterogeneous Mahomedan races of his Empire; and he showered his favours upon Arabs, Kurds, Albanians, Circassians, etc., preferring them even before the pure Turk, whose loyalty he could take for granted, and recruiting from amongst them his most trusted advisers, and the mixed Prætorian guard to which he entrusted the safety of Yeldiz Kiosk and of his own sacred person.

When William II paid his first visit to Constantinople, Abdul Hamid had already achieved a considerable measure of success along lines not uncongenial to the young Emperor's masterful temperament. He had revived the Khalifate, and he had made the Sultanate once more a reality within his own dominions. The

power of the Sublime Porte, which had so long overshadowed it, was shattered. The famous Turkish Constitution, which had served his purpose as a lightning-conductor during the stormy beginning of his reign, had long since been consigned to oblivion, and its author, Midhat Pasha, to exile and death. He had made and unmade Grand Viziers and Ministers until those who held the empty titles were content to be nothing more than humble recipients of their master's orders and favours. Abdul Hamid seldom ventured forth from the seclusion of Yeldiz Kiosk, but so effectively had he gathered there into his hands the threads of the whole military and civil administration of the Empire that, as the Turks themselves used to say, not a single official between Baghdad and Scutari could change his coat without an imperial *Irade*.

What exactly passed between Abdul Hamid and William II during that first visit has never yet been told, but host and guest parted mightily pleased with each other. The old Chancellor did not approve of the visit before the Emperor started. He approved of it still less when the Emperor returned full of the visions he had seen on the Bosphorus. Bismarck looked upon Constantinople as a profitable field for German statesmanship, in the service of a policy which was confined, on the principle of 'beati possidentes,' to a maintenance of Germany's hegemony in Europe. For William II Constantinople was already the bridge over which Germany was to pass out of Europe into Asia and enter upon a vast field of splendid adventure. In the following year Bismarck was dismissed, and the Emperor was free to steer his own course. The famous 'Re-insurance' Treaty with Russia was dropped; and, though various circumstances delayed for a good many years the outbreak of acute antagonism between Austria and Russia and at times even produced a temporary *rapprochement* between them, Austrian ascendancy in the Balkan peninsula and an ultimate advance upon Salonica became part and parcel of William II's great scheme for the creation of 'a Germanic wedge reaching from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.'

Combining with a vein of almost medieval mysticism a thorough appreciation of modern business practices,

William II realised from the outset that the transformation of Germany into a World Empire, which he had set before himself as his life-work, could only be effected if economic expansion went hand in hand with political expansion. In order to bring Turkey permanently within the orbit of German world-policy, the first thing to do was to peg out Germany's claims in the domain of commerce, industry and finance. German manufacturers, German engineers, German capitalists overran Turkey. Already in 1888 the Deutsche Bank had obtained the right of working a short railway from the Bosphorus along a strip of the Asiatic shore of the Sea of Marmora, which had originally been given to an English Company; and to this was added a concession for an extension to Angora, which, after the Emperor's visit, was pushed on with the utmost energy, and soon developed into a claim for German monopoly of railway enterprise throughout Asiatic Turkey. German trade increased by leaps and bounds. Her imports and exports, which in 1888 had not exceeded 700,000£, grew within a decade to over 3,000,000£. At Constantinople German influence was paramount, for it stuck scrupulously to its bargain never to worry the Sultan about administrative reforms or about the wrongs of his Christian subjects. On the contrary, when other Powers, and notably England, tried to curb Turkish misrule, Germany was always ready with a cold-water douche to deprecate any interference with the effective sovereignty of the Sultan.

On his side Abdul Hamid, secure in the covert support of Germany, began to cast off all restraint. He was no longer content to oppose mere inert obstruction to all projects of internal reform. The time, he thought, had arrived when he might, with impunity, teach his Christian subjects once for all to 'tremble and obey.' The results were written in some of the bloodiest pages of modern history. For two whole years Europe was horrified by a tale of long-drawn massacres throughout the Armenian provinces of Turkey, which culminated in 1896 in wholesale bloodshed in the very streets of Constantinople. Europe was horrified, but it was impotent. Germany was determined that the Concert of the Powers should remain, whatever happened, a 'Concert des Impuissances.'

William II himself had, perhaps, some momentary qualms of conscience, for during his visit to Cowes in July 1895, just after Lord Salisbury's return to power, he alarmed that conservative statesman by unfolding a vast scheme for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Possibly it was never very seriously meant. His fertile brain has often entertained almost simultaneously the most contradictory combinations. Possibly he wished merely to draw Lord Salisbury, for his most confidential moods are apt to be a mere device for probing the real sentiments of his interlocutor. On this occasion Lord Salisbury's cautious temperament induced him to eschew the honour of further confidences. The Emperor had graciously expressed a desire for another conversation on the following day. But Lord Salisbury hurried back to London, and the Emperor returned to Berlin nursing against him the double grievance of a personal slight and a diplomatic rebuff. Henceforth he put all his money on Abdul Hamid. Lord Salisbury might denounce the crimes of the 'Red Sultan' with unaccustomed severity at a Mansion House banquet; he might move the British Mediterranean fleet up to the Dardanelles; but, as soon as the question arose of translating menace into deeds, he found himself practically isolated. Italy alone would have followed his lead. Austria, as usual, took her cue from Berlin. Russia was absorbed in the Far-Eastern adventure into which German diplomacy was successfully elbowing her. France would not commit herself against the wishes of her Russian Ally. The wrongs of the unfortunate Armenians remained unredressed, though a few more paper reforms were added to those which already encumbered the pigeon-holes of the Sublime Porte; and Abdul Hamid remained unhurt, to enjoy the enhanced prestige which the heavy chastisement inflicted on his Christian subjects conferred upon him in the eyes of all true Believers.

The following year, 1897, added a yet greater triumph to Abdul Hamid's policy. Turkey went to war with Greece; and, though she derived little material benefit from her victories, Abdul Hamid was able to boast that, for the first time for upwards of a century, a Mahomedan Power had fought and defeated a Christian. The

Turkish victories were noised far and wide through the Islamic world; and India itself felt their effect all along the North-West frontier in the Tirah rising of 1898. In Europe Germany alone greeted with enthusiasm the success of the Turkish armies, which was a splendid advertisement for the German officers who had trained and equipped them. The Crown Princess of Greece was sister to the Emperor William; but dynastic ties were no more allowed to stand in his way than humanitarian scruples. As Prince Bülow admits in his 'Imperial Germany,' the relations of Germany with Turkey were 'not of a sentimental nature'; they served Germany's interests from the 'industrial, military and political points of view.' So, in the autumn of 1898, while Abdul Hamid's hands were still dripping with the blood of his Armenian subjects and the laurels of his victories over Greece were still fresh on his brow, William II, accompanied by the Empress, proceeded on a second pilgrimage to Turkey; and on this occasion a State visit to Constantinople was followed by a sensational progress through Palestine and Syria. The German Emperor entered Jerusalem as a Knight Templar, and masqueraded at the Holy Shrines of the Christian faith as the protector of Christendom. But a week later, at Damascus, he proclaimed himself with still greater emphasis the protector of Pan-Islamism, and, to quote Prince Bülow again, defined what was to be henceforth the position of Germany not merely towards Turkey, but '*towards Turkey and Islam.*'

From that moment Germany had it all her own way at Constantinople. There was nothing that the Sultan could refuse to the mighty ruler who had for the first time publicly recognised his title as Khalif and thus endorsed the greatest of his ambitions. The German exploitation of the whole Ottoman Empire proceeded apace. Within the next twelve months the first convention was signed between Dr Siemens, Director of the Deutsche Bank, and the Sublime Porte, conceding in principle to the German Anatolian Railway Company the right to extend down to the Persian Gulf. A commission of German engineers, headed by the German Consul-General Stemrich, and including the German Military Attaché at Constantinople, was immediately

sent to report upon the land *tracé*, while a German cruiser visited the Persian Gulf in order to discover the most suitable point for a terminus in its waters.

The railways of European Turkey had already passed under the control of the Deutsche Bank group, which had its satellites in South Germany, Austria and Switzerland; and the new concession promised the early fulfilment of the great Pan-Germanic scheme, already known in Berlin as the B.B.B. (Berlin-Byzantium-Baghdad). It was undoubtedly a grandiose scheme; and not the least of its merits was that of inducing the Turkish Government to grant a handsome kilometric guarantee for the whole of the great trunk-line from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf and all its numerous feeders. Germany was thus able to place the financial burden on the shoulders of the Turkish taxpayers, while securing for her own people all the profits of a long succession of lucrative financial operations. The final convention for the Baghdad Railway was signed, sealed and delivered in 1902. Excepting, perhaps, the Manchurian Railway concession, which Russia had wrested some years previously from China, it was the most remarkable charter ever granted by one independent State to another. Perhaps the most effective bait held out to the Sultan was the linking up of the Baghdad system with the new railway which he was bent on building to the Sacred Cities of Medina and Mecca. What more splendid monument to the vitality of Pan-Islamism than a railway carried across inhospitable deserts to serve so pious a purpose, and built under the auspices of the Khalif with the help of contributions from the Faithful throughout the whole Mahomedan world? Nor was that all. Designed and constructed under the supervision of German engineers, its political object was to render communications between Constantinople and the Holy Places independent of the command of the sea; and the attempt made by Abdul Hamid in 1906 to get a footing in the Sinaitic peninsula and shift the Turkish frontier closer up to the Suez Canal showed clearly enough the strategic considerations which the Sultan and his German advisers already had in mind.

No State has ever organised and controlled the power of modern finance for the prosecution of a national

policy so effectively and so thoroughly as Germany, and nowhere so successfully as in Turkey. All the most important German Banks had their branches at Constantinople; and immediately after the Emperor's journey to Palestine the Deutsche-Palestina Bank was established with branches at Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa. Then came the Deutsche Orient Bank, a far more important institution, with its headquarters at Constantinople and branches in all the chief cities of the Ottoman Empire, as well as in Egypt and in Persia. Nor was Germany content to push her own Banks. Directly or indirectly, her influence permeated even the older cosmopolitan institutions, such as the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which had been hitherto controlled by British or French financiers.

'Peaceful penetration' was pushed in every direction. The German flag was shown, not only in the Mediterranean but in the Black Sea, by German shipping companies enjoying heavy subsidies from the State. The Deutsche Levante Line was specially created for the purpose, while the Nord-Deutscher Lloyd and the Hamburg-Amerika Line were encouraged to graft services to the Mediterranean on to their great Trans-Atlantic services. In 1906 the Hamburg-Amerika even extended its operations to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. A German Cable Company was formed to bring Germany into independent telegraphic communication with Turkey, and obtained in 1898 a concession for the laying of a cable between the Rumanian port of Costanza and Constantinople, with a view to future extension into Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. When wireless telegraphy began to take practical form, the Germans were the first in the field with concessions for wireless lines between Constantinople and Syria, and between the Turkish islands in the Mediterranean and the main land. German schools, German scientific expeditions, German missions contributed at the same time to the diffusion of German culture, while German control of the Turkish military administration was so tightened up, after its value had been proved in the campaign against Greece, that William II was already learning to rely upon the Turkish army as a subordinate wing of the German army in the event of a great European conflict.

Abdul Hamid, on the other hand, could survey with legitimate pride the growth of the Pan-Islamic idea, to which his pact with Germany had left him free to devote his untiring energies. Beyond the frontiers of his Empire a new spirit was unquestionably stirring the Mahomedan world. He had taught the Faithful in far-distant lands, and not least in India, to turn their eyes towards Turkey as the one great Power that still kept the flag of Islam flying. His name figured in their prayers as the Vicegerent of the Prophet; and they yielded to him as Khalif a measure of spiritual allegiance which, though not incompatible with the loyalty they owed to their own temporal rulers, tended to unsettle it. The Fakir's prophecy was in process of fulfilment. For a very long time past no Ottoman Sultan had bulked so large in the imagination of the Mahomedan East as a true 'Prince of the Faithful.'

Admirably, however, as in many directions the pact between William II and Abdul Hamid worked for both of them during nearly two decades, the impunity which it assured to the baser methods of Hamidianism brought it ultimately to ruin. When Abdul Hamid began to extend to European Turkey the ruthless methods which he had successfully employed in Asiatic Turkey, the Macedonian populations, more fortunate than the Armenians, possessed, in the small Balkan States, neighbours and kinsmen to whom they could confidently appeal. A Macedonian rising in 1903 threatened to bring on Bulgarian intervention; and, in view of complications fraught with such serious danger to the peace of Europe, the Great Powers could no longer remain absolutely quiescent. Great Britain was, as usual, foremost in recommending strong concerted action; and though Austria, under the restraining influence of Berlin, and Russia, on the eve of a conflict with Japan in the Far East, combined to take the wind out of Lord Lansdowne's sails, even the Mürzsteg Agreement imposed some restraint upon Turkey. A few years later, when Great Britain and Russia were drawing together, Sir Edward Grey was able to substitute for Austro-Russian control in Macedonia a far more effective scheme of international control, which, though repugnant to Austria as well as to Germany, Abdul Hamid was fain to accept. It was a

bitter pill for him; and the taste was not removed when at the end of 1907 Austria, having altogether parted company with Russia, demanded, with the support of Germany, from Turkey a concession for the construction of the Novi-Bazar Railway, which, according to Count von Aehrenthal, was 'to constitute a new and important route from Central Europe to Egypt and India,' and in the mean time bring Austria down to Salonica.

Did Abdul Hamid begin to realise that William II's friendship was, after all, rather costly and disappointing? Germany had so far as possible held aloof from the Macedonian reforms, but she had failed to avert them, just as she had failed in 1906 to avert the stern measures by which Great Britain had compelled the Sultan to withdraw his troops from Egyptian territory, and to renounce a demonstration against the British position in Egypt, which Germany herself had at first encouraged and perhaps even instigated. The methods of Hamidianism were, moreover, gradually arousing all over Turkey widespread discontent, which was by no means confined to the subject races. The despotism of Yeldiz Kiosk brooked no opposition; and there was scarcely an important town in the distant provinces of the Empire in which batches of deportees, suspected of conspiring against Hamidianism or even merely of entertaining Liberal opinions, formed in their turn centres of disaffection. While in other parts of the Mahomedan world Abdul Hamid still posed as the champion of Islam, there were plenty of Mahomedans in Turkey itself who, in conversation with European friends, would frankly express their regret that the concert of Europe did not take account of the sufferings of the Mahomedan as well as of the Christian populations of the Empire.

Abdul Hamid himself was growing old; and during the last two or three years of his reign a painful internal complaint enfeebled his will-power and compelled him to leave a much freer hand to the unscrupulous agents whom he had used for his own purposes and who now used him for theirs. The army, gradually estranged by arbitrary favouritism, resented the establishment of international control in Macedonia as the precursor of the further dismemberment of the Empire. It was in Macedonia that the malcontents first raised the standard

of open revolt; and the revolt soon grew into a revolution, none the less formidable because it was peaceful. As a first step Abdul Hamid was compelled to restore the Turkish Constitution. From that moment (June 1908), though he was not actually deposed till the following year, he ceased in fact to reign; and his power passed into the hands of the revolutionary Committee of Union and Progress.

German influence had been so closely bound up with Hamidianism that it seemed at first as if the downfall of Abdul Hamid must involve that of German ascendancy. During the brief 'Constitutional' honeymoon when Mahomedans and Christians fraternised throughout the Empire, and equal rights and equal liberties were promised to all races and creeds, the name of the German Emperor was almost as much execrated as that of Abdul Hamid himself; nor was the feeling against him lessened when his Austrian ally made the Turkish revolution an excuse for abruptly proceeding to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Bulgaria, whom the Germanic Powers were playing off against Serbia, repudiated at the same moment the nominal sovereignty which had until then vested in the Sultan. Germany remained so far as possible in the background until the Dual Monarchy agreed to a settlement more or less acceptable to Turkey. In Baron von Marschall she had had for a long time past in Constantinople an Ambassador of rare ability and experience, who knew that he could afford to wait. For Germany's material hold upon Turkey was far too strong to be shaken by a mere shallow wave of sentimental liberalism. Nor did he have to wait long. The first Constitutional Cabinet, under the veteran statesman Kiamil Pasha, and the first Turkish Parliament openly distrusted Germany and leant towards the Western Powers. But the latter merely opposed paper protests to Austria's high-handed action; and Germany's 'shining armour,' which in 1909 compelled Russia to abandon the cause of her Serbian *protégés*, dazzled the eyes of the military element which, with the men of Salonica, had from the beginning supplied the real driving force in the Committee of Union and Progress. With the fall of Kiamil, who had been made to bear the chief odium of the humiliation which Austria had inflicted upon

Turkey, the Committee became, and henceforth remained, the real if occult Government of Turkey; and Germany pulled as many strings in the Committee as she had formerly pulled at Yeldiz.

The military party, consisting largely of officers educated in and devoted to Germany, dominated the Committee in conjunction with the men from Salonica, the real birth-place of the revolution—men who for the most part belonged to the peculiar community of *Deunmehs* or crypto-Jews, which had had its headquarters for centuries in that city. Mahomedans in name, they still preserved the traditions if not the rites of their Jewish ancestry, and like almost all Jews in Turkey were quite indifferent to forms of misgovernment which had always afforded them congenial opportunities of dubious profit. They had no sympathy with the subject races, who, in so far as they were Christian, stood in their eyes for the creed which had driven their forebears to take refuge under the more tolerant rule of the Ottoman Sultans. Their influence in the Committee was constantly exerted against the policy of reforms which had been promised in Macedonia, as in other parts of the Empire, in the first blush of the revolution. They posed as good 'Ottomans'; and, under their inspiration, the military party set its face more and more against any concessions involving a recognition of the principle of nationalities within the Empire. Young Turkey and Pan-Islamism were, it is true, almost a contradiction in terms. Abdul Hamid had restored the temporal power of the Sultanate before attempting to revive the spiritual authority of the Khalifate. The revolution had reduced both to their former impotence. The Committee, comprising many freethinkers and Jacobins, who professed almost publicly the same contempt for the Mahomedan as for every other form of religion, could not therefore openly revert to Abdul Hamid's policy of Mahomedan ascendancy, but it pursued the same purpose by restoring in practice the ascendancy of the ruling Turk. The promises of equal rights and liberties were not withdrawn, but to claim their fulfilment the subject races were to become good 'Ottomans,' and therefore to surrender, if not their creed, at least their language, their traditions and their national aspirations. To this end the worst methods of the old

régime were soon revived in Macedonia and elsewhere, while, to maintain its secret despotism, the Committee gradually reverted to the Hamidian weapons of corruption and delation, reinforced not infrequently by assassination. The saner and more liberal elements were steadily overborne by the more violent faction; and the unfortunate Sultan Mahomet V, who had lived for thirty years during Abdul Hamid's reign as a state-prisoner in daily terror of his brother, soon lived in equal terror of the men who had put him on the throne. In proportion as the Committee, drifting down an evil plane, forfeited the sympathies of the Western Powers, it naturally fell back into the arms of Germany, who, as in Abdul Hamid's days, was willing to ask no questions so long as she obtained full value from the *de facto* rulers of Turkey in return for her political support.

At times, however, the situation must have severely taxed even Baron von Marschall's ingenuity. In 1911 the Italian invasion of Tripoli raised awkward questions. For was not Italy the ally of Germany? and how could Germany, as the friend of Turkey, suffer her ally to lay hands on Ottoman territory? In the following year the birth of the Balkan League, of which the paternity was ascribed to Russia, and the overthrow of the Turkish armies in the first Balkan war, were calculated to deal a still more serious blow to Germany's prestige. But, though to the chagrin of the Germanic Powers Serbia emerged triumphant from the second Balkan war, it brought some comfort to the Turks in the recovery of Adrianople; and, after the assassination of Nazim, the Committee of Union and Progress found in Enver Pasha a master who was determined to stake his own future with that of the Turkish Empire on a huge gamble which he could only carry through in partnership with Germany. Enver, who had been Military Attaché in Berlin, had long since been won over to the German interest; and he was just the tool that the Germanic Powers needed, when, Bulgaria having failed to destroy the rising power of Serbia, they were themselves—as we now know from Signor Giolitti's disclosures—resolved to smash 'the spear-head of Russia,' even at the risk of a general European war.

Enver poses, we are told, as the Napoleon of Turkey.

His career has certainly been meteoric. One of the leaders of the military revolt against Abdul Hamid, he organised the resistance of the Arab tribes in Tripoli; and he has himself likened his return from Africa during the Balkan wars to Bonaparte's return from Egypt. He was for a time something of a popular hero; and the recovery of Adrianople, for which he took the chief credit, helped him at any rate to build up a dictatorship of more than Napoleonic ruthlessness, which finally plunged Turkey into the great war. With over twenty thousand Germans at his back, and the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau' in the Golden Horn, he has been able to defy the Palace and the Porte and all the inarticulate mass of the Turkish people, vaguely conscious of impending ruin. Nor has he hesitated to throw the Khalifate, as well as the Sultanate, into the melting-pot. It is a bold thing to have unfurled the Green Flag of Islam in a war waged by Turkey in alliance with two European Powers, just as much infidels in the eyes of all orthodox Mahomedans as the Powers against which the Jihad has been proclaimed. Perhaps in this matter Enver has, after all, merely sought to oblige his German friends, who would seem, from the Emperor's telegram to the Crown Prince, to place no less faith in the Jihad than in the many other 'methods of frightfulness' by which the arch-enemy, England, is at last to be laid low.

What Germany expects from the Jihad has been set forth for us very frankly in a pamphlet published in Berlin just after the outbreak of war, by Dr Becker, a Professor of the University of Bonn. After expatiating on the wonderful statesmanship which had years ago inspired the Emperor at Damascus to call the forces of Pan-Islamism in aid for the furtherance of German World Policy in Asia—since Germany, having but very few Mahomedan subjects in her own possessions, had nothing to fear from a Mahomedan uprising, while it would be a growing menace to France and Russia, and above all to England—the learned Professor proceeds to foreshadow, to the satisfaction of his readers, what will happen as soon as Germany has mobilised Turkey. First of all, an invasion of Egypt will strike directly at the most important and at the same time the most vulnerable point in England's world-position. As for India he scarcely

trusts himself to disclose 'all that will happen there as soon as it is known that England, at war with Germany, has become involved in hostilities with Turkey.' Dr Becker wrote before Turkey had taken the plunge, and he could, therefore, only close with a pious prayer 'that the course of this great war may enable the Emperor to redeem his pledge and Germany to show herself by deed as well as by word the friend of Islam.'

It would be premature to enquire into the nature of the evidence upon which Germany based such sanguine expectations. Her agents, we know, have been at work wherever there were symptoms of disaffection towards British rule; and they were, we must assume, satisfied that they had ample justification for counting upon success. Such an enquiry would involve a discussion of the state of public opinion amongst Mahomedans in India and Egypt, and of their attitude towards Turkey, which would be neither profitable nor advisable at this stage of the war. All one can safely say, is that Germany's expectations have not yet been fulfilled, and are not likely to be fulfilled if we are true to our own traditions, and remember, as I believe the great majority of our Mahomedan fellow-subjects remember, that the British Empire remains even in the stress of war with Turkey a great Mahomedan Empire which can never be indifferent to the permanent interests of Islam.

VALENTINE CHIROL.

His career has certainly been meteoric. One of the leaders of the military revolt against Abdul Hamid, he organised the resistance of the Arab tribes in Tripoli; and he has himself likened his return from Africa during the Balkan wars to Bonaparte's return from Egypt. He was for a time something of a popular hero; and the recovery of Adrianople, for which he took the chief credit, helped him at any rate to build up a dictatorship of more than Napoleonic ruthlessness, which finally plunged Turkey into the great war. With over twenty thousand Germans at his back, and the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau' in the Golden Horn, he has been able to defy the Palace and the Porte and all the inarticulate mass of the Turkish people, vaguely conscious of impending ruin. Nor has he hesitated to throw the Khalifate, as well as the Sultanate, into the melting-pot. It is a bold thing to have unfurled the Green Flag of Islam in a war waged by Turkey in alliance with two European Powers, just as much infidels in the eyes of all orthodox Mahomedans as the Powers against which the Jihad has been proclaimed. Perhaps in this matter Enver has, after all, merely sought to oblige his German friends, who would seem, from the Emperor's telegram to the Crown Prince, to place no less faith in the Jihad than in the many other 'methods of frightfulness' by which the arch-enemy, England, is at last to be laid low.

What Germany expects from the Jihad has been set forth for us very frankly in a pamphlet published in Berlin just after the outbreak of war, by Dr Becker, a Professor of the University of Bonn. After expatiating on the wonderful statesmanship which had years ago inspired the Emperor at Damascus to call the forces of Pan-Islamism in aid for the furtherance of German World Policy in Asia—since Germany, having but very few Mahomedan subjects in her own possessions, had nothing to fear from a Mahomedan uprising, while it would be a growing menace to France and Russia, and above all to England—the learned Professor proceeds to foreshadow, to the satisfaction of his readers, what will happen as soon as Germany has mobilised Turkey. First of all, invasion of Egypt will strike directly at the most important and at the same time the most vulnerable in England's world-position. As for India he

trusts himself to disclose 'all that will happen there as soon as it is known that England, at war with Germany, has become involved in hostilities with Turkey.' Dr Becker wrote before Turkey had taken the plunge, and he could, therefore, only close with a pious prayer 'that the course of this great war may enable the Emperor to redeem his pledge and Germany to show herself by deed as well as by word the friend of Islam.'

It would be premature to enquire into the nature of the evidence upon which Germany based such sanguine expectations. Her agents, we know, have been at work wherever there were symptoms of disaffection toward British rule; and they were, we must assume, satisfied that they had ample justification for counting upon success. Such an enquiry would involve a discussion of the state of public opinion amongst Mahomedans in India and Egypt, and of their attitude towards Turkey ~~would~~ would be neither profitable nor advisable at ~~this~~ the ~~time~~ of the war. All one can safely say, is that German ~~ex~~ pectations have not yet been fulfilled, and are ~~not~~ to be fulfilled if we are true to our own ~~traditions~~ traditions. We remember, as I believe the great majority of our ~~M~~ Mahomedan fellow-subjects remember, that the ~~British~~ British Empire remains even in the stress of war with ~~Turkey~~ Turkey. — Mahomedan Empire which can never ~~be~~ be the permanent interests of Islam.

~~Various~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~main~~ ~~on~~ ~~end,~~ ~~g~~ ~~away~~ ~~to~~ ~~which~~ ~~pre-~~ ~~ving~~ ~~neutral~~ ~~which~~ ~~watches~~ ~~ships~~ ~~that~~ ~~are~~ ~~ol~~ ~~work~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~le~~ ~~the~~ ~~direct~~ ~~im-~~ ~~metals,~~ ~~rubber,~~ ~~oil~~ ~~eds~~ ~~for~~ ~~her~~ ~~military~~ ~~plies~~ ~~have~~ ~~reached~~ ~~other~~ ~~countries;~~ ~~but,~~

Art. 14.—BRITISH OVERSEA COMMERCE IN WAR TIME.

THE importance of commerce in war time has been emphasised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Speaking in the House of Commons on the outbreak of war he declared it to be vital, in order that we should have an uninterrupted supply of food and material, that our trade should go on during the time of war as it did in the time of peace. The freedom for British commerce which the Government felt confident of securing was no small matter; but its confidence has been well justified. At a time when the Navy was responsible for convoying large bodies of troops from India and the outlying parts of the Empire, the few German cruisers in the outer seas were allowed some liberty. But the total damage done by these marauders has been very small in comparison with the total values of British oversea trade; the depredations have been infinitely less than the most favourable expectations formed by high shipping authorities before the outbreak of war. We have seen what has happened to the German cruisers when the Admiralty could afford to detach forces specially to attend to them.

If anyone should be disposed to regard it as a small thing that our oversea commerce should be maintained in large volume, he should consider the idle condition of the German mercantile marine to-day. That marine before the war was, in comparison with our own, small—in tonnage it was only about a quarter the size of ours—but it was highly efficient. It is now non-existent on the seas. Where are the 'Vaterland' and the 'Imperator,' the new giants of the Hamburg-Amerika Line? Sheltering at New York and Hamburg respectively. Where is all the fine fleet of the Norddeutscher Lloyd? The 'Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse' has been sunk in action as an armed merchant cruiser; the 'Berlin' is interned in Norway; the 'Kronprinz Wilhelm' has been acting as a merchant cruiser—others have probably been waiting on the German warships; some ships have been captured and sold at auction; the rest are sheltering in various European and American ports, or in neutral ports in the East. The 'Cap Trafalgar,' the largest liner in the South American trade, was sunk when acting as a commerce-destroyer by the old British liner 'Carmania.'

Most of the vessels previously employed in the German South American fleet are either sheltering at Hamburg or in ports along the South American coasts. German companies for years had been developing the trade between New York and the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of South America. Germany had been gradually building up her mercantile marine and making ever greater efforts to acquire an increased share of the world's carrying trade, but she was unable, after the declaration of war, to protect that marine.

We learned from time to time of successful raids by the German cruisers 'Emden,' 'Karlsruhe,' and 'Dresden.' Yet, as pointed out above, the actual amount of shipping sunk by these and other vessels is, in proportion to the whole British Mercantile Marine, very small indeed. An estimate which I have made of the total cost of the damage done by German cruisers amounts to just over 5,000,000*l.*; and that is certainly not an under-estimate. We have heard of these losses because British ships are keeping the seas much as in time of peace; we do not hear now of captures of German merchant-ships at sea because there are none there to capture. Apart from the fact that the German Navy could not protect them at sea, there was no Government insurance to indemnify their owners against the risk of capture, so that the vessels were compelled to seek shelter in the nearest neutral port.

First and foremost, of course, the maintenance of British oversea commerce is due to the work of the Navy. It is the fear of the Navy which has kept the main German fleets in their harbours for weeks on end, and hinders enterprising ships from breaking away to prey on British commerce. It is the Navy which prevented many fast German liners from leaving neutral ports to act as raiders; and it is the Navy which watches over the safety of the hundreds of British ships that are at sea every day. Then it is the patrol work of the Navy which renders almost impossible the direct importation of contraband, such as the metals, rubber, oil and wool, which Germany badly needs for her military campaigns. It is known that supplies have reached the country through Holland and other countries; but,

whatever may have been the attitude of individual traders at the outbreak of war, the neutral countries now seem intent on husbanding almost all of their supplies for home consumption, for the extraordinary rise in freights, coupled with additional insurance charges, has rendered the imports of all commodities a very expensive matter for them. All the duties outlined have been carried out by the British Navy in addition to their work of protecting this country from invasion and convoying troopships.

The work of the Fleet has been ably seconded by the State War Insurance scheme. For years State War Insurance had been an academic subject. Committees have sat and voted against a Government scheme. Mr Austen Chamberlain's Committee in 1908 found that the objections to a Government scheme were greater than the advantages that might be expected. A sub-committee of the Imperial Defence Committee again considered the subject and last year reported that the conditions had undergone great changes since the earlier Committee sat; and it prepared, after consultation with experts, a scheme of its own. In normal circumstances the scheme would probably have been issued for public discussion this autumn, as it was thought that such proposals as were outlined should be ventilated in times of peace. No foreign susceptibilities could thus be hurt; and the scheme, if it were endorsed by public opinion, could be put into operation at once in the event of war. Probably at the end of July the White Paper outlining it was lying in a pigeon-hole in a Government office; when the war cloud burst it was extracted, and, within three or four days, the whole plan was launched.

Experience has amply vindicated the wisdom of putting the scheme into practice at once. In the few days immediately preceding the outbreak of war between this country and Germany very high rates were being paid by merchants for insurance against war risks, but immediately after the opening of hostilities, while underwriters were facing the new conditions, merchants could obtain the insurance they wanted at the Government Office. It is certain that a large proportion of the trade could not long have afforded to pay the high rates asked before war involving this country had actually broken out. The establishment of the Government

Office for the insurance of cargo had instantly a steadying effect. The authors of the scheme recommended that the maximum rate on cargo should be 5*l.* 5*s.* per cent., and the minimum rate 1*l.* 1*s.* per cent.; and, when the Office opened its doors for business on the afternoon of Aug. 5, the 5*l.* 5*s.* rate was quoted. This meant that merchants all over the world knew the highest rate which they would be asked to pay, and they could make their calculations accordingly. Gradually the Government rate was reduced, until on Tuesday, Sept. 1, it fell to 2*l.* 2*s.* per cent. No change was made for three months; but after the Battle of the Falkland Islands it was reduced to 1*l.* 10*s.* per cent. The Office has transacted a very large amount of business during the past few months, but insurance companies and private underwriters have had all the business that they could desire. In order to compete with the Government Office it was necessary for them to quote rates at least as low; and that they have been able to do so is a sign that the Government rate was intrinsically a sound one. The State Office was established mainly for the encouragement of trade and not with any idea of earning profits; but the Insurance Company or underwriter is in business to make money, and, if it had been thought in the market that the rate quoted by the Government would not leave a profit, the business would not have been accepted.

There is one important feature of the open market which affects its suitability for providing war insurance. The underwriter is able to withdraw as soon as he thinks he has had enough; and at one time many underwriters did withdraw temporarily from the market. It is, in fact, the prerogative of the strong underwriter to cease accepting business as soon as he thinks he has written all that he wants. He may have collected a considerable volume of premium and then have come to the conclusion that the outlook in some particular trade is not as satisfactory as he would like, and so he decides to become a spectator. He may think that the premiums he has in hand will be sufficient to enable him to pay all claims that may reasonably be expected, or he may even be prepared to face a loss on what he has written. His instinct is to use his skill in discriminating between risks offered to

him; and discrimination is precisely what is not wanted if commerce is to be maintained irrespective of the cost. The Government Office is, or should be, affected by no considerations of earning profits. Whether there be good news or bad news, it must continue accepting business at rates which are fixed periodically and cannot rise above the *maximum* figure. It will be satisfactory if the Government Office remains, as the Admiralty recently stated it was, perfectly solvent; but it would be of no national consequence if it showed a debit balance. It has behind it the whole credit of the country; and a few hundreds of thousands, or even a few millions, would be well spent if they enabled British overseas commerce to be carried on in enormous volumes, and they might be insignificant in relation to the benefits conferred on the country by keeping prices of commodities on a reasonable basis and by maintaining employment.

Yet, though in the light of events it is impossible to imagine that commerce could have been conducted on a vast scale without the support of the State Office, there has been no monopoly. A very large field of operations has been left open for Insurance Companies and underwriters. First, the Government rate has been a uniform one—it applied equally to short voyages from this country to the Mediterranean and to long voyages to ports on the west coast of South America. Underwriters, bound by no scale, have been free to discriminate, and in some trades have quoted very much lower rates than in others. For instance, the rate on cargo across the North Atlantic has fallen to 5 shillings per cent.; and at rates below one per cent. an enormous business was transacted. After the sinking of the liner ‘Manchester Commerce,’ and the discovery of German mines off the Irish coast at the end of October, rates were increased to 15 shillings and 1*l.* per cent., according to the class of ship. Similarly, low rates were quoted at various times for voyages across the North Sea. One effect of this discrimination was that there was a tendency to take the long-voyage risks to the Government Office, since underwriters were not quoting lower rates and might even have asked more, and to place the shorter-voyage risks in the open market. This tendency reacted unfavourably on the Government scheme, but it had been fully foreseen. Their business,

they realised, was mainly the encouragement of trade, whether the risks were good, bad, or indifferent.

Secondly, it was part of the State scheme that it should only be applicable to cargoes in vessels from their original port or from the time that they left a port of call. It was, no doubt, felt desirable that merchants should not be able to insure cargo while it was at sea between two ports, lest they should be tempted to do so on the receipt of information unfavourable to the venture. Brokers say, however, that it is not always possible to guarantee that a vessel has not already left port; and merchants may have learned at the last moment of heavier shipments than had been expected. In such cases the brokers have gone into the open market and placed the risks at rates similar to or higher than the Government quotation.

Thirdly, the Government scheme applied only to British vessels, and then only to British ships insured with clubs or associations approved by the Government. There has been plenty of work for neutral ships to do; and the war insurance on the cargoes of these has had to be placed either with the offices established by the respective countries or in the open market. France, Russia, Japan, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Sweden, have all established their own schemes of war insurance. There has been a very large amount of insurance placed in London on produce and merchandise from the United States and other countries to Scandinavia. Suggestions have been repeatedly made that goods professedly intended for Scandinavia were intended to be diverted to the German Baltic ports; and in October London and Liverpool Insurance Companies and private underwriters signed an agreement that all policies of war insurance should exclude the risk of seizure and detention by His Majesty's forces. Important firms of brokers have stated that since that order was imposed a good deal of the business fell off—a somewhat significant fact. The Admiralty announcement respecting mines in the North Sea also had the effect of making underwriters more chary of accepting cargo in vessels trading to and from the Baltic ports. At the end of the year the proposal was made that, in view of the difficulty of preventing supplies from leaking through into Germany, underwriters should

refrain from insuring any goods exported from neutral countries to the neutral countries neighbouring Germany. One notable result of the war has been that the underwriters have passed through five of the busiest months in their lives. The enormous volume of war insurance, together with the epidemic of insurance against aircraft and bombardment risks, has kept them busy from early morning until late at night. The pressure has been accentuated by the fact that from every large office many men have left to serve in the armies.

Brief reference has already been made to the Government scheme for the insurance of hulls as distinct from that for the insurance of cargoes. For some years past owners had been giving some attention to the war risks on shipping, and new mutual associations had been formed. These associations had been created to provide insurance against those risks of war, riots, civil commotion, which were specifically excluded from the ordinary Marine Policy. There were and are three great groups of associations; but their cover was restricted, in the case of vessels actually at sea on the outbreak of hostilities, to insuring the vessels until their arrivals in British or neutral ports, where they could safely remain. This insurance was obviously of an extremely limited nature and would do nothing to encourage owners to maintain their ships at sea. The existence of the associations, however, did provide the machinery for establishing a complete war insurance scheme. This system came into operation immediately on the outbreak of war. It was provided that the Clubs should issue policies covering vessels starting fresh voyages and that the State should accept 80 per cent. of such risks. The maximum rate of premium to be paid by owners was fixed at 5 per cent. and the minimum at 1 per cent. The first rate quoted was $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. for a single voyage and $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. for the round voyage; within a few weeks it was arranged that vessels should be covered for a period of three months at the rate of $2\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. Early in September the rates for the single and round voyages were reduced to one and two per cent. respectively, and the rate for the three months' period to 2 per cent. On Dec. 17 the rate for a single voyage was reduced to 15 shillings per cent., and the rate for a round voyage or

for a time policy of three months to 30 shillings per cent. This last rate of 30 shillings amounts, it will be seen, theoretically to an annual charge of 6 per cent. on the value of the steamers. In practice the charge is lower, because for a certain proportion of the year vessels are in port and may then not be covered at all against war risks. The values were to be arrived at by deducting an allowance of 4 per cent. per annum for depreciation from the first cost. The system had this effect, that in the event of loss the owner might not receive the full value which he placed on the ship or even a sum sufficient to replace her by another. Many owners have, therefore, been placing additional insurances in the open market.

It was an essential part of the scheme that all owners and captains should conform to the Admiralty instructions. Thus, in certain trades, vessels have been detained under Admiralty instructions until the route was considered safe for them to proceed. In preparing the scheme the Committee naturally could only conjecture what would be the effect of the war on British shipping. They assumed a possible loss during the first six months of nearly 10 per cent. of the number of British vessels engaged in foreign trade. On this assumption the total losses on hulls insured against premiums was expected to be 6,133,750*l.*, of which the Government share was estimated at 4,907,000*l.* The cost of losses on cargo to be borne by the State was placed at 8,000,000*l.*; and, including losses on hulls at sea or in enemy ports on the outbreak of war, for which no premiums were receivable by the State, the grand total of the State's share of the losses, without taking into account premiums, was estimated at 16,367,000*l.* It should, perhaps, be pointed out that marine insurance experts who do not possess inside information have sought in vain to follow the calculations on which these estimates were based.

The returns of Lloyd's Register show that on March 31, 1914, there were 8,514 steamers, excluding fishing boats and all vessels of less than 100 tons, of 18,273,944 tons registered in the United Kingdom. The value of tonnage varies enormously. A new first-class passenger liner may be worth as much as 30*l.*'a ton; an old 'tramp' steamer may be worth not more than 5*l.* per ton. Probably many underwriters would agree that the average

value of all British tonnage might be put at 10%. That gives the value of all British vessels as 182,739,440%. ; and, assuming that ten per cent. of that were lost within six months, the cost would amount to 18,273,944%. The figure is very different from the 6,133,750%. allowed for in the Government scheme. From the larger figure, however, apparently there must be deducted the value of vessels engaged in home trade and also the amount of tonnage laid up, but it would seem that there would still be a big discrepancy.

Calculations which I am permitted to use show that, in the British Mercantile Marine, 142 vessels of 436,787 tons have been lost by capture or seizure or through striking mines, i.e. 1·67 per cent. of the number and 2·39 per cent. of tonnage. Again on the basis of Lloyd's Register, Germany had 2,019 steamers of 4,743,046 tons and has lost 379 vessels of 984,870 tons, which represent 18·77 per cent. of the number and 20·77 per cent. of the tonnage. Included in these losses are the vessels which were in Antwerp and were subsequently sunk or disabled before the Allies evacuated the port. If these vessels should in the course of time be put into working order by the Germans they would have to be regarded as recaptures and the German losses would be diminished accordingly. On the same basis of calculation Austria-Hungary owned 419 vessels of 1,010,347 tons and has lost 47 vessels of 149,021 tons, equivalent to 11·21 per cent. of the number and 14·75 per cent. of the tonnage.

I need make no apology for devoting much space, in an article on British oversea commerce, to the State Insurance schemes. Undoubtedly their influence has been enormous. No private institutions could have withstood unmoved the shocks, temporary though they were, caused by the enemy cruisers, by the raids on mercantile ships, and particularly by the 'Emden' and the 'Karlsruhe.' Rates must have been 'jumpy'; and the effects of this would certainly have permeated through commerce from the producers and large houses to the consumer.

Shipping is always divided roughly into two classes—liners and tramp steamers—and the war affected them at first in rather different ways. Almost the first indications that the public had of anything abnormal in

announcements of additional surcharges. These surcharges were in some cases as high as 50 per cent., in others not more than 10 per cent. The announcements were followed by a general feeling of uneasiness among merchants, who seemed to think they were being asked to pay too much. The truth was that the shipowners could form no real estimate of the additional expenses and risks, and they were naturally on the safe side. Within a few weeks of the first surcharges were made, until they had risen to at only 10 per cent. It has already been pointed out that the shipowners have not considered the present War Insurance scheme completely adequate against loss, and therefore they maintained a higher level of earnings was necessary to cover what they might lose in the event of a loss. The cost of stores was dearer, and higher wages were being paid to the crews, partly because of the shortage of men they were incurring, and partly because of a certain shortage. This shortage was, perhaps, to some small extent by the fact that in times of peace many numbers of Germans had been employed in the British Mercantile Marine.

The outbreak of war freight-markets were in a depressed condition. There had during the first year been a steady decline from the high level of 1912 and 1913. The 'boom' period had, as was to be expected, followed by reaction. An immense amount of tonnage had been built, and there was not employment for all the older and less efficient boats. The first effect of the war on shipping was almost entirely to increase the demand for new chartering. This was not so much because shipowners had any qualms about sending their ships to sea, but because merchants, owing to the breakdown of the credit system, were not buying produce. The buying and selling of grain and other commodities is done almost entirely on bills of exchange; and, since all credit facilities were withdrawn, new business dwindled to very small proportions. It was not easy to transact business solely on a cash basis. Slowly, but surely, the financial difficulties were overcome, and freight markets then steadily revived. By the middle of September rates were generally rising. As the demand for tonnage increased, so

the supply decreased. The unfavourable effects of the trade dislocation seemed to have spent themselves, and the favourable factors began to be felt. Many liners had been requisitioned by the Government to act either as merchant-cruisers or as transports; and the withdrawal of these ships was bound sooner or later to make itself felt. Many ships had also been chartered by the British and allied Governments to carry coals and other stores, so that the supply of tonnage for ordinary purposes was very much restricted. It is unlikely that the large sums earned by the liner companies during the South African war will be repeated, but there seems no reason why those owners whose vessels are not captured should not emerge from the war in a satisfactory condition.

By the end of the year freight markets were 'booming.' The demand for tonnage had quite outstripped the supply, and the highest rates ever recorded were being paid. Shippers in North America were taking large numbers of British boats to bring the cotton and grain crops to this country; and South America was requiring a large quantity of tonnage for her wheat crop. Italy was chartering heavily for the purpose of importing wheat; and neutral owners reaped extraordinarily good profits from carrying foodstuffs to Holland and the Scandinavian countries. In bad times tramp-owners feel the depression more than the liner companies; but, when rates are soaring in certain trades, the power of diverting their boats from one continent to another enables tramp-owners to gain most.

Complicated problems were created for merchants by the paralysis of German shipping. Much of the cargo in the German ships which sought shelter in neutral ports throughout the world was British. It appears that, according to German law, shipowners were entitled to levy a general average deposit on all cargo carried in the ships, for expenses of detention. British underwriters have not admitted their liability. Those who covered the cargo against marine perils argued that the putting into neutral ports was not a risk which was included in the policy, or ever anticipated by them. Those that insured the cargo against war risks pointed out that they wanted nothing better than that the vessels should

proceed to sea, and be captured—as they believed they would be—by British warships. In that case they would obtain release of their cargo. It is to be presumed that the question of liability will only be settled by litigation. By a judgment delivered in Genoa in the case of the ‘Rhenania,’ the owners of the ship were held entitled only to charge general average from the time that the vessel put into the neutral port until the owners of cargo made a claim for delivery.

Then there was the case of German ships captured by British warships and taken during the course of their voyages into intermediate ports. Liners have thus been taken into Cape Town while bound to Australia. Merchants have made strong representations that these ships, which contained large quantities of British cargo, should be sent on to Australia; and British owners have offered to send out officers and crews to replace the Germans.

The main difficulty in the way of adopting this plan was due to the law which requires that the ships and their cargoes must be dealt with by the Prize Courts instituted in the ports into which the ships were taken. Thus it was decided that the three German liners ‘Hamm,’ ‘Apolda,’ and ‘Birkenfels,’ which were captured while outward bound to Australia, should be dealt with at Cape Town, whither the ships were taken, although it would have suited the British owners of cargo better that the cases should be heard in Australia. In the absence of any amending Act it is necessary, apparently, for the Australian cargo-owners to prove their ownership before the Prize Court at Cape Town, employing agents for the purpose and incurring costs estimated at 10,000*l*. The Commonwealth Government offered to act as agents for the Cape Town Prize Court or Admiralty, to guarantee proper delivery of the merchandise to British owners and to hold for the Cape Court any enemy cargo. Further, the shipowners who were willing to provide British crews to navigate the ships to Australia were willing to enter into similar bonds; but such proposals did not seem to be sufficient to satisfy the law. Consequently, the Australian consignees, helpless in the face of these difficulties, were inclined to think that ‘the law is an ass.’ These particular cases are only

instanced as examples of the world-wide disturbance of commerce caused by the outbreak of war.

One very important obstruction to commerce at first was the restriction placed by the military authorities on cabling. Until early in August, when the use of codes was entirely forbidden, many people could not have realised fully the extent to which codes are used in business. It is no uncommon thing for a single word to express a sentence of eight or ten words; and special codes are employed in the different industries, adapted to the peculiar requirements. In the end the concession was made that each set of ten letters should be reckoned as one word, and then permission was granted to firms to use four specified codes. This limited permission did not please everybody, and finally three more codes were placed on the approved list.

A scheme for the relief of traders who were unable to recover debts from abroad was one of the Government's important emergency measures. A Joint Committee, on which the Treasury, the Bank of England, the Joint-Stock Banks and the Chambers of Commerce were represented, was formed, with the object of authorising advances where need was urgent to an amount not exceeding 50 per cent. of the foreign book debts. These advances were to be in the form of bills; and it was agreed that 75 per cent. of any ultimate loss should be borne by the Government and the remaining 25 per cent. by the accepting banks.

We may next consider briefly prices as affected by the war. Food prices moved very little. At first wheat advanced rapidly, then declined, and for some weeks was hardly on more than a normal basis. Then prices of wheat and flour began to rise, and the half-quartern loaf advanced from $2\frac{1}{2}d.$ to $3\frac{1}{2}d.$ That was one of the few direct ways in which housewives in the South and West of England felt the effect of the war. The rise in wheat was due, to some extent, to the stopping of the Russian supplies from the Black Sea district and also to a short harvest following drought in Australia. Happily, the United States and Canada had good harvests, and were able to ship liberal supplies, which went some way to make up for the deficiency. Prices of meat moved only

slightly. At first shipments of chilled beef from Argentina were curtailed through fears of interference by the German cruisers; but confidence was quickly restored, and a steady supply, both for the population at home and the Army in France, has been regularly maintained week by week ever since.

Cotton fell heavily, which was bad for those who held large stocks and for some speculators, but it meant cheap raw material for manufacturers. The fall was due to the production of an abnormally heavy American crop, coinciding with the shrinkage in demand caused by the war. Even if there had been no war, cotton would have been very cheap.

Wool is one of the commodities which have been most affected by the war. The great source of supply is Australasia; and normally more than half the Australian clip is bought by Germany, France, and Belgium. No exports have been made to Germany; and, as the French and Belgian mills have been in the hands of the Germans, the whole clip must be dealt with by this country and the United States. The immense requirements of the Allies for army clothing have resulted in an unprecedented advance in the price of coarse wools, while the finer wools of merino growth have been correspondingly depressed. The activity in the English mills producing khaki has been very great indeed. Some authorities in the woollen trade go so far as to say that Germany could not face a second winter campaign, since she could not acquire the wool with which to clothe her men.

Finally, the enormous orders of the Allies for boots has caused a great advance in the price of boot leather. Leather, being contraband, cannot reach the enemy from overseas in any great quantities. Already it has been reported that the Austrians have been using canvas boots with leather toe-caps and thin soles. As Great Britain holds the command of the sea, it would seem likely that before the end of the year the enemy forces will be on their uppers.

CUTHBERT MAUGHAN.

Art. 15.—THE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON INDUSTRY
AND EMPLOYMENT.

Board of Trade Labour Gazette.

Report of the Board of Trade on the State of Employment in October 1914 [Cd. 7703].

WHEN Great Britain first declared war on Germany, the nation held its breath and braced itself to meet the industrial upheaval which it was assumed must accompany a great European war. But Christmas has come and gone, and instead of our streets being filled with processions of the unemployed, most employers are complaining that workpeople are more difficult to find than at the height of a trade boom. The man in the street, forgetting his fears of August, has swung completely round and is disposed to think that war spells prosperity for the country fortunate enough to hold command of the sea. The logic of events in this as in the Napoleonic wars proves that to a considerable extent this revised opinion is the correct one; but it is important that this outward calm should not lead us to overlook the very considerable changes that are taking place below the surface. The public generally, among whom we must include economists as well as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, has learned a great deal in the past few months about the economic life of the nation, for there has been taking place before our eyes a remarkable disturbance of the ordinary channels of trade, and sweeping readjustments have been made, some with and some without the aid of active intervention by the State. For a detailed picture of recent industrial changes we shall have to wait until full information is available after the war; but we can perceive the chief outlines.

The general course of employment since August, as shown by unemployment statistics of Trade Unions, exhibits the same tendencies, though in a very different degree, in both England and Germany. According to the December Labour Gazette, the proportion of trade unionists in receipt of out-of-work benefit has shown the following changes, the figures in both cases being exclusive of those who have joined the Army or Navy:

	England. per cent.	Germany. per cent.
End of July	2·8	2·9
End of August	7·1	22·4
End of September	5·9	15·7
End of October	4·4	10·9
End of November	2·9	—

The Board of Trade is continually warning us against making any absolute comparison between the unemployment returns of German and English Trade Unions; but the story told by these figures is too apparent to be affected by detailed differences in the basis of compilation. At the end of November employment in the United Kingdom was distinctly better than a year ago in all trades affected by war contracts, but in other trades there was a decline. The improvement in the German percentage is stated in the 'Reichsarbeitsblatt' to be due to the same cause, though other non-war trades, with the exception of building, are said to be better than in the first months of the war.

The Trade Unions figures, however, only give us a part of the story, for they throw no light on the extent to which the labour market has been relieved by the withdrawal of men for naval or military service. In view of the mobilisation of eight million men for the armies of the Kaiser, the above figures indicate an extraordinary shrinkage of industrial activity in Germany. The mobilisation, which in this country has acted throughout as a mitigation of unemployment, has probably been itself a cause of unemployment in Germany, through the crippling of certain industries which form an indispensable link in the long chain of production. Moreover, it will probably be found, when we know the facts, that lack of inland transport has ranked with the withdrawal of men and the cutting-off of oversea trade as a chief cause of industrial dislocation in Germany.

But while these points are at present a matter of conjecture, we have in the Board of Trade Report on the State of Employment in October a means of estimating the contraction of production in this country. The Report shows for the United Kingdom and for particular districts the extent to which those who were at work before the war in various trades are now working short-time or overtime, have been discharged, or have joined

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the forces. It is also shown how far employers have filled the places of recruits, or have been compelled to enlarge their staff. The figures for October, which may be applied to the whole industrial population, viz. 7,000,000 men and 2,250,000 women, are these:

CONDITION IN THE MIDDLE OF OCTOBER OF THOSE EMPLOYED IN INDUSTRY IN JULY.

	Males. per cent.	Females. per cent.
Still on full time	66·8	61·9
On overtime	5·2	5·9
On short time	17·3	26·0
Contraction of employment	10·7	6·2
	100·0	100·0
Known by employers to have joined the forces	10·6	
Net displacement	0·1	

In order to estimate the shrinkage of production from these figures, the proportion working overtime * may be set against a similar proportion on short time, leaving a net 12·1 per cent. of males and 20·1 per cent. of females on short time. These may be assumed (from information given on pages 11 and 12 of the Report) to be losing on the average one quarter of their normal weekly hours. That is to say, we must add to the actual contraction figure a quarter of the 'net' short time, in order to get the total reduction in work done. This gives us 13·7 per cent. reduction for males and 11·2 per cent. for females. Now the number of females occupied in industry is one-third of the number of males, while their work, as shown by wage statistics, is valued at something less than half that of males. Allowing importance to the work of males and females respectively on this basis, we get a combined percentage of 13·3 per cent. as the probable reduction in the industrial output of the nation. The corresponding figure for September was 16 per cent.—showing that the nation was more busily employed in October than in September.†

* Some overtime may have escaped the notice of the Board of Trade; and, in cases where no overtime is being worked, the output may be above the normal owing to an increased display of energy by the workpeople under the stimulus of a national emergency. But this tendency, if indeed it exists, is almost certain to be counterbalanced by the astonishingly small amount of work which a factory on short time contrives to do.

† Since this article was in type, the Board of Trade Report on Employment in December has been issued, showing that a fortnight before

This curtailment of production, although certainly much smaller than the corresponding figure for Germany, nevertheless implies an immense contraction in private business, when it is remembered what a large amount of work is being done in this country for the British and Allied Governments. It is impossible to say, with the information at present available, how much of the 540 millions sterling a year, that is being spent by the British Government in connexion with the war, is assignable to industrial contracts. Some of the money that Mr Lloyd George has had to find is going in the form of loans to foreign and Colonial Governments, some proportion of which is spent by these Governments in Great Britain for material of various kinds. Of the direct expenditure on our own requirements a considerable proportion is being spent in France; a very large sum is in respect of soldiers' pay and separation allowances; and the purchase of sugar and other important raw materials accounts for considerable sums, while payments to shippers and British railway companies are also important items. In the absence of any official statement of expenditure it is impossible to give any sort of estimate of the value of contracts placed in this country on behalf of the British Government. The figure, however, undoubtedly runs into hundreds of millions, only a comparatively small proportion of which is paid to foreign countries in respect of raw material imported from abroad. Mr Flux recently estimated, in the Census of Production, that the value of the products turned out by our factories, workshops and mines, amounted in 1907 to 1,250,000,000*l.* The value of Government contracts placed cannot be less than 10 per cent. of this capacity; and, if account is taken of the work done for the Allies, the figure may be nearer 20 per cent. The figures of employment show that our producing capacity has been curtailed since the war by some 13 per cent.; and, if a further 10 to 20 per cent. is at work on Government contracts, etc., our normal production for private trade would appear to have shrunk by from 23 to 33 per cent.—representing an output of

Christmas, the national output—calculated in the same manner—was only 9·2 per cent. less than before the war. This improvement would, however, seem to be due to the normal Christmas pressure and to Government contracts rather than to a general recovery in ordinary private trade.

300 to 400 millions sterling. So sweeping a change is without precedent in our modern industrial history.

On the other hand, agriculture has not been diverted to any large extent from its normal channels, except that a rather larger area than usual is being sown with wheat, and in certain other directions efforts are being made to increase the supplies of home-grown food. Labour has been withdrawn, to some extent, from rural districts for the forces; but it can well be spared in the winter months, and especially in a rather open winter like the present, when farmers have been able to choose their time for various operations. It remains to be seen whether output will be affected by lack of labour in the spring and summer; but agriculturalists are already anticipating serious difficulty in this respect.

As regards transport there has been at least as much work as usual to be done both by sea and land; and while railways, trams and omnibus companies have been under the necessity of taking on men to fill the places of those who have enlisted, the situation at sea has resulted in a serious shortage of tonnage, especially in European and American waters. In the business of retail distribution there has been a shrinkage in the amount of work to be done, proportionate to the considerable reduction of the turnover of shopkeepers. But a falling off of retail business does not lead to the discharge of employees to the same extent as a similar reduction in manufacturing output would do, since the former is so much less concentrated than the latter.

In the legal profession, and in those occupations which cater for amusement, 'output' has been reduced at least as much as in industry; and there have been no compensations in the form of Government contracts. In education and in the medical profession 'output' is as great or greater than usual.

This being in outline the situation as regards the productive activities of the nation, the question of employment needs consideration from three points of view: (1) The problems raised by the existence of a surplus or shortage of labour in various occupations at the present moment or in the immediate future; (2) The economic effects of the possible further withdrawal of

very large numbers of recruits; and (3) The situation that is likely to arise at the end of the war.

As regards the first point, it has been evident for some time that the dislocation due to the war has been so completely balanced by the withdrawal of $1\frac{1}{2}$ million civilians for military or naval service that there is no net balance of unemployment amongst males when all trades are considered together; for, although some industries have experienced a slump, others have had to take on men and in many cases work overtime. In some of the former trades earnings and profits are sadly diminished, expenditure has had to be curtailed, and, if conditions remain unchanged, the situation may involve some appreciable amount of distress, especially among small employers, and among elderly employees who are too old to enlist or change their employment.

The effect of enlistment on employment has not on the whole been quite what might have been expected. In some of the war-contract trades the increase in demand occurred so soon after the outbreak of the war and was so general that the enlistment percentage has never risen above a very low level. For example, in October, when the recruiting percentage in all industries was $10\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., the figure for the Boot and Shoe and Hosiery trades was only 6·7 per cent., while the percentage in Wool and Worsted was only 4·8 per cent. On the other hand, the Stock Exchange, which suffered from an immediate cessation of business, contributed nearly 30 per cent. of its employees to the forces in one form or another. Apart from these cases, however, there is no general evidence that booming trades have contributed small proportions and depressed trades large proportions to His Majesty's forces. Local characteristics and influences of various kinds, indeed, appear to have been stronger than economic considerations in causing differences in the proportion of enlistment. In Banking, which has been by no means depressed since the outbreak of the war, 20 per cent. of the employees have gone to the forces; while in commerce generally the proportion is as high as 13 per cent.

On the other hand, Quarries (largely a Welsh industry), though suffering some restriction in business, only show 7·7 per cent. of enlistment. The Tinsplate

trade (another Welsh industry) shows 7·8 per cent., the Cotton trade 7 per cent., while in the Furniture trade, which shows a gross contraction of employment amounting to no less than $21\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., in addition to a considerable amount of short time among those who are still employed, less than 11 per cent. have enlisted. Practically all other trades, whether in a state of prosperity or depression, show a percentage of enlistment of between 10 and 12 per cent. We may, in fact, infer from the figures that the question of earnings and employment has been a comparatively minor influence in inducing men to enlist, and that, except in a few special cases, the response to the first call to arms has been remarkably uniform in all occupations. At any rate, there are no enormous variations in enlistment comparable to the very considerable differences in the condition of various trades. Hence, enlistment has not in itself afforded anything like an automatic corrective of the unequal incidence of the industrial dislocation. Thus, while building, cotton, furniture, brick, stone and cement making, the tin-plate and cycle and carriage-building trades showed a surplus of unemployed labour after allowing for enlistment, at the middle of October, the chemical trades, hosiery, grain milling, food preparation, leather, shipbuilding, and iron and steel trades have had to take on men to replace those who have enlisted.

Under these conditions it is evident that the case of the depressed industries could be met in several ways: (a) by adapting plant and labour to those employments in which increased output is required during the war; (b) by taking steps, either by private co-operation or by Government action, to stimulate the markets served by such industries; (c) by providing Government work; and (d) by attracting an especially large proportion of recruits from the depressed trades.

As regards (a), the transference of labour and machinery cannot very well be carried out in specialised occupations, such as the cotton trade, though a few very exceptional cases have been reported of certain mills in Lancashire being adapted to the production of khaki. In the clothing trade, on the other hand, thousands of persons formerly employed in bespoke tailoring are now doing wholesale work for Government contractors. These

workpeople do not always appreciate the change, as they frequently earn less and are not very good at their new jobs. Many have, in fact, fallen a grade in industrial 'status.' On the other hand, for many East London firms, Government work is a higher class trade than their usual cheap ready-made output; and several cases have occurred of employers who have installed machinery in their works for the first time. In such ways as this, the changes of the war may have permanent effects. One of the most striking examples of transference is the boot and shoe trade, in which makers of female boots in Leicester and elsewhere have adapted their machinery for heavy army boots. Among other instances may be mentioned the watchmakers, who have been employed in making mechanism in connexion with small arms and ammunition. On the whole the lesson of the war in this connexion is that labour has proved itself considerably more adaptable than most observers had anticipated, and more capable of transference to new uses than plant and machinery. Hence the net displacement shown in the Government report in certain trades may quite properly, though to an unknown extent, be cancelled against the replacement of hands in the booming trades.

Such transferences, though helping to solve the problem of employment, afford small consolation to employers and those who have invested their capital in depressed industries. They, however, make less urgent the need of finding new markets as an outlet for the products of depressed trades. At the outset of the war a great deal of public attention was directed to this question in cases where the Continental market was of importance, or in trades making for home consumption, where the market was curtailed by economy on the part of consumers. The former turned their attention farther afield in the hope of capturing German trade—an operation which thus assumed importance not only as a means of harming the enemy, but also for its effect in keeping our factories occupied. It has, however, to be remembered, that the replacement of German goods for the most part involves a modification of plant and machinery and the production of goods somewhat different from those our producers are accustomed to make. For many

reasons, the experience of five months of war makes it doubtful whether this movement will attain success commensurate with the attention which it attracted during September. Up to the present, the substitution of British for German goods has been more successful in the home market than abroad. The finding of new markets overseas is hardly likely to meet the case of producers who formerly sold goods in Central Europe.

The shrinkage of the home market on account of the need for economy on the part of the consuming public naturally affects those goods which are not required for immediate consumption, but are durable or in the nature of luxuries. The shrinkage in the private market for motors and cycles, the slump in furniture and the piano trade, and the depression in the decorating branch of the building trade, are all in this category. In none of these cases was it expected that new markets could be found; and the only alternatives were special Government orders or loans to assist in making for stock on a large scale in anticipation of a recovery in demand at the end of the war. Making for stock, however, under present conditions of industry, is an exceptionally dangerous expedient, for no one can foretell in any particular case what the state of the markets will be, still less what will happen to prices, after the war.

As a third expedient, there was the possibility that the Government would itself provide a market by putting in hand work that otherwise would not have been undertaken—a remedy which is limited in practice to the building of working-class houses and the provision of certain classes of unskilled work—road-making and the like. It was, however, very soon evident that there was not going to be a surplus of unskilled labour unemployed; and the question is reduced to whether encouragement should or should not be given to building operations on the part of local authorities. At the outbreak of war the Government Committee on unemployment and relief of distress encouraged local authorities to prepare such schemes, in case of need; but, before the Municipal Councils had got their plans well under way, Mr Lloyd George administered a cold douche to those enthusiasts who were anxious to make work, and advised local authorities to economise expenditure at a time when all

financial resources were likely to be taxed to the uttermost. In a few cases, the War Office has endeavoured to make a market by modifying its requirements to meet the conditions of industry. As an example one may quote the use of bandoliers, etc., made of cotton instead of leather.

The fourth method of relief, namely, that of drawing a specially large number of recruits from depressed trades, has not as yet been consciously carried out to any extent, since there exists no means of bringing special pressure on particular classes except by carrying on an unusually vigorous recruiting campaign in particular districts. But, with the exception of agriculture, occupations are not sufficiently localised to make this a practical method of dealing with the question.

The problem will, however, become increasingly important, in view of the need of more recruits. The War Office already recognises that in the case of certain firms engaged in the provision of war material, men should not be enlisted for the forces; but the production of necessities, ammunition and equipment, ultimately involves many more occupations than those directly concerned. If the army requires another million men, it is quite evident that the existing surplus of labour in depressed trades will hardly go any distance towards supplying the need. Even when all the footballers and out-of-work entertainers have enlisted, it will still be necessary to come upon industry for a large proportion of the new recruits. Moreover, a considerable proportion of the existing surplus of labour in the furniture trade, in London at all events, consists of aliens. In the cotton trade the number of men actually out of work is not very large; and reports from Lancashire indicate that 'piecers,' who comprise most of the men of military age, are already becoming scarce.

In some industries, and certainly in many commercial occupations and in shops, there is no doubt at all that women could do a great deal of work that is now done by men. If the war is to be a long one and Lord Kitchener's demand becomes insistent, trade unionists no less than employers will have seriously to reconsider some of their prejudices against the employment of women. There is evidence that the substitution of

female for male labour has already taken place to an appreciable extent in Banking, in the telegraphic departments of the Post Office, and in other employments where men and women have already been doing the same kind of work. Trade Unions will quite rightly scrutinise the conditions under which the substitution takes place; and the relaxation of factory regulations as to employment of women at night will need to be carefully watched. But with good will on both sides much more could doubtless be done in this direction than at present. According to the Board of Trade, however, the number of unemployed women in the country is not large, and at the most will not release more than 100,000 men. Male domestic service might account for more recruits; but here, in hotel service at all events, there is a very large proportion of aliens.

To get anything like the million men suggested will apparently involve an appreciable curtailment of industry even when adjustments have been made and those who are left are working overtime. The question thus arises, what industries can be curtailed with least harm to the vital industrial needs of the moment. Clearly one of our largest industries, building, could if necessary be practically dispensed with during war time; and this would make available a very large number of serviceable men. It is true that the building trade is one which employs an abnormally large proportion of men over forty; but it would no doubt be possible to get many hundred thousand men from this employment alone. The brewery trade is another industry which some people think could be well dispensed with, while stone-quarrying and the manufacture of bricks should also be able to supply a large number of recruits. Whether this question will become a pressing one depends on the further needs of the Army after the recruits now in training are ready for service. So long as no machinery exists for making any kind of selection, it will be impossible to draw recruits on a large scale without causing industrial chaos.

In this connexion the data given in the Report on Employment enable us to get a rough idea as to the sources from which reservists and recruits had been drawn in October. Except in the case of industrial

occupations, the figures do not cover the whole ground ; the commercial percentages, for example, are based only on conditions in London. The report contains very scanty information about the professions and domestic service, but it would appear that enlistment is slightly higher than the average in the former and less than the average in the latter. If the enlistment percentages may be taken at 12 or 8 per cent. respectively, and assuming that the London percentages for commerce and retail trade apply throughout the country, we get the following estimate of the sources of enlistment :—

	Number occupied.	Joined the Forces.	Percentage.
Industry	7,000,000	735,000	10½
Government Service (Central and Local)	307,000	31,000	10
Commerce	778,000	101,000	13
General (Dealers, etc.) *	300,000	33,000	11
Transport	1,630,000	163,000	10
Agriculture	2,028,000	213,000	10½
Professions	451,000	55,000	12
Domestic Service	448,000	40,000	8
	<hr/> 12,942,000	<hr/> 1,371,000	<hr/> 10·4

The application of the industrial percentage to Agriculture is a pure guess. The recruiting campaign was undoubtedly more successful in the early part of the year in the towns than in the rural districts ; but, on the other hand, reservists are drawn very largely from agricultural occupations. There should be added some figure unknown in respect of those who enlisted after losing their employment, but the number cannot be large. The effective strength of the various army and naval reserves before the war was 260,000, and of the Territorials 256,000, on the above figures. This leaves 825,000 as the enlistment figure for new Territorial battalions, for the regular army, for the special naval reserve, and for the New Army—which agrees fairly closely with the figures quoted by the Prime Minister and the Secretary for War early in November.

There remains the question of the after-effects of the war. Anything that may be said on this subject must

* A considerable number of dealers are no doubt included under other heads.

necessarily be highly speculative ; for there are so many uncertain factors—the chief being the duration of the war. If peace is delayed until 1916, the after effects will clearly be very different from the results if the war ends in the coming spring. But, while it is impossible to make a positive forecast, it is worth while to suggest a few cautions against hasty generalisations.

In the first place we cannot argue directly from previous experience, for, though the wars of the 19th century had certain points in common with the present one, international relations are so much more complex to-day and the area of hostilities is so much more vast that comparisons are likely to be misleading. During the Napoleonic War many industries in this country were stimulated by the opportunity of providing goods for distant markets, which were cut off from the Continent by our command of the sea. Contemporary writers, in fact, frequently speak of our 'monopoly' of extra-European trade. On the other hand, intercourse with the Continent was restricted. In the period leading up to the peace of 1814, when it was clear that Napoleon would soon be beaten by the allied armies, considerable speculative production was entered upon by British manufacturers in the confident expectation that, as soon as peace was declared, there would be a big boom in demand both on the Continent, which had only been able to get our goods under difficulties during the war, and in Asia and America, which it was assumed would flourish in consequence of the general peace. To some extent these expectations were realised, and considerable quantities of goods and particularly of clothing materials, etc., were sold on the Continent. But our manufacturers had overshot the mark ; and in a few months the markets were glutted, prices fell, and the restriction of production coinciding with demobilisation (together with other contemporary influences, such as replacement of hand-work by machine-made goods) caused severe unemployment. Continental countries also added to the difficulties of our manufacturers by putting on tariffs to protect the industries which had come into being under the stimulus of Napoleon's Continental System. The boom, in fact, only lasted a few months, and was followed by ten years of depression.

The Franco-Prussian war, on the other hand, was followed both in France and Prussia by a much longer spell of prosperity. The war broke out at a time when trade conditions were already good, the campaigns were short and localised, and involved comparatively little damage to property and industry. Harvests were exceedingly good in Europe generally; and, though industry, both in Germany and France, was handicapped by shortage of rolling stock on the railways while the war lasted, the blow to industry even in the belligerent countries was comparatively slight. Neutral countries were rather busier than usual supplying war material; and, as soon as the war was over, both Germany and France, with the rest of Europe and America, resumed at an accelerated rate the industrial boom which was previously in progress. In Germany the receipt of the indemnity was an additional artificial stimulus, which perhaps made the ensuing slump more severe than it otherwise would have been. But the chief lesson of the war is that in a case where the external trade of the belligerents is not cut off, where the war itself is fairly restricted in area, and where credit conditions are not seriously impaired, industry may be almost unaffected. In these respects, however, the present war is unlike the Franco-Prussian war. The industrial districts of Belgium, Poland, and Northern France are already devastated; and it may be assumed that before the war is over the chief industrial districts of Germany will share the same fate. Moreover, the position of the Central Powers in regard to foreign trade is very like that of Europe during the Napoleonic War, that is to say, they can only import by roundabout methods through neutral countries at enhanced prices. The number of men mobilised is altogether without precedent; and the falling off in production is much more serious than a century ago, or even than in 1870, when agriculture was more important in relation to manufactures in the belligerent countries than it is to-day.

Finally, the terms of international exchange, at all events at the outbreak of the war, have been more seriously and more universally affected than in any previous war; and, though financial relations between the allies and the neutrals may, perhaps, be re-established on a fairly satisfactory basis before the end of the war, there

are certain outstanding difficulties to be adjusted which will make monetary conditions uncertain for some time to come. In this connexion the financial arrangements of Germany will be of great importance, since they will affect the solvency of many who have outstanding trade relations with that country, while one of the immediate after-effects of the war may be that Germany will want to dispose of all her holdings of foreign securities. The price of stocks generally, the rate of interest, and the general level of prices, will depend to a large extent on the degree of economic exhaustion in Germany itself and the steps which are taken by her Government to re-establish normal conditions. Against this there is the reasonable certainty that, given fair harvests, there will be an active demand in extra-European markets for commodities, which will make itself felt as soon as financial and currency difficulties have been settled. There will also be large purchases to repair the damage of war. British manufacturers must form some opinion as to the future in all these respects before drawing their plans for an after-war trade campaign.

Whatever the future demand for industrial products may be, and even if we may accept the optimistic view that peace will be followed by a great outburst of trade activity, the task of replacing millions of men in civilian employment will be one requiring great care and forethought. Many employers have undertaken to keep places open; but, in view of the transferences referred to above, it will be merely shifting the incidence of unemployment if the returning soldiers are put back and other men thrown on the streets. Moreover, a very large proportion of men have no specific promise upon which they can rely. Clearly it is far easier to throw the industrial machine out of gear than to put it back into order again. There are, however, one or two circumstances which may mitigate the acuteness of the difficulty of demobilisation. For example, some time may elapse between the arrangement of an armistice and the settlement of the terms of peace, during which period some slight recovery of private trade may be expected. If there is any question of indemnity, an army of occupation may be required for a longer or a shorter period; and in any case it will take some time to bring home the large army which, on the

conclusion of peace, we shall presumably have on the Continent or even further afield, in Egypt and elsewhere. If these influences, however, do not apply, the Government will, in any case, have to spread out the process for industrial reasons.

We may now sum up the few broad conclusions which emerge from a mass of conjecture. In the first place, the dislocation and transference of the ordinary productive activity of the country has been on a scale entirely without precedent; but the privileged position of this country as an island power retaining command of the sea, together with the need of suddenly raising an army on a continental scale, has prevented this dislocation from being converted into terms of actual unemployment or distress among working people. Secondly, it appears that a balance has already been struck between recruiting and unemployment in most industries. If anything like another million men are to be raised, it will be necessary not only to employ as many women as possible in the place of men, but also to restrict production in the least vital of our industries. Finally, history affords no precedent as to the immediate industrial after-effects of the war. But the destruction of wealth, the interruption of commercial relations, and the dislocation of markets have been so general and on so large a scale that it is rash to assume, on historical analogies which are really inapplicable to the present situation, that trade will quickly be able to resume its normal conditions, or that spending power, in the form of either coin or credit, will at once be available for those who will have urgent need of material goods. Hence the re-absorption of European armies, together with the re-transference of those workpeople who have been diverted from their ordinary occupation to produce guns and war equipment generally may be a slow process, and will present our own as well as European Governments with a problem in organisation that will tax their utmost capacity.

WALTER T. LAYTON.

Art. 16.—PROGRESS OF THE WAR.

I.—ON LAND.

THE course of the operations in the two principal theatres of war during the latter part of November made it apparent that the general situation had undergone an important change. After the supreme effort of Nov. 11, when the crack corps of Germany, including the Prussian Guard, were sacrificed in desperate attempts to break the Allies' line near Ypres, the enemy's offensive in France and Belgium began to abate. By the end of the month the infantry were almost everywhere on the defensive; and, though the artillery continued to display considerable activity, the Allies' guns were steadily establishing their superiority. In the Eastern theatre of war the Germans, after sustaining what seemed to be a decisive defeat between the Vistula and the Warta, had resumed the offensive with augmented forces and renewed determination. It was evident that, for the first time since the beginning of the war, they had relinquished the offensive in France, and transferred their principal activities to the Eastern theatre of war. As the significance of this change may not appear at first sight, it is proposed to consider the situation in some detail.

When Germany plunged into war, dragging with her half-reluctant Austria, she felt no misgivings as to the result. The problem she had to solve—that of defeating the numerically superior armies of France and Russia—had been studied by her General Staff during many years of peace. The plans for dealing with it had been thought out in the minutest detail, and every preparation had been made that careful forethought could suggest.

The Germanic powers enjoyed certain advantages which might be expected to go far to compensate for the numerical inferiority of their military forces. Being resolved on aggression, they could make certain of obtaining the initiative by secretly ordering mobilisation while France and Russia were still negotiating. The initiative confers the power of taking the offensive in any direction without regard to the adversary, who, being unprepared, is powerless to interfere. Being certain of possessing the initiative, the German General

Staff were therefore free to adopt the plan of operations best calculated to achieve the object of the war. The conditions of the strategical situation defined the French army as the first objective, because it would be next in the field after the German army. Austria would follow, with Russia lagging far behind. Hence it was decided that Germany should attack France, while Austria should detach an adequate force to subdue Serbia, and invade Russia with the remainder of her army with the object of breaking up the Russian concentration before it could be completed. By these means it was hoped that France would be brought to her knees before Russia could become dangerous. The fundamental idea of the plan required that the Allies should be defeated in France while Russia was still held within her own frontiers.

This bold plan was thwarted by the defeat of the Germans on the Marne, and by the unexpected readiness of Russia, whose armies overran East Prussia and inflicted on Austria a series of defeats in Galicia which laid Silesia open to invasion. This situation was too menacing to be neglected. From that time till the middle of November the Germans continued to make strenuous but unavailing efforts to pursue the offensive simultaneously in both theatres of war. Being ultimately convinced of the inadequacy of their forces for such an ambitious project, they relinquished the offensive in the Western theatre of war and transferred several army-corps to the frontiers of Russia.

Thus, after nearly four months of war, the Germans have had to suspend the course of action on which they relied for ultimate success. What seemed imperatively necessary for Germany, on account of her central position between France and Russia, was a decision in one or other theatre of war, in order that one frontier might be secure from attack while she was engaged in offensive operations on the other. Against Russia such a decision is impracticable, because the vastness of her territory and resources would enable her to evade defeat, and to prolong the contest indefinitely. It is, therefore, against France that Germany must seek the decision.

Until recently it was probably the opinion of most students of war that the Germans could not afford to lose time in dealing the decisive blow in France. It

seemed that, if the Russian menace should become imminent while the French campaign was still undecided, the transfer of troops that would inevitably result must so weaken the German army in France as to place it at the mercy of the Allies. It was not supposed that the Russians could be dealt with, and troops be transported back to France, in time to restore the situation. The Germans themselves were probably of this opinion. The feverish activity they displayed during the earlier operations in Belgium and France indicates that they regarded the destruction of the Allied army as a necessary antecedent to offensive operations against Russia. This idea has been falsified by the unforeseen power of resistance provided by the skilfully-designed system of entrenchments evolved by German ingenuity. With one flank secured by the sea and the other by the Swiss frontier the German position in Belgium and France appears to be practically impregnable. The Allies have been unable to make any sensible impression on it, while the bulk of the German army has been operating against Russia. The situation resulting from the weakening of their army in France proves to be by no means so critical for the Germans as was expected.

The disadvantage of Germany's central position, referred to above, is accentuated by the character of her Eastern frontier and by certain political and economic conditions. By some mischance Nature has made her frontier strong in the west, where, owing to the concentration of large forces and the prosecution of an offensive campaign, strength is not needed ; while her Eastern frontier, where defensive action is required, possesses no natural facilities for defence. In the west the Moselle and the Rhine, with their fortresses, form successive lines of resistance. In the east, marshes, lakes, and forests afford some slight protection to the frontiers of East Prussia and Posen, but Nature has left Silesia quite uncared for. When it is considered that Berlin is within 170 miles of Russian territory, and that Silesia is one of the richest provinces of the Empire and a great industrial centre, it is not surprising that the threat of a Russian invasion should have caused the Germans to hurry troops from the scene of prospective conquest to that of present danger.

Germany's central position is not, however, wholly disadvantageous. It enables her to transport troops from one theatre of war to the other in complete secrecy and perfect security, while the widely-separated Allies are unable to render each other any direct assistance. During the many years of preparation for war she has given special attention to the provision of railway facilities for expediting to the utmost such movements of troops. No fewer than twenty railway bridges span the Rhine between the Swiss and Dutch frontiers. Lines of railway follow both banks of the Rhine; others skirt the Polish frontier, connecting the lines that traverse Germany from east to west, and providing lateral communication for the movement of troops in rear of a field army. Special sidings and platforms for entraining and detraining troops are provided at every point where they are likely to be of service. In short, the entire railway system of Germany has been specially designed to facilitate and expedite the transport of troops in connexion with specific plans formulated by the General Staff for the conduct of the war which has been foreseen and provided for during many years of peace.

The withdrawal of troops from Belgium probably began shortly after the battle at Ypres on Nov. 11. It was effected with the utmost secrecy, the Allies being kept occupied by occasional infantry attacks at various points, and by a sustained and sometimes violent bombardment. At the same time a large number of troops, apparently drafts to replace casualties, were brought into Belgium with some ostentation, their arrival being sedulously advertised through the medium of Amsterdam newspapers. Rumours of a projected renewal of the offensive in the region of Ypres were also put abroad, which even gained credence in some London newspapers, eager for sensational news. These devices were obviously intended to keep the Allies in a state of uncertainty, and to conceal the transfer of troops to the east. How far the Allies were deceived is uncertain, but they did not assume the offensive in France and Belgium for some time, while the Russians were certainly surprised by the arrival of the German reinforcements in Poland.

The German offensive movement between the Vistula and the Warta, which began to develop about Nov. 12,

was directed at the weakest part of the Russian front in Poland. When the German armies, after being defeated on the Vistula in October, retreated beyond the frontier, the Russians, not expecting that they would renew the offensive, appear to have moved the bulk of their armies towards Cracow in pursuance of their original plan. The Austrian army had retired towards Cracow and the Carpathians; and it was reasonable to expect that the Germans would keep touch with their left flank about Cracow, and occupy the entrenched position, which was known to have been prepared behind the Warta, in order to cover Silesia. In moving on Cracow the Russians believed that they would strike at the junction of the German and Austrian armies, a point which is likely to be weak on account of the tendency of allied armies, when separated, to fall back on their respective lines of communication. There were other reasons, not less cogent, for choosing this line of advance. It aimed at the point where the frontiers of Germany and Austria meet, threatening both countries with invasion. The capture or investment of Cracow would be a necessary preliminary to further progress. For the prosecution of the war against Germany the invasion of the rich industrial province of Silesia promised the best results. An advance through Silesia would avoid the forests and marshes which obstruct movement in the province of Posen, and would turn the defences of the Oder. These were probably the chief reasons which decided the Russians to concentrate the greater part of their forces near Cracow.

The destruction of the roads and railways seriously impeded the progress of the smaller Russian army which was following up the portion of the German army retreating westwards towards the Warta. The fresh German offensive encountered only cavalry and light advanced troops, which fell back on the main body behind the Bzura. Here desperate fighting ensued, resulting in the Russian line being broken on Nov. 19 in the neighbourhood of Strykow. Then followed perhaps the most extraordinary episode in modern military history. Two German army corps, a force amounting to about 90,000 men, described in the Russian official account as an 'avalanche,' poured through the gap, and

swinging round to their right, pushed on as far as Tuschin, attacking the right flank and rear of the separated Russian left wing. Although thus enveloped, the Russians maintained their ground till reserves, coming up from the direction of Petrokoff, took the Germans in flank and rear, and drove them back on Breziny and Strykow, where they were intercepted by another Russian force which came up from the direction of Lowicz and Skierniewitz. The greater part of the German force was destroyed or captured; and by Nov. 26 the Russian position had been re-established, and the critical phase of the battle had passed. It should be noted that during this fighting the Russian cavalry made several successful charges against the enemy's infantry, capturing numerous prisoners and guns.

The second phase of the great contest began with the appearance of strong German reinforcements on Nov. 22 between Sieradz and Lask, and, three days later, in the neighbourhood of Lutomiersk, twelve miles west of Lodz. These reinforcements were officially stated by the Russian General Staff to amount to six army corps and five cavalry divisions, some of which had been transported from France. During this phase of the battle the principal fighting occurred about Lowicz and Lodz, the Germans also attacking the Russian left flank in the region of Sczerkow and Petrokoff. In order to improve their position, the Russians on Dec. 6 withdrew from Lodz, which, being in advance of the general line, was difficult to defend.

The third phase (Dec. 7-17) was distinguished by heavy German attacks on the front Ilovo—Glovno, all of which were repulsed. On Dec. 15 German reinforcements arrived at Ilovo, and the Russian right was withdrawn behind the Bzura. Two days later the left fell back to Opocno, the line then being approximately Sochaczew—Rawa—Opocno. With their front thus contracted and reinforced, the Russians maintained a vigorous offensive-defensive till, after Dec. 25, the German attack began to show signs of exhaustion. The principal fighting took place on the Bzura about Sochaczew and Bolimow, and on the Pilitza about Inowolodz.

These operations on the German side were well designed to take advantage both of the general situation

that existed early in November, and of the scanty means of communication with which West Poland is provided. They suffered in some respects from being badly timed. The column operating from Kalisch arrived too late to confirm the success of the force that broke through the Russian line at Strykoff, as it might have done had it appeared at Lask on Nov. 19 or 20, instead of on the 22nd, when the crisis had passed. Subsequent reinforcements came up at different places on different occasions, enabling the Germans to renew the offensive at one point after it had become exhausted at another. In this respect the operations furnish a lesson in the futility of bringing up reinforcements in dribblets. Had the Germans postponed their offensive till all their forces were concentrated, the result might have been different.

Apart from this defect the operations were well planned. The line of advance directly threatened Warsaw, the centre of the railway system of Poland, where three bridges span the Vistula. The possession of Warsaw would have practically secured command of the middle Vistula and a dominating position in the entire area enclosed by the Prussian and Austrian frontiers. The line of communication of the Russian army in South Poland by Radom and Ivangorod would have been in serious jeopardy. The Russians were compelled to concentrate as they best might to oppose the advance. To persist in their offensive against Cracow and Silesia would not have availed, because it could not produce any effect for some time. The Germans could afford to ignore it, the danger being remote, while that presented by their own offensive was imminent. The Russians were exposed to the double danger of being defeated on the lower Vistula and of losing Warsaw. By this plan the Germans secured the advantage of the communications. They had, as main lines of supply, the Vistula with its steamers and barges, and the railways Thorn—Kutno—Lowicz, and Kalisch—Lodz—Lowicz, with the branch line Lodz—Koluska—Tomaschoff. It will be observed that these lines governed the directions of their main attacks. There were also three main roads leading to the front: Posen—Kolo—Kutno—Lowicz, Kalisch—Lodz, and Wielun—Petrokoff—Opocno, the last-named facilitating

operations against the Russian left flank. They had for purposes of lateral communication the main road Kutno—Leczyca—Lodz—Petrokoff. The Russians, on the other hand, had no secure communications to bridge the gap between their separated armies except the circuitous route by Ivangorod and Warsaw. In the first phase of the operations, before the German offensive on the line Wielun—Sczerkow—Petrokoff began to develop, they may have used the line Czestochowa—Petrokoff.


While these principal operations were proceeding, the Russian armies which had begun to close round Cracow on the north, east, and south, being weakened by the demands made on them for reinforcements, were obliged to fall back before the Austrians on both banks of the Vistula as far as the Nida and the Dunajetz. Russian forces, which had crossed the Carpathians, also had to retire before an Austrian offensive which developed early in December, and to relinquish the passes north-west of the Uzok. The Austrians thus gained the line Tuchow—Sanok—Lisko, which defines the limit of their offensive movement. By the end of December the Russians had again developed sufficient strength to resume the offensive with success on the Galician front. The operations in East Prussia exercised only a negative influence on the course of events in Poland, by holding in check the enemy's forces, and by covering Warsaw and the right flank of the Russian army south of the Vistula. The situation in the region of the Masurian lakes appears to have continued practically unchanged since November. The enemy's offensive from the direction of Soldau, after some initial success, was defeated on Dec. 12 after several days' severe fighting on the line Prassnitz—Ziechanow, the Germans being driven back beyond Soldau. Their advanced guard was reported, on Dec. 23, to have made vain attempts to cross the frontier.

In connexion with the operations generally it is necessary to observe that the weather has been exceptionally mild for the time of year. The frost has never been severe enough to freeze the East Prussian lakes, or the rivers and marshes of Poland. This has probably been the chief cause of the deadlock in the Masurian district, where the Russian offensive had prospered till

it reached the lake region. Extensive areas in Poland have remained quagmires, impassable for troops except by the few existing roads. Here the Russians have been at a disadvantage owing to the lack of lateral communications by which reserves might be moved to threatened points; while the Germans, successful in maintaining the offensive, have been able to bring up to the selected points of attack, by the routes already indicated, the successive reinforcements which arrived at various periods from Germany and from the western theatre of war. On the other hand, the Russians have been able to employ armoured steamers on the Vistula; and both the Vistula and the Pilitza have been available for purposes of transport.

The Russian campaign has been affected throughout to the detriment of the Germanic allies by the necessity of detaching an Austrian force to conduct the 'punitive' expedition against Serbia. During the early part of the war about four and a half army corps, more than one-fourth of Austria's entire field army, were allotted this task. Towards the end of October, in preparation for the third invasion, this force was increased to five army corps, supplemented by a strong force of heavy artillery and some Landsturm and reserve formations, the entire infantry force amounting to 250 battalions. This formidable force invaded Serbia on a broad front. The left crossed the Danube at Semendria with the intention of advancing by the Morava valley, the remainder of the army passing the Save and the Drina at various points between Shabatz and Baina Bashta. The idea of the Austrians was to envelop both wings of the Serbian army. This scheme was facilitated by the angular form of the frontier, which enabled a converging attack to be made by columns crossing the Danube and the Save on the north, and the Drina on the west. The Serbians evaded this danger by retiring behind the Kolubara river, where their entire army was concentrated for the first time since the middle of September.

The Serbian operations had hitherto suffered from political considerations being allowed to override strategic principles. After having twice defeated the Austrians in August and September, the army was divided into



two approximately equal parts, one of which, in conjunction with the Montenegrin forces, marched on Sarajevo, while the other part was dispersed in a kind of cordon along the Save and Drina, in order to oppose a further Austrian advance, which did not take long to develop. In the absence of effective pursuit the Austrian forces, though they had been severely handled, recovered quickly, and for more than a month attacked the Serbian positions on the rivers. The meagre force available for the defence could do no more than hold its own. The object of the expedition to Sarajevo is hard to understand. From the military point of view it cannot be justified. The war could only be brought to a successful conclusion by the destruction of the enemy's forces in the field; and for this purpose every man and horse and gun should have been assembled.

When the Serbian army was at length concentrated behind the Kolubara, the situation was, therefore, in most respects more favourable than it had been during the previous two months. There was, however, one cause for grave anxiety. The ammunition had run out; and, though a fresh supply was on the way from France, it was uncertain whether it would arrive before the development of the Austrian attack.

Fortunately the Austrians were dilatory in their movements; and the Serbian ammunition columns were full when, at the end of November, the crisis arrived. The Austrian offensive began on Nov. 24 with an attack on the Montenegrin forces, which had moved northwards towards Visegrad to support their allies. After four days' desperate fighting the attack was repulsed. On Nov. 26 the engagement became general. The garrison withdrew quietly from Belgrade on Nov. 29 and 30. On Dec. 3 the Serbians boldly took the offensive all along the line, taking the Austrians by surprise during the execution of their enveloping movement. By Dec. 8 the Austrian right wing, consisting of the 15th, 16th and part of the 13th army corps, had been defeated and driven towards the Save and the Drina, away from the rest of the army. Dec. 12 saw the line of the two rivers once more in Serbian hands.

Meanwhile the advance of the Austrian left wing, comprising the 8th and 17th corps, had been delayed by

a small containing force. The Serbians now concentrated the bulk of their forces against it, and by Dec. 13 had driven it back towards Belgrade after desperate fighting. The rearguards covering the retreat were annihilated, and the enemy's main body with difficulty effected the passage of the Save and the Danube by pontoon bridges previously constructed. On Dec. 15 the last of the Austrian troops had crossed the frontier, and the Serbian standard again floated over Belgrade.

Of the operations in the western theatre of war there is little to say. After the German offensive subsided in the north-western area, the Allies probably devoted some days to resting and reorganising their troops, interrupted occasionally by local infantry attacks, and exposed to incessant bombardment by the enemy's artillery, over which they ultimately established an ascendancy. On Nov. 28 they began a modified offensive, with the view, apparently, of strengthening their line by capturing points of tactical value, and of straightening it in localities where it had become indented by the violent assaults it had sustained. Since that time the daily record tells of a little progress made here and there, followed by counter-attacks which have sometimes resulted in the enemy regaining their lost ground. On the whole the advantage has been with the Allies, but owing to the resolute attitude of the Germans the losses have been severe. In the Argonne, on the heights of the Meuse, and in the Woevre, the situation, which was discussed at some length last month, has not materially changed.

The opposing armies have settled down definitely to a system of trench-fighting, of which the end cannot be foreseen because there is no apparent way of obtaining any decisive result. The entrenchments are of such strength that frontal attacks on the scale hitherto attempted either fail, or lead to no advantage at all commensurate with the losses entailed. The flanks being secured on one side by the Swiss frontier and on the other by the sea, turning movements are impracticable. The slight progress made is mostly effected by the underground methods of fortress warfare. The procedure of the Germans was described some time ago



Pronunciation: — c-ts, č-tch, š-sh, ž-French j.

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by the 'Eye-witness,' whose narratives are issued periodically by the Press Bureau. After referring to the loss entailed by attacking across the open for any considerable distance, he writes :

'To shorten the space over which their infantry has to advance they move forward by several narrow end-on approaches, which are either open to the air, or a foot or two below the surface of the ground. Where open, these are zigzagged to avoid being enfiladed. . . . At what is considered a possible assaulting distance these approaches, or saps, are joined up by a lateral trench roughly parallel to that being attacked. Here the stormers collect for a fresh rush. . . . In some cases, usually at night, a sap is driven right up to the parapet of the hostile trench, which is then blown in by a charge. Amid the confusion caused, and a shower of grenades, the stormers attempt to burst in through the opening and work along the trench. They also assault it in front.'

With regard to life in the trenches, he writes :

'Where bombardment is, or has been, severe, everyone within range of the enemy's guns . . . will be found ensconced underground in "dug-outs" or "funkholes" as they are familiarly called. . . . Behind the firing-line trenches, are found the shelters for the men holding the line, and for those forming supports. . . . Communication between the firing-line and the various shelters in rear, and with the headquarters of units, is kept up along approach-trenches, all zigzagged to prevent their being enfiladed, and liberally partitioned into compartments by traverses, so as to localise the effect of shell-fire. . . . Behind the front trenches . . . are perfect labyrinths of burrows of various types. The principal feature of the battle-field . . . is the absence of any sign of human beings.'

It is hardly necessary to remark that the kind of warfare thus described is altogether out of harmony with the traditions and training of a field army. The value of a field army, apart from the natural soldierly qualities of the individuals of which it is composed, depends mainly on mobility and shooting efficiency ; to which must be added, in the case of cavalry, horsemanship and skill in the use of the *arme blanche*. It is by superiority in these qualities that, other things being equal, one army is able to defeat another army. In a war of entrenchments there is neither scope nor need for these qualities ;

and, from their disuse, the offensive power of the troops must inevitably deteriorate. The cavalry, that valuable arm which constitutes the eyes and ears of an army, finds no place unless, as happened during the critical period towards the end of October when our force was hopelessly outnumbered in the neighbourhood of Ypres, it is employed dismounted in the trenches. It would be hard to conceive any use to which cavalry could be put that would be more detrimental to efficiency in its proper rôle. The field artillery, designed for speedy manoeuvre and precision in coming into action, cannot find much scope for its proper functions. The physical powers of men and horses must deteriorate from inactivity.

Under present conditions these things are inevitable. They are mentioned here because, from our having become habituated to the existing situation, there is danger of its coming to be regarded as normal. The minor successes, of which so much is made in the daily *communiqués* and in the newspapers, are apt to engender a feeling of satisfaction. It is necessary to realise that the present situation in France and Belgium is an *impasse*, from which, at present, there is no visible release; and not only that, but the troops are deteriorating in those qualities which, when the release comes, must prove the deciding factor. It is no answer to say that the German troops are subject to the same disadvantages, and undergoing similar deterioration. The process is one of levelling-down, and therefore operates to the disadvantage of the army which is superior in the qualities on which depends its value in the field, where the decision must ultimately be fought out. Unless our faith is misplaced, it does not favour the Allies.

It is not good to be either optimistic or pessimistic, but it is well to look facts squarely in the face. There is, and since the beginning of the war there has been, a tendency to optimism in the public Press which is not justified. This is largely due to ignorance of what war really is, and to the intention—praiseworthy in itself—to take a cheerful view of things. It is calculated to do harm, because ultimate success in this war of nations—not of professional armies such as we have been accustomed to—requires that the nation should put forth its utmost efforts. If the nation will exert itself, success

should be within reach; otherwise nobody who is not ignorant of war, or foolish, or something worse, can imagine or pretend that success is certain. The attitude of the Press, or at least a certain section of it, is therefore much to be regretted. Thoughtful officers at the front regard it with something like dismay. An officer wrote recently :

'I do hate the cheap papers on the war. . . . I am sure this tends to stop recruiting. . . . The papers ought to put things as they are, viz., that we are up against a brave, determined, and ferocious enemy, who use their brains, and are without any very nice scruples; that it takes the French . . . and ourselves . . . all our time to match them, and that we want more men, and highly-trained men—especially highly-trained men—and every ingenious device and method that can be suggested to defeat them.' ('Morning Post,' Dec. 30.)

Other letters have been written to the same effect. Recently an officer, whose duties give him a somewhat extended view, said to the present writer when home for a few days' leave, 'I can't read the papers. It makes one sick to think that such pernicious stuff can be published.'

For the optimistic attitude referred to, the methods of the Censorship are in some degree responsible. Facts and statements have been suppressed merely because they related to some event or circumstance that was not entirely advantageous, and not because they were either incorrect or calculated to be of service to the enemy. On the other hand, statements have been allowed to pass which, though manifestly incorrect, represented matters in a favourable light. The inevitable consequence of such action is that a distorted view of things is presented to the public. The results are far-reaching, because the Press is forced to conform to the principle thus tactically laid down, namely, that nothing must be published which does not represent things in a rosy aspect.

There is also, no doubt, an inclination on the part of the Press to take its cue from foreign newspapers. The foreign Press is subject to control, its influence being utilised to promote the national interests. It is unnecessary to remark that the Press of Germany is notoriously subject to such direction. But the conditions in Great Britain and in Continental countries are

essentially different. The Continental Press best favours national interests by an optimistic attitude. The system of national military service assures the supply of recruits; what is necessary to ensure the resolute prosecution of the war is the maintenance of national enthusiasm and the avoidance of anything that might cause depression.

With our voluntary system, when the normal sources of supply have been exhausted, recruiting must be stimulated either by offering special inducements or by making the nation see—or, at least, permitting it to see—the gravity of the situation. The first great rush of recruits synchronised with the publication of a Press report which, till officially contradicted, caused general alarm, and which, even after it was contradicted, left a feeling of uneasiness. So far as can be judged from outward signs, a large section of the public has now relapsed into an apathetic attitude which is detrimental both to recruiting and to the vigorous prosecution of the war. It is the duty of our Press to help the people to form a just appreciation of the situation and to realise the need for an effort that will bring the war to a speedy conclusion. The existing state of deadlock is pregnant with danger.

Let us consider the situation. The Germans have overrun nearly all Belgium, and a not inconsiderable part of northern France. These territories they hold with their entrenched armies. Opposed to them is the Allied army, also entrenched. Neither army has, during nearly three months' fighting, made any appreciable impression on the other. This is the state of things which has been picturesquely described as the blockade of Germany. It might, with a nearer approach to truth, be described as a blockade of the Allies. Germany took Belgium by assault, is holding it, and means to keep it. So far the advantage rests with the Germans, who have both conquered territory and kept the war on their enemies' soil. In the eastern theatre of war they occupy a considerable part of Poland, where there are indications that they contemplate attempting a similar blockade. As a Berlin paper recently observed, 'We have a large portion of the enemy's country in our hands as a safe pledge.' Only in East Prussia and Galicia have the Allies trodden German soil.

Meanwhile Germany is busy training new troops, for

which purpose she has available the facilities of her elaborate territorial system. It is agreed by those who have gone into the question so far as it can be examined with the information available, that she has already put all her trained men into the field, amounting to about $4\frac{1}{2}$ millions, including non-combatant services. Many of these have been killed, taken prisoner, or wounded. There remain between five and six million men of military age, who were untrained at the outbreak of war. Of these most, if not all, who are fit for service, are now being trained, and will be put into the field when the moment is considered opportune. The situation of Austria is similar, but her casualties have probably been relatively greater. She is believed to have put between two and three million men into the field, and to have an equal number in reserve who were untrained at the beginning of the war. The provision of officers, guns, and equipment is the chief difficulty that confronts all countries in raising new armies. This difficulty is probably greatest in the case of Russia, which has in other respects the greatest resources.

The prolongation of the war may lead to other difficulties than those to be encountered in the field. The insidious methods of German spies and agencies seem to be producing their intended effect on the opinion and attitude of neutral nations. Some attempts have been made to counteract their baleful influence; and it is no doubt easy to overdo this species of activity. Reports from various countries indicate that the results of the German press-campaign have been the reverse of successful. But it is equally clear that we cannot afford to dispense with energetic and wisely-directed efforts in this direction. What is especially needed is to provide the neutral public with true versions of incidents that are habitually perverted, and to inculcate just views regarding the world-wide issues at stake and the possible consequences of the war. Unhappily, in the case of the country which most nearly concerns us, where, with more candour, we might have received more sympathy, there is reason to fear that any measure of this kind is now belated. For among the public in question, our secretive methods have undoubtedly aroused suspicion with regard to information officially supplied. There are people who,

being neither lawyers nor logicians, find it difficult to differentiate between the suppression of fact and the suggestion of falsehood.

W. P. BLOOD.

II.—AT SEA.

FOUR intimately associated incidents in the war on the seas—the action off Coronel, the engagement near the Falkland Islands, the lightning bombardment of unfortified Yorkshire towns by German cruisers, and the aerial raid on Cuxhaven, one of Germany's naval bases—are likely to exercise a profound and permanent influence on the future of naval warfare and to lead to some modification of theories which met with considerable acceptance before hostilities occurred. Though no naval battle has been fought in the North Sea, light has been shed by these events on some problems of the first rank. Not a few popular misconceptions have been removed; and it is probable that naval officers will have to revise their standards of conduct and belief which have rested mainly upon tradition.

If we would extract their legitimate meaning from the two cruiser actions—the destruction of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock's squadron (to which reference has already been made in this Review) and the practical annihilation of Vice-Admiral Count von Spee's force—they must be examined as two scenes in a single act of a great drama. After defeating Admiral Cradock, Vice-Admiral von Spee appears to have come to the conclusion that powerful British and Japanese squadrons would search for him in the Pacific. He evidently thought himself justified in concluding that, after destroying the only two British ships in the Atlantic which he had reason to fear meeting, he could operate in that ocean in comparative safety for a time. It is possible, moreover, that he learnt that the old battleship 'Canopus' and the light cruiser 'Glasgow,' which had formed part of Admiral Cradock's force, had left Pacific waters with the apparent intention of rounding Cape Horn and coaling at the Falkland Islands, the most lonely and most undefended of all British possessions. He determined to follow them, assured of gaining further glory.

In the meantime the naval authorities in London had not been inactive. In all secrecy—and secrecy is the basis of the work of all competent strategists—they determined to trap and overwhelm the German force. It may be assumed that the orders given to the 'Canopus' and the 'Glasgow,' which constituted these ships decoys, formed part of the general scheme. Simultaneously instructions were issued to two battle cruisers in home waters, the 'Invincible' and the 'Inflexible,' to prepare to go south; and in one of these Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, who had been Chief of the Admiralty War Staff since the opening of hostilities, was instructed to hoist his flag. While the Admiralty, under the new First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher, attached importance to secrecy, it was realised that time was also of the essence of a successful issue. The naval authorities insisted there was not an hour to be lost if the scheme was not to miscarry; hence the employment of two of the swiftest armoured ships under the White Ensign and the haste with which they left Europe, without, indeed, completing their stores.

There is a widespread impression that the enemy possesses agents at all the great naval ports, and that these persons have means of communicating swiftly with Germany. A movement such as the despatch of these two battle cruisers, under the orders of the Chief of the War Staff, could not be carried out without many persons sharing the secret; and yet for several weeks the secret remained inviolate. The first news which Admiral von Spee obtained of the Admiralty's decision was when he was confronted with these two powerful men-of-war off the Falkland Islands; and everything points to the conclusion that the German naval authorities were also in ignorance until they learnt that four of the five ships under Admiral von Spee had been sunk.

In accordance with the German admirals' decision the Pacific Division left the Chilian island of Juan Fernandez on Nov. 15, heading for Cape Horn, with the apparent intention of seizing the Falkland Islands and gaining possession of the wireless station, which would have put Admiral von Spee in a position of strategic advantage. The ships arrived off Port Stanley on the morning of Dec. 8, under the impression that no serious opposition

would be encountered. In the meantime, however, the two British battle cruisers, the 'Invincible' and the 'Inflexible,' under Admiral Sturdee, had steamed in all secrecy from the English Channel, a distance of nearly 7,000 miles, and had arrived at the Falkland Islands on the previous afternoon. They were engaged in coaling when the German ships arrived. The Admiralty had arranged, also unknown either to the German naval authorities or to Admiral von Spee, for several other British ships, besides the 'Canopus' and the 'Glasgow,' to concentrate on the Falkland Islands, thus giving to the strategic scheme a completeness rare in the history of naval warfare. Without revealing their actions to the enemy, the British authorities brought the right force to the right place at the right moment. If the 'Invincible' and the 'Inflexible' had left Europe a day later, or if slower ships had been employed, the scheme would have failed, and we should have suffered another reverse.

The captain of the light cruiser 'Dresden,' the only German ship which escaped, has communicated to the German Consul at Punta Arenas an illuminating account of the movements of the German force:

'The German Pacific Division left the Pacific to go to the Falkland Islands by way of Cape Horn. The voyage was made without incident. A little before arriving at our destination the commander of the division, Vice-Admiral von Spee, detached one of our cruisers to explore and to discover facts concerning the presence of English ships in the islands. The ship returned and reported that there were two English cruisers. The admiral prepared at once to give battle to the hostile ships, issuing the necessary orders.

'Advancing towards the islands, in a little while we were able to make out the strength of the hostile forces. There were not two cruisers, but six. Our commander kept to his resolution and continued the advance. A little later at the mouth of the bay we noted two Dreadnoughts of the 'Lion' type,* 26,000 tons, more or less, whose presence was unknown before. The conditions were magnificent. The weather was clear and calm. These conditions made impossible a combat with a chance of escape for the German fleet. Admiral von Spee persisted in his resolution to give battle, with the "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" acting together, ordering at the same time the dispersal of the three other units, the minor cruisers, "Leipzig," "Dresden," and "Nürnberg."

‘Meanwhile the two cruisers above mentioned courageously faced the English Fleet. The latter was attacked by our two cruisers, while the “Leipzig,” “Nürnberg,” and “Dresden” tried to place themselves outside the range of the enemy’s cannon, the only device compatible with the circumstances in view of the number, quality, and size of the English ships. It suffices to remark that the English Dreadnoughts were armed with 34-centimetre cannon, while the German cruisers only had 21-centimetre cannon.’* (‘New York Times,’ Dec. 18.)

It is now known that there was only a slight disparity in the number of ships under the British and German flags respectively when the engagement opened off Coronel, each admiral having two large cruisers; but, whereas Admiral Cradock had with him only one light cruiser, carrying two 6-inch and ten 4-inch guns, Admiral von Spee possessed two vessels of this type, mounting, however, nothing bigger than 4·1-inch guns. All the accounts of the subsequent engagement indicate that the action was fought between the big ships and that the smaller vessels took little or no part in it. In other words, two British armoured cruisers engaged two German armoured cruisers. The former were sunk with all hands. Why? It has been suggested that the result was due at least in some measure to the fact that, whereas the German ships had been in commission for some time and had become expert in gunnery, the British ships had been only recently commissioned, and that the British officers and men used their guns less effectively. There is no evidence to support this contention. The only explanation of the decisive outcome of the action is to be found in the fact that the German ships were better armed and had the advantage of speed. One spectator has indeed stated that the British shells fell short of their targets by about three miles. This is probably an exaggeration, but the German ships appear to have come out of the action almost unscathed, while on the other hand the two British cruisers sank, with 1,625 officers and men.

In the subsequent action which was fought off the

* These two statements are erroneous. The two vessels are of an earlier and less powerful type, carrying 12 in. or 30·5 centimetre, and not 13·5 in. or 34 centimetre guns.

Falkland Islands the conditions were completely reversed. The German squadron, which had achieved so complete a victory five weeks before, was surprised by the appearance of two battle cruisers of the 'Invincible' type when they anticipated an encounter with only armoured cruisers. The battle cruisers 'Invincible' and 'Inflexible' mount sixteen 12-inch and thirty-two 4-inch guns in contrast with sixteen 8·2-inch and twelve 6-inch guns possessed by the Germans. Whereas, however, the British ships could bring to bear all their sixteen battle guns, the broadside of the German ships comprised only twelve of the weaker guns. The German flagship and her consort, which resembled her in all respects, were well armoured, possessing 6-inch belts, tapering to 4½ inches and 4 inches towards the bow and stern respectively. In the matter of protection the enemy's ships were not much inferior to the British ships. The explanation of the fact that the German ships were sunk and the British battle cruisers emerged from the action practically uninjured cannot be found in any suggestion that the 'Gneisenau' and the 'Scharnhorst' had either been newly commissioned or possessed ill-trained gun crews. The difference lay not in personnel, but in materiel; in other words, the advantages in effective range and in weight of metal were on this occasion with the ships flying the white ensign; and in this condition, in association with superior speed, is to be found the cause of the complete destruction of the German flagship and her sister vessel.

It may be assumed that the other British cruisers which were present exercised little influence on the course of events so far as the two principal German ships were concerned. The 'Kent' and the 'Cornwall' are sister ships of the 'Monmouth,' carrying nothing bigger than the 6-inch gun—fourteen each. The 'Carnarvon' could bring into action four 7·5-inch weapons in addition to half a dozen 6-inch quick-firers. The 'Bristol' and the 'Glasgow' each mount two 6-inch and ten 4-inch guns. They apparently took no part in the major operation. From the fact that the seven British ships lost only seven killed and four wounded, and that the German vessels were the best shooting ships in their navy, it must be assumed that the main encounter was

decided at a range at which even the 8·2-inch guns of the 'Scharnhorst' and the 'Gneisenau' were ineffective, and that the annihilation of these two well-armoured and well-gunned ships is traceable to the fact that they were opposed by two overwhelmingly better armed British vessels. From first to last, in other words, the German big guns were outranged and their small guns ineffective; and Admiral von Spee suffered annihilation under much the same conditions as did Admiral Cradock, and for the same reasons.

These two cruiser actions constitute an interesting commentary upon theories advanced by Admiral Sir Reginald Custance. Commenting upon the battle of Tsu Shima, this officer wrote : *

'These facts confirm previous war experience that the danger to flotation and stability is not great. Is it worth while to divert from the guns the great weight required to give effective armour protection to the water-line, when the chances are that the battle will culminate before it is hit? Will it not suffice to make sure that the magazines are safe from direct blows, and for the rest to trust to water-tight subdivision, to armour only so far as it may limit the size of such holes as may be made, and above all to gun-fire to beat down that of the enemy? Is it not more important to disarm the enemy than to sink him? Are not the protection of your own water-line and the perforation of that of the enemy secondary considerations in settling the armour and guns to be carried? . . .

'Now the main object in battle is to make the enemy believe that he is beaten. The most effective way to do this is to disable his personnel and silence his guns. The above results seem to indicate that the smaller gun is by no means to be neglected as an instrument for this purpose. The effect produced depends not only on the size of the projectile, but on the place where it hits. A small shell on the right spot is more effective than a large shell in the wrong one; but to hit the right spot is difficult. Hence, in determining the armament of a ship, a careful balance must be maintained between the number and sizes of the guns carried. Again, the facts show that it is misleading to compare the gun power of ships by the total weights of their respective broadsides. To do so is to assume that on the average an 850-lb. 12-inch shell will damage the fighting efficiency of the ship as much as will eight 100-lb.

* 'The Ship of the Line in Battle,' pp. 188, 190 (Blackwood, 1912).

6-inch. Such an assumption seems not to be true. When the guns in ships of the line were all about the same size, the method was legitimate; but it is believed to be entirely misleading at the present time when they differ so much, some being, perhaps, unnecessarily large and others too small for the work to be done. Are not the numbers and sizes of the guns carried the best and only safe standard of comparison?'

Thus we see that, whether we consider the difficulty of hitting or the comparative effect produced by shells of different calibres, there are grave doubts whether batteries of comparatively few large guns form the most effective armaments.

In the case of the two German ships Admiral von Spee never admitted that he was beaten, nor for that matter did Admiral Cradock. In the action off Coronel and in the subsequent engagement in the neighbourhood of the Falkland Islands, the smaller gun proved negligible. Indeed, though the vessels engaged carried many of these weapons, there is no indication that a single shell from them was effective because the bigger gun asserted its superiority. The superior speed of the Germans on the first occasion and of the British vessels on the second enabled the admiral possessing the longest range guns to choose the distance at which fighting should take place, and in each case the result was the same—annihilation due to the big gun.

The encounter on Dec. 8 between the smaller British and German cruisers bears significant testimony to the same effect. Admiral von Spee had under his orders three small cruisers, mounting thirty 4.1-inch guns. The five British ships which were opposed to them mounted four 7.5-inch, thirty-eight 6-inch, and twenty 4-inch guns. What was the result of the flying action which took place when the German light cruisers scattered on the opening of the main action? Two of the three German ships, the 'Leipzig' and the 'Nürnberg,' were sunk, and the other one was able to escape the same fate because the pursuers, it is reported, ran short of coal. Here again nothing indicates that there was a marked superiority in personnel. The British ships carried a heavier broadside; and the heavier broadside triumphed. The Germans had not apparently read Sir Reginald Custance's declaration and did not recognise

that the British were trying to convince them that they were beaten. They were under the impression that the British gunners were bent on their complete destruction. It must be assumed that in fact the British ships were not content to tickle the enemy, but determined to rob his vessels of 'flotation and stability'—in other words, to sink them. They succeeded, and their success bears further testimony to the value of the bigger gun.

Both these actions were fought at long range and could hardly have been more decisive. The results rebut in the most convincing manner such arguments as were advanced in criticism of the big-gun policy embodied in the Dreadnought and later ships. It was urged that quantity of fire to disable the personnel, destroy the fire control and do other incidental damage was of more importance than quality of fire. An action would be fought at close range, when many small guns would be more effective than a less number of big guns. These and kindred arguments were summed up tersely in the following statement written two years after the launch of the Dreadnought type-ship :

'A battle at extreme range will be indecisive, first because of the extreme delicacy and vulnerability of the controlling paraphernalia ; secondly on account of the impossibility of checking the range with absolute accuracy save under exceptionally favourable circumstances, and it is upon accurate range-finding that all else depends. Upon a calm day, at a stationary target, a varying range can be picked up fairly easily by watching the fall of the shot. But when the target is an enemy's ship, firing back, moving at fifteen knots, on a squally day, with rain pouring down and almost blotting her out at frequent intervals, the problem is not so simple. And in a fleet action other ships will be firing at the same target, and it will be impossible, especially in rough weather when waves are breaking, to tell which particular far-distant column of spray is caused by the projectiles from one's own guns.' ('Famous Duels of the Fleet' (Blackwood, 1908), p. xiii.)

Every incident which has occurred during the war has riddled these arguments. The bigger gun confers on the guns' crew an overwhelming advantage ; and, if the ship in which it be mounted has the advantage of

superior speed, the action becomes one-sided. In the Bight of Heligoland the British battle cruisers, owing to their speed, reached the scene of action just at the opportune moment and overwhelmed the enemy with their heavy guns, receiving practically no injury. At Cocos-Keeling Island the cruiser 'Sydney,' owing to her heavier gun power and higher speed, destroyed the 'Emden,' herself suffering little damage. In the action off Coronel and in the engagement off the Falkland Islands, the result was the same.

Before the war occurred, those who regarded the battle cruiser as a costly and indeed extravagant type of ship, which outraged correct strategy and tactics, asserted that the type was already dead because reflection had proved to its detractors that such ships had no adequate *raison d'être*. It is true that the Admiralty hesitated, and that apparently no provision was made for such ships in the Estimates of 1912. But this was not so. The Admiralty, in fact, laid down five ships which, though described as battleships, may be regarded as glorified battle-cruisers—the 'Queen Elizabeth' and her four sisters, to which a sixth was added under the Estimates of 1914–15. They are vessels which, like the vessels of the 'Invincible,' 'Lion' and 'Queen Mary' types, carry only eight big guns; but these guns are the most powerful ever mounted in a ship of war—15-inch weapons. Some speed was sacrificed to obtain increased armour protection. The ships were, therefore, designed for 25 knots and given armoured belts 13 inches thick, whereas the original Dreadnought, with a speed of 21 knots, carries only 11 inches, and her swifter sisters of the 'Invincible' class only 7 inches of armour. In these vessels of the 'Queen Elizabeth' class, of which six are either built or building, we have a type of ship which every incident of the war has shown to approximate closely to the model battleship of the future. They are powerful in offence and defence; they are swift; they carry only moderate-sized crews; and they reflect the sound strategic policy of a people with interests to defend in every part of the world, to whom therefore it is necessary that they should be able to move their defensive forces swiftly from one sea to another as circumstances may dictate. As no other ships except

heavily gunned vessels of great speed could have won the action in the Bight of Heligoland, so no other vessels could have travelled the 7,000 miles to the Falkland Islands in the necessarily short time available and almost completely annihilated the German Pacific Squadron.

So much by way of examination of the results of these two actions. Both admirals went down in their ships, with about 3,800 officers and men; neither endeavoured, so far as we know, to avoid action, which meant destruction; neither admitted defeat or had a thought of surrendering. The two events will suggest different thoughts to various minds. But the predominant one must be whether an admiral is bound in duty to his flag to fight, whatever the odds against him; and whether, the result of the action being certain, he is compelled for the same reason to refuse to admit defeat, when by so doing, though he may hand over battered ships to the enemy, he would open a way to safety for those officers and men under his orders. The responsibility of a flag officer has greatly increased in the process of naval evolution which has occurred in the past hundred years. To-day defeat means apparently not disablement, but annihilation. In the circumstances doubts will be raised as to whether the old code of conduct in face of the foe does or should hold good. One tradition has already gone since the war opened; Admiralty orders are to the effect that when one battleship or cruiser is torpedoed by a submarine, her consort or consorts should not stand by in the hope of rendering assistance, thus offering a stationary target or targets, but should steam away from the lurking peril. The cruiser actions, with their disastrous destruction of human life, will suggest that possibly the new warfare calls for other revisions in the traditional code of conduct.

The raid on the Yorkshire coast was the direct sequel to the action off the Falkland Islands. The German public realised, as in a flash, that superior brain power and superior naval power had triumphed. Depression overspread the whole Empire, and the naval authorities apparently decided that a tonic was necessary. In these circumstances the raid on our east coast was planned. What ships should be used for the purpose? Just as the British Admiralty chose two battle cruisers to

proceed south and overwhelm Count von Spee's ships, so the Germans selected three vessels of a corresponding type, in association with the 'Blücher'—which is to a battle cruiser what the 'Lord Nelson' is to the Dreadnought—to dart across the North Sea and bombard Hartlepool, with its nominal fortifications, and Scarborough and Whitby, which are entirely unprotected by any defences. The German ships, steaming evidently at about 24 or 25 knots, were able to pass across the North Sea in the hours of darkness. Vessels of such speed, such heavy gun power, and such adequate armour protection had nothing to fear from any British patrol squadron; and the German naval authorities were aware that the Admiralty do not keep large armoured ships wandering aimlessly about the North Sea inshore, as easy targets for the enemy's submarines.

The flying cruiser force was able to reach the Yorkshire coast, and for a period of about an hour bombard it, killing some 110 men, women and children, and covering the newest navy in the world with an indelible mark of shame. During the sixty or seventy minutes that they were off these Yorkshire towns, German officers were aware that the sands were running out. Engaged with great pluck by a British scout cruiser and a few destroyers, they fled precipitately, realising that delay involved the certitude that they would be cut off and brought to action by superior force, and the last thing they desired was to fight. But, short as was their visit, it was very near being too long. But for the friendly assistance of a heavy mist, they would have been forced to fight, with what result is in no doubt. Climatic conditions, and climatic conditions alone, saved these ships from destruction.

It was no doubt assumed in Germany that this raid would powerfully influence public opinion in this country. One daily newspaper only—the 'Daily News'—and one public man only—Sir Walter Runciman—indulged in unfriendly criticism of the Navy and the naval administration. The nation as a whole realised that the immunity which the enemy enjoyed was to be regarded as the penalty which must be paid for the fruits which flow to us from a military command not of one sea only, but of every sea. They realised that the act of the Germans

was equivalent to the stealthy visit of a burglar to a hospital in a well-policed town at the dead of night. Our watering-places, like every other watering-place in the world prior to the adoption by Germany of the policy of 'frightfulness,' were protected by a generally accepted law of nations and not by fortifications. The burglar respects the hospitals, but the German Navy has no regard for any conventions of humanity.

It was asserted in the German Press that this incident showed that the British Fleet no longer exercised commanding influence in the North Sea and was indeed in hiding. Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, the Naval Secretary, even had the temerity to suggest that the German High Sea Fleet desired no better fortune than to meet the British forces if opportunity were offered. These foolish boastings had their sequel on Christmas Day, when the British Navy carried out one of the most daring exploits of which naval history contains any record. During the night a group of light cruisers, carrying seaplanes, and accompanied by destroyers and submarines, crossed the North Sea, arriving off the German coast in the neighbourhood of Heligoland about daybreak. Germany was thus challenged by a small British force in her own waters. Not a surface vessel appeared to support the German claims as expressed by the head of the enemy's Navy. A couple of Zeppelins and a few seaplanes arose from their base at Heligoland, and a few submarines issued forth to attack British ships. That was all. For three hours the British flotillas remained off Cuxhaven and succeeded in driving off the airships by anti-aircraft guns, out-manceuvring the submarines by the use of the helm, and evading the bombs dropped by the enemy's heavier-than-air machines. In the meantime seven British seaplanes, which had been brought across the North Sea, were piloted with consummate skill and daring over the Shillig roads, where a number of men-of-war were anchored, and over Cuxhaven, dropping bombs on various points of military importance. The extent of the damage is unknown, but, from the consternation reflected in the German Press and the subsequent action of the Emperor in sending for the Naval Secretary, it may be assumed that considerable injury was inflicted. All the seven airmen escaped—three being picked up by

the waiting cruisers, and three by submarines, while the seventh was rescued by a Dutch trawler.

In this wise the British fleet, by taking the offensive in Germany's own waters, once more reminded the world that, though British battleships and battle cruisers are not stretched as insecure isolated units along the 700 miles of our eastern littoral, it exercises effective control over the North Sea. The British ships, although attacked, remained for three consecutive hours in Germany's own waters, until their purpose had been completed, and only then retired. The raid of the German cruisers on our east coast was an act of devilry; the aerial operations over Cuxhaven constituted a legitimate act of war. The naval authorities could have provided no more effective contrast between British and German methods than this Christmas Day incident afforded, while at the same time they corrected effectually any unfounded impression which the east coast raid may have produced on the minds of those uninstructed in the principles underlying the effective exercise of sea control.

Two other incidents have occurred, both, unhappily, involving heavy loss of life, but neither of military importance as affecting the final issue. Two sister battleships, the 'Bulwark' and the 'Formidable,' have been destroyed; and in each case the cause is somewhat obscure. The 'Bulwark' was in the River Medway on Nov. 26 when she was blown to pieces. Observers state that an explosion occurred and that, when the smoke cleared away, the ship, with all her officers and men, had disappeared. The inevitable suggestion that the loss was due to foul play on the part of an enemy has been officially discredited; and the assurance has been given that the disaster was due to an accident in the interior of the vessel, though of its exact character nothing has been revealed, apparently because nothing is known. The circumstances in which the 'Formidable' was lost are hardly less mysterious. This vessel was steaming down Channel in a gale with high seas running. In the morning of Jan. 1, shortly after 2 A.M., an explosion occurred on her starboard side abreast the foremost funnel. About fifteen minutes later another explosion took place. In the only announcement made

by the Admiralty it was stated that it was not certain whether the ship was struck by a submarine or a mine. Some days later the German naval authorities claimed that it was the work of one of their underwater craft; but, departing from the usual procedure, they failed to give the vessel's number. At any rate the battleship settled down and sank after about two hours. Of the complement of nearly 800 officers and men only 199 were saved.

Of all the incidents in the naval war this is the most disquieting, if indeed the 'Formidable' was sunk by a German submarine. The attack was made at night, when it was thought by most instructed persons that an underwater vessel was blind; it was carried out when a gale was blowing and even large ships were navigated under difficulties, when the 'Formidable' was apparently steaming at about 16 knots, and at a point off the Devonshire coast, 800 or 900 miles from the nearest German base. The last point is of no real importance, because a submarine of large size has a radius of action of from 2000 to 4000 miles. We cannot doubt that the enemy has made a careful study of submarine tactics, and that, well supplied with provisions and fuel, these vessels can hover in one spot for days, if not weeks, remaining submerged by day, and coming to the surface for air by night, when there is little chance of their presence being discovered. The other conditions are disquieting, because they suggest that the latest types of underwater craft have sea-keeping qualities far in excess of what they were believed to possess, and that even at night they are far from blind. It was thought, moreover, that a battleship steaming at a speed four or five knots in excess of that of a submarine secured a large measure of immunity. In this connexion the only explanation which can be offered is that the submarine was waiting in readiness for the attack when the battleship passed her. The first torpedo robbed the battleship of propulsive power, and apparently the submarine, still unseen, so far as is known, by any one on board, manœuvred to the port side and discharged the second weapon at the stationary target.

The whole of the circumstances, it will be seen, are somewhat shrouded in mystery; all that can be stated

is that, if the destructive agency was a couple of torpedoes from one of the enemy's submarines, discharged in the dark and with high seas running, these craft are far more formidable in their offensive powers, in their seakeeping qualities, in their mobility, and in their endurance than was commonly believed. Any naval constructor will also admit that the sinking, in about two hours, of a ship so well designed and well built is in conflict with the theories which before the war were generally accepted in this and other countries. On the other hand, it will be advisable not to rush to the conclusion that the destruction of the 'Formidable' and other vessels heralds the disappearance of the battleship. So far, in spite of incidents which may seem to point in an opposite direction, the most authoritative evidence, as well as the inactivity of the German battle fleet, second only in strength to our own, supports the belief that, in the words of Admiral Charles J. Badger, late Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet of the United States Navy, 'the control of the sea will be maintained in this war and in all future wars by the nation having the most powerful sea-going and sea-keeping fleet.' 'Because of a few daring and successful exploits of what all acknowledge to be useful and powerful adjuncts of the fleet, we should not,' he has urged, 'rush to the decision that the submarine, as at present developed, has proved itself powerful enough to control the sea, which control must be the end and aim of all great naval wars.'

ARCHIBALD HURD.

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Art. 1.—GERMAN 'KULTUR.'

I.—AS ILLUSTRATED BY GERMAN SCIENCE.

THE present war has directed the attention of thinking men to the mental and moral outlook of the German nation. What kind of men must they be, who have deliberately involved practically the whole of Europe in a terrible strife? What are their ideals? What are their objects?

So far as one can learn, they think that they have a mission to disseminate what they term 'Kultur' among the human race by force of arms. This leads to the enquiry—what is 'Kultur'? Now, the word 'Kultur' has the same origin as our 'culture,' yet the conceptions conveyed by these two words must obviously be very different. There is a German equivalent, too, for 'culture'; it is approximately 'Bildung': formation of character, and of a correct taste, by education. It will be attempted, in the following pages, to define German 'Kultur,' as illustrated by German scientific achievements in the realm of pure and applied science.

Everyone is agreed that it is desirable that the human race should progress—that is, everyone of the western nations, for the natives of India have not this ideal; that people is, as a whole, content to live as of old. There are two absolutely different views as to how progress may best be made. One is individualism; it postulates that, left to himself, man will gain by the struggle for existence; that his best qualities will be strengthened by personal effort. The other view is that progress is more rapidly and satisfactorily made by

collectivism; that by combining together, men can achieve more than by separate effort. One form of collectivism is Socialism. The Socialist sees that effort is not always equally rewarded—that some possess much, while others are poor; and he looks forward to a day when equality of effort will always gain equality of wealth, when there shall be universal brotherhood, and strife will cease. Most of us believe that he seeks an unattainable Utopia; and we doubt whether this Utopia can be reached without leaders so unselfish that they will subdue all claim to special reward for their special powers. Such leaders will be hard to find.

The other form of collectivism is 'Kultur.' The leaders of the German nation, having learned that much can be done by organisation, have made it a fetish. Theirs is a kind of socialism, inculcated from above by self-elected rulers. They have spent more than a century in gaining experience in organising their army and their education; they have more recently organised their trade; and they now believe that the world is to be reformed only by having this system thrust upon it, by German methods, and by German bayonets.

The general opinion as to the origin of this war held in Germany, and by nearly all Germans, is that it is due to envy, and to jealousy of their superior powers. That the nation as a whole is and has long been disliked, cannot be denied; but no other nation has wished to adopt their system. It has tended towards what is generally held to be dishonesty, immorality, and suppression of individual initiative. And in no branch of affairs is this so clearly illustrated as by their doings in pure and in applied science, during the last half-century, since the prepossession of their infallibility began to gain credence among themselves. For the Germans of fifty years ago were a kindly, plodding, somewhat dull race, among whom there were a few very remarkable men, as indeed there were also remarkable men in every other European country. The race has now lost its kindly feelings; it still remains plodding, dull, and bourgeois.

This national catastrophe (for it is a catastrophe when a nation suddenly throws civilisation to the winds, and engages in an immoral attack upon peaceful neighbours) has excited our horror, and has amazed us. The

writer spent some years of his early life as a student in a South German university; he looks back with the utmost pleasure on his student days. He made many friends, most, alas, now gone; and with those who remain he has kept up friendly intimacy. He has visited Germany frequently, and has always been welcomed with the kindest hospitality. He has had several interviews with the Emperor, who always evinced cordiality, and interest in scientific subjects, on which he was remarkably well informed for a layman. The Emperor gave the impression of great vitality and extraordinary alertness. The view which the writer held for many years was that, whatever his successor might do, the Kaiser, at least, would do his best to keep peace. This was probably the almost universal opinion of Englishmen who knew Germany well. But we must confess ourselves mistaken. We knew of the cry for 'Kultur'; we knew of the admirable organisation which had been introduced into various spheres of human endeavour; and we thought it worthy of imitation. But we did not realise that it had become a fetish; that Germans believed that by organisation the world would be reformed; and that it was the mission of Germans to compel the world to accept this doctrine as necessary for civilisation.

It may be interesting to enquire what share Germans have had in scientific discovery and invention; and there is a work, termed '400 Jahre Pionier-Arbeit in den exacten Wissenschaften' ('400 years of pioneer work in the exact sciences') by L. Darmstaedter and R. du Bois-Reymond, one a Jew, the other of French extraction, from which the following data are taken. The book was published in 1904.

Beginning with the 16th century, 39 German names are mentioned between the years 1500 and 1600, out of a total of 176, or 22 per cent. Among these, are to be found the first operator who employed the Cæsarion operation, Jacob Nufer; Albrecht Dürer; Paracelsus; Michael Stifel, who gave to algebra its modern notation; Agricola, the great metallurgist; and Simon Stevinus, who introduced decimal fractions. These were all Germans. Among non-Germans, we are struck by the names of Amerigo Vespucci, Columbus, Leonardo da Vinci, Fernando Cortez, Bernard Palissy, Copernicus,

Tycho Brahe, Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh, Davis (of Davis' Straits), Galilei and Gilbert (who wrote the first treatise on the magnet), to mention only those of world-wide fame.

Between the years 1600 and 1700, out of a total number of 312 entries, 48 are German, or 15 per cent.; among the names mentioned are those of Bacon, Briggs and Napier (of logarithm fame); Dudley, who introduced coal for iron-smelting; Harvey, famous for his discovery of the circulation of the blood; Descartes and Pascal; Torricelli, Hooke and Huygens; Boyle, the 'father of modern chemistry'; Malpighi, who confirmed Harvey's discovery; Thomas Willis and John Mayow, the precursors of Lavoisier; Papin of 'digestor' fame; Halley, the astronomer; and Savoy, the precursor of Watt. The distinguished Teutons on this list are Kepler, Glauber, Kunckel, Leibnitz and Bernoulli.

During the next century, the entries are 517, of which 72, or 14 per cent., refer to German discoveries. We note the names of Newton, Newcomen, Boerhaave, Flamsteed, Maclaurin, Réaumur, Stephen Hales, Swedenborg, Linnæus; Darby, who first introduced coke in iron-smelting; Roebuck, the first to use lead chambers in the manufacture of oil of vitriol; Benjamin Franklin, Smeaton and Watt, the engineers; Black, Cavendish, Lavoisier, the chemists; Arkwright of the spinning-jenny; Coulomb, the physicist; Buffon, the naturalist; the anatomist Hunter; Priestley and Schele, the discoverers of oxygen; Count Rumford; the Montgolfiers of balloon fame; Josiah Wedgwood; de Saussure, the geologist; Haüy, the crystallographer; Berthollet and Laplace; Hutton, the founder of geological science; Lagrange and Euler, the mathematicians; Galvani and Volta, the early pioneers of electricity; Jenner, the inventor of vaccination; Charles Tennant, the manufacturer of bleaching-powder, besides others omitted for economy of space. The German entries of notables are Böttger, the manufacturer of Meissen porcelain; Immanuel Kant, the philosopher; Niebuhr, the traveller; Peter Woulfe, the first to make picric acid; Wenzel and Richter, who discovered chemical equivalence; Herschel, the astronomer, the discoverer of Uranus; Werner, the geologist; Gauss, the mathematician; and Alexander von Humboldt.

The period from 1800 to 1850 comprises 901 entries; of these Germans and Austrians form 234, or nearly 26 per cent. We note Thomas Young, the physicist; Robert Fulton, the engineer; Proust, Humphry Davy, Gay-Lussac, and Dulong and Petit, Wollaston, Henry and Dalton, illustrious chemists; Arago and Biot, the French physicists; Berzelius and Oersted, the Swedish savants; Lamarck, the precursor of Darwin; Avogadro and Ampère, Italian and French savants; Thenard, the French physicist, and Cuvier, the naturalist; David Brewster and Decandolle; George Stephenson; Prout, the chemist, and William Smith, the geologist; Chevreul, the discoverer of the nature of fatty bodies; Cauchy, the mathematician, and Fresnel, the discoverer in optics; Babbage, of the calculating machine; Niepce and Daguerre, the pioneers of photography; and Fourier, whose name is known in connexion with the propagation of heat; Michael Faraday; Macintosh, the inventor of water-proof materials; Sadi Carnot, famous for 'Carnot's cycle'; Brown, the botanist; Becquerel, the physicist, and Balard, the discoverer of bromine; Telford, the engineer; Graham and Dumas, the chemists; Wheatstone, the electrician, and Airey, the astronomer; Charles Darwin and Louis Agassiz; Schönbein, the Swiss inventor of high explosives; Regnault, the chemist; Armstrong and Whitworth, the engineers; Joule, the discoverer of the equivalence of heat and work, and Bain, the American inventor of telegraphy. Among Germans, we meet with Hahn, the founder of homœopathy; Fraunhofer, the investigator of the solar spectrum; Mitcherlich, Liebig and Wöhler, the chemists; von Baër, the anatomist; von Mohl, the botanist; Weber, the colleague of Gauss and Bessel, mathematician; Müller, the comparative anatomist; von Buch and Bischoff, the geologists; Doppler, the discoverer of a valuable astronomical principle; Siemens, the electrician; and Kirchhof, the inventor of the spectroscope in its modern form.

It would be invidious to name the discoverers and inventors between 1850 and 1900; suffice it to say that the records comprise 1021 entries, of which 477, or 46 per cent., can be ascribed to Teutonic sources.* But here

* It should be remembered, in connexion with the large percentages of German names in this list, that it was compiled by two German savants.

we note the characteristic of recent years ; as a rule, the principal advances in all subjects have been made by non-Germans ; and as soon as these have been announced, an army of Teutons has intervened to mop up the spoil.

The awards of the Swedish Nobel Committee are unbiased by any national spirit ; four prizes of the approximate value of 8000*l.* each are distributed annually, one for physics, one for chemistry, one for medicine, and one for literature. During the twelve years from 1901 to 1912 inclusive, 58 prizes have been awarded, of which 17, or nearly 30 per cent., were received by Germans or Austrians. An almost identical result is arrived at by finding the ratio of German and Austrian Foreign Members and Associates of the principal Academies of the world, viz. 28 per cent. It must, however, not be forgotten that it is the older men of science who are elected to honorary membership, and that this last method of computation refers to these, and not, as a rule, to the men under fifty.

This enquiry shows that the German race has had an honourable share in the progress of science ; but their influence has not been preponderating ; and with some brilliant exceptions, their scientific men have rather amplified in detail the work of the inventors of other nations. Such work is very useful and is by no means to be decried ; but it partakes rather of the character of that of the organ-blower, contrasted with that of the organist. Some years ago, the writer was discussing with two eminent French chemists the reason of the fecundity of the German output in chemistry ; and they somewhat regretfully confessed that, while a German professor can bring a small army of young men to bear on the experimental attack of a problem which he is investigating, the young Frenchman, more versatile, and more original, objects to be kept in bonds, and insists on opportunity of giving expression to his own views.

The progress of science is advanced in two ways ; one is in the conception of a useful idea, which is then applied in various directions ; the other is what may be termed 'the method of exhaustion,' that is, to attempt all possible methods of solving a problem, until a suitable one is found. The first plan involves genius ; the second continuous work, if possible with the aid of numerous

assistants. Great discoveries and inventions have been the result of the first method of attack; much useful work is achieved by the second. Speaking broadly, the Germanic races have progressed by the second, the Anglo-Saxon and Latin races by the first method. One might even go so far as to say that the first represents the masculine, and the second the feminine turn of mind; for no woman has been a great inventor, and yet women are unsurpassed for patient, laborious attention to detail.

How has it come about that a plodding, industrious race like the Germans have so altered their mentality as to have become bloodthirsty aggressors? Apparently by an overweening sense of the importance of plodding organisation as having contributed to their own success, and a conviction that in it civilisation consists. One would have thought that their failure as colonists might have taught them that it is impossible to rule races to which their methods are distasteful and foreign. It must, moreover, never be forgotten that they have applied precisely these methods to the organisation of their army; that they had compulsory service, and that their educational and military systems are closely inter-linked; that this huge engine of war, maintained partly by fear of attack, partly by desire of aggression, is governed by a small oligarchy of which the Kaiser is the supreme head; that from their earliest youth, German children are trained to regard the State as omnipotent, and are made to feel its direct influence from their cradles to their graves. Naturally, the directors of this vast military machine were desirous of testing it; and they have now the opportunity of trying its power against the combined force of nearly all Europe.

It must also be remembered that the German race, during the last half-century, has been growing less religious, and at the same time less moral. Like Gallio, they 'care for none of these things.' Their collective morality has seriously declined. Any foreigner who has tried to secure a German patent knows how the Berlin Patent Office, by trivial objections and tiresome delays, has rendered it a heartbreaking task. Many English manufacturers have suffered from a species of organised piracy, consisting in the deliberate infringement by Germans of the patents which they hold; from the

difficulty of securing justice in the German Courts, or the reappearance of the infringers under a new name, until from sheer weariness, or reluctance to throw good money after bad, the unequal contest has been abandoned.

Their rapid success in trade has been due in part to excellent organisation—their 'Kultur'—and in part to the important fact that their individual efforts have been officially subsidised. Their commerce, like their army, has been supported by the State. Thus the plan has been to attack, in a methodical manner, some industry carried on outside of Germany. Heavy import duties are imposed on the article which they desire to manufacture; bounties are given on exports of the article; freights are reduced on its carriage; and the ships which convey it to foreign countries are subsidised. In course of time this tells; it becomes unprofitable for manufacturers in a free-trade country to compete with a State-aided manufacture; prices fall, and after a struggle, the manufacture is abandoned. There exists at Berlin a council whose duty it is to consider each proposition on its merits; if there is a reasonable prospect of success, the attack is made; naturally, if it is successful, prices rise, and the manufacture is monopolised by Germans.* The reputation of the Germans as honest traders has, in fact, been steadily declining for years, and yet they have acquired an exaggerated sense of their own superiority. This has doubtless led them to believe that all men were their enemies; they have lived in a state of apprehension, tempered by a conviction that their imagined superiority would lead them to come out of any struggle victorious. In a word, they have become Prussianised. The southern races do not like the Prussian arrogance, yet they submit to Prussian domination, and have been infected by Prussian methods and morals.

It is obvious that this is ordinary commercial warfare, and that it is by no means unknown here or in the United States, but there is this difference; with us it is confined to individuals, in Germany it is backed by the whole machinery of the State. It would indeed be extraordinary if the talent which the Germans have

* This was pointed out by the writer in 1903, and is reported in the *Journal of the Society of Chemical Industry* for that year.

expended on the organisation of their army had not been also devoted to the organisation of their industries on a similar plan. It remains to be seen whether either will find itself in the long run justified by success.

Much as there is to admire in the German educational system, it is doubtful whether it has not been carried so far as to destroy whatever originality has existed in the Teutonic race; but we give two examples. A young Swede, who had spent a year in touring all over the globe, remarked, in conversation with me, on the fact that, wherever he went, he found English or Americans at the head of all important undertakings. He expressed himself as doubtful whether the countries of the European continent were not over-educating their children, and making of them merely well-trained machines, incapable of striking out new lines. An American acquaintance, who possessed a large electrical factory at Berlin, remarked some years ago that he was unable to employ German foremen; he said that Germans, owing to their obedience and method, make admirable workmen; but, after trial, he had to import American foremen, on account of their 'hustle,' their sharpness, and their keenness; and this in spite of the necessity for paying them nearly double the wages which the Germans received.

To revert to the thesis at the beginning of this article:—it is open to argument whether human progress is best achieved by the sum of individual efforts, or whether it can be hastened by socialism or by 'Kultur.' This, at all events, is certain, that the Allies will fight to the bitter end to avoid being subjected to domination by the German idea of the means for regenerating the world. This resolve has been enormously strengthened by the ruthless methods which have been adopted by the German Army Council in enforcing its demands on the Allied countries, and by their utter disregard for truth, honour, and uprightness. Knowing what we now do, it is manifest that conquest by Germany would involve the world in poverty and misery; it would destroy all ideals of justice and righteousness; and it would, even if carried out humanely, result in a ghastly failure.

It is not to be supposed that, even after the military power of Germany has been destroyed, they will abandon their unfair methods of attacking the commerce of other

nations. They will endeavour to undersell their competitors, regardless of the morality of the means they employ to secure their markets. If we are to oppose such an attack successfully, we have two alternatives—to copy their methods, or to refuse to deal with Germans. Perhaps these alternatives are not exclusive, for there are many things in their methods which we might with advantage copy; for instance, their skilled staffs, their widely extended agencies, and their careful organisation, not merely of any one industry, but of all allied industries. And it would perhaps be possible to boycott trade conducted on a system which we consider dishonourable or underhand. Time alone will show. But this is a fitting opportunity to consider our position; and by organisation, by co-operation among our manufacturers rather than by competition between them, and by scientific education of our directors and employees, we might do much to forestall the attack which will undoubtedly be made on our commercial position, if, at the end of the war, any prospect of recuperation is left to Germany.

WILLIAM RAMSAY.

II.—ART AND LITERATURE.

PROBABLY few English people had been prepared, by anything they had formerly learned about Germany, for certain aspects of the German mind and character revealed in eight months of war. They feel now, perhaps, that they ought to have been. They had of late read Nietzsche and Bernhardi; they had, many of them, heard some of the opinions of Treitschke and Clausewitz; and they had been a little startled by the Kaiser's speech to his soldiery on their departure for Peking, the speech in which he urged them to emulate the ferocity of the Huns against a people who, however guilty they may have been on the occasion which led to this intervention, had certainly suffered much more at the hands of Europe than Europe has ever suffered from them. But all this, it was thought, could not represent the real Germany. There was something about these utterances and ideas

so fantastic in its inhumanity, so raw in its aggressiveness, that it simply could not be reconciled with what one knew of this friendly, home-loving people, with their simple social life, their flourishing industries, their love for good music, good plays and good living. And now we begin to wonder whether we ought not to have known better. In its imaginative literature and in its plastic arts, a nation expresses most unconsciously and therefore most truly its general conceptions of life. What should these have told us about Germany? What have been the achievements of the 'Kultur' on which Germans pride themselves so highly?

In 'Kultur,' be it understood, I do not intend to include the applications of scientific discovery. A people might be essentially barbarians, and yet be equipped with every device for the attainment of physical comfort and convenience which the mastery of material forces can put into their hands. Again, a people can be highly cultured, and yet, as we see in many parts of India and until recently in Japan, remain almost entirely strangers to the scientific developments which have been so great a factor in the European type of civilisation for the past hundred years. The Germans are not so cultured a people as the Japanese, perhaps on the whole no nation ever has been; but in the application of science, intelligence and method to industry, commerce and social organisation, it is idle to deny that they lead the world. But these things are not in themselves culture. Culture is a sense of the relations, the proportions, the deeper and more permanent values of things; and that Germans, in the intense cultivation of science and method, have missed a great deal that true culture would have valued, is plain to everyone outside Germany, and indeed to many Germans also. One of these things is freedom. Every Englishman who has lived in Germany for any length of time feels a vague sense of uneasiness in his surroundings. He finds everything foreseen and arranged to a degree which produces in a people accustomed to shape life for themselves a reaction, which according to one's temperament may be humorous or indignant, or both. One cannot take a walk in the woods without being led by ingeniously contrived paths to a view-point with its little fenced platform, or to an

artificial pond presided over by an appropriate piece of sculpture. In a railway station one is carefully herded through appointed antechambers into a carriage which, it must be confessed, is a model of comfort and convenience, incomparably superior to anything which one will find in wealthy England. If one walks across a bridge, although there may be hardly another soul on it at the time, the injunction 'Rechts Gehen' forbids one to take which side one likes. The words 'Nach Vorschrift' confront one at every turn, in all the ways whether of business or of pleasure, and they are meant to be obeyed. At last the Englishman begins to understand that he is in presence of a system-ridden people, and he discovers, if he reflects at all on the subject, that this devotion to the idea of system is the source at once of Germany's immense strength and of her fatal weakness. This national trait was noted long ago by Tolstoi, who wrote of one of the characters in his 'War and Peace': 'Pfuhl was evidently one of those men of one idea who would go to the stake on the assurance they derive from their faith in the infallibility of some principle. Such natures are found among the Germans, who alone are capable of such entire confidence in an abstract idea.' It is really a kind of Vaticanism in the sphere of secular life, and it works there to just the same effect. It is capable of making the kindest people—and I venture to affirm that the Germans are naturally most kindly—inhumanly cruel, of making an honest people faithless and treacherous, and of rousing in all free peoples an instinctive horror of a sway which on the surface promises, if only you will submit to it, to make everything smooth and easy. Germans themselves did not accept it without a resistance which has never been wholly overcome.

The comparison with Vaticanism is curiously close and very instructive. Just as a Catholic, who may be one of the most estimable and upright of men, feels bound to defend the principle of coercion in matters of religious opinion—that is to say, a war upon the human conscience—because the Church has definitely committed itself to that principle, so we find German Professors, like Eucken, who are reckoned among the chief ethical teachers of the day, defending the flagrant iniquity of

the invasion of Belgium—a deed which ought to have revolted the conscience of every man in whom conscience had not been paralysed by the dogma of Prussian infallibility. But Eucken, like every other German Professor, is a State servant, and is bound more or less to the service of the official machine.

Let us see what goes on in the sphere of free creative literature. Here again we shall find our analogy still holding good. Nothing is more striking about the great literature of Catholicism—while it still produced a great literature—than the fact that it is nearly all a literature of revolt against ecclesiasticism. There is no trait which Dante—who was for a time on the Index—Boccaccio, the author of 'Piers Plowman,' Chaucer, Erasmus, Rabelais, have so much in common as this. It is hard to think of a really illustrious name in which the tendency is not distinctly to be observed. And similarly in Germany, with the rise of the hegemony of Prussia, which made the Germans the system-ridden people they now are, one may note the growing dominance of this note of revolt—the effort of literature, striking about it, often recklessly enough, to shape for itself a space in which it can breathe more freely. As I have remarked in an earlier study of this subject, it was the German poets quite as much as Bismarck who brought the German *Reich* into being.* But a survey of German literature since 1870 shows this class, in the main, to be profoundly discontented with its creation, and disposed to look on it much as Frankenstein did on the monster which made its creator's life a burden. Naturally, the war, with its terrible and imminent possibilities, has silenced for the time being all these voices of revolt, or has turned them, like Hauptmann's, into the chorus of 'Deutschland über Alles.' But nothing which has appeared in English papers and pamphlets for the past few months on the subject of the German Empire and its leading figures could exceed the severity, the drastic satire, of some of the attacks on German chauvinism and militarism which have come in recent years from strictly German sources.

A slight but amusing instance may be mentioned. We have all lately been laughing over Mr E. V. Lucas's

* 'The Quarterly Review,' July 1914.

capital adaptation of that children's classic, 'Struwpeter,' to the history of the war. We have also read the remarkable 'Hymn of Hate' against England published in a recent number of the Munich illustrated paper, 'Jugend.' I have before me a copy of this paper for October 21, 1913, in which Mr Lucas's idea has been anticipated. There is a 'Struwpeter' page representing the Crown Prince as 'Fidgety Phil' bringing down the German dinner-table with its contents, while the Kaiser and his Chancellor look on in helpless dismay. Another Munich paper, the well-known 'Simplicissimus,' which has been made by the genius of Olaf Gulbranson and his colleagues the ablest journal of social and political satire in the world, has been prosecuted again and again, and forbidden entrance into Prussia, on account of its incessant and unsparing attacks on precisely those characteristics of modern German policy against which we consider ourselves to be doing battle at the present moment with other weapons. To the literary editor of this journal I once ventured to hint that the scathing destructiveness of its criticisms of imperial Germany might usefully be modified by something not so wholly negative, some influence that might build towards a better ideal as well as destroying the false ones. 'We are not in sight of that yet,' he replied. 'There is still too much to pull down (*herunterreißen*) before we can begin to build.'

Of the more serious side of modern German literature, one must regret that so little has yet been made accessible to English readers. The special interest attaching just now to writers like Nietzsche, Treitschke and Bernhardi has so riveted attention on them that we are disposed to think that Germany produces nothing else. This is a great mistake. Apart from Carl Hauptmann, whose dramas are now appearing in an admirable English translation and are documents of great value for the social history of Germany, and leaving aside also writers of wide celebrity like Sudermann, Clara Viebig and Ricarda Huch, there are many contemporary German authors whose work is well worth knowing and who stand as far aloof from Prussian materialism and mechanical organisation as any English, French or Russian writers could possibly do. Books of which one never hears in

England, such as 'Der Erzketzer' by Wolzogen, or 'Es war ein Bischof' by Adam Müller-Guttenbrunn (one of an interesting group of Austrian writers), or Otto Reuling's 'Quellen im Sande,' or 'Der Thor,' an earlier and much better work by the now famous author of 'Der Tunnel,' are examples among many of a school of fiction which is treating modern life and its problems with courage, insight and sincerity, as well as with a mastery of style which is comparatively new in German prose.

There is, however, a quality which is wanting in a good deal, though by no means in all, of this literature. Delicacy is perhaps the best word to describe this missing element. The modern German writer has learned much, but he has not quite mastered the supreme lesson of the economy of force. He wishes to *imponieren*. Phrases and descriptions are deliberately used for their power to stun and shock. Thus writers so unlike each other as Carl Hauptmann and Arthur Schnitzler—both of them masters of language for whom no nuance is out of reach—sometimes express themselves with a crudity worthy of Swift or of Rabelais. But Swift was crude, like Hogarth, because that was his type of humour; he delighted in the racy vocabulary, the boisterous *abandon* of gutter badinage. With the German writers brutality is not sought for its own sake; it is merely an inverted form of finesse, and it strikes one on that account as being all the more disagreeable.

In the plastic arts the same trait is to be observed, and here indeed it is much more emphasised than in literature. Some thirty years ago, when I first made acquaintance with German sculpture and painting, those arts, taking the general run of what was shown at exhibitions, bought by the public, praised by the critics, were chiefly notable for a quality best exemplified perhaps by Schilling's colossal statue of Germania on the Niederwald. This kind of art was both academic and sentimental; it was stupendously complacent and self-satisfied. It was not heroic, but it was bulky; it was not tender, but it was soft; one felt that, like wax before a flame, it would collapse into an amorphous mass in presence of any genuine artistic passion, any keen perception of life. And so indeed it has collapsed, but the

art which has taken its place is far from being as strong and sincere as the literary art which has put Gustav Freytag, Felix Dahn and Georg Ebers out of fashion. And owing perhaps to the nature of the medium, it strikes a foreign observer as being decidedly more brutal. Thus in the Munich *Kunstausstellung* and other exhibitions of last year one might have noticed, as compared with the French Salon, a certain crude violence, an obvious tendency to *imponieren*, in the renderings of the nude, of which not a single example was to be found the same year in the Salon at Paris—a city not exactly noted for prudish restraint in these matters.

Curiously similar is the tale which is told by modern German architecture—the feature of the country which perhaps most impresses the traveller who is gathering surface impressions during a short tour. Every such traveller must have become aware of a new type of design which is showing itself in public buildings and monuments of all kinds, and of which I may name as salient examples the new University buildings at Freiburg im Breisgau, and the huge Leipzig memorial erected on the centenary of the national uprising of 1813. Here is something peculiar to Germany, widely diffused throughout the country, and recognisable at once as a consistent and expressive style. But what does it express? In the first place, the deliberate avoidance of any concession to the principles of grace and charm. All is bare, solid, and unfriendly; to impress at all it must make a massed attack; on a small scale this kind of building would be merely uninteresting. There is a tendency to avoid overhanging eaves and cornices with their suggestions of a protective and alluring shade—they would interfere with the designed impression. The best analogy for this new German style was furnished since the war broke out, when our newspapers began to publish illustrations of the enormous German siege guns with their muzzles pointing skyward. The German buildings I refer to give exactly the same impression of a blunt, truncated strength, aggressive and domineering—it is the howitzer style of architecture. The conception of physical force and mass are all that it seeks to convey. It is impossible not to see here the expression of a definite attitude of mind in modern Germany.

A nation's mind and character are always more faithfully expressed in its building than in any other art. But it must be remembered that the buildings here in question are mostly public works, and embody what one may call the public and official expression of national sentiment. It has, however, been the constant aim of German officialism to impress its sentiment upon the whole nation. But a study of contemporary German literature shows us that this has not been achieved with anything like the success that might at present be supposed. Hence the bitter complaints of writers like Treitschke, Bernhardi, Bülow and many others, of the 'defective patriotism' of the German people—complaints which must surprise those who do not know Germany from the inside, and who witness only the extraordinary unanimity and zeal produced by the sudden revelation of the hostile forces which German policy has called into action. These dangers have compelled the German people to put itself for the moment wholly in the hands of the autocracy. But it is impossible that it should not ultimately realise that the dangers against which the autocracy is endeavouring to shield the country are simply the creation of the autocracy itself. As Graf von Reventlow has pointed out in a recent important work ('Deutschlands auswärtige Politik, 1888-1913'), it was only with the greatest difficulty that the German people could be got to sanction the preparations of the naval chiefs for a challenge to the maritime supremacy of England. According to Bernhardi's estimate of his countrymen, 'no people is so little qualified to direct its own destinies.' But which was the more prescient and truly patriotic policy—that of the people, or that of the military party by whom they were despised and overborne? The answer is being written in letters of blood; and, when Germany has read it to the end, it can hardly be doubted that there is in the country a sufficient store of freedom, courage and sanity to ensure that German destinies shall never again be decided by irresponsible directors over the heads of the German people. The mind of this better Germany must be sought for in the neglected imaginative literature of the country. Those who seek it there will be rewarded in every way; not least by the discovery of points of contact, possibilities

of sympathy and understanding, which they would certainly never suspect from the kind of German literature which circumstances have made best known to us to-day.

T. W. ROLLESTON.

III.—GERMAN SCHOLARSHIP.

IN sheer straightforward professional erudition Germany easily leads the way. And the more professional the work is—the more it depends on labour, method and organisation—the more absolute and incontestable is her lead. This comes out most clearly in the great works of reference. It is Germany which publishes the *Corpus of Greek Inscriptions* and the *Corpus of Latin Inscriptions*; Germany which is now, or has been until lately, undertaking the great *Latin Thesaurus* and the best *Greek Lexicon*. For *Greek Grammar* there is no book in any other language which stands beside the four volumes of Kühner-Blass and Kühner-Gerth. There is no classical encyclopædia which, for thoroughness and mastery of the whole subject, can vie with the 'Real-encyclopædie' of Pauly-Wissowa, though in some ways the French work of Darenberg and Saglio is more convenient. No dictionary of mythology can compare with Roscher's 'Ausführliches Lexicon.' No manual of Greek or Roman religion is as comprehensive as the volumes of Iwan Müller's 'Handbuch' by Gruppe and Wissowa. Indeed that 'Handbuch' itself is, by English standards, an unapproached marvel.

If we take the great works of collection, the result is much the same. The fragments of the Pre-socratic Greek Philosophers have been recently edited by Diels, the fragments of the Stoics by von Arnim. Now in point of quality neither of these works could be pronounced superior to the late Prof. Bywater's edition of the fragments of Heraclitus; but, as collections, no work produced by another country could for a moment compete with either. The Epicurean fragments still need doing, but the material which the editor will use will be mostly the work of Germans—Usener's 'Epicurea,' Sudhaus's 'Philodemus' (based on English work at Herculaneum),

and divers lesser works, such as William's 'Diogenes of Oenoanda.' The 'Fragmenta Historicorum' have still to be sought in Karl Müller's Didot edition of 1848 and onward to 1885; the fragments of the tragedians in Nauck's admirable collection of 1884; the fragments of the Comedians in Kock and Meineke. In the issuing of cheap but well-executed texts of Greek and Latin authors of all periods the Teubners easily lead the way. The Oxford series of texts, though generally in detail better and more cautiously edited, does not cover nearly so wide a field. Again, a little series like Lietzmann's 'Kleine Texte' leaves one greatly impressed both by the excellence of the work and the large educational demand which the series seems to imply.

If we take works by a single author as our basis of comparison, the lead of Germany is not so marked. True, no one scholar in any other country can be compared for range and brilliancy with the Professor of Greek in Berlin, Ulric von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf. It would be hard to put any general Greek history, since Grote, on a level with Eduard Meyer's; or any book on style and language above Norden's 'Antike Kunstprosa.' Still there are books in English which clearly take the lead in their own subjects. In the matter of texts, for instance, the English Plato and the English Cicero are undoubtedly the best. I shrink from such personal comparisons; but, to take the recent work of one English University alone, it would be hard to find any German book on a kindred subject more learned and complete than Sir James Frazer's 'Pausanias,' or the account of 'Zeus, the Indo-European Sky-God,' by Mr A. B. Cook.

Lastly, one must not forget the periodical literature and the small dissertations. Here the German lead is enormous. I cannot find the actual figures, but I should judge that the bulk of specialist journals and magazines must be fully ten times as great in Germany as in England, and that of tracts and dissertations even more disproportionate. In quality it might be safe to pronounce that, as a rule, the English work shows sounder scholarship and less lack of judgment, while the German shows far more thoroughness and daring and power of research. But we must remember that these results

are largely caused by the university systems in vogue in the two countries. In Germany students, to get their degree, have to write, and often to publish, a thesis. In England they get their degree by a very hard and wide examination. To win teaching appointments in Germany a man has to publish a book and, probably, to plunge into a controversy; in Great Britain men are usually appointed on private evidence of their teaching capacity, intellect and general character. The Germans, therefore, tend to put most of their force into writing and publishing, the English into life and teaching.

Is there anything whatever to be said on the other side of this account? Anything in which English or French or Italian or American or Russian scholarship can be said to be equal or superior to that of Germany? I think there is. I will not lay stress on certain achievements which happen to be great but are not specially characteristic. The greatest advance of the past century in the realm of classical antiquity was, I suppose, the excavation of Cnossus, the work chiefly of an Englishman, Sir Arthur Evans. The next, perhaps, was the discovery of Egyptian papyri, where again the most important part has fallen to Englishmen, Dr Grenfell, Dr Hunt and Sir Frederick Kenyon. If Germany had been in occupation of Egypt or had obtained the permission to excavate at Cnossus, it is quite likely that Germans would have done the work as well or nearly as well; they could hardly have done it better. Much the same conclusion holds about Numismatics. The English habit of travel brought many collections of coins to this country in the 18th century; consequently a large amount of the work on coins has been done by Englishmen, and it is certainly not inferior in quality to the work of any other nation.

This point is worth dwelling upon for a moment. Great Britain is, on the whole, a somewhat silent member of the international comity of scholars. Her output is rather small, and sometimes it is hard to tell how much competence or incompetence her silence covers. Now the various excavations and the discoveries of papyri have, as it were, compelled her to speak. They have put suddenly into British hands new and enormous enigmas, each demanding its answer. And the answers received,

whether you take the case of Crete, of Sparta, of the Oxyrhyncus Papyri or any similar test, have been obviously and undeniably in the very first rank of competence. For my own part, I can hardly imagine a severer or more searching test of any scholar's knowledge of Greece and Greek, than to make him edit for the first time a mass of unsifted fragments of papyrus out of an ancient rubbish-heap.

These branches of work, therefore, give us reason for confidence in the general adequacy of English scholarship; and one may, perhaps, in all humility, raise the question whether there is any region or any aspect of scholarship in which Great Britain can actually claim a superiority over Germany. It is easy to deceive oneself in such matters, but the point on which I would lay stress is this. If, instead of looking merely at the effectiveness of the book, we try to estimate some quality in the mind of the writer, the comparison will come out in a very different way. The quality in question may be some form of what in England is called 'scholarship'; it may be something much wider. For instance, I have said above that the best Greek Grammar is that of Kühner-Blass-Gerth. But supposing I wanted guidance on some very delicate point of Greek usage, and was looking for some one with a subtle *flair* and feeling for the language, there are two Americans and also certain English people whom I would consult in preference. Where a thing can be ascertained and proved, and the instances counted, I go to the German; where it is a question of feeling, no. This difference goes along with a great difference in method. In England we write Greek and Latin, both prose and verse. In Germany the best scholars have a great command of fluent Latin and can often speak it without hesitation; but otherwise they are not good at 'composition.' I have certainly had undergraduate pupils who wrote better Greek prose and incomparably better Greek verse than any German known to me, except, perhaps, two. Germans do not write Greek verses; they write books on Greek 'Metrik.' They aim more at knowing; we at feeling and understanding. They are professionals, we are amateurs.

An institution like the Greek and Latin Verse competitions in the 'Westminster Gazette'—competitions

sometimes won by elderly K.C.s and Indian civilians as well as by dons and schoolmasters—may or may not be defensible as a social fact, but it certainly shows an attitude of mind towards the classics which is characteristically English. Scholarship with us is an art rather than a science, though, of course, like other arts it has its scientific basis. It is even expected to form an integral part of character; it helps to make 'a scholar and a gentleman.' And, if one tries to analyse that old-fashioned phrase, assuredly the 'scholar' is one who feels certain beauties and delicacies, not merely one who knows many recondite facts. We may put the same distinction from another point of view. Both nations, of course, use classical study mainly as a general foundation on which the later practice of the literary and learned professions is based. But it would seem that in England the study of the classics has conserved to a greater extent this general and foundational character; in Germany, it was either dropped or became professional. From what I can make out, I do not suppose it would be possible to find in Germany men like Mr Gladstone, Mr Asquith, Lord Bryce, Lord Cromer, Lord Halsbury, Lord Morley, and many others, statesmen in the first rank of public life who read and enjoy their Homer and Plato and Lucretius. The corresponding German phenomenon would, perhaps, be a specialist professor who might be given a title and commissioned to write a pamphlet about some political question. With us the statesman, in many cases, is a good Greek and Latin scholar and takes an interest in ancient studies. With them the professor is apt to be decorated and produced in public with *éclat* when he is wanted.

We may illustrate the strength and weakness of German professional scholarship, at its average level, by two concrete cases. There is an ancient writer of choliambics named Phoinix of Colophon, represented to us by some five quotations, mostly in Athenæus. Some further fragments have recently been found on a papyrus. The total comes to about one hundred complete or nearly complete verses and another hundred very fragmentary. This small amount of moderately interesting verse has been edited by Dr Gerhard of Heidelberg in a book of three hundred pages, full of

learning, replete with parallel passages from all parts of Greek literature, and leading up to some generally sound conclusions. I read the book with much interest and profit. But the editor's first task, of course, was to treat the text and, where possible, emend it. And in this task, which an average English scholar would not have thought difficult, the learned man makes mere 'howlers.' In line 41 he emends ἀπιστή γε πάντων, making a spondee in the fourth foot; in 39 ὦ γε θαύμαστον, making an impossible position of γε; and in 40 ἐν θηρίοισι σιλλαίνειν, again making a spondee in the fourth foot and inventing a new verb to do it with. I write this not in order to attack Dr Gerhard. The book is a valuable book. Few English scholars could have collected so much learning on so limited a subject; but no English scholar would have undertaken the task without much more complete scholarship.

Take, again, the work of a distinguished and fertile writer like Dr Nicholas Wecklein. Wecklein has been doing school editions of Greek tragedies for some thirty years, as well as other valuable work. Whenever I lecture on a play I get the Wecklein edition, if it exists; and probably most English scholars do the same. The editions are admirably thorough. Parallel passages, grammatical explanations, MS. readings, discussions of the development of the myth are all fully given. Yet there is hardly one volume which does not occasionally make a competent English Greek scholar smile. Perhaps we cannot write such good books, but we certainly would not write such bad ones. Sometimes it is a mere blunder in verse-writing—an emendation violating Porson's canon, or the like; sometimes it is a general lack of perception; sometimes it is a violent rewriting of the text because the editor has not understood it. I remember a competition being held for the worst emendation of a Greek text that any of those present could recall. Wecklein won, perhaps unjustly, both the first and the second prize. His books are more useful, more learned, more methodical, and vastly more numerous, than, let us say, the works of Professor Butcher or Professor A. Croiset; yet one feels that his mind compared with Croiset's or Butcher's is like that of an industrious journeyman compared with an artist.

The professional against the amateur; the specialist professor against the 'scholar and gentleman'—these two antitheses take us a long way in understanding the general difference between German and English scholarship. We are always aiming at culture—in Arnold's sense, not Bernhardt's; they are aiming at research or achievement. The weaker sort of scholar on both sides shows the contrast best. The weaker English scholar has probably a certain small number of great classical books, which he knows pretty nearly by heart and expounds in lectures or lessons which are sound as far as they go, but devoid of intellectual curiosity; he can also write prose and verse in the classical languages with a good deal of taste and a slight deficiency of exact knowledge. At the end of his life he will have added nothing to our knowledge of his subject, but he may have made a number of other people read some great literature and study some fine and intricate structures of language with a fair amount of appreciation and thoroughness. The weaker sort of German will set himself to some obscure piece of work which can be achieved by industry without understanding, and which, to the best of his belief, no one has yet done. (If some one has already done it, war ensues; war of an outspoken bitterness which is out of fashion in Great Britain.) There are many such jobs which can be performed by collecting instances of the occurrence of a particular phenomenon in a given author, or even by reading and cataloguing articles in learned periodicals. And the results of such studies are often valuable.

I have taken the weaker type of scholar on both sides to point my antithesis. If one took the best scholars in England and Germany one would, of course, not find these weaknesses. No one could dream of saying that such men as Wilamowitz and Blass and Norden do not know their Greek literature. They know it up and down, in and out, and with a range that could probably not be equalled by any Hellenist of the last two or three generations in England. And one can think of some English scholars who would be hard to beat either in their exact professional learning or in their knowledge of periodical literature.

Prof. von Wilamowitz stands rather apart from

other German scholars. (I have even heard him say in his wrath that the only hope for the future of Greek scholarship was in England.) He has doubtless the imperiousness and energy of the Prussian noble, but he has the passion and imagination of the Slav. He is impatient, brilliant, original, magnificent, unmethodical, a man of genius as well as of enormous learning. He covers a vast field and sometimes splashes superbly into subjects that are not quite his own. He has on occasion made resounding blunders—apparently from sheer haste, because his scholarship is really above reproach. His references are continually a line or two wrong; at times it almost looks as if, instead of verifying his quotations, he was merely trusting to a colossal memory. His sheer learning and technical skill would put him in the front rank of European savants; it would be hard to mention any living scholar who could compare with him. But he adds to his learning a number of gifts which belong rather to the amateur than the professional; vitality, eternal freshness, a real sense of literature and a power of entering into and expounding the thoughts of a poet. And he is never betrayed into wildness or eccentricity. His range reminds one of Hermann; his vitality of Bentley; his sense of literature perhaps of Dr Verrall.

I can recall two German criticisms of English scholarship which tell an interesting tale. One was an obituary notice of Sir Richard Jebb, which concluded by the pronouncement that 'as a philolog he was nothing,' but that as a statesman and man of affairs he commanded the highest respect. The judgment was not dictated by mere perversity. The critic judged a 'philolog' by his achieved '*Forschung*,' by the mass of his actual discoveries; and such '*Forschung*' was not Jebb's line. On the other hand, the critic found, as a kind of by-product of Jebb's activity, a considerable amount of public work, especially on educational questions, performed with an ease and familiarity and mastery of ordinary political conditions which genuinely astonished him. He failed to appreciate one side of Jebb's work and was honestly dazzled by the other. The second criticism in my mind is a review of Miss Jane Harrison's '*Prolegomena*,' which enquired in a bewildered manner what sort of a book it was and what public it could possibly be meant for? For

Fachgenossen? No, because it was full of imaginative writing and *belles lettres*, and it gave translations, and even poetical translations, of the passages which it cited from Greek authors. For the 'ordinary public'? No, because it was full of learning and argument and new theories which could only be followed by a specialist in Greek. There was no public in Germany, said the critic, which would read such a book.

I am inclined to think that the difference here indicated goes deep. There have been several books produced of recent years in England of which one could say this: they are the work of professional scholars possessed of much exact learning and a decided spirit of research, yet the moving impulse which produced the books is really the impulse of an artist. For example, the writings of Mr Cornford, Mr A. E. Zimmern, Mr R. W. Livingstone, Mr Edwyn Bevan's 'Stoics and Cynics,' Mr J. A. K. Thomson's 'Studies in the Odyssey,' to say nothing of older works like some by Mr Mackail or Mr Warde Fowler; all these are books that stand as much by their sense of beauty and their imaginative suggestiveness as by the particular conclusions which they try to prove. Yet they are all of them works of definitely technical and professional scholars, men who would probably dally with the thought of suicide if guilty in public of a false quantity or a grammatical blunder. Such books represent an ideal quite different from that of Jebb or Conington, who wrote good editions of the classics in good English and with thorough intelligence, but not from an artistic impulse; and equally different from that of J. A. Symonds, who wrote artistic criticism of Greek poetry with no pretence to professional scholarship or research.

The nearest class of German books would be, perhaps, the best works of popularisation. Schwartz's two volumes of 'Charakterköpfe aus der Antiken Literatur' are very good and the work of a fine scholar. But they have not much actual beauty of thought or writing about them, and they have not the spirit of research. The author tells us his results, he does not try to lead us groping on. Wendland's 'Hellenistisch-Römische Kultur' is a wonderfully competent, valuable and interesting book; it has the charm of research in it as well as an

extraordinary command of relevant information. So has Seeck's '*Geschichte des Untergangs der Antiken Welt*,' a book, whatever its faults, which has a real mind behind it. But neither book begins to make the particular artistic or spiritual effort which is at the heart of the English books mentioned above. The Germans of an older generation, like Winckelmann and Schlegel, did pre-eminently make such an effort. The famous Nietzsche, before he gave up Greek and went a-whoring after false philosophies, did some fine work of this character, half-creative and half-critical, but decidedly illuminating. At the present time I can think of only one German who makes this particular effort—Schultz, who writes on '*Ionische Philosophie*' and on '*Gnosis*.' But he cannot control his impulse. It only leaves him hashing his authorities and passionately floundering in his explanations, and German scholars in general treat him severely. Of course I do not say that English scholars in general approve of this quality which I have ascribed to certain English books. They illustrate a tendency, and a tendency which may be dangerous, for the writer to use his whole mind in his work and not to limit and stunt himself. The true specialist ruthlessly cuts away every interest that may interrupt his particular work, and sets his achievement above his personal development.

In Germany there is more devotion and more loss of proportion. More people are willing to spend their lives in narrow and absorbed pursuit of some object which, viewed in cold blood, possesses no very great importance and no particular illumination or beauty. In England there is more humanity, more interest in life, more common sense, and, as an almost inevitable consequence, less one-sided devotion and less industry. Browning's grammarian would be more at home in Germany. He would be decorated and made a '*Geheimrath*.'

GILBERT MURRAY

IV.—MODERN GERMAN HISTORIANS.

THE admirable work * in which Mr Gooch surveys the historiography of the 19th century reminds us not only of the extent to which the thought and knowledge of the world is indebted to the labours of historical students, but also of the catholicity and interconnexion of the historical movement. No country can claim a monopoly. Every country has made contributions corresponding to its wealth of scientific equipment and reflecting the characteristics of its peculiar genius. It cannot even be said that the primacy goes unchallenged; for, if in the fifties and sixties, when Sybel, Mommsen, Häusser, Droysen, and Giesebrecht were at the height of their powers, the pride of place unquestionably belonged to the Germans, in the last decade of the century the most brilliant galaxy of historical talent was undoubtedly to be found on the banks, not of the Spree but of the Seine. Here the student might listen to Renan on the Hebrew Text of the Old Testament, to Sorel on European diplomacy, to Paul Meyer and Gaston Paris on the medieval literature of the Romance nations, to Viollet on the history of law, and to Aulard on the annals of the French Revolution. Taine was completing his brilliant historical work in the *Origins of Contemporary France*. Vandal, Houssaye, and Masson were illustrating the Napoleonic age in a style which suffered little from the rich abundance of material. Luchaire was already famous as the most finished exponent of French municipal antiquities. Rambaud and Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu were established authorities on Russia. Hanotaux and Lavisse were widely known, the one for an unfinished fragment of high quality on the age of Louis XIV, the other for a series of valuable contributions to Prussian history as well as for his general powers as a teacher. Among the younger generation Langlois and Bémont were attracting notice for the solidity of their medieval studies; and, when a 'Soutenance de thèse' was held at the *École des Chartes*, the great Léopold Delisle would preside over the jury,

* 'History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century'; Longmans, 1913. Cf. Fueter, 'Geschichte der neuern Historiographie'; Munich, Oldenburg, 1911.

bringing from the Bibliothèque Nationale such a sum of minute and exact medieval scholarship as can seldom have been gathered in a single brain.

There is, however, a sense in which the 19th century may be claimed for the German historians, for not only was the critical treatment of authorities greatly developed in Germany, but in sheer volume of printed matter the Germans easily distance their competitors. It is, however, important to observe that the competence of the Germans in historical study is a fact of comparatively recent date. No English contemporary of Charles James Fox would ever have thought of Germany as a source of historical illumination. No German of that age would have looked to his own countrymen to furnish him with a 'history in the grand style.' 'Read Burke,' wrote Stein to Gneisenau, 'it is the breviary of all wisdom'; and again, 'English literature especially deserves to be known because it furnishes us with the best historians.' Even if we take account of the preliminary work of editing and publishing chronicles and documents, in which the Germans have now acquired so great a mastery, there was in those days nothing anywhere comparable, for the imposing mass of its achievement, with the patient labours of the French Benedictines. 'Your bold progress,' wrote Ranke to Waitz in 1838, 'evokes my greatest sympathy and joy. You are treading the paths of Baluze and Mabillon.' That is a significant compliment.

The true historical awakening of Germany sprang out of the Napoleonic wars; and the movement has never lost all traces of its origin. German historians have been what the political history of their country has made them. They have been opposed to doctrinaire radicalism because it is the creation of the French Revolution. They have been liberal because they hated the French despot and saw in the development of constitutional liberties a guarantee for national power. Fervent advocates of Prussian expansion, they favoured the exclusion of Austria from the German confederation, facing such ridicule as might attach to the label of 'Little Germans,' and losing no opportunity of exposing the waste of national power involved in the political disunion of their country. Since a military monarchy

was a distinguishing mark of Prussia, they combined with their constitutional liberalism a strong faith in the Hohenzollern dynasty, whose services to the German cause they depicted with romantic enthusiasm.

The patriarch of all this historical movement was a Danish administrator, who being called to Berlin a little before the battle of Jena was entrusted with the direction of the Bank of Prussia. Niebuhr was a competent financier, a master of twenty languages, and the most profound and various scholar of his age. It is customary (though not entirely exact) to speak of him as a pioneer in critical method, and as, in a sense, the founder of scientific history as that term is now understood. But the real importance of Niebuhr in the intellectual development of Germany does not consist in his learning or in his critical acumen or in his application of philological tests to decide historical problems; for in the generation of Wolf, Boeck, Savigny and Grimm there was no lack of learned scepticism in Germany, and the Homeric poems had suffered violence before Niebuhr laid sacrilegious hands on Livy. It consists rather in his political spirit. He was the first of the Germans to approach history from the angle of a modern statesman and to discover in the past a discipline for character and a guide for public action. Thus the learning which gave to Niebuhr's Roman history an authoritative place in our English Universities until it was deposed by Mommsen is not really its chief title to be remembered. The learning commended but did not constitute the message. For Niebuhr the true interest of the history of Latium was that, presenting as it did 'a model of national development,' it served as an example to his adopted country of the methods by which a small people may achieve greatness. Even as Rome had gathered all Italy under her sway by a resolute exercise of prudence and courage, so might Prussia, shaking off the foreign tyrant and incarnating all that was valiant and manly in the German spirit, unite the scattered fragments of the German Federation under her rule.

The impetus, once given, continued through the century, gaining volume as it went and bringing to the academic prophets of German unity and Prussian

power an influence over public opinion which no prodigies of cold science could have secured. It was not so much the political doctrine which mattered, as the patriotic feeling and the stimulus to national self-respect. From the historians Germany gained a loving, perhaps exalted, sense of her former greatness. She learned how in the distant past the Germans had broken down the Roman Empire, founded dynasties in France, Italy, England, Africa and Spain, and refashioned the face of Europe. This people, laid helpless at the feet of Napoleon, had once been the great conquering and imperial nation of Europe. A German Emperor had ruled in Arles, and the Netherlands too had been part of his domain. The old epics and songs, the old chronicles and legal customs, were made the framework for an infinite labour of affectionate embroidery. In Giesebrecht's eloquent and learned pages young people could read the romance of the Medieval Empire, of that great and tempestuous effusion of German chivalry which for many centuries filled Europe with its noise, and ultimately suffered the ruinous check which fate administers to those who chase shadows.

All this exuberant stirring of national sentiment, though it often led to the expression of unripe opinion, was quite consistent with scrupulous workmanship. For the greater part of the century Ranke, 'that discreet and disinterested servant of the Prussian monarchy,' provided an admirable exemplar of historical impartiality. His governing idea of the individuality of peoples grew out of a temperamental opposition to the French theory of a Universal Republic or Empire; and it was his main interest in history to define the distinctive character of each national group and then to describe their mutual action and interaction at the moments of universal history. The spirit of those alert and lively Venetian *relazione*, the importance of which he was the first to discover, seems to have entered into this gentle and curious Saxon aristocrat. Wherever he moves—and he moves everywhere—he is always elegant, dexterous, well-mannered. Even the tempest of 1870 did not discompose him; and, while the guns were booming at Gravelotte and Sédan, Ranke was describing the origins of the Seven Years' War with the sobriety of a judge. The

hotter tempers of Germany did not appreciate this Olympian detachment.

Ranke, however, lived to be a miraculous survival of an earlier age. The dynamic forces during the later half of the century were men of a very different type from that band of patriot scholars, of whom Dahlmann may be taken as a conspicuous example, whose life hopes had been crushed by the failure of the constitutional movement of '48. Mommsen, the greatest of all the new professors of 'Real-politik,' had begun life as a journalist, was even concerned in the disorders of the revolutionary period, and never ceased to manifest a fiery interest in the politics of the day. Always a liberal, and even after 1870 a vigorous opponent of Bismarck in the sphere of domestic policy, Mommsen was at the same time a convinced and passionate imperialist. Whereas Niebuhr had regarded the foundation of the Roman Empire as 'one of the most afflicting spectacles in history,' for Mommsen it was the salvation of the world, and its creator was the only man of genius produced by Rome. The 'Römische Geschichte' was first published in 1854, and took the world by storm, not merely for its vigorous eloquence, its hard firm outline and massive knowledge, but also as a brilliant incarnation of the spirit of Prussian imperialism. An apology for Cæsarism so thoroughgoing and confident had never been pronounced by a scholar entitled to a hearing. The old idols of Republicanism were swept down with a contemptuous gesture, Cato as a vain and tragical fool, Cicero as a despicable charlatan of the journalist tribe. The ideals of the aristocratic Republic were treated as beneath observation, for, as M. Guillard aptly remarks, 'le vaincu pour Mommsen a toujours tort.' The great scholar was on safer ground when in later life he evolved the history of the Empire from the inscriptions, for here his survey was unblotted by the clouds of passion. But the earlier and more famous work is another illustration of Lessing's witty saying that nobody ever writes the history of any age but his own.

A younger contemporary of Mommsen brought historical studies into more intimate relations with German politics. Heinrich von Sybel, a Westphalian by birth but a Prussian by adoption, was primarily a

publicist, holding in common with Seeley that history should be practical and the historical workshop a laboratory of political hygiene. His own opinions, which were of the National Liberal type, vehemently Prussian and Protestant, were held and enunciated with great vigour during a long and busy life. As a political pamphleteer he was certainly unequalled in his generation, for he took large views and was the master of a manly and robust style, sometimes touched with irony and always marked by conviction. His best short pieces denounced the Medieval Empire as an extravagant and disastrous folly, and (at some expense of historic justice) depicted Austria as the destroyer and Prussia as the constant champion of German interests. But his fame rested upon two long historical books, each of which in a sense marked an epoch. We do not now read Sybel's 'French Revolution,' which was in truth a political pamphlet designed to unmask the baseness and cruelty of the French, the cowardice and treachery of Austria, and the loyal courses of the Prussian monarchy in a distracted age. We do not read it, partly because its political estimates are biassed, and partly because the book is dull and heavy, wanting alike in psychological insight and graphic power. But nevertheless we have all profited by Von Sybel's admirable researches. He was the first historian to attempt a complete study of the documentary evidence for the Revolution, the first to bring out the importance of the Polish question as a factor determining the course of European affairs, and the first who paid serious attention to the economic side of revolutionary history.

His second long work, on the 'Foundation of the German Empire,' being an unstinted eulogy of Bismarck, earned for him the dislike of the present Emperor, and exclusion from the Archives of Berlin. The brief to which he wrote would have perplexed a moralist, but Sybel was too hardened a Prussian to permit himself the luxury of a fastidious conscience. He defends the second partition of Poland and is at elaborate pains to argue the Prussian case for the annexation of the Danish Duchies. Von Roon, who was a blunt soldier, did not see the need of professorial apologies. 'The question of the Duchies,' he said truly, 'is not a question

of right but a question of force, and we have the force.' To rob first and excuse afterwards was the classical process whereby Prussia had grown, and the successful thief was always more honoured than his apologist. 'Je prends d'abord,' said Frederic II; 'je trouverai toujours des pédants pour prouver mes droits'; and Bismarck had no more difficulty in finding his pedant than the robber of genius who established the greatness of Prussia on the stolen provinces of Silesia and Posen.

The graphic quality, which is so singularly lacking in Sybel, was amply supplied in the work of a deaf and passionate Saxon who has been described by some as the Macaulay and by others as the Carlyle of Germany. Heinrich von Treitschke was a man entirely devoid of some properties commonly held to be essential to the adequate writing of history. He was generally lashed up to a white heat of indignation, and consistently insulting to large and respectable bodies of the genus Man—to the English and French nations, to the Jewish race, and to all who professed socialist or radical opinions. Violent in his capacity for theological execration—for he preached his political doctrines with fanaticism—he created misgivings among many German scholars, including Ranke, who drew a line between the publicist and the historian. But the man was a genius. His history of the German confederation from 1815 to 1848 is one of the most delightful and brilliant achievements of modern prose literature. The little courts and the big courts, the wandering idealising students with their patriotic songs, their duels, their gymnastic clubs and sentimental absurdities, the newspaper men and the junkers, the special characteristics of manner, physique and tradition by which the inhabitants of one part of Germany may be distinguished from another—all this and much more he paints for us with such wealth of illustration, such vitality, and so easy a mastery of men and things, that there is no other historical book upon any period from which Germany and all that Germany means can be so well understood.

So far I have spoken of Treitschke merely as a lively descriptive artist, but Treitschke was a great deal more; he was not even principally an artist, and of course still less a man of science. If we wish to classify this

astonishing master of eloquence, we must think of him as a prophet, delivering, as all true prophets must, one message and one message only to his age, and repeating himself now in one form, now in another, but always on a sustained note of fiery and even reckless intellectual courage. And the message was in essence identical with the creed of Mommsen, Droysen, Sybel—the necessity for a strong Germany, united under the Prussian sceptre and informed by the Prussian spirit.

Of this doctrine Treitschke was certainly the most influential, even if he was not the most learned, exponent. His lectures at Berlin, spiced with malicious sallies at the English, the Jews and the socialists, were one of the established entertainments of the capital and widely celebrated in the student world of at least six nations. Nobody could complain that the Professor's teaching was lacking in the quality of directness. He knew exactly where he stood and whither he intended to lead his flock. A single idea informed his whole teaching. If he praised Hegel as the 'first political head among the German philosophers,' it was because the Hegelian philosophy glorified the State. If Byron was held up as a shining example to cosmopolitan decadents like Heine, it was because 'to the banished aristocrat England still remained the first country in the globe.' The State was the ultimate good, patriotism the supreme virtue; and the main problem for the teacher was to develop the State-sense in a people remarkably deficient in political coherence. What matter if there were some exaggeration? To a nation like the German the call of the State must be bawled through a megaphone.

In the light of this governing principle, common to Aristotle, Machiavelli and Hegel, Treitschke expounded the ethics of German imperialism to a generation steadily becoming more and more conscious of its inner unity, its military strength, and its great future in the world. He did not hesitate to glorify war as a necessary and elevating influence on national progress, and at all times and seasons preached with reverential emotion the gospel of material power. For Prussia his enthusiasm knew no bounds, for he held that she had performed every great achievement in German politics since the Peace of Westphalia. The true test of a man, as of a nation,

was capacity for sacrifice. But if we ask the oracle to what ultimate end, we obtain no very clear or satisfactory response.

That Treitschke has been the principal literary organ of a very brutal type of imperialism should not blind us to the many elements of real moral grandeur contained in the body of his writing. Perverted, overstrained, violently prejudiced, as he undoubtedly was, nobody has paid more unstinted reverence to the proud and heroic forms of human temperament. And the example of Carlyle is sufficient to show that a philosophy of politics fundamentally opposed to the specific Christian virtues may be so held and propagated as to exercise, upon the whole, a fortifying influence on the brain and will by bringing into relief the sterner beauties of human character, by insisting on the seriousness of life, and by exciting a more active sense of its duties and responsibilities. So it was with Treitschke, who, with less of mystic depth, had more of practical sense and elasticity than Carlyle. The generation for which he wrote welcomed and needed the stimulus of his genius; and, though in many ways his influence is greatly to be deplored, in others it was good, not only as giving to the study of politics a large and imaginative outlook, but also because it helped to arouse an intelligent interest in the conduct of public affairs.

The present constitution of the German Empire, with its unequal federalism, its Prussian predominance, its aristocratic social structure, its vast system of militarism combined with universal suffrage, is so anomalous a mixture of medieval and modern principles that, were it not for the fact that Professors in Germany are state servants, we might be surprised at its having received a general measure of academic assent. Treitschke, like Alexander Hamilton, would have preferred a unitary state to a federation and was ill-pleased with the Reichstag. Yet, upon the whole, being at once aristocrat, militarist and monarchist, he was well satisfied with the polity as it finally left the shaping hands of Bismarck. As we learn from Mr Davis' excellent volume,* his early enthusiasm for liberty grew cooler with the passage

* H. W. C. Davis, 'The Political Thought of Treitschke'; Constable, 1914.

of years. Free education, local self-government, a free acceptance of reasonable laws by the citizens of a national state—such was the ultimate residuum of his liberalism. For party strife and parliamentary government he cherished an infinite contempt, and regarded such institutions as entirely unfit for Germany.

Indeed part of his intellectual activity was devoted to combating the notion, which was not uncommon in the middle years of the last century, that the political salvation of Germany was to be found in English Constitutionalism. This or something like it had been the belief of the great Dahlmann, Treitschke's master in history and the creator of the still-born Constitution of 1848. And it was because English liberalism was at once so seductive and yet so incompatible with the Prussian spirit, that all who stood near to the mind of Bismarck determined to discredit it with every weapon at their command. How basely the campaign was conducted by their hero is concealed in many volumes by Sybel but amply revealed by the voluble Busch. Nor can we be surprised if the professor of patriotic history in Berlin did not fall short of his political chieftain in his efforts to weaken that sentimental attraction of the Germans to England which was 'really a deadly sin, nothing less than the sin against the Holy Ghost.' In this congenial operation Treitschke was assisted first by the patent sympathy of the English people for the Danes in the affair of the Duchies and then by the English neutrality during the Franco-Prussian War. That Great Britain should refuse to strike in with Prussia appeared to him a crowning demonstration of baseness. 'The lust for mammon,' he writes, 'has stifled every feeling of honour, every feeling of right and wrong; cowardice and sensuality take shelter behind that wondrous theological rhetoric which to us free German heretics is the most repulsive of all the defects in the English character. We seem to hear that reverend snuffle when we see the English press turn up pious eyes full of indignation against the unchristian and warlike nations of the Continent.'

In so viewing history from the strictly patriotic and nationalist standpoint, without the barest attempt to understand either the general complex of international relations or the great and inspiring features of alien

civilisations, Treitschke was unfaithful to that high tradition of scientific detachment which earned for the leading historians of Germany their wide audience and honourable name in Europe. But, if his object was to stamp a particular set of political views upon the main body of his countrymen, he may be pronounced to have been brilliantly successful. His picture of England was not more malevolent than Michelet's; but, being less fanciful and executed in a series of strong confident strokes, it was far more telling with the public. The selfish island power, impervious to heroic ideals, which had stolen an empire while the world was asleep; the tyrant of the seas, the modern Carthage, the upholder of a barbarous system of international law; the land of hypocrites and shopmen, preaching and canting, yet buying cheap and selling dear and lusting for a 'Cotton millennium'; the secular perturber of European peace, against whose insidious diplomacy the unvarnished simplicity of German nature would be for ever, save for some heroic remedy, exposed in unequal conflict; a nation brutalised by sport, demoralised by the obscuration of its ancient aristocracy, patently loose in patriotic principle and organic cohesion—such was the estimate of our people which he drew for Germany, and which in the lower regions of German opinion found an only too easy acceptance.

It would be unjust not to admit that there are many passages in Treitschke's writings which present a true appreciation of the more sublime qualities of the British genius, as also of some political virtues of the more ordinary stamp. But in general it may be said that his capacity for appreciating Englishmen steadily declined with his own advance in years, and that the England of his admiration was finally interred in 1832. In language both plain and emphatic he indicated his opinion that some time or other Carthage would cross the path of Rome, and that, though the struggle might be long and difficult, self-interest would be vanquished by valour and the purse defeated by the sword.

It would have been surprising and even discreditable if so great an event as the foundation of the German Empire, with its amazing procession of military triumphs and its great exaltation of patriotic feeling, had left no

impression on the historical literature of Germany. And in fact the impression has been profound, the political process directing the pen of the writers, and the writers in turn shaping the public mind to appreciate and extend the process. Indeed it is not too much to say that the historians of the Prussian school have been the principal architects of the political creed of modern Germany. They have exalted material power and belittled the empire of moral sentiments. They have applauded war as an instrument of progress and national hygiene. Holding that aggression is a symptom of vigour, and vigour the sign manual of political virtue, they have championed every violation of right which has subserved the aggrandisement of Prussia. They have scorned small states because they were small and have applauded big states because they were big. And in their violent but not unnatural reaction against the quietism and happy contemplation of that old pleasant Germany for which Mozart wrote music and Goethe verse, and which still holds Europe in its manifold enchantment, they have exaggerated with Teutonic thoroughness the brutal side of politics as a thing much to be respected and a talisman calculated to conduct their too kindly fellow-countrymen into an Elysium of indefinite ease and self-respect.

If we have thus concentrated our attention on the political historians of the Prussian school and on the important share which they have taken in shaping the public mind of their countrymen, it is from no failure to recognise that there is more than one department of historical study in Germany and more than one type of German historian. Even in the narrower sphere of political history the case for South Germany has not gone entirely by default, as Baumgarten's criticisms of Treitschke remind us; and books are still written by professors of modern history under the good old rubric of scientific serenity. Meanwhile outside the regions of modern polemic the indefatigable industry of the German race continues to make valuable contributions to the sum of knowledge. If the exploration of the papyri is for the most part carried on in London and Oxford, the greatest living historian of antiquity is a German. Liebermann, a Jewish scholar it is true, has given us

the best edition of the Anglo-Saxon laws, Krumbacher the only Byzantine bibliography; and, in the sphere of Biblical criticism, German scholarship, though no longer without serious rivalry, is still sufficiently active to provoke a reproof from the Imperial partner in the Divine concern. But, while it is important not to minimise our continuing indebtedness to German historical science, it is equally necessary to avoid overstatement. The Germans have been pioneers in the organisation of learned enterprise, but have nothing better of their kind than the dictionaries associated with the names of Murray, Stephen and Lee. They created the academic study of history, but are now equalled, if not surpassed, by the severe and polished standards of Paris. The countrymen of Savigny can still boast of great legal antiquaries, but of none so brilliant as Maitland and Esmein. Ihering was a genius, one of the rare Germans who have sown original and fruitful ideas; yet it will be generally admitted that in range and illumination and fertility Maine was his superior. Indeed, if we weigh the historical product of the nations not by the brute mass of knowledge which it contains but by the quality of its insight, the true balance of its judgment, the wealth of its original perceptions, the charm and brilliance of its manner, we shall find ourselves asking questions which, in the interests of the international comity of scholars, had better not be asked, and will not confidently be answered. Was Stubbs as learned as Waitz, and yet more actual? Has anybody equalled De Tocqueville in social analysis? What historian is fairer than Lecky, wiser than Gardiner, more imaginative than Carlyle, more full of threads to guide than Guizot, more brilliant in narrative than Macaulay and Vandal? Among the many excellent German historians of Greece is there a political judgment as massive as Grote's? We cannot dogmatise, but this at least we know, that whoever would pass from the ancient to the modern world must tread that great Roman causeway the stones of which were so soundly laid by the genius of an Englishman some hundred and fifty years ago, that neither the traffic of scholars, nor any sudden tempest in the climate of intellect, is likely to leave it cracked and unserviceable.

H. A. L. FISHER.

Art. 2.—'WHITE WOLF' IN KANSU.*

VERY different is the outlook of one who is actually drifting amid tempests, from that of him who sits comfortably at home and reads about them connectedly and in composure. As one wanders on from frightened town to frightened town, encircled by rumours black and terrible from every quarter, life becomes a hand-to-mouth affair, where the threatened evil of to-day is quite sufficient. One's horizon of information is bounded by a radius of fifty miles, and everything beyond is wrapped in a darkness that one has neither power nor leisure to illuminate. One sees history in the making from a small and personal angle; of the great events that go to make it outside, one gleans no hint as they happen, and the small things that help to compose the great become the daily anxieties and pivots of existence. Consequently, from a point so close at hand, details loom larger than the whole landscape viewed from afar; and one's chronicle of experiences, though wholly incomplete in knowledge, wholly local and self-centred, yet has an actuality, a growing force, beyond the reach of luckier people before whom the full tale of events lies fresh and hot-pressed on their breakfast-table every day. These may gather in the columns of the press a convenient bird's eye prospect of mankind from China to Peru; but the connected history they glean, with the daily addition of every rumour and proclamation throughout the Empire, can never have quite the savour of the local rumours and tragedies, on a knowledge of which one's life perpetually depends, till the forgotten outer world of kings and emperors and republics fades utterly away before the imminent problem of the White Wolf's proximity to oneself.

Long ere this, facts and fictions of recent China have been clearly set forth for every English reader; and Chinese news, which has not even faintly penetrated as yet to the Thibetan border, is stale and cold long since at English dinner-tables. Yet, in the vast panorama, many a detail may seem small that on the spot bulks

* This paper was written in Kansu last summer (Editor).

huge; and some very ghastly work has lately been doing in these far corners of Kansu, which probably, compressed into a few small lines at the bottom of a column, has quite eluded popular notice, or may have seemed as remote and meaningless and trifling as would the sack of Magdeburg to the monks of Taprobane. Yet here they have their weight; and the ten thousand rotting dead in the streets of Taochow lie heavier on the scale than the fate of the Dragon Throne itself.

We slipped out of Sian-fu just in time, scudding westward on the fringe of the advancing storm. The great Imperial city, foul with the dust of death, was all in a tumult of terror, seething in convulsion like a boiling pot. The Wolf was advancing; he was at hand; he was a ruthless bandit; he was a nice gentlemanly person whom Mission ladies expressed a wish to meet. The situation darkened; and the Mission ladies changed their views, when they heard the tales of Lao-ho-kou and Kint-ze-kwan. The troops were disaffected, their arms medieval, their leaders corrupt as they. And still the Wolf drew nearer; the City of the Peaceful West was a place of howling storm. In all probability we were the last Europeans to be allowed by the Yamen to leave the capital in any direction. For, in the increasing danger, all the ruffians of Shensi were agog for some haymaking of their own; and the shadow of grave peril lay even over the highway of the border. Permission to start was hardly wrung from the authorities, responsible as they were for our safety, and commendably anxious to assure it, on risk of their own heads. Wrung it was, however, in the end; and means of conveyance secured by diplomacy, our chartered mules being hidden in our yard till the moment of departure, lest the soldiers should commandeer them to their own use, as they certainly would, had they known the opportunity.

On a sunny afternoon we slipped out of Sian, leaving behind us an imminent sense of danger, and escaping gladly to a freer air, westward, at least, of the Wolf, and where the worst of the threatened perils were vague and shadowy. Our last news, as we left, was local; we learned that the mule-broker responsible for our caravan had been seized by the soldiers on our departure, and

summarily beheaded. And after this tale, we passed out into the dark night of utter newslessness; no sound or syllable ever since has reached us, either of Great China, or of the pale feigned storms of Europe that have so quaint an air of unreality when considered in this land of real life and death where we now circulate. For some weeks, indeed, all news of any kind ceased wholly; even local rumour slept or dozed; and we continued a mild career along roads that, in defiance of all warnings from the Yamen, seemed perfectly peaceful for our passing. Yet, even as we passed, there was a sensation on the road that this sunlit calm was but the lull of a brewing storm. An ominous quiet, indeed, it seemed, along this, the main artery of East and West, that carries all the northern trade between Asia and Europe, China, Russia and Thibet. Less august, though, is the roadway, than its importance; and many a stony upland lane of Westmoreland might sneer at this, one of the great highways of the world. Through flat and fertile lands it winds towards the West, through placid little villages, and walled towns comfortably asleep in snug hollow or open plain. But a sultriness lay over everything as we went; it seemed as if at any moment the crash of thunder might break the perilous calm. Watchers with anxious or evil faces lined the streets at our passing; no word was spoken anywhere of war; but every evening we were glad to have left a day and its cities behind us, to be yet one day nearer the Kansu border, beyond which I was assured that peace had her everlasting and inviolable home. Feng Hsiang was a point to be rapidly passed; here the Elder Brother League is strong, and rascality runs high. A slatternly city, with rows of streets half blind and dead, but thronged with dense mobs of sightseers, in whose eyes a heavy and greedy malignance brooded. And here, indeed, we heard that the ulcer was felt and known to be near breaking-point, and the resident Europeans had been warned to be on the watch for their lives. So we passed through and crossed the border, and came to Tsinchow, here leaving the Nanchow road, and striking away southward towards the arid valleys of the Black Water River.

The air at once was changed. In place of brewing sedition and brigandage the land was full of calm.

Frank Mahomedans and kindly simple Chinese peasants occupied the fields and towns in peace. There was no thought of danger from within or without. The Wolf was very far away now ; he would never want or dare to trouble Kansu. And thus, with divers adventures by the way, we saw many men and many cities, and at last, blocking the vault of Heaven, the vast white wall of Thibet. And now, if before we lacked information, we plunged here into the deepest abysses of silence. Our own affairs soon occupied us completely, and not a whisper arrived of even the little places we had left but a few days since. Yet the change from China to Thibet was not one from stress to peace.

My name, in Chinese character, is Law-and-Order-Great-Lord. I and my name alike are complete strangers to this borderland ; and Law and Order are unfortunately things with which the inhabitants deserve to be drilled into a salubrious intimacy. All along the dividing line of China and Thibet, there stretches a series of independent or semi-independent principalities. The rulers of these often live far away, and in no case are in a position to exercise any effective authority, oppressed as they are between the claims of China on one hand and those of the monks on the other. The result of this is that the border is a lawless no-man's-land, where the monks have everything their own way, deriding the temporal powers of their lords, and owning but the most shadowy allegiance to the vast and vague pontificate of Lhasa. In many places, accordingly, they are, for the most part, an evil crew, intolerant, autocratic and uncultivated, ruling the peasants with a rod of iron, and with all the harshness of masters elevated from the class they govern, seeing that a son of every family is claimed for monastic orders. At the same time, it is not from missionaries, nor from travellers fed entirely from missionary sources, that a fair appreciation of Lamaism can reasonably be expected. No professor of one faith, however candid in intention, can possibly be really ingenuous and impartial in his criticism of another ; a Buddhist evangelist would find unexpected and unpalatable things to say of Roman monasticism or Orthodox Iconodules. In one respect, especially, English condemnation of Lamaism seems unfair. Worshipping as we do, above all, material success

in this world, the capacity for slaughter, and that merciless Moloch, Efficiency, we fall foul of Lamaist monasticism in Mongolia because 'emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros,' reclaiming a wild and bloodthirsty people into a meekness and mildness that we ourselves despise as enthusiastically as our Gospels praise it. And yet, when we meet the same monasticism producing exactly the contrary effects in Thibet, and hardening a hard mountain race into yet further courage, audacity and fire, we have no better word than 'obstinate fanaticism' for our angry verdict on a frame of temper that may not suit our own purposes so well as the contemptible meekness or lethargy of the Mongolian.

For my own part, deploring altogether the wide divergence of Mahayana Buddhism in all its branches from the pure traditions of the South, I could yet wish that Mongolian effects were more evident in Thibetan Lamaism. While China just behind us was in agonies we never guessed, we ourselves found our hands sufficiently full in fending off the unfriendliness of the monks. On our arrival at a border village, subject in name to the far-off Prince of Jo-ni (Choni in the maps) we were confronted with an initial difficulty in obtaining lodgment. The men of the village—tall, handsome, burly figures in Isabella-coloured homespun—met us with hostile looks; and their wives were even more overt in their enmity, preventing their husbands from returning any civil answer, wherever one might seem inclined. Finally, however, we secured a house, and were promptly invaded by a deputation of monks from the abbey on the promontory. They came, headed by the Business Manager or Almoner or Chancellor, filled with curiosity and unfriendly questions. It came out that we had already nearly occasioned a grave scandal in the community. For our road, winding over the shoulder of the hill, had suddenly, just as it came in sight of the village, offered us two alternatives, between a low road, convenient and smooth across the cornfields, straight to the houses, and another steep and stony, toiling upwards, right round the encircling slopes, and so down. I, never noting a barrier of brushwood in my path, was at once for taking the obviously easy road; and an instant eruption of dismal howls from the village taught me nothing, for my innocence took none

of the noise to my own account. However, I was soon called back, and the error rectified. Not only in the sphere of morals is the high and stony way more recommendable than the short and smooth. It appears that, before the harvest, the monks impose all sorts of mystic taboos and magic rites, on pain of the most fearful dangers to the crops and cattle, from murrain and hail. Among other prescriptions for a good yield, certain paths must not be trodden by foot or beast until the corn is in. On such a forbidden track had I begun to set hoof. Our peace was made at last, but with difficulty, the monks exhausting themselves in their inquisitory catechism, and, though slightly conciliated by news of my creed, could not overcome their suspicions as to the causes of our coming. They are convinced that we come only for their gold and silver—a grim but hardly unjust comment on European zeal for the spread of 'civilisation.' They are further convinced that our eyes have a miraculous power of penetrating the bowels of the earth and there discovering the sole objects of our search. This is clearly a glorified misconception of the telescope and field-glass; these being products of the West that even these remote monks were aware of, and eagerly clamoured to possess.

At last the holy assemblage was got rid of, and the night spent, as best might be, in avoiding the lively relics of their visitation. Next day brought fresh illustration of the perils that environ unwary feet on the Thibetan border. For my companion went out for a short stroll, along a path as open as Piccadilly; while I lay quiet, studying unwillingly the ways of the little white Thibetan flea. As I lay, I became aware of cries, increasing steadily in number and volume, till finally they lured me to the threshold of our hayloft, whence, about a quarter of a mile away, I perceived with innocent ethnological curiosity, the male inhabitants of the village all gathered in a disorderly mob, and apparently celebrating the Spring or the crops in some quaint primeval rite that consisted in leapings and gesticulation and a dissonant choir of howls irregularly but constantly emitted. For a few minutes I pleasantly pondered over this picture, and was only waked to the true situation by pale and shaking voices that summoned me below. On descending

I learned that that howling mob had in reality gathered together with swords and guns by the pathside, to murder my companion as he returned. For that one occasion it so happened that he was armed only with a smile; this, however, he brandished with energy and perseverance, advancing resolutely down a lane of crowded figures on the banks above him that gnashed upon him with faces so devilish as he went, that the noise and the sight of them will be long before they leave him. Nevertheless, in precarious safety he came through, further protected, as I like to hope, by the dissuasions of a young monk, who now came hurrying along to claim praise for averting the murder. At the same time, the situation was far from solved; an attack from the peasants might be apprehended at any moment. Guns and revolvers were primed and prepared accordingly, and we held ourselves ready for a decisive stand, when in an instant a crowd of monks flowed vehemently into the room, all talking loudly, and all at once, of their, and our, innocence and goodness, and of the wicked obstinate hearts of the people, who were in no wise to be persuaded that we were as excellent and harmless as the monks for their part well knew us to be. The sum of it all was that we should be best advised to make off as soon as possible, and utterly avoid the mountains and their peoples thenceforward. In plainer words, these holy men desired our absence, indeed, but not quite yet our death. This time they even brought the Lord Abbot to add his word; but he made no impressive figure in the scene, being a small-pocked, shock-headed Peter of a man, young but frowsy, stockish and stupid in the face, squat in figure, and of toad-like conformation generally. There was evidently nothing for it, however, but to take these sufficiently plain hints and go. Go we did, accordingly, at dawn, with no further word or look of ill; and with torn hearts began turning away from the great snowy Alps, across to the cultivated lower country which was once more China, the prudent Empire occupying sedulously all profitable land, and leaving the wild hills to Jo-ni and Thibet.

And here, again, what a change! After this interlude of barbarism back into the company of friendly, cordial, simple people, ready to welcome and help, and laugh

and be pleasant. One old lady, indeed, did swear herself black in the face on seeing some of our rugs laid out on her roof; but by nightfall our grandeur had convinced her of her error, and in full audience of all the village she came upstairs and did lowly penance on her knees, repenting in a loud and lamentable voice with beatings of her forehead on the floor. Still no news, however, of great China behind; but we learned that there was a Chinese village under one of our longed-for mountains, which was the best news the moment could have brought us, especially as it proved that the village was wholly friendly, and contained a little old empty temple ready for our reception. To this, then, we joyously removed, demanding authority and sanction from the Governors of the Subprefectural City some forty miles away across the northward ranges. And in answer came the first hint of coming storm: 'Tufei' (brigands) were in South Kansu—whether Wolves or not still seemed obscure, as did also their direction and whereabouts, so that the Subprefectural City was by no means yet in any alarm, but mildly begged us to retire betimes within its walls. We, however, preferred the security of our remoteness, and continued investigating the botanical wealth of the Alps from day to day, but little disturbed by the traffic of the shrine. For the temple was all collapsing to ruin, the roof unsound, the statues gone to pieces, and the dusty floor bestrewn with long-neglected mumming-masks. In the yard lived only one monk, a simple kindly soul, very old and meek and holy, busied all day with his prayers and beads and scriptures, sitting in his cell or in a sunny angle of the court, with a projecting fringe of red hairs fixed round his forehead to protect his eyes from the glare. He was only a visitor by invitation, full of a quiet and unobtrusive dignity. But more insistent was his vicar, a stout and squinting person in dim purple, whose duty it was to conduct the Office in the Shrine. At dawn and dusk he would come down from his cottage at the other end of the village; his acolyte unbarred the great doors, and the drum boomed forth its summons to worshippers who never came. So in a minute or two the doors were locked again, and the service over, and the minister at leisure—this indeed was his unvarying condition—to come up

and pester the strangers, with pattings and pokings and protestations of inordinate devotion. So the days passed; and each expedition into the hills concluded, according to the season, in torrential rains and hail. Finally, we were just upon removing to camp high up, when at midnight returned a messenger whom we had sent over the hill for mules. Through the pouring dark he returned, alone, over a high and stony pass; to the accompaniment of the splashing rain outside in the yard he crouched in a corner of the room, and, yellow in the vacillating light of the one candle, told his tale in husky whispers.

For those fatal hails had brought upon us again the fury of all the border peoples and their monks. And now, to the number of 3000 strong, this simple and pious peasantry was marching immediately up to our massacre, conceiving that the late devastation of their crops was due to nothing else but the annoyance of the mountain Gods at our unauthorised intrusion on their fastnesses. In this belief they were fortified by the clergy, anxious for their monopoly of gold and silver, and utterly deriding the notion that anybody could be so obstinate as we in penetrating the Alps, for any reason short of precious metal, much less for any motive so incredibly silly, so patently a pretence, as the mere discovery of plants and weeds of no value. Once more, then, we were to be harrowed up, and sent packing; for, though the attack came to nothing for the moment, it was obvious that further stay was impossible, if the border peoples had no scruple about invading Chinese territory. So we must fly. But whither?

Now came one of the times when local news and politics become of a vital importance inconceivable in England, where the utmost crisis merely begets an indecision as to whether one may dare dine with one's oldest and dearest friends; such indecision hinging on the uncertainty of human tempers, but not on any uncertain integrity of one's own throat. And a possible scant line at the bottom of an English newspaper column swelled to vast proportions as we were led on to learn that the problem of our flight was further complicated by the fact that terror now reigned throughout South Kansu, that the Wolf was sweeping through, that all the little

towns through which we had so lately passed had been put to sack within a few days of our own departure, and that the Subprefectural City itself was either in convulsions of panic fear, with its mandarin fled, or else actually already in the hands of the Wolf. The marvellous luck of our escape hitherto, the uncanny good-fortune of thus having everywhere *just* flown through in safety ahead of the advancing storm, now paled its lustre before the difficulties of the immediate situation. To the west of us lay the Tepo Tribes, Thibetans wilder and wickeder than most; to the south impassable Alps; to the east the valley was blocked by the Crusading Army athirst for our blood; and on the north lay the chance of running straight into the Wolf's arms, or of meeting his bands upon the road. In either case, with all our boxes and all our bullion, there could not be any great hope for our lives. However, the urgency of the problem demanded prompt decision. To stay was death, sooner or later; to go was only the risk of it. We finally decided to stake our all on the notorious uncertainty of rumour, and the fair chance that the Subprefectural City might prove in less desperate case than was represented. The comparatively small question of ways and means could not delay us long. No mules were to be got in the poor little place, and our big black boxes were of daunting weight. Nevertheless we chartered all the able-bodied villagers as bearers; and the endless stream went filing out at last over the mountains (looking like a string of square black beetles), dismissed with gentle blessings and farewells by the old monk, and with excessive protestations of love and innocence from Squint-eyes, whose disclaimers of all complicity in the Crusade were further discounted by the fact that we had hardly left the village when numbers of unsuspected monks emerged from his quarters and scattered in all directions to their monasteries with the news of our departure.

Through the golden day we travelled in anxiety, seeing no evil thing, but hearing tidings more and more terrible at each successive village that brought us nearer to the Subprefectural City—the Black Water bridge was gone, the city sacked, and the mandarin dead or bolted, or both. Finally, when we reached the river, the bridge

was there; and, as we advanced up the long dry valley towards our goal, firmer assurances met us, that the Subprefectural City stood intact where it did, and that in his accustomed seat the mandarin still sat undisturbed. Never was a place so defensible, indeed, as this. The way winds in and out by the river-bed, commanded by watch-houses and eminences, so that no enemy could get within three miles if these had each a good rifle or two. The city, snuggling into fat folds of hills beneath a huge limestone mountain, and girdled with golden fields of corn in a sunny bay beside the Black Water, with tangles of sweet roses embowering it all around, possesses from the rampart of its walls complete command for several miles of every line of approach, and could easily be kept clear of all attack by a mere armful of good guns. No such defences, however, had the mandarin to inspire him; twenty odd tatterdemalions in blouses, armed with primeval muskets never cleaned and rarely fired except at imminent risk to their user, do not make for confidence against such an army as the Wolf's. Accordingly the Lord Jang had displayed, instead, the wisdom of the serpent, for his valley leads onward nowhere but only into Thibet some six miles west, and his city is poor as a bone. So with good heart he sent down men in disguise to where the valley merges into that of the main road going north to Minchow and Taochow. Along this in time came the ravening Wolves, and, seeing these apparent peasants, asked how far it was to the Subprefectural City. They answered, 60 li, instead of 30; the Wolves disdained to diverge so far for a place so poor, and swept onwards to their appalling sack of Taochow and Minchow. Thus it was that again we just eluded the Wolf, against every reasonable expectation, now following after in his track, and slipping aside into the only city of South Kansu which escaped his clutch.

Hardly any place resisted him successfully; few places, defenceless and unarmed, could hope to do so; and none but two or three attempted it. The Subprefectural City must inevitably have gone with the rest, had it not been for that timely stratagem. As it was, we found it, when at last we wound our way through the gates and along the densely crowded streets, in a state of hysterical excitement. Our arrival marked the climax of emotion;

from afar tumultuous hordes came flocking to escort us in. Our coming created first of all a frantic terror, and then bewildered amazement—terror, lest we should prove robbers, and then amazement that we had not been robbed. The mandarins fell upon our necks, exulting in the prestige of our presence, no less than in the relief of having our precious persons comparatively safe under their own eye within the walls. Nor would they let us go again; we were carried off to stately quarters in the Military Governor's Yamen, and there preserved as a palladium of the City. Excitement began to subside, and the sight of a real rifle rekindled public confidence. But peace was not yet; and now we had a lively sample of what life must have been in the border-towns of England during the sixteenth century, for hardly had the alarm of the Wolves died down, than the Thibetans were known to be advancing on a raid from the west, according to their usual habit in early summer, when they replenish their exhausted stores by crossing the vague border and laying waste the villages, sometimes advancing against the Subprefectural City itself. So it now was; instantly the place went once more frantic. It is hardly possible to conceive the conditions from afar, unless the mind can fairly figure its circumstances of life and peril—that quiet little population of some two thousand peaceful, decent people, only asking (like all decent Chinese) to be let alone to drive their little trades and work their little cultures, not too much squeezed or worried by officials, but living orderly under perhaps the finest system of public justice and carefully graduated responsibility that the world has ever known—if only its performance could be kept at the level of its conception. This population still lives contentedly in the Middle Ages; and the fall of the Manchus makes as little difference to it, and is as little realised by it, as that of the Mings. Their coinage is as primeval as their notions; their defenders' few weapons are as old as either, and only fitted for a museum. But they are encircled by a noble battlemented wall of five-and-twenty feet or so, with a broad level ramp on which two motors could go abreast. This, indeed, is its only defence: for the garrison is a slouching Ragged Brigade, as disinclined to fight as it is incapable, believing that, if you hold a gun and let it off,

you need not aim it, as the inherent Spirit of the gun does all the rest.

Over this little town are set two Governors, the Civil and the Military, of whom the Civil—in this case a kind, jovial old fellow, all for softness and general good-will at any cost—has precedence. What else can one expect in this acutely anti-military Empire, which will not even take the trouble to keep a quiet frontier, though, in places such as these, it could be done with the utmost ease at very slight expense, by a permanent garrison in each place of even thirty modern soldiers, uniformed, well drilled, well paid, and armed with efficient magazine rifles? Indeed, when one contemplates this huge and harmless land, asking nothing but peace and getting little but war, the mind even of one who has a firm sympathy with the wise, enduring East, as against the hurrying and 'successful' West, is apt to feel a pang of irritation at such persistent neglect of elementary and obvious precautions. For want of these, especially of late, thousands of kindly inoffensive people have been plunged into bitterest penury and mourning; and yet one well-posted regiment or so, in the passes of the South, would have completely barred the advance of the Wolf into Kansu. Contemplate the position of the Military Governor of the Subprefectural City. Unlike his Civil colleague, he is a man who has travelled far and wide in all the provinces of China; he has studied Europe in Shanghai, and stood face to face with the Supreme Pontiff in Lhasa, and the great Grand-Dowager in Sian. Here he ends, in the Subprefectural City, ruined, embittered, broken up by the hopeless helplessness of his position, alone among sullen rebels fixed in the unmoved methods of the Ming Dynasty, among whom he stands as grotesque as a motor-bicycle in Stonehenge, powerless to stir, educate, discipline or reform. Four years he has ruled; but his soldiers go on strike whenever the fancy takes them, leaving gates and wall unguarded, and Jo Dâ-ren alone in the innermost yard of his wide but ruinous Yamen, all of which, with himself, family, guests, court, attendants and garrison he has to maintain in the due dignity of the most tremendous Empire in the world on an official salary of ten shillings a year.

Thus, under the rumour of the Thibetan approach, the

town went justly crazy with the instinct of self-preservation. The whole male population turned out upon the wall; stones were piled all along the battlements for throwing; and in disorder ran up and down the tattered garrison, making a vain show of refurbishing their ridiculous muskets and the pair of mud-embedded mortars that might have saluted with their latest sigh the accession of Queen Elizabeth. The citizens meanwhile sent their notabilities in solemn deputation to the foreign Lords, to entreat their help; and in a short time came up their Highnesses Jang and Jo, upon the same errand. We gladly assented; and rifles, cartridges, revolvers and tents were sent up on to the wall at the threatened Western Gate, and there publicly displayed, to the great encouragement of the defence. Meanwhile a procession was formed from the Yamen, and up to our posts we ourselves were convoyed in state by both the mandarins, between a ragged avenue of Yamen attendants in the unaltered scarlet and yellow blouses of Imperial days, armed with every sort of fantastic and theatrical-looking halberd, hung about with crimson tassels to keep away the ubiquitous devils of Chinese life. On the wall we pitched our tents amid enthusiastic crowds. Night came; the scene might have been laid in Troy, but for the lack of Helen. Under the serene night of stars fires shone and flickered all round the line of battlements. Jo Dâ-ren, in contempt of this nonsensical medievalism beyond his power to help or heal, went home indeed to bed; but Jang continually went the rounds, attended by his underlings, addressing fatherly words of encouragement to his little flock from point to point. Gongs clanged incessantly, trumpets wailed across the booming of drums, and clackers pitilessly clacked all through the darkness and far on into the dawn. And in the end, though the foe advanced to a high ridge above the town and peered over, they were discouraged by the sight of such unexpected preparations and puissance, and retired accordingly in discomfiture, empty-handed.

A few days later, however, more excitement supervened. Suddenly, at two hours' notice, three hundred Szechuanese soldiers marched into the city. The population was nearly wild with wonder and dread at sight of these monsters, uniformed in khaki, walking with a

well-drilled swing, and armed with modern rifles clearly capable of going off. What would these anachronisms do? What were they come for? Would they save the town, or turn to plunder it? Everybody was confounded at the sight of them and of the coinage they offered—unheard-of silver disks called dollars, and rectangular pieces of paper which they mendaciously made out were money, and produced for payment in place of the immemorial perforated pence which are the town's one currency, and of such a value that ten shillings' worth would be more than a man could carry. Pavid as the town lay under fear of the military, it could not but make a stand against such incomprehensible frauds; and for a time more difficulties were added to a difficult situation, which was already causing poor stout old Lord Jang to fall visibly away with anxiety, as he paddled to and fro endeavouring to solve the problem of peaceably providing for three hundred men (with the threat of more), in a place so poor that the two foreign Lords alone had driven it nearly bankrupt in flour and eggs and hens. The Szechuanese meanwhile proved perfectly decent and orderly, though how long they would remain so, if angered, defrauded or starved, was a problem which kept my Lord Jang awake at night.

They had come, it turned out, with orders to restore peace on the frontier, teach the Thibetans a good lesson, and then go northward against the Wolf. This news upset the city yet more. It had no malice against the marauding Thibetans; the custom of ages prescribed a situation of mutual and quite amiable brigandage, each party robbing the other in turn, and nobody conceiving bad blood against anybody else. But now, if these troops were to go out and kill Thibetans, what reprisals would not that vengeful and longanimous people take when once the troops were removed? A state of embittered blood-feud would succeed the pleasant state of things that had gone before. Lord Jang felt this, and quaked as he sat; the troops would some day go, and he would be left to bear the brunt. The news spread far and wide; the monks of the border took to quaking too. The foreign Lords had evidently sent to Yuan Shi Kai, and the late insult to them was to be wiped out in blood. At last a monk came slinking in to learn the truth of all

this. Fortunately he happened on the honey-dealer, who was friendly to the foreign Lords for buying all his honey. Besides, he was a Mahomedan and therefore delighted at the chance of vexing a monk. 'For a week,' he said, 'you need not so greatly fear: but after that—Heaven help you!' Whereupon the monk, with no more words, gathered up his purple skirts and fled precipitately homeward over the hills.

The expedition into Thibet was reported a success. Back came the troops in triumph, making the most strangely anachronistic effect as they marched through the streets. Minor alarms and excursions now succeeded; some went, more came. Nobody knew what was to happen next, and the Military Mandarin was as much in the dark as his meanest coolie, according to that immemorial separatist spirit of Chinese officialism, which preserves the most absolute secrecy between different departments, though matters of state debated in the open Yamen became property of the listening street immediately. So came and went the forces, but no news either went or came. For two months the city sat in utter isolation, as if in the most rigid siege. Not a soul dared venture out upon the roads, and not a soul came in from outside to tell of what was going on in Kansu. The silence, at last, grew terribly ominous; not even the oil-men came down from Minchow with their wattled jars, and not a postman for many a week had been heard upon his tinkling journey over the desolate and empty highways. There was a stillness of death abroad; the Subprefectural City seemed alone to live, a strange suspended life in the void of a dead world. All attempts at re-establishing communications failed; emissaries from either Yamen, despatched to Minchow under pain of heavy beating, either flatly refused to stir, whether beaten or no, or else trotted forth with obedient alacrity, only to spend a few days resting in some village just beyond the walls, and then return with a story of impassable roads.

So weeks went by, and, at last, news began to come. A stray mail, long belated, fluttered in from England, hinting at strange doings, pale and remote, yet, like all mails, telling nothing, and leaving the reader more in the dark than ever. It had gone circling the round of the

sacked cities, and so in the end came safe to hand, according to the unalterable fidelity of the Chinese Post Office. But, even more important, soon came letters from the north, and at last we learned of the Hell that had raged through Kansu in May and June, while we and the Subprefectural City alone lay safe and whole, beyond even the remotest sound of the storm. We learned the looting of Minchow; and hardly had we read of it, than the bloody tale turned white in comparison with the ghastly fate of Taochow. Yet now the coast was clear; the Wolves were gone in disorder; the Thibetans were in a state of comparative calm. Accordingly, not without a sadness in leaving the quiet little town that had been to us so kindly and opportune a harbour through a time of storm and peril unrealised, we obeyed at last the insistent call of the great northern mountains which so long had kept us fluttering on the chain, ungratefully chafing against the tediousness of our enforced sojourn in the Subprefectural City. But the channels were reopening, the air clearing; it was time to be gone, if we wanted to catch the skirts of early summer on the high Alps, whither she had long retreated. So with affectionate farewells to my Lords Jang and Jo, we set forth at last on our way, making northward in the blasted trail of the Wolves. No sure news of the outer world was yet to hand, but there were at least rumours of international troops now coming to take charge of China—dead gossip long ere this at home; lying gossip too, very likely. And then last of all, perhaps as true, perhaps as false, or only premature, the night before we left, Jo Dâ-ren came privately to our room and told us in whispers of an official letter just received from Lanchow, and it was couched in the style and formula of the Emperors of China! Under that silent night in the Yamen yard, the vast and awful shadow of the Dragon Throne seemed to take shape once more and fill the world. Not long had its majesty lingered in the lumber-room of history.

REGINALD FARRER.

Art. 3.—THE ECONOMIC CONDITION OF ENEMY COUNTRIES.

IN surveying the financial and economic position of enemy countries, the wish is apt to become father to the thought. In spite of every desire to be judicial and to avoid the pitfalls of patriotic partiality, it is difficult to escape completely from the temptations of national bias. As 'all is yellow to the jaundiced eye,' so are the figures of German or Austrian or Turkish trade and finance liable to be distorted by their enemies into evidences of imminent disaster. This one-sided view and its attendant exaggeration are much to be deprecated. Nothing is gained by painting the devil blacker than he really is. It is much more serviceable in the long run to look at an opponent's position with an eye to his strength as well as to his weakness. We can adopt this binocular method with the less reluctance because even the fair and moderate view need not cause us the least misgiving.

But while deprecating *trop de zèle* on our side, we are bound to add that it needs discountenancing far more in Germany. Germany is remarkably anxious to make it known that there's nothing rotten in the State. But the official attempts to 'make the worse appear the better cause' are almost childishly transparent. It is difficult to decide whether the Imperial Chancellor, the 'Cologne Gazette,' and the Vice-president of the Reichsbank, all of whom have insisted so loudly on the strength of Germany's economic position, are engaged in a pre-arranged game of bluff, or are the victims of a portentous self-delusion. A really impartial view of the situation is entirely at variance with German official optimism, whether real or assumed. It would almost seem as if deceptive boasts, similar to those which have characterised the Berlin Press bureau, were being used in the home campaign in order to hearten the German taxpayer for the heavy pecuniary sacrifices that lie before him. The only alternative theory is, that those who ought to know the real position are in such a state of ignorance that they cannot distinguish favourable from unfavourable factors, and so read into a superficial prosperity the signs of unassailable stability.

On no other assumptions can the boastings of the

'Cologne Gazette' be explained. In one number it published fabulous statistics of German national wealth and a panegyric of Germany's fiscal policy. In another number it reported at great length a lecture purporting to show that Germany is much more prosperous than England. In a third number a long semi-official telegram from Berlin insisted upon the wonderful harmony between Germany and Austria, the success of the Austrian loan, the confidence expressed by German personages of all sorts, and the fact that there was a temporary improvement in the statistics of unemployment. At a meeting of the central committee of the Imperial Bank not long ago, the vice-president asserted that not only the German money market but the general economic situation in Germany had shown thoroughly satisfactory development. It is noteworthy, too, that the speakers at several company meetings claimed that the mining industry, as a whole, is producing to the extent of about 50 or 60 per cent. of the normal output.

It may be admitted that Germany escaped the full force of the great financial crisis which broke upon England when war was declared; but one not very creditable reason for this comparative immunity was that she owed us many millions sterling on trade account which she has omitted to pay, and which form part of that 'prosperity' of which she has lately been boasting. It is easy to make a pretence of solvency when you are jingling other people's money in your pockets. The quasi-panic in London was largely the product of German financial intrigue. The dumping of securities on our Stock Exchange, the discounting of German bills at the London banks, and the secret removals of gold before the declaration of war, were all part of the elaborate mechanism by which Germany hoped to smash our credit. She avoided for the moment some of the emergency expedients that had to be adopted here. The German Government, for instance, was not forced to guarantee the payment of foreign acceptances, for the simple reason that the balance of indebtedness was very largely and of malice aforethought on Germany's side. Nor was a moratorium resorted to; and much has been made of the fact. But at the beginning of the war the restrictions covering the issue of notes by the Reichsbank

were suspended—a measure which had much the same effect as the suspension of the Bank Charter Act would have had in England. All banks were relieved of the necessity to pay in gold. Although gold imports were made impossible by the closing of the seas to German shipping, yet for a couple of years previously active preparations had been going on with a view to husbanding and increasing the stock of gold in the country.

It is not, however, by the immediate consequences of a war crisis, but by its effects in the long run, that the strain of endurance must be tested. It is too early yet to look for the more serious results of economic pressure in Germany. The great cities, if far from normal, are at any rate not suffering from any close menace of privation. Six or eight months are, of course, no adequate test of the endurance of a rich and determined nation; and it would be foolish to deny to Germany either of these qualities. To a considerable extent, in Germany as in England, the lack of work caused by the war in many branches of trade has been balanced by increased activity in others, bringing down the percentage of unemployment. The manufacture of guns, ammunition, military equipment, airships, and war vessels is going on at the highest possible speed. Although many of the working classes are protected against the pinch of unemployment and even able to earn good wages, this abnormal production does not dispose of the growing feeling of anxiety with regard to trades which are not benefited by the war. The food question depends very much upon the extent of the supplies obtained from or through neutral countries. Germany, at the beginning of the war, had large stores of foodstuffs; and, although there is evident fear of a shortage of wheat, as shown by the official decree for the Government control of the corn supplies and for the strict regulation of the sale of bread, commodities generally are not yet so much above the ordinary level of prices as to suggest the immediate approach of famine. Every day, however, makes the position worse. The food supplies, with a few exceptions, are not being replenished as fast as they are being used. In another six or eight months the outlook will have become graver, and the problem of feeding the people much more difficult.

The economic position depends to some extent upon the military and much more upon the naval position. If Germany were making any appreciable headway in the field, if she were diminishing the superiority of our Fleet over her own, then the economic factors that are beginning to threaten her would at once become of relatively minor importance. A great naval victory would mean for Germany the liberation of her external trade, and would revolutionise as if by a stroke of magic the economic conditions. To recognise a possibility so influential is not, however, to admit its probability. At all events, until it really happens, we need not allow our point of view to be changed, or our measure of the situation to be revised. It would be just as futile to base one's estimate of Germany's economic position upon the most wildly fanciful postulate as to base it on a grotesque minimising of actualities.

It will be useful to take a closer look at the financial position first. Nothing has, perhaps, surprised people in England more than the large and persistent increase in the German Imperial Bank's stock of bullion during the last two years, and especially since the outbreak of the war. From about 70,000,000*l.* in July 1914, the nominal gold-store has risen to nearly 112,000,000*l.* It is, however, by no means certain that this figure represents gold absolutely. We have heard of laths painted to look like iron, and it is not scientifically impossible to paint paper to make it resemble gold. It was stated not long ago that in certain cases the deposit of war stock at the Reichsbank would be regarded on the same footing as gold; and the execution of such a brilliant piece of hypothetics might explain a good deal in the nature of reassuring totals. On this point we have the independent views of such an eminent authority as the Swiss Bankverein, a banking concern in Switzerland with many branches. The Bankverein remarks in a recently published memorandum:

'The issues of the Imperial Government having evidently absorbed all the means which the public has had available or is able to mobilise by pledging securities, the Prussian Government is now said to have issued 75,000,000*l.* sterling,

which loan will be handed over *in toto* to the Reichsbank; the Bank can place the issue to the War Loan Society and will receive thereagainst *notes issued by this Society which the Reichsbank is authorised to regard as gold cover for the issue of an equal amount of its own banknotes.* This procedure amounts in reality to an issue of Reichsbank notes against the Prussian loan, and seems to be adopted with the object of disguising the enormous growth in the fiduciary note issue of the Reichsbank.' (The italics are ours.)

If we assume that the whole of the alleged gold is real tangible gold, how has the increase of 42,000,000*l.* since July been brought about? In the first place, the War Chest, amounting to 12,000,000*l.* in gold, has been transferred from the Spandau fortress to the vaults of the Imperial Bank. Then, doubtless, some part of the stock consists of the proceeds of the new tax collection on fortunes, of which about one-half, or 30,000,000*l.*, should have been paid in just before the war broke out. Much of the gold that was in circulation has been gathered in by the Bank, and extraordinary pressure is still being exercised in all directions to gather in the rest.

If we look at the total gold stock in the abstract, without reference to its relation to the general currency question, the financial position of Germany would appear to be strong. To a certain extent, indeed, it is strong. There is all this gold to draw upon for war expenditure. So long as the stock goes on increasing, or even remains undiminished, the apparent stability of German finance will be satisfactory—to Germany. The real function of a gold store is to guarantee issues of paper money; and, so long as the paper money does not exceed the gold store, except within defined limits and with State security, it is performing this function on sound principles and to the advantage of the community. But Germany's note issue immensely exceeds its stock of gold, always supposing that it is gold. The note issue on Dec. 31, 1913, amounted to 253,000,000*l.* (not counting Treasury notes), as compared with gold in the Reichsbank amounting to about 105,000,000*l.* This means that 148,000,000*l.* of paper had no chance whatever of being redeemed in gold; in other words, Germany is keeping

up the pretence of solvency by means of an inflated paper currency. In the year 1914, during which the Reichsbank's gold stock rose by 44,387,000*l.*, the note circulation increased by 119,463,000*l.*, and the loans and discounts by a sum of 132,590,000*l.*; so that the addition to liabilities proceeded on a much greater scale than that to the gold stock. Sooner or later, the way of inflation is disastrous. No country has ever entered upon that perilous path without being reduced to desperate shifts to put things right. So long as a bank-note will purchase exactly the same as its equivalent in gold, all is well; but so soon as it fails to do so, a premium on gold is virtually established, and the paper currency is proportionately depreciated. In this connexion the Swiss Bankverein drew attention last November to 'the notable depreciation (almost 10 per cent.) in the German exchange,' and remarked that it 'seemed to justify the growing misgivings which are gaining ground in respect of Germany's financial position.' In dealing with the same question, Messrs Samuel Montagu & Co., the great bullion merchants, made the following significant remarks in a recent trade circular:

'The large increase of the gold holding of the German Reichsbank during the past two years acquires grave significance now that its gold reserves may be destined to become the sinews of war. A considerable portion of the gold added to the Reichsbank gold reserves since the commencement of war consisted of the contents of the Spandau War Chest. This accumulation of gold is not being released for ordinary foreign banking purposes, but is being held presumably for war finance alone. As a consequence, Holland for many weeks past has refused to accept German currency except at a discount of between 7 and 8 per cent.'

These rates of exchange show that German paper money is already looked at askance in neutral countries; and before the war is over it will probably be discredited altogether. Nothing short of sweeping and intolerable taxation can save the financial situation and insure Germany's solvency. The Imperial Bank's statement looks very rosy, and no doubt imposes upon the mass of Germans who are unversed in the expedients of

'haute finance'; but American bankers do not appear to think much of it, for they have so far shown a marked reluctance to lend money to Germany in spite of very alluring terms. The 'soundness' is of a more or less superficial character. When the day of reckoning comes, it will be a stormy one. The whole fabric of economic policy is based upon the view held by the high officials, from the Kaiser downwards, that Germany would enjoy a speedy triumph and exact an enormous indemnity. She is, therefore, in the position of a man who has borrowed heavily in all directions on the expectation of a highly problematical windfall. In a word, she has gambled on the chance of victory, and her stakes are become forfeit.

It should be an obvious conclusion from these comments that it is quite possible to attach excessive importance to German estimates of Germany's gold reserve. The real point of interest is the German exchange, in which is found emphatic evidence that the self-gratulations of the 'Cologne Gazette' are not echoed by neutral observers outside Germany.

Meanwhile, the force of economic pressure is steadily going on, implacable, irresistible, and fatal. With her main fleet bottled up in harbour, and most of her marauding cruisers at the bottom of the sea, Germany's foreign commerce—that commerce which she has been so laboriously building up during the last twenty-five years—has almost ceased to exist. Several of her colonies, on the development of which she has spent, first and last, some 50,000,000*l.* sterling, have been taken from her. Whether she will ever recover them depends on the course of events in Europe. For the present, however, we may regard the loss of Togoland, German Samoa, German New Guinea, Kiaochau, and some of the Melanesian Islands as definitive, in which case the trade prospects which were to compensate her for such a huge investment are extinguished for ever. Count Bernstorff's bombastic threat that, if one inch of Germany's possessions, in Europe or elsewhere, be taken from her, she will at once begin another era of bloated armaments, need not trouble us very much. Bloated armaments cost money; and Germany will have quite

enough to do in other directions, without expending her crippled resources on a remote project of revenge. Besides, it is a game two can play at. Anyhow, the threat comes too late to save Germany's possessions, for several 'inches' of territory, formerly German, in the Pacific and Africa have already changed hands.

And these losses will rankle. A craving for colonies is at the root of her frantic policy of expansion. It was her misfortune that these Imperial ambitions were a little belated. She arrived at the hotel after all the best rooms had been taken. Her remedy for this is to try to blow up the hotel, but it seems probable that she will succeed only in blowing up herself. The following comparison is interesting. The British self-governing Dominions with the Crown Colonies and Protectorates have an area of 11,224,000 square miles and a population of 434,000,000; the German Colonies and Protectorates (including, for this purpose, Togoland, German Samoa, and the others which have been seized) have an area of about 1,027,820 square miles and a population of some 14,500,000. In both cases the native races largely predominate, but much more so in the German colonies than in the British. The contrast is greater when we compare the character, progress and intelligence of Germany's largest possessions (those in Africa) with our own overseas Dominions of Canada, Australasia and South Africa. So far, Germany's ambition for a place in the sun has yielded miserably poor results, partly because the Germans are bad colonisers, and partly because there is no land available for them unless they take it by sheer force from someone else.

Not all of Germany's quondam possessions were self-supporting. In German South-West Africa, which includes Damaraland and Namaqualand, the receipts for 1912 were 860,500*l.* and the expenditure 2,250,000*l.*; in the Cameroons the receipts were 316,500*l.* and the expenditure 882,500*l.* The receipts for German East Africa were 624,000*l.* (151,135*l.* of which was State aid) and the expenditure 1,828,250*l.* The disproportion comes out more clearly in the budgetary statements for the current financial year:

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ESTIMATED REVENUES FOR 1913-14 (IN MARKS).

	East Africa.	Cameroons.	Togoland.	German South-west Africa.
Revenue	16,901,628	10,540,928	4,057,136	18,164,832
Government subvention	3,603,687	2,803,696	—	14,626,840
Loan to meet extraordinary expenditure	34,250,000	2,000,000	—	21,350,000
Total	54,755,315	15,344,624	4,057,136	54,141,672

	New Guinea.	Samoa.	Kiaochau.
Revenue	1,994,966	1,132,804	7,234,841
Government subvention	1,419,031	—	9,507,780
Total	3,413,997	1,132,804	16,742,621

The above figures show that an aggregate revenue of over 60,000,000 marks, or roughly about 3,000,000*l.*, is supplemented with Imperial subventions and loans amounting altogether to nearly 90,000,000 marks, say 4,500,000*l.*

In dealing with the exports and imports of the different possessions, we have to rely for the most part on the returns for 1912, those for 1913 not being available.

	Imports.	Exports.
	£	£
German East Africa	2,394,716	1,495,515
Cameroons	1,629,895	1,102,803
Togoland	561,400	498,000
German South-West Africa	1,624,944	1,952,667
German New Guinea	293,600	258,200
Bismarck Archipelago		
Caroline Islands		
Marshall Islands		
Samoa	251,263	252,224
Kiaochau	5,746,900	4,014,750

The imports into Germany from German Colonies amounted in 1912 to 2,645,000*l.*, and the exports from Germany to her Colonies to 2,865,000*l.* The recent fall of Tsingtao (the German headquarters in Kiaochau) will be a heavy loss to Germany. This ambitious enterprise

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cost an enormous sum. The following table shows revenue and expenditure for the last 12 years :

	Ordinary revenue.	Imperial subsidy.	Total expenditure.
	Marks.	Marks.	Marks.
1901-2	300,000	10,750,000	11,050,000
1902-3	360,000	12,044,000	12,404,000
1903-4	455,000	12,353,142	12,808,142
1904-5	505,300	12,583,000	13,088,300
1905-6	636,000	14,660,000	15,296,000
1906-7	1,048,000	13,150,000	14,198,000
1907-8	1,542,700	11,735,500	13,278,200
1908-9	1,725,800	9,739,953	11,465,753
1909-10	3,620,597	8,545,005	12,165,602
1910-11	4,565,206	8,131,016	12,715,884
1911-12	5,124,640	7,703,240	13,538,614
1912-13	6,242,693	8,297,565	14,639,725
1913-14	7,227,625	9,560,000	16,787,625

The two most salient features of these figures are: (a) the remarkable growth of the ordinary revenue, which has multiplied more than 24 times in the period covered; and (b) the heavy contributions made by the Imperial Government. If the subventions made before 1901-2 are included, we arrive at a total of more than ten millions sterling which Germany has invested, over and above the revenue receipts, in this China venture, all of which she stands to lose. Part of the expenditure is classified below, so as to show the cost of civil administration, military administration, and extraordinary expenses respectively, though it must be added that there are other items of expenditure common to both civil and military which help to swell the total.

	Civil expenditure.	Military expenditure.	Extraordinary expenses on works, etc.
	Marks.	Marks.	Marks.
1902-3	799,547	2,368,539	7,375,000
1903-4	907,164	2,434,542	7,470,000
1904-5	984,514	2,403,356	7,697,000
1905-6	1,106,690	2,771,897	9,257,000
1906-7	1,181,628	3,206,925	7,375,000
1907-8	1,246,872	3,339,241	6,230,000
1908-9	1,370,265	3,411,176	4,037,500
1909-10	1,301,105	3,556,449	2,661,300
1910-11	1,775,066	6,157,740	1,775,165
1911-12*	1,362,795	4,010,323	2,075,500
1912-13*	1,308,788	4,040,615	2,032,500

* For these two years we find an expenditure of 2,854,497 marks and 2,934,844 marks respectively under the new head of 'Fiscal Exploitation.'

The loss of her Colonies has had not only direct but also indirect consequences. What threatens to aggravate the monetary position in Germany and the slump in her overseas trade is her inability to sell her own securities anywhere, since neutral markets will regard them with misgiving and her bourses remain closed. London, once the dumping-ground of Europe, occupies that position of maid-of-all-work no longer. In view of the regulations in force to prevent German, Austrian or Turkish selling, even of international securities, on the London Stock Exchange, those countries will have to find some other and more accommodating market, or, as is not improbable, will have to do without any market at all.

If this restriction be taken in conjunction with the severe limitations of German trade, the conclusion presents itself that Germany has virtually to depend, until the end of the war, almost entirely upon her internal resources. Her export trade is killed by the compulsory inactivity of her mercantile fleet; her manufactures are seriously prejudiced by the limitation of imported raw materials; her food supply will probably, by and by, be insufficient for the wants of her population. In a word, the economic pressure will, from now onward, become more and more relentless and effective.

In order to see clearly what commercial consequences are looming ahead, and the extent to which Germany is likely to be affected, it is necessary to consider the trade figures that are available. Germany's budget for 1914 provided for an expenditure, ordinary and extraordinary, of close upon 175,000,000*l.* This was the sum, therefore, that had to be provided in time of peace; and this Imperial revenue had to be raised from posts, telegraphs, customs and excise duties, taxes, the Imperial railways in Alsace-Lorraine, and the matricular contributions of the several component States. The revenue for the previous year was about 184,800,000*l.*, a good deal of which was due to non-recurring expenditure in connexion with the Army changes of 1912. Yet, in spite of her rapidly-increasing national indebtedness, and the steady growth of her annual expenditure, Germany was, up to the outbreak of war, a prosperous nation; and her prosperity would have continued to grow if she had

but been content to live at peace with her neighbours and had not cherished a monomania to control the whole world. But her attitude has always been one of aggression and suspicion. As the thief sees in every bush an officer, so Germany suspected in every precautionary move against her own threatening policy an insidious attempt to take her by surprise. The 'Wehrbeitrag,' or levy on property enacted to obtain the money for hurrying up the new Army law, was nominally a defensive but actually an offensive measure. This graduated tax, both on property and income, falls heavily on the owners of big fortunes and on the richer limited liability companies. It was passed some little time before the war, but, burdensome though it is, it will go but a little way towards meeting the tremendous expenditure necessary in financing the war. For there is the interest on the new War Loans to be provided. The German Imperial debt, funded and unfunded, amounted to 289,844,390*l.* two years ago; and since then a loan of 250,000,000*l.* has been issued and a further loan of unlimited amount authorised. The new debt, if it amounts to 500,000,000*l.*, will mean an extra charge, in interest alone, of 25,000,000*l.* a year—a serious item considering the falling incomes of many of the big trading concerns and the blow already inflicted on the revenues.*

With the collapse of foreign trade comes the necessity for heavier taxation. While the manufacturer is earning very much less, he is called upon to pay very much more; and, while scarcity of employment in many trades is making cheap food a necessity, interference with the importation of food-stuffs is making it an impossibility. Great as are the agricultural resources of Germany—from eight to ten millions of her people are in normal times engaged in agriculture—they cannot be available to anything like their full strength now that so many of the peasant class have been called to the colours. Work on the land is done to a considerable extent by German women; but no amount of female labour can

* The Imperial Budget for the coming year places the ordinary revenue and expenditure at 166,154,076*l.* The revenue in the extraordinary budget is estimated at 4,024,965*l.* and the expenditure at 502,112,100*l.*, of which 498,092,139*l.* will be covered by loan,

compensate for the loss of strong and lusty men in agricultural work. This interest will therefore suffer, though not, at the outset, so much as the manufacturing interest. Both will be called upon to make good by taxes the deficiency in customs dues and in profits on exported goods, and the increase of interest on the rapidly-swelling national debt. To a smaller extent we at home are affected in a similar way. We have to raise new taxes at a time when trade, except in war requirements, is sluggish and in some cases stagnant. But there is this vital difference—our mercantile marine is pursuing its normal course, and will continue to do so in spite of submarines or other menaces. A few ships have been captured or sunk, and a few cargoes confiscated; but, with these trivial exceptions, our import and export trade with all countries, save those directly affected by the war, is going on just the same as usual. We have lost our trade with Germany, Austria and Turkey, and to a great extent that with France, Belgium, Russia, Italy and Switzerland has been crippled, but Germany's disaster is world-wide.

Although it is probable that a good deal of merchandise, food-stuffs particularly, are finding their way into Germany through neutral countries, it is certain that this can only be done by a relaxation of the customs dues, so that whether the import trade is wholly or partially suspended owing to the war, the loss to the revenue is pretty nearly the same. The value of the imports for 1913 was 534,750,000*l.*, the customs duties on which amounted probably to between thirty and forty millions. It may be safely assumed that not more than a third of this sum will be collected during the twelve months beginning Aug. 1, 1914. The case with regard to the exports is infinitely worse. Practically no merchandise is going out of Germany by way of the sea. Her mercantile shipping, which in point of tonnage is the second in the world, is lying idle in port; her great passenger liners are equally inactive; and the exports, which in 1913 amounted to a value of 495,630,000*l.*, are reduced to practically nil. Before the war, these consisted of iron and iron goods, groceries and food products, drugs and chemicals, wool and woollen goods, cotton and cotton goods, anthracite coal and coke,

instruments, clocks, machines and vehicles, earthenware, ores, hardware, art objects, fancy goods, clothing and silk goods. The loss of nearly 500,000,000*l.* sterling in export trade is one that must very seriously affect industrial interests and restrict employment. Germany's trade with the United Kingdom has, of course, come to an end altogether. This amounted in 1913 to 130,000,000*l.*, of which 80,500,000*l.* were exports, consisting principally of sugar, cotton, iron and steel, woollen and silk goods and grain. The chief commodities imported from the United Kingdom were cotton yarn, coal and coke, worsted yarn, machinery, etc., most of which may be looked upon in the light of raw material, and the lack of which will as seriously interfere with German manufacturers as with British exporters. The exceptional activity of the trades concerned in the manufacture of war munitions and military equipment will doubtless alleviate the industrial paralysis in Germany as well as here; but there is all the difference in the world between doing a trade with your own countrymen and doing a trade with the foreigner. The money that Germany is spending in this way is going out at a rapid pace, and there is next to nothing coming in. She is paying huge sums in unproductive work, whereas her productive enterprise is arrested; and big markets, which she has taken so much pains to acquire, are temporarily closed to her.

It is interesting to recall what was said by Herr Possehl a year or two ago (as reported in the 'Daily Express') in an address to the Deutscher Werkverein, wherein he frankly predicted the economic effects of a war and a blockade of German ports. In dealing with the iron and steel industry, he pointed out that it employs 400,000 men, not counting the 700,000 miners. To carry on this trade, more than 12,000,000 tons of ore have to be imported from Sweden, Spain, France and the Mediterranean, as well as from Russia. As Germany could not possibly supply the deficiency caused by the stoppage of these external supplies, the blast furnaces would have to close down, and trade in the interior of the country would be suspended.

'The situation,' continued Herr Possehl, 'applies equally to the great hardware industries of Rhenish Westphalia and of

Silesia ; the raw materials will fail, and the works will have to shut down. The cutting-off of our exports of manufactured goods, of which Rhenish Westphalia produces half, operates in the same way in the event of a blockade. Then comes the great textile industry, with 16,000 mills employing 900,000 men and women, which imports enormous quantities of cotton, wool, raw silk, and so on from overseas, and exports them as finished goods. The total imports and exports reach about 150,000,000*l.* a year. Here no new source of raw materials is possible. The machinery trade, which employs 900,000 workers in 20,000 shops, accounts for exports worth 25,000,000*l.* The chemical industry, the iron-working trade, the supply of foods and drinks, the rubber industry, hides, paper, wood-working and other trades employ hundreds of thousands of workers and contribute enormously to the wealth of the German people.

'I am persuaded,' he declared, 'that a long war, with a blockade of the coast, would mean that one-third of our industrial workers would be without bread ; even if agriculture could temporarily employ a great number of the town workers and various branches of industry were busier than they normally are on war materials, still there would remain about a million workers without a stroke of work to do.'

'Germany's maritime trade and shipping are dead in the event of war,' he concluded. Of Germany's exports and imports to the total value of 900,000,000*l.*, more than two-thirds, he points out, come and go by sea, and 'are consequently at the mercy of the sea power of England.' All the prophecies put forth with such striking candour in this speech have not yet been fulfilled, but they are probably on the way to fulfilment. Economic pressure is not a thing of a day or a week or a month ; it takes time to act, and the longer it takes the more deadly is its action.

The question of foodstuffs, already briefly referred to, is one which has already caused anxiety to the Imperial Government. In order to put the matter without any bias, we will simply quote a few figures from an authoritative German source. Wheat consumption in Germany amounted in 1910-11 to 29,000,000 tons, not counting seed-corn. Of this total, 6,000,000 tons, or nearly 16 per cent., was imported. Population and consumption of

wheat per head have increased without any proportionate increase of agricultural produce. In order to feed the cattle raised in Germany, the import of enormous quantities of fodder has been necessary; and the supply of home-bred meat has only been possible by reason of this unobstructed importation. Even of potatoes there was a shortage in 1911, owing to persistent rain. The net result is that 100,000,000*l.* worth of foods and drinks, including fruit, dried fruits, wines and tobacco, were imported annually. The stoppage of the greater part of this must have a sinister bearing upon the problem of feeding the German nation. The longer the war continues the more serious will become the position. What is but a gentle increase of pressure to-day may become an intolerable burden in a few months' time. That the situation with regard to food supplies is becoming critical may be judged from the fact that a State-supervised company, 'War Cereals, Limited,' was recently formed in Berlin with power to seize private stores of grain. The 'Lokalanzeiger' said recently of this Company:

'Its object is to acquire as much grain as possible, even if necessary by the seizing of private property, and retain it for the last months preceding the new crop. The company works co-operatively; dividends are limited to five per cent.; and on dissolution shareholders only receive par value for their holdings, any surplus going to the State for national purposes. We may therefore rest assured that the feeding of the population has been secured till the next crop, but only on the presupposition that the necessity of exercising the most rigid economy will be recognised by the whole German nation, and that the use of bread will be limited to immediate requirements.'

Since this was written, the Government has stepped in with its control of the wheat supplies and bread allowances of so much per head. Nor is that the only sign of uneasiness. Early in January a semi-official notice was published which indicated that there was considerable apprehension about the future. It recommended the public to lay in supplies of ham, bacon and pickled pork, because, owing to the scarcity of fodder, it was necessary to sell as soon as possible pigs which were ready for killing. In these circumstances it was said to be the duty of everybody who could afford it

and who had, or could rent, storage room, to provide himself with as large supplies as possible of smoked or pickled provisions. Not only should families make this provision, but co-operative societies, hospitals and all large institutions should take advantage of the opportunity. The towns were advised to lay in large stores of frozen meat, in order to assure the supply of the population during the spring and the summer. In this way the surplus stock of pigs which could not be fed any longer would be made to serve the requirements of a time '*when perhaps other provisions will be scarce.*'

Perhaps more important even than a threatened food-scarcity is the actual scarcity of copper. Always a metal of many and various uses, it has been thrust by the war, on account of its indispensability in the manufacture of ammunition, into a new and startling prominence. There has thus been created in Germany a demand which far exceeds that of ordinary times and has led to a corresponding rise in the price that German importers are willing to pay. This rise has tempted merchants in neutral countries to import copper from other neutral countries and to run the risk of shipping it to Germany. The Germans are, nevertheless, still hard put to it to get enough copper for their ceaseless output of war material. Very little is produced in their own country or in Austria. For 1913 the total amount raised in Germany and Austria combined was less than 30,000 tons. Before there was any general apprehension of war, Germany's importation of crude copper had been going on at the rate of 230,000 tons per annum. A good deal of the yearly consumption, which amounted to about 250,000 tons, was undoubtedly applied in the manufacture of shells and cartridges; but, now that these are being used up with such reckless profusion, a huge amount of copper must be required for fresh supplies.

This stimulation of demand coincides with a serious check administered by the British to open trading. Copper, being declared contraband of war, is liable to seizure if intended for an enemy's use—a state of things which makes its direct shipment to Germany almost impossible, or, at all events, is attended with commercial risks that no prudent firm would care to undertake.

The blockade of German ports which has been virtually established prevents the import of copper in the ordinary way and leads to such surreptitious devices as can be utilised with any prospect of advantage. Copper in Germany, notwithstanding these methods, is almost as scarce as gold currency. All sorts of expedients have been resorted to for economising its use and turning it from domestic to military purposes. Some months ago the coinage of copper was stopped; and, although the proportion of this to nickel in the small monies was insignificant, it was made even less. Copper kitchen utensils and all kinds of scrapped copper were diligently collected, and orders were issued that the fragments of shells and spent cartridge-cases found on the battlefields were to be gathered up for the sake of the copper they contained. Neither these economies nor the imports through neutral countries, however, bulked sufficiently large to arrest the rise in the price of copper. At the beginning of the war refined copper could be bought in Germany at the rate of a little over 60*l.* a ton; to-day it is eagerly bought at 170*l.* a ton, and it has been stated that in exceptional cases as much as 200*l.* a ton has been paid. In England, the current price is now about 64*l.*, and the difference between this and the German price is a measure of the relative urgency of demand in the two countries.

The world's total supply of refined copper for 1913 was a little under a million tons; and Germany's consumption amounted to 250,000 tons, just one-fourth. The United States production was about 55 per cent. of the whole; and, as Germany obtained the largest part of its supply—197,353 tons—from the United States, it follows that something like two-fifths of the American output was going to Germany before the war. Some of this was, of course, used in manufactures. Electrical plant must have accounted for a good deal. Copper is a big factor in telegraph and telephone wires and in dynamos. In the form of a sulphate it plays an indispensable part in the dressing of vines to prevent the havoc of the phylloxera. A great many culinary vessels for German use were formerly made of copper. Although the vessels may be dispensed with, and the vines may be neglected, there must be field telegraphs and field telephones, to say nothing of the millions of copper cartridge

cases and the hundreds of thousands of copper-banded steel shells needed for the prosecution of the war. It is not extravagant to believe that, if Germany were prevented from getting any more copper through neutral countries, her powers of resistance would be broken in a few months by shortness of ammunition.

Sir Edward Grey's figures justify the inference that the new supplies obtained through these channels have been considerable. From the beginning of the war down to the third week in September, Italy imported from the United States 36,285,000 lbs., as compared with 15,202,000 lbs. for the corresponding period of 1913. During the same time the combined imports of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Spain and the Balkan States amounted to 35,347,000 lbs. as compared with 7,271,000 lbs. for the corresponding period of 1913. It would be folly to believe that these startling increases are due to any marked growth of industrial activity in the neutral countries themselves. Trade does not jump about in that way. Even if we may suppose that the preoccupation of the belligerents has stimulated the industries of neutrals, it cannot possibly have stimulated it to anything like the extent reflected in the above figures. The sane conclusion is that a good deal of the increased importation has been passed on to Austria and Germany, thus enabling them to prolong the war. But the price is, after all, the best possible indication that the supplies are still insufficient. Germany would not pay 170*l.* a ton and upwards for copper if there were anything like an adequate supply in view. If the scarcity is such as to compel an increase in price of 166 per cent. as compared with the market price elsewhere, what will it be when the neutral countries have put into full operation the more stringent examination which they realise to be obligatory?

Nearly everything that has been said about Germany applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to Austria-Hungary. The principal industry of the latter is agriculture, and it would no doubt be sufficient for the food requirements of the people if the labour conditions were normal. The drafting of so many thousands of men into the armies must have interfered seriously with cultivation; and the outcry already heard about the prices of provisions will

surely become much louder when the fields are left unsown. A nation which by reason of military strain can neither grow nor import food is not far removed from a state of threatened famine. And the pressure of war on Austria-Hungary will not be lessened by the fact that she is certainly not as rich as Germany, while her trade is smaller, and the people of the Dual Monarchy are by no means united.

Austria's estimated revenue for 1913 was 130,728,397*l.*; Hungary's was 86,367,043*l.*, which included the sum set aside annually as a contribution to the service of the General Debt of Austria. Austria-Hungary's foreign trade for 1913 was 141,433,000*l.* in imports and 115,129,000*l.* in exports; and the customs duties played an important part in the revenue figures. Her National Debt of about 304,000,000*l.* will be largely increased by the War Loan recently 'placed' and by further vast expenditure to come. But the most hurtful financial factor, as in Germany, is the embargo put upon her export trade. Her chief exports before the war were beet sugar, grain, cattle, horses, eggs, timber, woollen and leather goods, glass and glassware, and fancy goods. Nearly all these are suspended. The value of Austria-Hungary's exports to the United Kingdom alone amounted in 1913 to 7,706,000*l.*, by far the larger part of which was in sugar. No doubt a certain amount of commercial interchange will still go on between Austria-Hungary and Germany, between Austria-Hungary and Turkey, and between the German powers and neighbouring neutrals; but this will not save them from an enormous falling-off. Germany has in the past invested big sums in Austrian commercial and manufacturing enterprises; and it is estimated that at the present time she has between 100,000,000*l.* and 200,000,000*l.* in these ventures. Those which are devoted to the manufacture of things required for the war will be profitable, but it is not at all likely that much more than a tithe of the total is in this relatively fortunate position.

It is difficult to refrain from smiling when one comes to discuss the financial position of Turkey. In one sense, Turkey has no financial position. She certainly has no financial credit, and, before the present war started, she

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was in the direst financial straits. Her participation in the struggle, at the prompting of the fatuous Young Turk party, will only make the financial confusion worse confounded. To what extent Germany is prepared to give monetary aid to her obedient cat's-paw, no one can tell; certain it is that with a bankrupt Treasury the prospects of the army are very chilly. Not very long ago, France was confiding enough to advance a loan of about 20,000,000*l.* in exchange for certain concessions; and the Powers at the same time agreed to a 4 per cent. increase in the Customs duties and the institution of several Government monopolies. The state of war precipitated by the Sultan has not only made any further financial assistance from the Western Powers impossible, but has seriously affected the interests of the Turkish bondholders, interest on the debt being, of course, suspended, except in the case of the loans secured on the Egyptian tribute. It is believed that French investors hold about 55 per cent. of the total debt, Germans 25 per cent., and English investors barely 20 per cent. The outstanding debt on March 1, 1914, was as under :

LOANS SPECIALLY SECURED ON THE EGYPTIAN TRIBUTE.

	£T
1855 (joint English and French guarantees) . . .	4,196,720
1891 Defence Loan . . .	5,915,712
1894 Egyptian Tribute Loan . . .	7,868,674
	<hr/> £T17,981,106

SECURED ON REVENUES ASSIGNED TO DEBT ADMINISTRATION.

Unified converted debt . . .	37,065,930	
Lottery bonds . . .	10,870,791	
	<hr/>	£T47,936,721
Other loans . . .		63,738,180
		<hr/>
Total . . .		£T129,656,007

In addition, at the end of 1914 there were Treasury bills outstanding for over 20,000,000*l.*, and there have been temporary loans since. Some of these may have been paid off out of the proceeds of the loan provided by France, but in any case the total debt of Turkey to-day is hardly less than 160,000,000*l.*

The T17,981,106*l.* secured on the Egyptian Tribute may be eliminated from calculations as to the ability

of Turkey to meet the service of her debt, because, unless Egypt ceases to be a British Protectorate, as much of the tribute as is necessary is certain to be remitted regularly direct to London. Until the war is over the interest on the rest of the Ottoman debt will remain unpaid, so far as English and French bondholders are concerned. What the German bondholders get will depend very much upon the state of the revenue and the demands of extraordinary expenditure. The revenue for 1914-15 was estimated at T31,921,163*l.*, and the expenditure at T34,007,619*l.* Both will be influenced by the war; the revenue will be much less and the expenditure much greater. The imports for 1911 amounted to 37,774,913*l.*; and the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* duties on the same basis in normal times (excluding tobacco and salt) would be between 3,000,000*l.* and 4,000,000*l.* The exports for the same year were 22,474,818*l.*; and in 1913 Turkey exported to the United Kingdom alone goods of the value of 5,416,659*l.* Her foreign trade is now in the same position as that of the other enemy countries; she can neither import nor export, so that she loses the customs dues on the one hand and the growers' profit on the other. Figs, raisins, barley, fruits, tobacco, wool, mohair and opium are amongst her chief exports, which have hitherto been all to the benefit of agriculture and flock ownership. It does not seem to matter much, in the circumstances, which revenues are assigned to debt administration, because in a state of war it is improbable that any effective means of enforcing payment exist. One of the loans (the 4 per cent. of 1909) is secured on the revenues formerly applied to the war indemnity of T350,000*l.* annually payable to Russia from May 1882. This was paid regularly down to Dec. 31, 1908, when a new convention was signed by Russia and Turkey allowing of the free disposal of the annual instalments for forty years. Where the customs receipts form the security, the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt has, speaking generally, the collection and application of the dues. During war time, however, the remittances to England and France may be looked upon as having no actual existence.

Turkey's desperate need of money is shown by the arbitrary action of the Government in connexion with

the Imperial Ottoman Bank. The Government, it appears, brought pressure to bear upon the local bank authorities with the object of getting them to sanction an issue of 2,000,000*l.* of bank notes. The Directorial Committees having their seats in Paris and London refused their approval, without which the issue would presumably be invalid. The Turkish Government then adopted the high-handed policy of appointing provisionally for the duration of the war an executive committee with its seat in Constantinople, in order 'to make provision for indispensable financial measures.' The negotiations referring thereto are reported to have progressed so far that a definitive result is expected, if it has not already been reached. The Director-General of the Ottoman Bank in Constantinople and the Assistant Director-General declined the Government's proposals, which would have allowed them to remain at their posts under certain conditions.

The Bank in Turkey is therefore in the hands of the tools of the Government; and, although it was originally established by an imperial firman and its head office is situated in Constantinople, most of the capital is French and English, and the shareholders cannot regard without misgiving the appointment of an executive committee obliged to carry out the behests of the war party and its German task-masters. If the position demands these drastic illegalities at a comparatively early stage of Turkey's participation, what may not be expected when a few more crushing defeats, followed by public disillusionment, have made the position of the Government critical and the financial conditions disastrous?

H. J. JENNINGS.

Art. 4.—MUSIC AND THE WAR.

THE unmistakable influence which national convulsions and international wars have had at all times in awakening the highest forces of musical art is one of the most interesting problems of the historian and the psychologist. The evidence is convincing and cumulative. At no time has a great country failed to produce great composers when its resources have been put to the supreme test of war, provided (and the exception is one of the highest importance from the point of view of human nature) that the ideals of the nation are high, that its principles of action are just, and that it possesses a sound incentive to call forth a genuinely patriotic effort. Hence it is as common to find a great artistic movement rising at moments of gravest peril, and even of disaster, as at a period of triumphant success. The individual expressions of the greatest composers, when called upon to celebrate the concrete successes of their countries, have generally been on a level of excellence inferior, often far inferior, to that of their best work. Where Beethoven failed, others of less calibre and inventive force could scarcely hope to succeed. When their thoughts turned upon the realisation of a general conception of greatness, or of the agony of reverses, their highest powers did not fail them. The masterful personality of Napoleon, and his influence for good or evil upon Europe, found a musical expression in the 'Eroica' Symphony, superior in its intensity of emotion and its grasp of the big things in life to any literary biography, however accurate or eloquent. The gathering of Emperors and Kings at Vienna in 1814 only resulted in two compositions by that greatest composer of his age—the 'Battle of Vittoria' and the 'Glorreiche Augenblick'—neither of which can be classed higher than *pièces d'occasion*. The genius, which flashes out almost in spite of itself in everything Beethoven touched, scarcely showed itself for more than an 'Augenblick' in either of them. But the Spirit which moved upon the face of the waters inspired in full measure the pages of the Mass in D. In the last movement of that mighty work, the 'Agnus Dei,' the whole tragedy of war finds

its most sublime expression called forth by the prayer for peace.

It is interesting to note the coincidence of the appearance of greatest composers of various countries with the time of great national danger. The conquest of the Netherlands by Spain and the worst days of the Inquisition in that country, far from stifling music, gave it a strong impetus; it is only necessary to name three composers of renown, Josquin des Prés, Willaert and Roland de Lattre (Orlando di Lasso), out of a bevy of glittering talent. The same period of stress saw the rise of Palestrina and Gabrieli in Italy, and of Goudimel in France. The Spanish wars and the Armada peril resulted in an equally strong outburst of artistic life in England. Tallis, Byrd, Morley, Orlando Gibbons and the Elizabethan madrigalists gave England the right to its title of a 'Nest of singing birds'; just as in the older and less chronicled days of Henry V, the name of Dunstable, the father of modern choral music, still shines through the fog of obscure records, and a setting of the 'Song of Agincourt' still lives in its original manuscript to prove its title to fame. The Civil War and the period ending in the Revolution of 1688 saw the zenith of the career of Henry Purcell. The sufferings and interminable struggles of Germany during the reign of Louis Quatorze in France and of Frederic the Great were coincident with the appearance of Sebastian Bach in Thuringia and of Handel in Saxony. The international turmoil which extended over Central Europe with little cessation down to 1815 saw a succession of musical giants, Couperin and Rameau in France, Gluck in Vienna, Haydn in Croatia, Mozart in Tirol, Beethoven (a Netherlander) in the Rhineland, Schubert in Vienna, Weber in Dresden, Cherubini (a Florentine) in Paris, Rossini in Italy. In later times the Revolutions of 1848 and the fermentations which surrounded them found their musical expression in Wagner and Brahms to the east of the Rhine, and in Berlioz and Bizet to the west; and Chopin appeared at the moment of Poland's greatest trials. The struggle for Italian unity is even symbolised in the very name of Verdi. The renaissance of Russia and its manifold successes and reverses are marked by the name of Glinka, and an ever-increasing roll of

remarkable creators of a national school, Tchaikowsky, Rimsky-Korsakoff, Moussorgsky, Glazounow, and many more of consistently high aim and sparkling vitality.

Psychologists will, however, not fail to note that the greatest men arose precisely in those countries which had the highest ideals and which fought to maintain them. Invention was not stimulated by aggression or by greed, while it reached its highest level where the incentive for action was founded upon justice, patriotism, and the maintenance of freedom. As soon as Beethoven saw that Napoleon's aims were guided by personal ambition, he tore the dedication off the score of the 'Eroica,' and trampled on it. With tragic satire he changed the superscription to the words 'per festeggiare il sovvenire d'un gran uomo.' The 'gran uomo' was very much alive (1804); and the memory Beethoven celebrated was that of the greatness which was shattered, for the composer, by Napoleon's assumption of the Imperial title. France had no equivalent to show. Aggression did not stimulate the artistic brain. The only composer of great merit whom she possessed was not of her nation; Cherubini was an Italian to his finger-tips. The stimulus of the Revolution had produced one immortal melody, the Marseillaise; its excesses temporarily throttled the music of the nation. As it recovered from them, the national inventiveness began to reassert itself. The stars of Berlioz, Bizet, and Auber arose, to be followed in recent years, as the influence of old aggressiveness faded away and the higher principle of the defence of freedom and of country became irresistibly stronger, by a remarkable outburst of artistic life; not so powerful, perhaps, as the similar manifestation in Russia, but arising from the same incentive.

The appearance of a school of American music dates, as might be expected, from the Civil War of the Sixties. The North fought for a great cause, and from the North that movement has come. In poetry a new note was sounded by Walt Whitman in the West, answering the trumpet call of Tolstoi in the East. In music the beginning was made, although a nation of such recent growth, and consisting of so many still unamalgamated elements, could not be expected to strike out a new and individual path. Nations have to grow old with a folk-music of

centuries behind them before they express themselves in unmistakable terms of their own nationality. The ingredients have to be mixed and boiled before the dish is served. Upon this point von Bülow and Dvořák were equally positive; both agreed in the prophecy that with patience the day of American music would come.

The remarkable rehabilitation of Britain as a music-producing country dates from the same period. Our insular position has to some extent militated against foreign recognition of the enormous stride which this country has made in the last thirty-five years; but the chief stumbling-block in the way of appreciation has been the attitude of Germany. Europe has long looked up to Germany as the best judge as well as the best producer of music, whereas she has for the last two decades been living solely on the reputation of her past; and her stubborn denial of value to any British productions has hypnotised the rest of Europe. The facts, however, are alike distinctive of the value of her judgment, and proof positive of the cause which underlies it. 'There are none so blind as those who will not see'; and Germany has refused to see. The tendency, growing year by year since 1870, and with amazing acceleration since 1896, to admit no rivalry, however friendly, to build up frontiers against art, even to use her all-powerful Press Bureau to stamp out any sign of appreciation of good foreign work, has been patent to all who have come into close contact with them. Treated with respect, courtesy, and admiration when they come to this country as our guests, the Germans persistently made it clear that in none of these qualities will they show the least approach to reciprocity.

The reason is not far to seek. The ideals which alone can nourish art have faded away, and aggression pure and simple has taken their place. The creators of great musical work have vanished from their midst, and they are critical and clever enough to know it. Hence the decision, 'If we cannot do these things ourselves, we shall take good care not to admit that other nations can, and more especially that Great Britain can.' So they bang and bolt their own door, while expecting that the doors of other nations will stand wide for them. The better judgment and broader views of a

section of Germans, and that no small one, are hectored into quiescence by an all-powerful clique. The German masses never protest, and take everything, as the saying is, 'lying down.' Not the least suggestive sign of the general submissiveness is the absence of printed correspondence in their multitudinous daily papers. So long ago as 1887, Hans von Bülow lamented the attitude of the '*compositeurs indigènes, lesquels profitent de la très regrettable tendance actuelle du chauvinisme pour protester contre mes principes cosmopolitiques en matière d'art.*' What was but a 'tendency' then, has crystallised in recent times into a creed. When the German Press brings its ammunition to bear upon foreign music—even such as is accepted and acclaimed by its public—it rarely fails to interlard its columns with political innuendoes, even to the point of rebuking for unpatriotic temerity, such promoters of performances as are broad-minded enough to look beyond their own frontier. Against this brick wall of insulated prejudice Art runs its head in vain.

The modern developments of German music since the death of Wagner and of Brahms throw a light, if a lurid one, upon the trend of German character. The anti-militarist and peace-loving nations outside, more especially in England, have, with the exception of a few men of deeper insight and more intimate knowledge, treated these specimens of art-production as if they were hardy and mature growths from a sound parent stem. They have failed to see that they are but suckers, taking on the appearance of the old tree, but sapping its life-blood at the root. The essence of German militarism has been reliance upon numbers, rapidity of concentration, perfection of machinery, repression of individual initiative, and in action the attack in close formation of which this repression is the necessary corollary. In their recent music, all these elements can be clearly traced. Richard Strauss is the counterpart of Bernhardt and the General Staff. He relies increasingly upon the numbers of his executants, upon the technical facility of his players, upon the additions and improvements to musical instruments, upon the subordination of invention to effect, upon the massing of sounds and the superabundance

of colour to conceal inherent poverty. A review of his career is convincing of these facts. Strauss began work as a writer of chamber-music, which to any eye of average critical ability is but 'Capellmeister-musik' of a fairly distinguished order. He found this would not do, and that pale quasi-Brahms was not a passport to notoriety. So he threw Brahms, for whom he had apparently all the admiration of a would-be follower, overboard; even characterising in a never-to-be-forgotten gibe a work of his own, which bore that mark, as 'nearly as bad as Brahms.' He began to sit at the feet of Wagner and still more of Liszt, the greatest of executants and most fascinating of men, but none the less the emptiest and most pretentiously bombastic of composers, whose undisputed pianistic supremacy hid from his hearers the barrenness of his invention. Wagner was drawn upon for his orchestration, Liszt for his efforts to apply the stage to the concert-platform in the shape of programme-music.

Thus equipped, Strauss set out to conquer the world by force and surprise, when he knew that he was powerless to do so by charm or beauty. He established a new order of Capellmeister-musik, so rich in colour and in machine-made effects that only the acute observer could see the old Capellmeister-musik still lurking there, disguised in glittering garments and so loud and flamboyant as to conceal its real vacuity. But the older influences for good could not be obliterated at a blow. In his earlier incursions into programme-music-land they survived enough to give artistic interest. 'Tod and Verklärung' ('the hospital-ward affair,' as one of his own most celebrated compatriots described it) has elements of beauty in it, though its close, which is its best moment, owes everything to Brahms' Requiem. 'Don Juan' contains a theme which is beautiful *per se*, and reaches a level which its composer never again approached. It is also full of a certain dash and youthful exuberance which carries the hearer along with it without giving him time to analyse the component parts.

From that day, Strauss' record is one of steady decadence. The means are multiplied as the invention wanes. He glorifies Nietzsche in 'Zarathustra,' in strains under which that philosopher would have writhed. He

sets Bernhardi to music in 'Heldenleben,' not indeed taking him or even a Napoleon for his hero, but with sublime egotism glorifying himself. To succeed in this he uses old themes of his own, obviously because, as the context shows, he was unable to hit upon any so good. He makes his climaxes out of the well-known sounds and combinations familiar to any musician who knows his 'Nibelungen' or his 'Tristan,' and adopts them with such a bold face that criticism, which would expose the imitation if it appeared under any other name but that of Strauss, is reduced to silence, and even forgets the origin of his effects. He cannot even leave the domestic hearth and the innocence of childhood alone, but blares at infancy with tubas and trombones. In his view Blake should have been a Boanerges in the nursery, howling Treitschke instead of baby rhymes; and the bath should have been sown with floating mines. In his stage work the decadence is even worse. Beginning with a pale reflex of Wagner in 'Guntram,' it would seem as if the later morals of Berlin promised quicker returns. He treads on risky ground in 'Feuersnoth,' presses Oscar Wilde into his service in 'Salome,' outrages all the ideal spirit of Greek drama and violates its first principles of keeping horrors from the public gaze in 'Electra,' and finally lets himself and such art as he has left roll in the gutter and bespatter himself and his hearers with the mud of 'the Legend of Joseph.' For this supreme anti-climax of a career for which many had such hopes, he, because his name was Richard Strauss, was honoured by the Alma Mater of Cranmer, of Laud, of Gladstone and of Newman. He has not, like his compatriots, repudiated the Oxford degree.

For such a *débâcle* there can be no feeling but one of the deepest regret, which is not softened by the consideration that the approach of inevitable disaster was but gradual. There will be no rejoicing over such a catastrophe in any land where music is loved. The causes are not so much the fault of the individual as of the system which has undermined his judgment and his better self. In the world of Pan-Germanism, Strauss is but an unconsidered cypher, apart from his celebrity in art. The canker of militarism has eaten into his system as it has into that of the most peaceful of his

compatriots. It has throttled his invention, and compelled his colossal technique to serve its own purposes. A glance at the volumes of marching songs, which he arranged (by Imperial order) for the soldiers, affords the most vivid proof of this slavery to Junkerdom. Where simplicity, cleanness, and clearness of treatment are imperative, there is a seeking after crudity and a crookedness of expression, which in a less-known man would be set down to inexperienced and ignorant technique. To get even the obedient Teutonic rank and file to sing them at all would certainly require the menace of the officers' revolvers.

It is somewhat curious, and it is also a sign of the times, not only that a strain of the old musical sanity still lingers in Germany, but that its isolated exponent is almost snowed under. His works may be few, but their value is a more than equivalent counterpoise to their paucity. Two diamonds are a greater possession than a cartload of stones. Humperdinck provides the only oasis in a desert of cacophony. The 42 cm. shells of his brethren create such a din and stupefy so many with their fumes, that he is, for the moment only, a solitary and almost unnoticed figure. But he loves children, and the purity which appeals to them; and he stands alone, a living protest against the cruelty and barbarity of his country. He may sign as many professorial protests against other nations as he likes; his work belies the tenets to which his signature is set, suggests the pressure applied to secure the support of those of his kidney, and is far less indicative of self-advertisement than the abstention of his noisier colleague. He is a disciple of Wagner, it is true, but of the best in Wagner; the Wagner that knew and appreciated Palestrina, that laid his foundation upon folk-song, the Wagner of the 'Siegfried Idyll,' of the 'Meistersinger' and of 'Parsifal,' not the Wagner of unbridled excitement and sensuality. He writes music and does not confound it with chemistry. It is clean; and that quality, unfortunately, is not the fashion in his country now, any more than it was in the France of 1870. In that, as in many other particulars, the rôle of the two nations has been entirely reversed in the short space of forty years. It is the old story of the demoralisation of the *nouveau riche*. It explains

how it came about that the possession of a great literature of noble folk-song, which in the Napoleonic troubles and the heroism they compelled found fruit of indigenous and characteristic growth and savour in Körner and in Weber, and in 1870 in Karl Wilhelm and the 'Wacht am Rhein,' has to turn to England for the melody of 'Heil dir im Siegeskranz' and to Croatia for that of 'Deutschland über Alles.'

The war of 1914 has brought about a convulsion in the world of music. The results which will ensue are almost as hard to forecast as those of the Conference which will delimitate the frontiers of Europe. The music-centre of the European nations will, as a dominant factor, cease to count. Financial considerations alone must so cripple Germany that it will for decades to come be unable to preserve its Opera-houses and its Concert Institutions at a sufficient height of efficiency to attract the hosts of students and of music-lovers which congregated there. The loss is prodigious, and it must be supplied. The love of the art and the creative incentive of the composer will not cease with the explosion of the last shell. Public taste and public spirit will demand the revival and continuance of the arts of peace. A substitute must be found for the country which has for so long, though of recent years to a smaller extent, been the Mecca of musicians, old and young. It will be a distinct gain in many ways if the land which has been overmanured should be allowed to lie fallow for a time. Better crops may be raised on more virgin soil. We have our own to our hand. England at last has the chance of her life; but, if she is to take it, she must break away for good and all from the influences which have for so long strangled her efforts.

Those influences are, first, the inveterate preference shown by the higher ranks of Society for the foreigner, and, next, the equally inveterate and unfounded disbelief in, and consequent discouragement of, its compatriots. Such encouragement as these have got in the past has been, by the irony of fate, not a little owing to the active assistance of the immigrant foreigner. The first champion of recent British music was August Manns, a Prussian bandmaster. The second was Carl Rosa, a

Hamburg violinist. The former did yeoman service for the orchestral composer, the latter for the operatic. Neither got much encouragement from any above the ranks of the middle classes, but they did not take their hands from the plough. Manns made his large public listen to new native works by combining them with attractive and well-known masterpieces, following the policy by which Jullien popularised Beethoven in earlier days. Rosa risked more, for an English opera had to stand by itself; but he believed in the power of this country to produce and to perform, and was rewarded by the success of his ventures as long as he lived to control their destinies. His enthusiasm infected Augustus Harris, who at the time of his early death at the age of forty-four was working hard in the direction of National Opera.

Meanwhile all the pro-foreign influences were as hard at work as they had been in the days of Handel, that gigantic trampler upon national aspirations. As George III supported the great Saxon who had overwhelming genius to back him, so successive generations of the leaders of Society carried on the tradition, extending their patronage even down to the preference for foreign musicians for dances and entertainments. The last connexion of the English executant with the State, the King's Band, which was a permanent institution dating back to the reign of Edward IV, was abolished only within the last few years. Its place was taken by Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians; not on account of their superior ability, for the English players were in every respect their masters. When this example was set, smaller fry profited by it, and most London functions followed suit. Even the theatres and music-halls copied the policy of their patrons; and only a few good men and true, such as Irving, stuck by their country. The musical strength of Germany is well known and proved to have been fostered and solidified by the unfailing encouragement and support given without stint by the numerous heads of small states, such as Weimar, Schwerin, Meiningen, as well as by the larger Courts of Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria. In time their example stimulated great, and even small, municipalities to follow on the same lines. Dresden at one time favoured the Italian

to the exclusion of its own compatriots; national feeling was too strong for it, and Weber slew the invader. From that day, though Italian and French work was performed, it had to be performed in the German language. France, Italy, Russia adopted a similar policy, and became formidable competitors, the last an overwhelming one.

In England we had no such influences as the lesser courts of Germany provided, to direct taste into patriotic channels. We continued to feed British ears with every sound and language save our own. Not, be it clearly understood, from lack of talent. While the North can breed the finest choral singers in the world, there can be no lack of voices. When every foreign conductor knows and even allows himself to admit, that British orchestras are unsurpassable for tone, temperament and executive skill, there is no excuse for underrating them. When the 'Nibelungen' can be sung (not shouted) on the stage by British singers in a way to compel the unstinted praises of its first Baireuth conductor, there can be no famine of artists for far less exacting operas. No one who has had personal or intimate knowledge of German opera-houses and German singers and orchestras can deny that, apart from the long experience born of unbroken routine, Great Britain is their superior in freshness, in beauty of tone and in elasticity of interpretation. Wagner, when he visited London in 1877, openly expressed his preference for the use of the English language in the English presentation of his operas. He knew, as we should know, if we were not such inveterate depreciators of our own possessions, that the language which was good enough for the Bible, Shakespeare and Milton, is good enough for the operatic stage, provided that it is written in a style worthy of the literature of the country. Wagner's wishes were carried out by Mr Frederick Jameson, in translations of the 'Ring' and of the 'Meistersinger' which will stand comparison with any German translations of foreign works. What Mr Jameson began we have plenty of literary men to complete, as soon as their services are required.

Even in the difficult and subtle task of translating German lyrics, we have abundant proof of the ability of English poets to grapple with it, in the masterly translation of Tieck's 'Magelone-Lieder' by Andrew Lang,

a rendering no whit inferior to the original, even though hampered by the necessities of fitting the syllables to Brahms' voice-part. Ignorance of the English language has too often induced foreign publishers to print ridiculous and childish translations to their vocal productions, and has led unthinking and prejudiced persons in this country to enlarge upon the so-called unsuitability of our language for music. They forget the beauty with which it clothes the 'Messiah'—its sonorousness when well chosen, its extraordinary wealth in subdivisions of vowel sound—and they class all poetry for music in the same category as that of the Poet Bunn. There have been as yet only spasmodic efforts to produce works which require carefully thought-out English to illuminate them. The earliest attempt of recent days, that of Carl Rosa, was directed by himself; and, being a German, he could not be expected to apply severe literary criticism to what he saw. Nowadays we can do not only better, but superlatively well. In scenery and scenic effects we not only hold our own with other countries but even surpass them; and there is no reason why, in a country fresh to the business, we should not strike out as individual a note of our own as the Russian artists do.

All this has been accomplished not only without help from the influential and monied classes in this country, but in spite of their apathy. It has been work all along against the collar. That it has been persisted in without faltering is the greatest proof of the healthy vitality of the artistic heart of the country. The time has now come when England can show whether she is going to be true to herself, or to be content to let others reap the harvest which is ready to her hand. The magnet is removed from central Europe; is England, 'whence' (as Brahms said in 1896) 'you will see great things come,' going any longer to prefer the foreign voice to her own? Will she only accept a compatriot if he changes his name by the addition of a '*vitch*' or a '*ski*,' whitens his hands, and lets his back-hair grow well over his collar? Or is she going to see where the real stuff is, and to give her own sons and daughters at least an equal chance in the race for success? If the lead is given, she will go ahead. If it is not, no amount of musical taste in the masses (and there is no lack of it) will be able to rescue her.

This popular good taste, which is more deep and far-reaching than the inhabitants of Mayfair and Belgravia imagine in their wildest dreams, and of which one visit to an East End Sunday Chamber Concert would convince them for good (if they have forgotten or ever knew the orchestra seats at the Monday Popular Concerts), is ready to support and carry to victory any honest effort if the rich and well-to-do determine to turn over a new leaf and to do their duty by their own race. It is not by any means necessary that the leaders should be endowed with musical taste, or should even know one note from another. They must look at the art as an essential part of national evolution and refinement, as they look at the National Gallery and the British Museum. No man need be a literary critic or even a great writer to grasp the importance to the nation of the possession of a sound and wide literature, nor need he be a painter or a judge of pictures to gauge the value of the masterpieces of great artists. If they grasp the importance of all arts as a national asset, that conviction will be enough to induce them to extend their assistance to all arts alike, irrespective of personal predilection for any one of them. Hitherto all arts in this country have profited by this spirit except one—music. It is not too late to include in its proper place that art which ancient Greece, at the climax of her intellectual supremacy, valued as high as, if not higher than, any other.

Much has been said and written, unfortunately not without dire cause, about the disastrous effects of the war upon the arts and their exponents. None of them has escaped, but music has suffered the most heavily of all. This, in view of the conditions in the past, is only natural. It has earned far less than its colleagues, and has therefore less savings from better days to rely upon. Society, however, has not scrupled to call upon half-ruined singers and players to give their services to help to swell subscriptions for charitable purposes. They have come forward without grudging, and have themselves furnished many to fill the ranks of the Army on active and auxiliary service. After the stress is over, there will be a debt to pay, not for services given in war-time, but for service available in peace-time.

When that day comes, will Society turn its back on artists who were good enough for the purpose when the gentlemen with foreign prefixes and surnames were not procurable? There is but one answer; it cannot, if it is loyal; it must not, if it is honest. If it goes one step further than obligation, and substitutes cordial support for cold acknowledgment, the day of British music will be dawning, and the sky will clear.

Another serious problem confronts the musical world, which, although not patent on the surface at the moment, is bound to call for solution in no long time. Germany has been the centre not only of production but also of publication. The commercial ramifications, which it has so sedulously fostered for so long, include one which is as far-reaching as any other. It has supplied the world with printed editions of the works of the great masters, and of many modern composers. These outworks will also be destroyed, together, very probably, with the stability of the firms from which they are issued. The supply of English music of what may be called the serious type—chamber-music, orchestral works and the like (and quantities of it are in existence)—are mostly in manuscript upon their composers' shelves. If the writers had been 'made in Germany,' most of their works would have been procurable by the public long ago. Being writers in a country where publishers follow the trend of Society, and disbelieve, or at any rate argue that the public disbelieve, in British work, they cannot find their way into print, still less obtain the smallest value for it. The consequence is obvious in every music-seller's window—a row of royalty ballads. The exceptions are sufficiently few to prove the rule. When a German composer, even a beginner and little known, produces a work in his own country, the publishers congregate to hear it, and to form their judgment upon its suitability for print. If an English work is produced, the English publisher is at his own fireside; he knows nothing of its fate and cares less. Even the favourable comments of the press will fail to move him to consider at second-hand the claims of any work which does not fall into the category of large profits and quick returns. A string-quartet, an orchestral symphony or concerto, would

be looked upon as matters far too ephemeral to be considered in the same breath as a three-verse song with organ obligato. Their author will be pitied for wasting his valuable time on visionary ideals.

This antiquated Philistinism must be superseded if British music—that is to say, the music which counts—is to have its chance. Performance from manuscript is equivalent to isolated performance. Repetition alone will make a fine work tell. Repetition will not tell unless it spreads outside the bounds of the original producer. It cannot spread without the intervention of print. The more serious type of music is not appreciably more lucrative abroad than it is here. Its profits are nearer 5 per cent. on the capital that is invested in it than the 100 per cent. which an English publisher fixes as the minimum of a successful venture. But canny Germany was content all the same to receive the smaller dividend on sounder bonds, while not abstaining from more lucrative ventures to supplement them. It saw that the ephemeral, without the lasting work at its back, would not enhance the credit of the country or the fame of its publishing houses, and became thereby the home of the celebrated editions of Sebastian Bach, Handel, Beethoven, Schubert *et hoc genus omne*, while throwing a willing ægis over contemporary work. But these monumental editions are gone, and can now only be saved for posterity by photography, the metal upon which they are engraved having been absorbed by Krupp; their place must be taken somewhere and by somebody enterprising enough to secure them. Why not by England, equally with Germany the admirer and devotee of those great masters?

A leading publisher in America—which is to all intents and purposes a new field for music, and a land where commercial interests are paramount—lately said that he made it a rule to include a solid percentage of high-class music in his catalogues, even if they spelt a deficit in themselves, for the credit of his house and of his country. The sooner it is brought home to the English music-publisher that the credit of a nation's output depends in the main upon music of the highest class, not upon choral works which are only for English consumption and require translation to reach foreign nations, or upon

works written for the English Church which are unsuitable for any other, or upon ephemeral pianoforte music, or, least of all, upon worthless ballads and part-songs, the better will be the outlook of this nation in the world of art. It is not the time for ploughing lonely furrows, still less for attacking foreign firms merely because they are foreign, whose record for the production of good music is far healthier than the bulk of our own. We must do better than they, and gain thereby the respect and confidence of the musical world. The day when the chief Berlin publisher of his time was able to state without fear of possible contradiction that a 'good composition published in England was a lost composition, killed by its rubbishy surroundings,' must, if only for our national credit, go, and go for good. 'By their works ye shall know them' is as great a truism as it was 2000 years ago; but the works must be procurable.

War has its blessings as well as its curses. One of the greatest of its blessings is the awakening of patriotism. Much has been written about patriotism in business, and its utilisation to give stimulus to the nation's inventions and manufactures. Little has been said about its influence in the arts, and especially in music, the wholesomest aid to patriotism in the field and outside it. To stimulate artistic patriotism is the need of the moment; we must cultivate a trust in British ideals and British effort at least as great as other nations have long shown in their own. If this patriotism has been long dormant, it is not too late to wake it. If it is restricted in amount, it can be extended. But the need of the moment is a lead, and a strong lead, not in the direction of exclusion of the best from without, but of the encouragement of all that is good within; and, given conditions of equal ability, a preference to the men and the productions of our own country.

CHARLES V. STANFORD.

Art. 5.—THE ABANDONMENT OF THE GOLD STANDARD.

THE Great War will be long remembered for other things besides the destruction of life and the reconstruction of the map of Europe. On the financial side the most notable event was the universal abandonment, for the time being, of the gold standard. The abandonment, varied in extent, was effected by different devices in different countries, and was described in the kind of language that is familiar from the bulletins of defeated armies; it was not in reality an abandonment at all, but only a temporary retirement under the guidance of the higher financial command.

The two principal forms assumed by the abandonment were the Moratorium and Inconvertibility. The two forms are in essence the same. Inconvertibility is generally applied to bank notes; it means that the bankers are authorised to refuse to meet their promises to pay in gold on demand. There is, however, besides this open inconvertibility *de jure*, a disguised inconvertibility *de facto*, which may be the more dangerous because hidden. A moratorium means that all debtors (not specially excluded) are authorised to postpone the fulfilment of their monetary obligations. Germany adopted at once the method of inconvertibility, and prided itself on not being obliged to adopt the moratorium; but inconvertible notes were issued on such terms and to such an extent that a moratorium was not needed. France adopted both methods. The United Kingdom adopted openly the method of moratorium, and in a disguised manner the method of inconvertibility. English people will long remember the beginnings of the Great War, when some of the London banks refused to give gold for Bank of England notes and people were forced (or delighted) to receive postal orders as legal tender. They will long remember also the advent of the new sin of hoarding gold and the new virtue of turning it out of their pockets into the banks. With the war the whole duty of the private man as regards gold was declared to be total abstinence; the proper place for gold (so it was preached) was a bank; and the proper business of the bank was to hoard it.

For a time the banks were commanded by the Treasury not to pay out gold. The order of the day was disguised inconvertibility.

The abandonment of the gold standard by the respective nations, each within its own borders, was still more marked as regards foreign payments. England was a large creditor; and, failing other modes of remittance, large sums of gold were due in London on the outbreak of the war. But the foreign debtors with one consent hoarded their gold. The essential idea of a banking reserve was lost sight of. A reserve is intended to meet an exceptional strain. In ordinary times it is useless; it is never drawn upon to any marked extent; there is always an apparent over-abundance. But on the outbreak of the war the great banks refused to part with gold, especially for foreign payments. Six months after the outbreak of the war the banks of France, Germany and Russia had actually increased* their enormous stocks of gold. Such a general abandonment of the gold standard could not have taken place unless the monetary evolution had long since been tending in that direction. A short historical survey seems the best way to explain both the nature and the extent of this abandonment and the promptitude with which it was effected.

Down to the conclusion of the Franco-German war of 1870-71, gold and silver were, generally speaking, on an equal footing as standard money. In India and the Far East silver was the sole standard and the principal metallic money. In some of the most important Western countries (e.g. France and the countries forming the Latin Union and the United States) the double standard prevailed; gold and silver were legal tender to any extent at a ratio fixed by law, and the mints were equally open to both metals. In the United Kingdom gold was the standard, and silver was only used for token coins.

* At the end of January 1915 the holdings of gold, compared with January 1914, showed for the Bank of France an increase of 28,034,000*l.*; for the Imperial Bank of Germany 44,879,900*l.*; and for the Bank of Russia 4,002,000*l.* But, *per contra*, the note circulation of France had increased by 183,184,000*l.*; that of Germany by 130,390,000*l.*; and that of Russia by 136,995,000*l.* All these notes are legally inconvertible.

So long as this state of things lasted, although there were no formal international agreements, practically a certain amount of silver all the world over would always command a certain amount of gold (within very narrow limits), so that for ordinary purposes and for banking and international trade the two metals were interchangeable to any extent.

This system, which *de facto* had great stability* and great advantages, was upset by the action of Germany on the conclusion of the Franco-German war. This action of Germany was due, like all the main lines of her recent economic policy, to the imitation of Britain. Germany thought that British commercial supremacy and the predominant position of the London money market were largely due to the gold standard. Therefore Germany determined to have a gold standard, and set about what was called the demonetisation of silver. This action of Germany upset the balance of the two metals, and they were no longer interchangeable in the same way. A given amount of silver would not obtain the usual amount of gold but a less amount. Silver was depreciated, and the depreciation increased. The consequence was that other nations found it necessary or desirable to make gold the only standard. In order to do this they put the silver (which they held in large quantities as standard money) in some kind of dependent relation to gold, the nature of the relation varying in the different countries.

This process of readjustment took a very long time; and during that time there was a continuous fall in prices and a great depression of trade, the fall in prices reaching its lowest depth in 1896. The difficulties in the general adoption of the single gold standard were greatly increased by the falling-off in the supply of gold. In course of time, however, practically all the nations of the world put themselves on the gold basis; and all the great financial and commercial transactions of the world came to be conducted on this standard. The actual monetary contracts were no doubt expressed in terms of

* The normal ratio of silver to gold (15½ to 1) was practically unaffected by the great wars of the century and the great changes in the relative production of gold and silver.

the various national currencies, but all of these were ostensibly linked up with the gold standard. As it happened, since 1896 this universal adoption of the gold standard was greatly facilitated by the largely increased production from the mines. Before the outbreak of the present war it seemed as if the new gold was sufficient not only to provide for this universal adoption of the gold standard, but also to cause a general rise in prices. Certainly the common opinion in financial circles is that, just as the fall in prices before 1896 was due to a decrease in the gold supplies, so after that date the rise in prices has been due to their increase.

Unfortunately, however, during the process of getting rid of silver as an alternative standard and making gold the sole standard, there grew up very hazy ideas on the nature and the uses of a monetary standard. These hazy ideas were made the basis of important changes in financial practice. The ultimate effect was that, even before the outbreak of the war, gold had in reality become less effective as a monetary standard than it was in the days when its dominion was supposed to be shared equally with silver. The reason is that in various forms and to various degrees the pernicious principle has been adopted of deferred or suspended or delocalised or denationalised convertibility. Ostensibly, with the adoption of the gold standard all monetary obligations were to be met in gold; but practically all sorts of expedients have been invented to 'economise' (as it is euphemistically called) the use of gold. This 'economy' has now reached its limit with the introduction of legal inconvertibility in three of the great nations concerned; in the fourth the inconvertibility is disguised.

The degree of the change in opinion and practice may be realised by reference to the bimetallic controversy. Then the great argument of the gold standard purists was that in the natural course of things silver would depreciate. Therefore it was said that, if debtors (governmental or private) could discharge their debts in silver, they would do so, and the British gold creditors would suffer. Bankers in particular were horrified at the idea that promises to pay in gold could be made good by payments in silver, or in currency or credit based on silver. The stability of the London money

market, and with it the stability of British trade, were supposed to be dependent on the maintenance of the gold standard in the strictest and most absolute form. The adoption of the gold standard by Germany confirmed this view. Now the banker who made a wry mouth at a silver spoon will eat paper like an ostrich.

This strict maintenance, before the present war, of the gold standard in the United Kingdom, where it had been effectively established since the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, was an easy matter; it was only necessary to observe the old maxim—‘*quieta non movere*.’ But in other countries, where silver had been standard money, the real establishment of gold as the sole standard was a matter of great difficulty. In France, for example, silver was still full legal tender, though the mintage was restricted; and in that country the double standard had given way to what was known as the limping standard (*étalon boiteux*). In India, although the dominant metallic money is still silver, silver is not the standard; nor on the other hand has the gold standard been effectively adopted, but only that modification of it which in these latter days has come to be called the gold-exchange standard. Its opponents call it the gold standard without gold. The essence of this standard is that, by the limitation of the coinage of rupees and by other devices, fifteen silver rupees in India are interchangeable with a gold sovereign in London (within narrow limits). This is no doubt, in normal times, a convenient arrangement for the Governments of India and of England, though whether it is advantageous to the people of India is another question. The present point is that, although India is supposed to have a gold standard, its principal metallic money is only imperfectly convertible into gold. It is a case of suspended convertibility.*

The plan adopted by India in 1893 with the closure of the mints to silver was not new. The Report of the Committee on which action was taken, after a comprehensive survey of monetary systems, concludes :

* The great rise in prices in India since 1900 is never officially ascribed to the enormous issues of token rupees, and the difficulty in the management of the exchange since August is set down to the war ‘*simpliciter*.’

'It would thus appear that it has been found possible to introduce a gold standard without a gold circulation, without a large stock of gold currency, even without legal convertibility of an existing silver currency into gold.'

This method of imperfect convertibility * had also been adopted long before the war in different forms by the principal countries of Europe. There was an appearance of monetary strength in the masses of gold held in the central banks, but any exceptional demand for this gold, especially for foreign remittance, was met by making a special charge, or in some cases by actual limitation. The gold was in effect hoarded by the central banks; and provision for foreign remittances was met by foreign credits in various forms.

In normal times this imperfect convertibility of credit into gold was not even noticed, and certainly caused no apparent difficulties. In normal times most monetary transactions are concluded without the actual passing of gold. But the real meaning of effective absolute immediate convertibility (no single word can convey the full meaning of the old system) was not simply that people could always get as much gold as they found convenient (e.g. for making ornaments or for payments abroad), but that very real effective limitations were imposed on the undue expansion of credit.

The simplest credit substitute for gold is a bank note, which in essence is a promise to pay on demand the metallic money that it is supposed to represent. Notes based on gold are strictly convertible only so long as the demand for conversion can be met under any conditions within the range of practical possibility, as shown by the financial experience of nations over long periods. The demand for conversion into gold in ordinary times is one thing; it is a demand that is only exercised within very narrow and customary limits. But the demand for conversion in extraordinary times is quite another thing; and it is only in extraordinary times that the real stability of a monetary system is tested.

It was the necessity for being ready for exceptional

* Cf. 'Money and Monetary Problems' (Essay on the Indian Currency Experiment), by the present writer; and 'Indian Currency and Finance' by J. M. Keynes, ch. II.

strain that induced nations to adopt very stringent measures as regards the issues of bank notes. The issues have been limited in all sorts of ways; and special provisions have been made for securing an adequate reserve against any emergency. Curiously enough, the legal restrictions on the issues of notes by the Bank of England are more severe than those of any other great Bank. After a certain amount has been issued (now 18,450,000*l.*), for every other note an equal amount of gold must be kept in the issue department. The consequence was that, in the week before the outbreak of war, against an issue of notes of 55,121,405*l.* the Bank held gold coin and bullion to the extent of 36,671,405*l.* After six months of war the Bank of England held in the last week of January gold coin and bullion in the Issue Department 68,352,305*l.* against an issue of notes 86,802,605*l.* There was also a sum of 813,512*l.* of gold and silver coin in the Banking Department. It would seem from the figures of the Issue Department that the Bank of England notes were secured to a ridiculous point of safety, namely, with about 80 per cent. of gold.

But it is most important to observe that all the other forms of credit, just like bank notes, are ostensibly convertible into gold on demand. Even if the date of payment is deferred, as in bills of exchange, by the method of discounting, the present value is convertible into gold on demand. For the week quoted above the account of the Banking Department of the Bank of England shows a reserve against liabilities of 32 per cent. as against a proportion of 51 per cent. a year before.* As shown by Sir H. Inglis Palgrave, in his standard work on the Bank Rate and the Money Market, it is not the absolute amount of the reserve but the proportion that counts. The great argument of Bagehot's 'Lombard Street' is that the Bank of England ought to keep a far larger proportional reserve than other banks, mainly owing to the uncertainty as regards the magnitude and the times of

* It is true that on Feb. 10, 1915, the Bank of England held 24,049,183*l.* in coin and bullion more than on Feb. 11, 1914; but the proportion was 31½ compared with 53¼. The Imperial Bank of Germany for the corresponding weeks showed an increase of 44,286,000*l.*—yet the German currency was depreciated.

foreign demands. This argument has been strengthened by the course of events since that work was published.

Before the outbreak of the war London was more than ever the centre of the financial world. The fact has been repeatedly forced on public notice since the war began, but it is doubtful if its importance has been adequately realised by the public. So long as every promise to pay means in the last resort a power given to the holder of the promise to get gold from his bank, his bank is obliged to have the command of gold. If his bank finds it convenient, instead of keeping gold, to have a credit with the Bank of England, then the Bank of England, 'the bankers' bank,' must keep a stock of gold equal to any probable demands not only of this particular banker but of all the holders of similar promises to pay gold. In this way the reserve of the Bank of England imposes, or ought to impose, stringent limits on the expansion of credit. The essence of the system by which London became the central money market of the world was the immediate convertibility of all credits into gold. In other countries, especially after the depreciation of silver, this convertibility of credit into gold became imperfect, which is only another way of saying that credit was unduly expanded.

The effects of this laxity in the interpretation of convertibility into gold were shown in the great crisis in the United States in the autumn of 1907. There had been an undue inflation of credit and prices—over-banking and over-trading. When the demand for real convertibility set in, it could not be met. For a time the United States had really an inconvertible currency, consisting mainly of cheques that could not be cashed. The effects of this crisis were world-wide. Everywhere there was a great contraction of credit for the time being, and a great fall in the prices of securities. It might have been expected that the crisis of 1907 would have given the banking world a lesson, but the only immediate effect in the country of origin seems to have been the evolution of a new scheme for emergency currency in case of another crisis. To save trouble the emergency notes were at once printed and stored ready for use. Such was the foresight of the United States; and it is now made a matter of complaint that this

country was not equally provident. 'Stuff a fever' instead of 'starve a fever' has now become the maxim of the financial medicine-man. In spite of our unpreparedness we have certainly stuffed our fever pretty well. But this is anticipating the course of events.

The general position of the commercial and financial world before the outbreak of the war may be expressed in two propositions. Firstly, gold had been nominally adopted as the universal standard of value. In the countries in which silver coins were still unlimited legal tender (e.g. France, India, etc.), they were supposed to be in the position of bank notes convertible into gold—they were 'bank notes printed on silver.' Secondly, this nominal adoption of the gold standard had only been imperfectly realised in practice, because the different kinds of representative money—not only the silver and the bank notes, but all the various forms of bankers' credits—were only imperfectly convertible into gold. In normal times, within customary narrow limits, they *were* convertible into gold; but on the slightest strain some kind of difficulty was put in the way of getting the gold immediately. The only exception was London. London was acknowledged to be the only free market for gold—the only market that was likely to be open in times of stress. It is no doubt quite true that in the other great banking centres the greatest respect was shown to gold. The other central banks piled up far larger reserves than the Bank of England. But, for all the good it did, the greater part of this gold might as well have been molten into great golden calves, to be worshipped by the customers of the banks. Of course, the gold might be useful as an emergency war-fund (e.g. in bribing Turkey), but that is another question.

The principal effect of this system of imperfect convertibility was that credit was unduly extended, and that the limit on its expansion, properly imposed by effective convertibility into gold in even exceptional circumstances, was broken down by the use of all kinds of 'soft' substitutes—the time and place of the actual convertibility being apparently a matter of no moment so long as the promise to pay was not definitely repudiated.

This economy in the use of gold in practice was

supported by a corresponding development of theory. As generally happens in economics, the theory was invented to explain and justify the practice. We were told that paper was much more convenient than gold for internal currency, and that the actual circulation of gold was wasteful. It would be quite sufficient to keep a reserve in bullion; and the bullion itself would only be required for an occasional balance in international payments. If a country held enough gold for this occasional emergency, then the rest of its gold could be left to fructify in Egypt or South America, instead of being subjected to useless wear and tear in the pockets of the people. Even as regards these fitful international payments, every effort was made to minimise the useless transmission of gold. 'Bullion, as it circulates among different commercial countries, in the same manner as the national coin circulates in every country, may be considered as the money of the great mercantile republic.' So wrote Adam Smith; and he also observed that 'naturally' a merchant exerts his invention to find out a way of paying his foreign debts rather than by sending gold and silver. Too much invention and economy in the great mercantile republic as in others leads to inconvertibility in times of stress.

The natural consequence of this economy of gold was that the outbreak of the greatest war in history found the financial world with inflated credit and inflated prices, and with an ordinary commercial crisis like that of 1907 looming in the near future. The only difference was that in some cases the emergency currency was ready; and, if in other cases the emergency measures to be taken had not been regularised by far-seeing legislation, the minds of all men were fully prepared for the suspension of any inconvenient laws and the substitution of practical measures (and paper) worthy of the occasion.

The consequence of this development of easy finance and the substitution of a system of great elasticity for the old cast-iron system was, as shown by the most extraordinary results, almost too good to be true. All over the world under the old system of credit the Bank of England rate had been regarded as the best measure of the stability of the world's credit system. In the great crises of the 19th century the bank rate rose to

10 per cent., and in one year (1866) remained at 10 per cent. for 96 days and over 7 per cent. for other 96 days. This great crisis arose simply out of the failure of one great firm. But within a week of the declaration of war by England last August the bank rate was reduced to 5 per cent.; and at 5 per cent. it has remained down to the time of writing, although a kind of arithmetical deference was shown to old tradition by the adoption of a 10 per cent. rate during a five days' Bank Holiday. It is remarkable that a year before, in the midst of profound peace, the bank rate had also been 5 per cent.; so that it looked as if the Great War had had no real effect on the world's financial system. The newspapers were full of congratulations on the ease and the speed with which the crisis had been suppressed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer became the most popular man in the City. At the Lord Mayor's banquet it was announced that a peerage was to be conferred on the Governor of the Bank of England. All seemed going well.

It is true that, even when we look only at the surface of things, the situation does not seem quite so cheerful as is suggested by the glut of money in the London money market. The Stock Exchange was closed to the end of the year; and the premier security, the old Consols, which used to be considered as good as gold and as the barometer of public credit, was unsaleable at an official minimum price too high to attract buyers, and higher (value for value) than the price of issue of the new War Loan. One of the most amazing things about the present war is the effect it has had on people's memories. They have quite forgotten all they said about Consols and public credit. When, with the new year, the Stock Exchange was opened, it was under severe restrictions both as regards dealings in old securities and the creation of new. It was remarked by the chairman at the annual meeting of one of the great Joint Stock banks that the primary object of a gold reserve was to inspire confidence, and that it must above all things be visible. But the Bank of England has put itself in line with the new theories on the gold standard by keeping an unknown part of its gold reserve in Canada, South Africa, or Australia, and ear-marking other parts. It is true that the Bank Act of 1844 has not been

suspended, but the enormous issues of Treasury notes, against every principle of that Act, render this technical abstention insignificant.

It may be admitted, however, that the aggregate effect of the various measures taken by the Government in a sudden and unexampled emergency has been for the time very pleasing; but, in judging of the full effects of any economic disturbance, we must always distinguish between what economists call the 'short period' and the 'long period.' With regard to the 'short period,' on the outbreak of war every one expected a series of earthquakes accompanied by the fall of financial houses great and small. It appears, however, from a calculation in the 'Times' that the insolvencies in England from August to December were less in number and in magnitude than in the corresponding period for the year before; they were, indeed, below the average, and there was no failure of any particular importance. In the same way people expected a great increase in unemployment; instead there has been a decrease, just as in insolvency; and except in Lancashire, no great industry seems to have been much afflicted, whilst many have attained unusual prosperity. It is true that exports have fallen off; but imports have almost reached the normal, and the ports are congested with undistributed cargoes. After six months of war there is apparently no real economic pressure so far as we are concerned, whilst we have the gratification of observing all the symptoms of increasing pressure in Germany. If these marvellous results and this astonishing contrast are to be ascribed to the financial measures adopted in England and Germany respectively, then the clamour of self-congratulation is at least pardonable if excessive. But are they to be so ascribed? Is there not something of the simplicity of the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* in the conclusion? And are the 'long period' effects likely to be equally satisfactory?

First of all, attention may be directed to the effects of the emergency measures on the foreign trade of the country. Unfortunately an adequate appreciation of this side of the question depends on understanding the working of the foreign exchanges; and this is a matter to which in this country very few people, even bankers,

pay any regard in the ordinary course of their business. The ordinary man does not know even the meaning of the foreign exchanges. When he was told that the foreign exchanges were dislocated, he probably thought that it was part of the business of the navy to put them right. He was not far wrong, but it takes longer to clear the seas than to sign documents, and London could not wait. The bill on London had come to be recognised as the world's international currency. The bill on London was made good by a plentiful use of public credit. How much eventually will be added to the national debt in consequence is looked on as negligible in the midst of the flood of the other governmental expenditure necessary for the war.

In judging of this restoration of the foreign exchanges, two points ought to be borne in mind—one retrospective, the other prospective. The dislocation of the foreign exchanges was not due to any probability of a run on the Bank of England in what is called a foreign drain of gold. On the contrary, the real difficulty was that other countries owed to London so much gold that they were unable, or thought they were unable, to pay. They thought they were unable to pay because they were afraid of the effect of appearing to lessen their gold reserves. They were afraid of an internal commercial crisis. They were all dominated by the golden-calf theory of banking reserves. The principal offender (be it said with all respect) was the United States of America. As the event showed, only time was necessary for the exchanges to be restored in the usual way; but, as time was of importance, the action of the Government was enthusiastically approved.

The prospective point is now of more practical interest. Is the restoration likely to be enduring, or are the measures adopted in an emergency liable to have a setback later on? To answer this question, we must consider the measures taken, apparently not in the interests of foreign trade but of home trade and industry.

Here it is difficult to understand on what principles, if any, the country was flooded by emergency currency. Notes for one pound and for ten shillings were issued as fast as possible, and at first were supposed to be intended to support the banks. The banks were to be

allowed to borrow these notes from the Bank of England up to 20 per cent. of their liabilities. If the banks had acted on this privilege they could have borrowed and issued over two hundred millions of these notes, which, having regard to the banking system of this country, was an absurdly extravagant amount. Fortunately the banks scarcely made any use of the privilege. But long after the banking system of the country had settled down—and it was never much upset for internal purposes—the Government continued to issue millions of these notes. By the end of the year the amount had exceeded thirty-eight millions; down to last January every week had seen an increase. After some contraction in January the weekly increases began again in February. Besides this, postal orders were made legal tender and were issued free of charge; that is to say, they were exactly like bank notes of small denomination, that could be issued by any private person who chose to give coin for them, and in general the coin was silver. They were convertible into any legal coin at the Bank of England. They ceased to be current and legal tender by the Proclamation of Feb. 4. The Treasury notes proper were convertible into gold, but the provision for convertibility was practically non-effective.* The notes were by the Act to be convertible at the Bank of England, but, in order to assist the Government and the Bank of England, the country banks were encouraged to use the notes as much as possible and to send any surplus gold to the Bank. An ominous foresight was shown even in the superscription of the Treasury notes; they bore no promise to pay in gold. In case of complete inconvertibility being adopted subsequently, they would be all ready and would not need to be reprinted. Even this flood of postal orders and

* On Feb. 10 the currency note redemption account showed gold coin and bullion amounting to 24,500,000*l.*, 'ear-marked' against a note issue outstanding of 36,102,858*l.* This is so far satisfactory, but the 'ear-marking' would not mean much if the gold were needed for other purposes. In the debate in the House of Commons on Feb. 23 Mr Chamberlain said: 'I do not care about seeing a great deal of gold in the pockets of the people; I care about a large reserve of gold for an emergency. You get your gold together to use it when the emergency arises.' Mr Lloyd George expressed his entire agreement. What then becomes of the special redemption of the Treasury notes?

Treasury notes does not complete the sum of the Governmental assistance to the country in the way of providing 'money,' since in other ways there has been a great extension of bankers' credit, the chief form of modern money. Even the war loan was made the basis of the most easy borrowing from the Bank of England—ultra-Teutonic in its easiness.

That such and so great an inflation of currency and credit should raise prices, including the prices of food and other necessities, seems never to have entered into the minds of any one in authority. The Cabinet Committee appointed to enquire into the rise of prices issued a statement in which eleven points were put down for investigation, but the inflation of the currency was not even mentioned. The check to the issues of the notes in January was the only sign that this old way of paying new debts is not to be indefinitely continued. The worst of it is, as all experience shows, that a rise in prices due to currency causes is never detected until it is so marked and general that the ordinary abuse of the speculator and the shippers and the railways and all the other brigands seems unequal to the situation.

There is, however, one way in which an inflation of prices is forced on the attention of the great financial authorities. Our imports for January 1915 were in aggregate value practically the same as for January 1914, whilst the exports declined 40 per cent. If the rise in prices encourages imports and checks exports, then there will in time be a difficulty in meeting the foreign payments, and the foreign exchanges will again be dislocated in a way that the Government will find not so easy to correct. Early in the war Germany began to feel this difficulty in meeting foreign payments, which is of course so far a comfort to us, but it recalls the old proverb about the house of one's neighbour being on fire: '*proximus ardet Ucalegon.*'

J. S. NICHOLSON.

Art. 6.—THE BALKAN STATES AND THE WAR.

THE European conflict began in the Balkans; it will probably end in the Balkans, for the closing period of this gigantic struggle will inevitably be protracted by fresh war in those regions, unless the present artificial and unnatural distribution of territories in the Peninsula can be replaced by a more reasonable and equitable arrangement in conformity with the principle of nationalities. Continued misery and unrest in the Balkans, the direct result of alien and unsympathetic rule, after threatening the peace of Europe for more than a generation has at last brought about the great conflagration. To those who repeatedly pointed out the danger and denounced the uselessness of ineffective remedial measures the dire catastrophe brings a melancholy justification. Like Cassandra, they have witnessed the fulfilment of their prophecies. And it may be predicted with equal certainty that, should the European conflict be followed by new arrangements ignoring the rights of nationalities in the Balkans, another struggle in those regions will inevitably ensue.

The ultimate cause of all the trouble, the '*fons et origo mali*,' will be found in the Treaty of Berlin, the proximate cause in the Treaty of Bucarest. At the close of the war of 1877-1878 Turkish authority in Europe had been practically extinguished. An effort to effect its partial restoration was made by Lord Beaconsfield, aided by Count Andrassy, who had already secured Bosnia and Herzegovina as Austria's share in the Sick Man's inheritance, and by Prince Bismarck, who declared that the Balkan Christians were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. The denial of Crete to Greece was a crime which entailed a heavy retribution. The appropriation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria was a gross wrong to Servia, which had twice taken up arms on Russia's side. But the treatment accorded to newly-born Bulgaria was the greatest crime of all. Scarcely two million Bulgarians received political independence under Turkish suzerainty; some 800,000 were given autonomy under a Turkish governor; while more than a million unhappy beings were handed back to

Turkish tyranny with nothing to console them but the promise of reforms. The 'big Bulgaria' of the Treaty of San Stefano had been correctly delimited—except in some small particulars—on ethnographic lines and represented a united nation; the little Bulgaria which issued from the dissecting room at Berlin was a maimed and mutilated remnant. The darkness of night fell once more over Macedonia, which for a few brief months had witnessed the dawn of liberty.

The seeds of future trouble were thus sown, and the doleful harvest was reaped during the next three decades. For several years the Macedonian Bulgars patiently awaited the promised reforms; it was not till 1893 that, despairing of aid from the Powers, they began to form revolutionary associations. For ten years the struggle against Turkish oppression went on; in 1903 it culminated in a general insurrection of the Bulgarian population in the Monastir Vilayet. A merciless repression followed; the Powers were at last compelled to intervene; and Austria-Hungary and Russia, the 'two most interested Powers,' were allowed by Europe to try their hand at reforms. The 'Mürzsteg programme' which they elaborated proved, as might have been expected, a total failure. The two Powers were mainly concerned in prosecuting their rival interests; in January 1908 they finally fell out with each other, and their place was taken by Great Britain and Russia. The Anglo-Russian scheme, the 'Reval programme,' drawn up a few months later, seemed at last to ensure effective European control in unfortunate Macedonia. But this was precisely what the more patriotic, or rather chauvinistic, element among the Turks was determined to prevent. The Reval project had scarcely been announced when the Young Turk revolution broke out in the Monastir region under Enver Bey and Niazi Bey; the 'Constitution,' promulgated in 1876 with the object of thwarting foreign interference, was proclaimed once more for the same purpose—together with the 'perfect equality of races and creeds,' a venerable phrase embodied in the Hatt-i-Sherif of 1839 and since then repeated *ad nauseam* on innumerable occasions. The Powers, believing or affecting to believe that all would now go well with Turkey and her Christian subjects, committed the unpardonable

error of withdrawing their officials from Macedonia, thus sacrificing at a stroke the whole position acquired at the cost of a naval demonstration and five years of laborious diplomacy.

The consequences of this blunder were soon evident. Allowed a free hand in Macedonia, the Young Turks, who had been fêted in London and Paris as the harbingers of civilisation, proceeded to stretch the races of that country on a Procrustean bed. Bulgarians, Greeks, Vlachs, Serbs, Albanians—all alike were expected to renounce their nationality and to become 'good Ottomans.' In order to facilitate their conversion a general disarmament was decreed, and was carried out with the utmost barbarity. A conspiracy of silence was maintained in the European press; and the world knew little of the horrors of 1910 and 1911. But a community of misfortune drew the Christian races together; the formation of a Balkan alliance, hitherto a dream, became a reality; and the battle of Lule Burgas sounded the knell of Turkish domination in Europe.

Had the statesmanship of the victorious Balkan nations proved equal to the task of providing a reasonable division of the liberated regions on the basis of nationalities, the great European conflict might have been averted or at least postponed for several years. The secular feud between Teuton and Slav, the resolve of Germany to challenge the maritime and commercial supremacy of Great Britain, the yearning of France for her lost provinces, the centrifugal forces at work in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the intolerable burden of increased armaments, might have continued to threaten without disturbing the peace of the world for another decade or even another generation. The partition of Africa, an immense achievement, had been effected without a European war. The separation of Norway from Sweden had been accomplished without the shedding of blood. If time could be gained, it was at least conceivable that the advance of democracy and the growth of a universal conscience might have finally triumphed over old-world militarism. However this may be, the golden opportunity for effecting a settlement of the Balkan Question was lost when the conference of the delegates from the various states which assembled

in London in December 1912 broke up without arriving at an agreement.

The inner history of what then took place has yet to be written. Between Serbia and Bulgaria there was practically nothing to discuss, inasmuch as the territorial question between the two countries had been settled in the minutest detail by the 'secret annex' to the treaty of Feb. 29, 1912. Between Bulgaria and Greece no arrangement existed; and it was of vital importance to the future of the two countries, to that of the Balkan Alliance as a whole, and, indeed, to the peace of Europe, that a settlement should be arrived at without delay. Unfortunately the very moderate proposals put forward by M. Venizelos were rejected by his Bulgarian colleague, whether *proprio motu* or by order from Sofia it is hard to say; the real question at issue was the possession of Salonika, for which the Greek delegate was ready to make large concessions. At the same time the Bulgarian representative met the claims of Rumania to 'compensation' for her neutrality during the war with proposals which can only be described as derisory. It might, of course, be argued that Rumania, which looked on unmoved while the sister states staked their existence in the cause of humanity and freedom, was entitled to no compensation whatever; but considerations of this kind find no place in practical politics. The virtual rejection of the Rumanian claims derived some palliation from the unwise employment of menaces by Rumania, but it was a blunder. The question was afterwards settled, as it seemed, by an award of the ambassadors at Petrograd, accepted by both sides, but subsequently denounced by Rumania.

Had time been allowed for the protracted bargaining so congenial to the Oriental disposition, it is by no means improbable that an arrangement might have been arrived at between Bulgaria and Greece, and that the second Balkan war, with all its lamentable consequences, would have been averted. The real cause of the second war—the repudiation by Serbia of her treaty with Bulgaria—would in that case never have taken place. But the work of the Conference was cut short by Enver Bey's *coup d'état* at Constantinople; and the Balkan States unanimously resolved to continue the

war with Turkey. The brunt of the struggle once more fell upon Bulgaria; and, while she was fighting in Thrace, her allies found time to conspire against her and to encroach on the territories she had occupied during the first period of the war. It is strange how the smallest circumstances sometimes determine the course of great events. Had M. Gueshoff, the Bulgarian prime minister, a man of conspicuously moderate and pacific character, been allowed to come to London, there can be little doubt that he and M. Venizelos would have settled the questions between Bulgaria and Greece. M. Venizelos had not intended to act as delegate, but he agreed to do so on the understanding that M. Gueshoff would be his colleague. At the last moment, however, M. Gueshoff's departure from Sofia was countermanded.

After the break-up of the London Conference matters went from bad to worse among the allies. The mysterious assassination of King George of Greece at Salonika removed a moderating influence of priceless value, which was replaced by military chauvinism. At Belgrade M. Hartwig, the Russian representative, the virtual author of the second war, encouraged the Servian Government to tear up its treaty with Bulgaria. An anti-Bulgarian compact was concluded between Servia and Greece; and, when the Balkan delegates assembled again in London to make peace with Turkey, the Servian and Greek delegates, with the object of exhausting Bulgaria by continuing the war, combined to delay the signature of the treaty until Sir Edward Grey politely hinted that their presence in London was no longer necessary. Then followed the dreary wrangle over the question of Russian arbitration, prolonged by the vacillation of the Russian cabinet, which repeatedly changed its standpoint, sometimes veering to the Servian, sometimes to the Bulgarian point of view. The delay gave Austria-Hungary time to prosecute her intrigues at Sofia; while at Belgrade M. Hartwig, who pursued a policy of his own, encouraged the Servians to put forward impossible demands. The tension became intolerable; and at last, under Austrian inspiration, the war party at Sofia broke away. On June 29, 1913, an order was issued to attack the Servian and Greek armies. The question of the responsibility for this insensate act is

now *sub judice* at Sofia. The order was recalled two days later and the troops withdrawn, with fatal results to the campaign which followed. But the position of Bulgaria was in any case hopeless. Rumania, setting aside the compact of Petrograd, and Turkey, tearing up the Treaty of London, fell upon her from the north and east.

A nation must bear the consequences of the blunders of its rulers. But whether it should be condemned to permanent dismemberment as the penalty of a rash act is a question which may at least be argued. That question in the present case possesses more than an academic interest, inasmuch as the sentence passed upon Bulgaria by her enemies at the Conference of Bucarest will come up for revision before the reconstituted European Areopagus at the close of the great war. Two wrongs do not make a right; and it remains to be seen whether Europe will decide that Bulgaria's misdemeanour must be purged by a sentence violating the principle of nationalities and handing over whole populations to the domination of their secular foes. Public opinion in Britain and France rightly condemned the Bulgarian escapade, but it is only fair to remember that practically all its information came from sources hostile to Bulgaria. An unscrupulous but successful newspaper campaign was organised with lavish patriotism by the wealthy Greek colonies all over Europe and in America, while Servians, Rumanians and Turks took their share in the chorus of denunciation. The virulence of the subsidised French journals, which knew no bounds, is unhappily remembered to-day in Bulgaria; and the natural sympathies of her democratic people with the great western Republic have been chilled. French policy at this time aimed at setting up Greece as a rival to Italy in the Levant; and, apparently inspired by this idea, M. Delcassé even proposed the partition of Bulgaria during the sittings of the Bucarest Conference. The Bulgarians bowed their heads before the journalistic storm; a rustic, self-centred and unimpressible race, they underestimate the force of foreign opinion, while the urban, alert and cosmopolitan Greeks are only too much alive to its importance. Many of the calumnies then circulated were exposed by the Carnegie Commission, but its valuable report was belated; it failed to

appear till shortly before the outbreak of the great war, and consequently attracted little attention.

The worst of culprits should not be judged unheard. Even the most heinous crimes are viewed by modern jurisprudence in the light of the provocation and of the circumstances in which they were committed. At the end of the present war—before long, let us hope—Bulgaria will appeal to Europe for a mitigation of her sentence. It is commonly said that the Bulgarians committed revolting atrocities, that they began the war against their allies, and that they got what they deserved. As regards the beginning of the war, the accusation is, of course, true. But, in order to arrive at a just judgment, the circumstances of the case must be considered.

The common belief that the Bulgarians lost their heads in consequence of their victories is altogether erroneous, except as regards a limited number of courtiers, politicians and *militaires*. Never did a nation display greater sobriety and restraint in the hour of victory. Even the tidings of Lule Burgas, conveyed in brief and modestly worded telegrams to Sofia, produced no paroxysms of excitement, no elation, no *fanfaronnades*. But the repudiation of the treaty of alliance by Serbia, and still more the arguments by which it was maintained, aroused a keen feeling of indignation. A still greater provocation lay in the maltreatment of the Bulgarian populations of Macedonia and Thrace by the Servians and Greeks, which began from the first days of their military occupation of those regions. An interesting account of this persecution will be found in the Carnegie report. Bishops, priests and schoolmasters were evicted from their dioceses, churches and schools, and were banished from the country; the peasants were compelled to sign documents declaring themselves to be Serbs or Greeks; those who refused were beaten or imprisoned; and all the usual machinery of forcible assimilation was set in motion.

This state of things had continued for eight months—unhappily it continues still—in territories which at that time had not yet been assigned to the Servians or Greeks, and were *ex hypothesi* in the possession of the three allies. The Macedonian emigrants, always a powerful

factor in Bulgaria and now augmented by some 18,000 volunteers as well as by refugees from the districts in Servian and Greek occupation, became restive; they mistrusted Russia owing to her frequent changes of attitude, and feared that, if her arbitration were accepted, a portion of Macedonia would be lost to Bulgaria. They therefore resorted to threats in order to prevent the departure of Dr Daneff for Petrograd, where a Conference of Balkan delegates was about to meet. They little knew that Russia was at that time prepared to award almost the whole of Macedonia to Bulgaria. But the main cause of the Bulgarian *coup* was the condition of the army. The peasant soldiers, who had been under arms for nine months, wanted to return to their fields for the harvest. They were willing, they said, to fight at once if fighting there must be, but otherwise they would go home. Had they done so, Bulgaria would have been compelled to surrender Macedonia to her enemies without striking a blow. The situation became desperate, and the war party had its way.

The rupture between the Allies was a success for Austrian policy, which had steadily laboured for this end. On the day of the Bulgarian attack the members of the Austrian legation at Sofia could scarcely conceal their delight. 'From the beginning,' wrote the inspired 'Reichspost' some months later, 'we knew of the formation of the Balkan Alliance and we set ourselves to break it up.' In truth Austria knew only of M. Hartwig's plan, but the confession of the 'Reichspost' is nevertheless instructive. Ever since the Berlin Treaty it has been the settled policy of Austria to promote discord in the Balkans. Of this, abundant proof could be given if space permitted; it is enough to recall King Milan's unprovoked attack on Bulgaria, carried out under her auspices in the sacred name of 'equilibrium' in 1885, and the Greco-Rumanian alliance against Bulgaria, arranged by Baron von Burian, the new Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, in 1901. The Treaty of Bucarest, which perpetuated the causes of discord and indeed increased them, was another triumph for Austria; it violated the principle of nationalities, to which for domestic reasons she was always opposed, and facilitated the preparation of her approaching *coup* in the Balkans.

The creation of a big Serbia, extending down the valley of the Vardar, would form an obstacle, of course, to her long-projected advance to the *Ægean*. But it had at least the advantage of perpetuating Bulgarian exasperation; and the effort to govern a hostile population would be a cause of weakness to Serbia. But Austria had already decided to settle accounts with that Power. The treaty, of course, could not stand; but it served Austria's purpose for the present, so she confined herself to reserving her claim to its revision in the future while the Kaiser enthusiastically proclaimed its finality.

Had the Western Powers and Russia intervened at this time on behalf of a more equitable arrangement, they would in all probability have succeeded. Austria, notwithstanding her desire for war, could not have opposed the transference of the greater part of Macedonia to its rightful owner. She had already begun to pay court to friendless Bulgaria. Germany was not ready for war; she had only recently begun the great augmentation of her forces which she deemed necessary in consequence of the formation of the Balkan Alliance and the consequent fall of Turkey. Italy, as we now know, would not have moved. The conduct of the Western Powers was excused on the ground of their anxiety for peace. The world has seen how peace has been preserved. The maxim 'Be just and fear not' is something more than a high moral precept; it is commonly a safe rule to follow in private and political life. The opportunity for arriving at a just and reasonable settlement, which the Balkan States and the Powers alike threw away at the time of the London Conference, once more presented itself at Bucarest. Such a settlement could now only be imposed from above. This might have been done with comparative ease in London; the task was now more difficult, but far from impossible, notwithstanding the greedy appetites which had been whetted during the period of controversy and the savage passions kindled by the war.

The main problem which the Balkan delegates both in London and Bucarest had to face was how to come to any kind of an arrangement that would satisfy the swash-bucklers and demagogues at home; most of them, moreover, were party leaders themselves and had their own

political future to consider, which might be fatally compromised if they surrendered any portion of the national claims. At Bucarest, for instance, M. Venizelos received orders from King Constantine to demand so much of the *Ægean* coast that only a few kilometres near Dedeagatch would have been left to Bulgaria. He refused and tendered his resignation, but eventually had his own way. Similarly Dr Daneff had demanded his recall before the premature break-up of the London Conference. Strange as it may seem, if the Powers of the Entente, either during the London Conference or before the signature of the Treaty of Bucarest, had interposed with an equitable solution, the Balkan delegates would have welcomed an intervention which would have enabled them to plead *force majeure*, and the various governments would have done likewise. Resistance would never have been attempted without armed support from the Central Powers, and of this there was no prospect whatever.

On the day before the signature of the Treaty of Bucarest the writer sailed up the Danube and passed beneath the two gigantic pontoon bridges over which the Rumanian troops marched into Bulgaria. The sight suggested the question, which of the two States had meditated aggression in the past? These immense structures had been prepared for years; Bulgaria possessed nothing similar; her thoughts were with her enslaved kinsmen in Macedonia. Under the guidance of King Carol, Rumania had concluded a military convention with Austria; she had been offered a large slice of her neighbour's territory, and the means had been duly provided for her entry into the Promised Land. The finger of Austria seemed to stretch over the long line of pontoons; Rumania had already taken her morsel—not so large indeed as the stipulated portion; what would Austria do next?

On the same day Austria, already aware of the terms of the treaty, enquired, as we know from Signor Giolitti's disclosures, whether Italy would agree that a *casus fœderis* had arisen for a joint attack on Servia; he was met by a refusal. What passed between Austria and Germany at this time is unknown, but there is nothing to show that Germany backed the Austrian request on

this occasion. On the other hand, it seems improbable that Austria would have taken this step without consulting her principal ally. The Italian reply seems to have given Austria pause; and, if William II donned his 'shining armour' at this moment, he soon replaced it in the cupboard. That Austria meditated an attack on Servia so early as the preceding June, when the war between the Balkan Allies, which she had deliberately fomented, broke out, seems proved by the recent revelations of M. Pichon and the historian Guglielmo Ferrero; while M. Take Jonescu, the Rumanian statesman, relates that at that time the Austrian minister at Bucarest declared to him that Austria would come to the aid of Bulgaria 'with arms in her hands.' 'Nous avons fait bonne affaire,' said a high Austrian official gleefully to a friend of the writer at the moment of the Bulgarian attack in Macedonia. But the Treaty of Bucarest caused Austria to make up her mind. The murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, which took place ten months later, furnished a convenient pretext for putting her design into execution; Germany was now ready; the shining armour at Berlin was displayed to all the world, and the great catastrophe followed.

The Treaty of Bucarest is founded on the ruins of violated contracts; it stands on the flimsy substructure of torn-up 'scraps of paper.' It has not been recognised by any of the Powers, and therefore cannot be regarded as a legitimate substitute for previous arrangements which they have drawn up or sanctioned. It presents a series of grotesque frontiers, traced on vindictive lines in violation of the principle of nationalities and in defiance of economic laws. It has condemned more than a million unhappy beings to conditions of existence which cause them to regret the rule of the Turks. It was completed during a period of eight days—a short time for the discussion of the most complicated question of modern times—and was imposed on the Bulgarian delegates almost literally at the point of the bayonet. Before the end of the negotiations M. Maiorescu, the Rumanian prime minister, intimated to M. Toncheff that, if he failed to sign the document, within 48 hours Rumanian troops would occupy Sofia.

Bulgaria now demands the revision of the treaty,

so far, at least, as regards a portion of her lost kindred in Macedonia. On the reply to this request depends her attitude towards the present war, and, strangely enough, that of Rumania also; for Rumania, rightly desirous of union with the cognate race in Transylvania, is ready to throw in her lot with the Entente Powers if Bulgaria will do likewise. The question is thus of the utmost importance, for, apart from the considerable aid which the two States can render to the Allied cause, their military action would almost certainly be followed by that of Italy, and the war would be shortened by many months. Rumania, which hopes to annex a region with 4,000,000 inhabitants, has now abandoned the doctrine of Balkan 'equilibrium' propounded with so much unction by the victors in 1913; she is now willing to consent to concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia, and even to restore to her a portion of the territory of which she deprived her in that year. That an injustice has been done to Bulgaria has been publicly admitted by M. Take Jonescu, the most brilliant of contemporary Rumanian statesmen, who recognises that she has been wronged in Macedonia.

Bulgaria is willing to leave the whole question between herself and her former allies to the eventual decision of the Powers, and to maintain a strict neutrality. In return for her neutrality she has been promised by the Entente Powers the whole of Eastern Thrace as far as the Enos-Midia line laid down by the Treaty of London, together with considerable concessions in Macedonia. This promise, it is understood, will be fulfilled at the end of the war. For her active and timely aid she has been promised larger concessions in Macedonia. But in return for this she desires the present cession of at least a portion of the district, now in Servian occupation, lying south of the line laid down by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912. Beyond this line Servia pledged herself 'not to ask for anything'; and the region in question is, or rather was, inhabited by a compact Bulgarian population.

In short, Bulgaria asks for something in hand as the price of her military co-operation. She defends her position on two main grounds. In the first place she can no longer place any confidence in international

contracts. Without questioning for a moment the sincerity of the three Powers, she cannot feel sure that their promises will be realised even in case of their success. She has seen three solemn compacts torn up to her disadvantage—the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, signed by the sovereigns of the two countries and approved by Russia; the protocol of Petrograd, prepared by the ambassadors of the Powers; and the Treaty of London, drawn up by Sir Edward Grey and sanctioned by Europe. She has seen, she might add, the reoccupation of Southern Albania by Greece in violation of the convention of Corfu, and the German onslaught on unhappy Belgium. How can she trust any more to ‘scraps of paper’?

Secondly, the continued persecution of her kinsfolk across the frontier involves her in serious internal trouble and exposes her to dangers which can only be removed by their liberation. If, to quote the words of the Carnegie report, the methods of assimilation and extermination applied by the Greeks display ‘*encore plus de rigueur systématique et encore moins d’humanité*’ than those adopted by the Servians, the condition of the Bulgars in Servian Macedonia has, in consequence of the war, become apparently worse than that of their brothers in misfortune under Greek rule. All the men of military age have been taken for the army—to fight for their enemies; the cattle, the furniture, the clothing of the family are sold for the payment of increased taxes; and in many cases soldiers, gendarmes and even brigands are installed in the defenceless households. Only those who have witnessed the misery of the ill-clad and often starving refugees, who, at the risk of being shot down by the frontier guards, daily make their way in hundreds across the snow-clad mountains into Bulgaria, can realise the horror of the situation or fully grasp the truth of the principle that one Balkan race must not be allowed to rule over another. Unless life had been made intolerable to these people, they would not have left their homes. Many of the fugitives, especially the children, succumb to cold and privation during this terrible pilgrimage. The survivors must be maintained by the Government; they swell the great host of Macedonian exiles, whose exasperation increases daily. This sentiment is sedulously played upon by

German and Austrian emissaries, who swarm at Sofia and preach an anti-Servian crusade in subsidised journals in the hope of compromising Bulgaria with the Entente Powers.

By the irony of fate Bulgaria, humiliated and despoiled, is now in a position to control the action of her neighbours; and the Entente Powers, anxious to secure her co-operation and that of Rumania, have undertaken to urge the desired concessions on Servia. M. Pashitch, if he were a free agent, would doubtless comply; it is obviously in Servia's own interest to help her allies to shorten the war; and the concessions will in any case have to be made at its conclusion. But the military coterie which surrounds the Prince Regent will not hear of them. It was the officers who insisted on the repudiation of the treaty of 1912; among them are some of the conspirators who placed the present dynasty on the throne. Their calculation is that the Entente will win in the end and that no concessions will then be necessary; but they leave out of account the sacrifices which their policy will impose on their allies and on Servia herself owing to the protraction of the war. The Prince, accordingly, has countered the proposals of the Powers with a proclamation promising constitutional rights to the Macedonian Bulgars—he describes them as sons of the Servian conqueror Dushan—thus indicating the resolve of Servia to retain them under her rule. Everyone must admire the heroism with which the Servians have defended their country against enormous odds, but, in this instance at least, they cannot be congratulated on political wisdom. The true expansion of Servia lies in the direction of Bosnia, Northern Herzegovina, and Southern Dalmatia, with the ports of Metkovich, Spalato and Sebenico. When she obtains these regions she will more than double her territory. Whether Catholic Croatia will join her is a question which might be left to its inhabitants. The extreme south of Dalmatia, with Gravosa and Cattaro, should go to Montenegro.

In urging both Servia and Rumania to refuse all concessions to Bulgaria, Greece has acted against the interests of the Entente. Her policy is due in part to hostility to Bulgaria—the hatred of the Greek for the

Bulgar is something phenomenal, surpassing in bitterness all other race-hatreds of the world; in part to the military considerations which dominate the court of Athens—Bulgaria, it is urged, must not receive any accession of territory, for her military strength would thereby be increased; in part to the fear that a precedent may be created for concessions on the part of Greece. Such concessions, however, will be inevitable if at the end of the war the Entente Powers carry out their declared intention to vindicate the principle of nationalities; the regions of Kastoria, Florina, Yenidjé-Vardar, Vodena, Kukush, and Drama should go to their rightful owners. Kavala, hitherto mainly a Turkish town, should also be handed over to Bulgaria; it is inconceivable that this promising seaport should be cut off from its hinterland. Greece should seek her legitimate expansion in the twelve islands now occupied by Italy (that Power obtaining compensation in the Trentino) and on the western coast of Asia Minor, where the Hellenic element is strong. Greece should withdraw from Southern Albania in accordance with the Corfu Convention; and the Albanian State should be restored under a new ruler, receiving Ipek and Dibra in the north.

The Emperor William, who telegraphed to his Rumanian cousin that the Treaty of Bucarest was 'definitive' and who 'fought like a lion' to obtain Kavala for his Greek brother-in-law, will find that his family policy, more suited to the Middle Ages than to modern times, was a blunder. Nothing but an arrangement based on the sound principle of nationalities will ever bring peace to the Balkan Peninsula. A durable peace in South-Eastern Europe, followed by a revival of the Balkan Alliance, will, it is to be hoped, be among the beneficent results of the present calamitous war.

Art. 7.—THE ATTITUDE OF ROUMANIA.

ROUMANIA is neutral. She declared her neutrality during the life-time of King Charles at a 'Crown-Council'—a political court improvised for the occasion. Subsequently she explained that this neutrality did not involve any departure from the line of policy she had hitherto pursued, which was recognised as the one best suited to her situation. Though discussions went on well into the autumn of 1914, and were characterised by a good deal of excitement on the part of that section of the public which delights in rowdy demonstrations, and by the urging of violent measures by individual groups such as the 'Universitaires' of Bucarest, they bore only on the question, under what circumstances military intervention might be either permissible or advantageous. The result was that Roumania, well aware of what she has owed of recent years to German 'Kultur,' with no illusions as to her own strength, and uninfluenced by sentimentalism, romance, or sympathy with the Latin race—that race to which she herself belongs—made up her mind that she would not go to war to swell the triumph of Austria-Hungary. That this decision should have been approved by almost the entire nation, points to the fact that it was based on weighty considerations. We propose to lay these considerations before the British people, which has shown hitherto but a half-hearted interest in the affairs of Roumania; for it is important that the attitude of a country which remains neutral should be thoroughly understood.

In no country did the ultimatum, with its amazing terms, which the Austro-Hungarian monarchy thought fit to address to Servia, bidding that country to identify herself with the perpetrators of an abominable crime, and to proclaim the fact not only before her own army but before the whole of Europe, provoke graver apprehensions or a franker expression of disapproval than in Roumania. In the first place, there was no doubt that the ultimatum emanated from Budapest. For, though it was felt that Germany had a strong motive for provoking a European war at this particular moment, instead of waiting till her enemies had time for preparation, the haughty feudal spirit, the lordly contempt, and

the peremptory tone were unmistakably those of the group which, in the name of 'Magyarism,' directs the policy of Hungary. These modern representatives of a bygone suzerainty, mindful of the time when the kings of Hungary could add to their title that of Kings of Rascia, Cumania and Bulgaria, aspired to play the part of rulers of the Balkan Peninsula, of which in time they hoped to gain entire possession.

It is true that, after protracted struggles, in which she displayed great heroism, Hungary had (in 1867) at last escaped from the tyrannical and 'Germanising' yoke of the Court of Vienna. But, from the very day of her liberation, her dream was to regain by fresh struggles and renewed efforts—in which she looked for the support of that party in the Dual Monarchy which still remained Austrian—the position of political importance which she had enjoyed under the Arpadians, under Louis the Great, and under Mathias Corvinus. Magyar Imperialism differed from that of Vienna as embodied in the autocratic policy of a Prince Eugene of Savoy only in so far as it aimed, not only at political, but also at racial supremacy. Since the time of Széchenyi, in the early part of the 19th century, the Magyars believed themselves capable of denationalising the lesser peoples in their immediate neighbourhood, so that they might have the honour of sharing in the triumph of Magyarism. It was only, as they conceived, at this cost that their existence as a new nation could be justified. But, in cherishing this ideal, they entirely left out all consideration of the historical past of Hungary, which had left its mark in a medievalism entirely alien to the great national conflicts characteristic of the present day.

Now Roumania, a state founded, at the cost of great sacrifice, in the territory of Cumania, which the Arpadians of Hungary in the 11th century claimed as one of their provinces, was, along with Servia—the latest embodiment of a polity which originated in the contemporary Rascia—included in the Imperialistic programme of modern Hungary. It was therefore felt strongly at Bucarest that the efforts of the Dual Monarchy, to conquer and administer the Balkan Peninsula—where she has no rights to maintain, where her trade has been for some time on the decline, and where her mission of civilisation has

never been recognised or desired—were traceable simply to the aggressive spirit of Magyarism. Such indeed is the ideal of the Magyar aristocracy, which aims at the subjugation of the entire Serbian race (from whom they have wrested Bosnia and Herzegovina), and the expansion of their territory, by way of a conquered Albania, to the Adriatic, and, by way of Salonica, to the Ægean.

On more than one occasion, in the parliament of Budapest, attention has been drawn to the fact that there are in Western Moldavia some thousands of Hungarians of the old stock who, having clung to Catholicism and thus avoided denationalisation, still inhabit a certain number of villages between the Carpathians and the river Sereth. Of recent years these Hungarians, who have almost completely forgotten their nationality, have been subjected to a continuous propaganda; and every effort has been made to give a touch of Magyarism to the Catholic Church recently established in the Kingdom of Roumania, the Church of which these people are adherents. Even in publications of recent date one meets with the contention that the two principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which together make modern Roumania, were originally provinces of the Kingdom of Hungary. The chiefs of these provinces, it is argued, were the humble tributaries of Hungary, forced to pay punctual tribute, and liable at the hands of their all-powerful masters to rewards and punishments according to their behaviour.

Roumanians are well aware that the theories propounded in books and newspapers, and preached in University courses and lectures, are not due merely to a wish for notoriety or originality on the part of some isolated scholar, but rather to a determination to further by every possible means the aims of modern Hungary in the direction of conquest and supremacy. Efforts are being made, moreover, even at this moment, to remove natural apprehensions on this score, by means of newspapers published openly under the auspices of Count Czernin, representative of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at Bucarest, which draw a terrifying picture of the effects of Slav despotism. This expedient has been tried before. It was made use of more than a century ago, as much by way of suggesting to Roumania a policy

of friendliness towards Vienna, as of gaining for themselves the sincere and enthusiastic adherence of those Roumanians inhabiting Austria-Hungary whose influence on the attitude of Roumania in the present European crisis we are about to sketch.

Differing in race from the various Slav peoples who are subject to the Hapsburgs, from the Yougo-Slavs of the Balkans, and from the millions of Slavs united under the sceptre of the Tsar, Magyars and Roumanians (we are told), while maintaining their own existence, share a common task—that of defending Western civilisation, with which they are identified, against the encroachments of a spurious civilisation based on Asiatic serfdom, of which Russia is the armed representative. Such is their theory. At one time it was the Germanic race marching in unison from the west towards the conquest of the east—the ‘*Drang nach Osten*’—which was viewed with apprehension among the Magyars. But things have changed; and Hungary, anxious to gild the fetters with which she binds Roumania to herself, looks to this very Germanism for support in preventing Europe from becoming, according to the well-worn phrase, ‘*Cossack*.’

In denouncing the designs of Russia, Hungary knows well that she is not preaching to deaf ears. The young principality of Roumania took an important part in the war waged by Russia in 1877 for the emancipation of the Christian peoples of the Balkans, which ended in the Treaty of San Stefano, a treaty subsequently revised at Berlin, to the detriment of Russia. But, by a gross error on the part of Gortschakow, who was anxious to wipe out all traces of the Treaty of Paris (1856), Roumania lost the three districts of southern Bessarabia bordering on the Lower Danube and its Kilia mouth, these being ceded to her allies. For many years the relations between the great empire and her neighbour Roumania remained profoundly influenced by these painful recollections.

Among the principal politicians of Roumania there were many who felt that Peter the Great's Will, which urged the policy of pushing towards Constantinople, was a greater danger than the German ‘*Drang nach Osten*.’

Roumania was developing agriculturally ; and every year showed an increase in the agricultural produce shipped to the Bosphorus by the Danube (by way of Galatz and Braila) or by the Black Sea (by way of Constantza), in comparison with that which was exported by land. The freedom of the Dardanelles was thus becoming one of the first economic necessities of a country which had no direct access to the open sea. And, as Russia's designs on the Straits were well known, nothing was more dreaded than a policy on her part aiming by every means in her power at getting possession of the 'keys of her house'—the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

The result of these apprehensions was an 'entente' with the Triple Alliance, which had just been formed (1882). It appears that there was a formal Act to this effect, signed by the Sovereign with the consent of a very limited number of the leading political men of the country. It was even said that this Act was laid before the recent Crown Council (see p. 439). However that may be, there has been no open departure from the foreign policy which the country then adopted, and which is styled the 'traditional policy' of Roumania, as if it were at least a century old. For some time past it has not been etiquette to discuss questions of foreign policy in Parliament, though such discussions were allowed by way of a harmless pastime for dissatisfied members of the Opposition, or for the 'irresponsibles,' i.e. those independent of 'Government parties' (Conservative or Liberal, and since 1909 Conservative-democratic)—a sort of opportunism which is also evident in regard to domestic politics. The mildest form of liberty of speech was sternly rebuked ; and members were told that they need not concern themselves with the future or the progress of Roumania. This, they were assured, was quite safe, for the Powers of Central Europe had taken charge of it.

We have briefly recalled these facts and conditions, in order to explain the difficulties with which the Government of Roumania, even if it had made up its mind to depart from the beaten track, and to strike out a new line of policy involving considerable risks, will have to contend. These risks include not only the danger of Pan Slavism—still a reality much to be dreaded,

according to certain people*—but also those which may arise from the fact that, owing to her constant attitude of suspicion towards Russia, Roumania had dropped all intercourse with the powerful Empire beyond the Pruth. Any knowledge the Roumanians had of Russian literature they had acquired through French translations; Russian society was as little understood as that of Japan; no one crossed the accursed frontier to penetrate into the country of 'barbarians'; the archives of Russia, rich in the past history of the country, aroused no curiosity; even sympathy with their kinsfolk of Bessarabia cooled when it was remembered that they were the subjects of a State which it was a duty completely to ignore.

This state of mind still exists. We need not enquire into the causes of the enthusiasm aroused by the visit of Nicholas II to Constantza last June. Gossip asserted that it pointed to the marriage of Prince Charles, son of the heir to the throne, with one of the daughters of the Tsar, who was to bring with her, as a dowry, the whole of Bessarabia, or at least the districts which had been 'retroceded' in 1878. On the very day after his visit to Constantza, however, the Tsar alluded, at Kicheniev, the capital of Bessarabia, to the inseparable ties which bound that province to the Empire. This was quite enough to cool the enthusiasm that had been roused in the public mind, flattered by the visit and by the marked interest shown in their army, their organisation and their national life, by a powerful sovereign who had hitherto been an entire stranger. Such is ever the fate of a policy based on sentiment—to dazzle at a distance, but to lead to no practical issue and serve no useful purpose. Nevertheless, there was no return to the 'traditional' attitude of docility towards the blandishments of Vienna and the friendly, if sometimes unpleasing, counsels of Berlin.

Other causes also had helped to bring about this

* M. D. A. Stourdza, only recently dead, republished some months ago a statistical pamphlet of a somewhat controversial nature, by which he tried to prove, if not the authenticity of Peter the Great's Will, at all events that perfect community of aims and interests existed among the Slavs, and that the manifest intention of the Russian Government was to create a Slav confederacy even at the cost of pushing back the Germans and annihilating the Magyars and Roumanians.

negative attitude of revolt against the 'traditional' policy, which however has not, even yet, resulted in a clear and courageous declaration for the future. In the month of June 1913 Roumania had the satisfaction of a great diplomatic success (a little over-emphasised by a press prone to take impressionist and optimistic views), brought about entirely by the rapid and striking display of military force, amounting to half a million well-trained troops, on the other side of the Danube. The Balkan world, entirely disorganised by the war of 1877-8, was, with the exception of a few scattered dreamers, wholly unconscious of the need that had existed from that date onward, of forming a united defensive Balkan confederation. Such a confederation was required, on the one hand to prevent the outrages of a corrupt Turkey against those Christians who still remained under their rule (Slavs, Greeks, Albanians, and the Aroumanians of Macedonia), and on the other, to put a stop to the daily encroachments of Russia and Austria, continually vying with each other in their efforts to recreate the Eastern Empire of Rome to their own advantage. Bulgaria, under Stambulov, had had the courage to shake off the absorbing influence of Russia, only to return in a short time to the feet of her mighty elder sister. From this position, it is true, she soon seceded again, in accordance with a policy of opportunism adopted with the object of regaining, sooner or later, the frontier marked out for her by the Treaty of San Stefano. The policy of Servia, under her astute King Milan, destined to fall a victim to his own vices, was Austrian; she pursued the same policy under Milan's unfortunate son Alexander, who was assassinated, not without suspicion of alien instigation. The accession of King Peter, a member of the rival family of Karageorgévitsch—a family attached to Russia by a long-standing friendship—brought about an abrupt change of front, followed almost immediately by differences with Austria. These differences were accentuated by the formal annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Montenegro meanwhile vegetated in the pay of Petrograd, which lavished money on the army and the Court. Greece, intoxicated with vain hopes, was sunk in unparalleled inactivity, dreaming that the realisation of her 'great idea' would be brought

about by the spread of philhellenism and the reign of justice in Europe.

Roumania had therefore a great part to play—namely, to arouse on all sides the resolution to act independently of foreign support. To a combination of forces in the Balkans such action was decidedly possible at that time; but, in order to create the resolution in others, it was necessary that Roumania should be fully conscious of it herself. Her advice would then be listened to, her directions followed; and with her greater wealth, her older organisation, her incomparably superior civilisation, both material and spiritual, and the prestige of her sovereign, her supremacy would be assured. This important and difficult task, however, had not even been attempted, when, in the autumn of 1912, the political leaders at Bucarest were suddenly confronted by the uprising of the Balkan League. In the face of this emergency, they had no clear idea what attitude to adopt. Regret was expressed in certain quarters that Roumania had not accepted the better strategic frontier offered her by Russia in 1878 for the new province of Dobrudscha, which would have extended as far as the line Rustschuk—Chumla—Varna. The word ‘quadrilateral,’ which had a purely military signification, was flung out; and an excited public was quick to catch it up. Diplomatic mediation was attempted, but proved almost fruitless, resulting, after the decisions of the European Conference at Petrograd, in little else but the acquisition of the town of Silistria with a circumference of three kilometres. Then, in July 1913, on the advice of France and Russia, as well as of Austria-Hungary, anxious to use Roumania in order to strike a blow at the too-successful Balkan League, recourse was had to military intervention, which led to the extension of the Roumanian frontier as far as Varna, and the incorporation of Turco-Bulgarian territory within that line.

The Treaty of Bucarest (1913) was concluded in haste. Cholera was raging; Austrian intrigue was rife; it was necessary to come to a decision as speedily as possible. Had the various Balkan problems been thoroughly studied at Bucarest, had there even been greater liberty of discussion, the work of readjustment, in which Roumania took the lead, might have been fertile of

good results. But, carried away by rejoicings over peace restored, over the recognition of Roumanian prestige, over the assured future of the Aroumanians,* and lastly over the acquisition of a strategic frontier, people in Roumania took too optimistic a view of what was to follow. Instead of quiet and determined efforts, directed towards the rebuilding of the ruins and the quelling of animosity, the Balkan peoples were confronted by disturbances in Albania, discontent in Macedonia, and cabals and attacks on the part of a press for ever egging them on to cut each other's throats.

Greece, which had managed to acquire the larger share of the booty taken from her two successive enemies, was in alliance with Serbia, the second of the two 'beati possidentes.' Is there a similar treaty between Serbia and Roumania? It is certainly believed to exist. But, on the other hand, the military convention with Austria-Hungary is said to have been renewed by M. Maiorescu. It was in this condition of things that the heir to the Austrian throne was assassinated at Serajevo last June by a Serb; and Austria-Hungary took up arms to crush the 'horde of assassins' at Belgrade.

In this crisis was Roumania to uphold Serbia? Public opinion was unanimous in desiring it. But the attack on this valiant little people coincided with the outbreak of European war. Roumania had announced at Sofia that she was determined to 'uphold the Peace of Bucarest'; she had also declared that she would resist any attempt on the part of Bulgaria against Serbian Macedonia; and it is impossible to say whether this declaration may not have influenced the attitude of Bulgaria, though that country may well have had other reasons for remaining neutral. Overtures on the part of the Young Turks, who were completely subservient to German policy, met with no success. On the contrary, they even called forth a general outcry against the promoter of them, Talaat Effendi, himself.

At such a time as this, when the most imposing political structures seemed to tremble under the blows

* They are still without the bishops promised in the terms of the Treaty; and most of the Roumanian schools in Macedonia still remain closed.

of Fate, no war-like measures could have been ventured upon without some external support. Roumania wishes to come to an understanding with her older Latin sister, Italy, whose situation offers certain analogies with her own. But between the positions of the two states there are also essential differences. Austria is in a position to offer her partner, who has found in the Triple Alliance no reason for joining the Germanic Powers in the war, compensations on the Balkan shores of the Adriatic, without reducing herself to political bankruptcy—a painful expedient even for those who find themselves *in extremis*. That is not, however, as we shall see, the position of Roumania. Bulgaria has every reason for opposing any policy on the part of Servia which aims at the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy; and Greece has nothing to gain by a disastrous development of the Austro-Hungarian crisis. As for Turkey, she is already doing her best to assist her Germanic allies by all means in her power.

The support of a united Balkan Peninsula, which Roumania might at one time have hoped for, is in these circumstances out of the question. She must either fall back upon her old policy, the disastrous consequences of which she knows only too well, or embark on a new course whose risks she cannot foresee and dares not encounter. It is, nevertheless, incumbent on her to decide; and only one course is open to her.

There are in Russian Bessarabia some 2,000,000 Roumanians who have been deprived little by little of their rights—of archbishop, bishops and priests of their own nationality, of schools and church services in their own tongue, and of any literary or cultural activities of their own. The Roumanian population in Austrian Bukovina, torn without a blow from Moldavia in 1775, is swamped by Jewish innkeepers, who rule the towns, and by peasants of Ruthenian and Little-Russian stock, who, favoured by the administration, have now attained a numerical majority, especially in the north. In Transylvania and the neighbouring districts as far as the Theiss, there are 3,500,000 Roumanians, while in the independent Kingdom of Roumania there are only about twice that number.

Has there ever been, is there anywhere at the present

day, a nation that would tolerate such a situation? To understand it one would have to imagine some fifteen millions of Frenchmen or ten millions of Italians, living under a foreign yoke and yet in close proximity to the State to which they naturally belong, a State founded on the basis of nationality by their independent compatriots. The whole policy of such a State must be primarily influenced by anxiety as to the fate of these brothers and by the duty of emancipating them.

The Roumanians of Hungary, it should be added, form the sanest element in the race, consisting as they do of peasants, hardy, thrifty and industrious, and closely attached to their priests and bishops, whom they look upon as their political leaders. The Roumania of to-day feels the need of this new, healthy blood to reinforce her after the reaction which necessarily followed on the great expenditure of force during the period of her heroic effort. Moreover, the support and example of these peasants, who have enjoyed a prolonged period of economic and social (though not political) liberty, is necessary for the salvation of those thousands who have only recently escaped from a state of wretchedness, the result of years of oppression and destitution. It is because they have enjoyed this partial liberty that our compatriots long for complete national emancipation. All their efforts have been directed towards this end. They sought it long ago through their bishops, who were buffeted and imprisoned by the Calvinistic Magyar aristocracy; through the 'union' of their priests with the Roman Catholic Church of the Emperor, when he became ruler of the country in 1692; later, by discussions in the provincial diets, by peasant risings (as under Horea in 1784), by petitions to the sovereign (e.g. the 'Supplex libellus' of 1791), by organisation of the self-governing churches among the 'united,' and especially among the 'orthodox,' combined with the participation of the laity in its administration (1850-60); by violent altercations in the Parliament of Budapest after the annexation of Transylvania to the Kingdom of Hungary and the establishment of the Dual Monarchy (1867); by energetic campaigns in the press; by appeals to the public opinion of Europe, to the interests of the Triple Alliance itself, and to their compatriots in independent Roumania.

Every effort has been made, but in vain. The result is that some four million human beings are looked upon as a people of the lowest status, their nation a mere ethnological feature of the unitary state of the Magyars, their individual members as worthless creatures, useful only to appease the savagery of a brutal police.

And now their devotion and their heroism are asked of them, to aid in swelling the triumph of a system which aims at their national annihilation. Only the other day Count Tisza, when, assuming the airs of a benevolent despot, he announced certain 'concessions,' so tactless that they were more like affronts, took the opportunity of affirming the absolute necessity of the 'unitary Magyar state.' Now it is this very attitude which is at the bottom of all the mischief. So long as this unjust and absurd idea prevails, all 'concessions' they may deign to grant to the Roumanians are nothing but narcotics, intended to deaden the pain of approaching death.

To this demand the Magyar race, by the voice of Count Tisza, master of the destinies of the Dual Monarchy, replies with a hard and brutal *non possumus*; and that at a moment when the plains of Galicia are stained with the blood of thousands of Roumanian soldiers, placed, not by accident, in the most exposed positions. A *non possumus* equally emphatic is the reply of the Roumanians themselves. They bide their time. This is clearly recognised in Roumania; and, whatever action she takes, it will be understood in this, the only possible sense. To live or die a united nation is no watchword of mere sentiment, but the outcome of a carefully thought-out policy, which is bound to have its results. If we are to believe those who neither understand her situation nor recognise her difficulties, Roumania waits too long. Well, let it be known that if she waits, it is not from hesitation as to her duty, but simply in order that she may discharge it more completely.

N. JOEGA.

Art. 8.—THE PRO-GERMAN PROPAGANDA IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE war has now been going on for eight months ; and the ordinary reader of any of the American daily newspapers of the first class is as well informed of the diplomacy that immediately preceded the war, and of all that Germany has done in Belgium, in France, in Poland, and in England, as the ordinary reader of a London newspaper. A well-organised and widely-extended propaganda on behalf of Germany—a propaganda in which the German and German-American leaders and their numerous lieutenants in the press and on the platform are persistent, resourceful, and often unscrupulous—has been conducted during all this time. The propaganda is still going on. Neither the division of it that is worked through the post office and managed from Berlin, nor the division that is conducted from New York and Washington, shows as yet any signs of flagging. It is impossible for Americans who read newspapers or receive letters and printed matter by post to escape the pro-German propaganda. But in spite of this tremendous and continuous effort on behalf of the Kaiser and his mission, it can be affirmed that 95 per cent. of the American people of English or Scottish origin are with Great Britain and her Allies ; and that the only sympathisers with Germany and Austria are Americans of German origin, Irish-Americans belonging to the Ancient Order of Hibernians and kindred Irish associations, and Americans of Anglo-Saxon lineage who have at German universities or elsewhere come under the influence of German 'Kultur.'

Americans who are with the Allies are not demonstrative in their sympathies. Most of the manifestations of sympathy are in the daily press ; for ninety-five out of a hundred of the newspapers printed in English have from the first been outspoken in their condemnation of Germany's action in bringing on the war, and still more outspoken and severe in condemning the invasion of Belgium and the shelling of Hartlepool and other towns on the east coast of England. No great public meetings are held to express sympathy with the Allies as was the

case in England in 1861-1865, when the Federal armies were suppressing the rebellion in the southern states. With the exception of Ex-President Roosevelt, no man of prominence in national politics has attempted to assume the rôle that Bright played in England during the civil war of half a century ago. The churches, with only here and there an exception, have been loyal to President Wilson's plea for neutrality. There is, moreover, no widespread perception of the fact that the Allies are fighting for the political civilisation of the United States—defending the principles on which the republic has been based since 1783, just as much as for the political and social civilisations of Great Britain and France. But there was gloom all over the United States when in the early days of the war it seemed probable that the German army might reach Paris; and, apart from the Teutophil elements mentioned above, joy will be almost universal in the United States when the Allies reach Berlin.

It is easy to understand the disappointment at Berlin over this state of things. There are grounds for the conviction, widely held among Americans, that the pro-German propaganda carried on since August 1914 had been prepared some years in advance; and also for the conviction that Germany intended to secure, no matter at what cost, that American sympathy should be with her when the time arrived when she deemed herself ready to plunge Europe into war. The system of 'exchange professors' is now regarded as part of the pro-German propaganda—as one of the schemes for influencing public opinion in the United States. This system had been in operation for eight or nine years before the war; and it is now obvious that its aim was to use, in the interest of Germany, American professors who were sent to German universities, and also German professors who were sent to the United States. The Kaiser was more than courteous to American professors who went to Berlin under this system. Two of these professors, by their part in the pro-German propaganda of the last eight months, must have fully repaid the Kaiser. But Americans in general now realise that the ostentatious courtesies of Berlin, duly recorded by newspaper correspondents, were not accorded merely because the

American professors were looked upon as representing what is best and highest in American university life; and to-day nobody persuades himself that the sole mission of the German professors who visited the United States was to enable students at the older American universities to come into contact with the flower of German scholarship.

The alliance between the German social organisations in the larger American cities and the local branches of the Ancient Order of Hibernians, which has come to light during the war, is not so old as the system of exchange professors. It was, however, in existence some years ago; and, although Germans and Irishmen in the United States almost monopolise the liquor trade, community of interest in this trade alone would not have brought about the present alliance. In recent years, whenever a new steamer of the Hamburg-America line or the North-German Lloyds reached New York on her maiden trip, her arrival was made a public occasion; and at the invitation of the Company thousands of visitors went over her during her stay in port. Americans, who in these days several times a week find their letter-boxes loaded with pamphlets and reprints of newspaper and magazine articles of the pro-German type, now perceive that these show-days for new German trans-Atlantic steamers were not intended solely to advertise the steamship lines; for the arrival of propagandist literature can often be explained only by the fact that the recipient had signed the visitors' book on a German steamer on view in New York. Americans are seldom disposed to look a gift-horse in the mouth. But people to-day are wondering whether the gifts of the Kaiser to American universities were due only to his admiration of these institutions and his love of American learning.

When the history of the international aspects of the war—particularly of those aspects that concern the neutral countries—comes to be written, no chapter will be of more interest to the people of England, or contain more surprises for them, than the account of the wooing of the United States by Germany in the decade that preceded the invasion of Belgium, and in the months immediately following the declaration of

war. The trail of the preliminary propaganda—the years of ground-baiting—will be found to strike through some honoured institutions and to touch some unexpected places; and the second half of the history—the propaganda in war time—will disclose the most remarkable example known to history of mission-work carried on in a neutral country on behalf of a belligerent.

No country but Germany could have carried on a propaganda in the United States so extensive, vigorous, and persistent as that of the last eight months. The only possible comparison would be with the propaganda in the United States in favour of Home Rule for Ireland, which went on from about 1880 to 1912. This was a remarkable campaign. From first to last it resulted in millions of dollars being sent from the United States for the use of the Irish Nationalists; and, next to the Roman Catholic Church, it was the most potent influence for the cohesion in the United States of men and women of the Irish race. But, united as are the Irish, they are not nearly as cohesive as German-Americans, or Germans resident in the United States who have not become American citizens.

There are two and a half million people in the United States who were born in Germany, to say nothing of German-Americans born in the country who have never lived in Germany. People of German birth, at the census of 1910, constituted 18 per cent. of the foreign-born population. The total percentage of British-born, including those born in Canada and Newfoundland as well as in Great Britain and Ireland, was 28 per cent. Of these the Irish formed 10 per cent.; and the remaining 18 per cent. was about equally divided between persons born in British North America and those born in England, Scotland and Wales. Except among the Irish, and to a small extent among the Scots, there is no cohesion among British-born citizens or residents of the United States. Englishmen and women are as completely lost in the general population as men and women from France; for, like Frenchmen, Englishmen are seldom actively interested in state or federal politics. They never form subdivisions of either the Republican or the Democratic party, as Germans have done for nearly half a century, and as Swedes, Italians and Jews have done

during the last fifteen or twenty years ; nor in any part of the United States are there newspapers which cater for the English-born, or claim a constituency of immigrants from England. There are daily newspapers in all the larger cities which frame their editorial and news policies to secure support from Irish-Americans, and weekly newspapers existing exclusively on this support. Jews, Swedes and Italians have their own newspapers. Americans of all these races are clannish ; but no race which in the last hundred years has helped to people the United States has shown such cohesion as the Germans, who, unlike the Irish, are settled in the rural areas, particularly in the Middle West, as well as in the cities from New York to San Francisco.

The Germans have been widely distributed in the United States for a longer time than the Irish ; and, family for family, they are more prosperous and better educated than the Irish. Religion and political traditions are the cement of the Irish, but Irishmen are not held together by language as the Germans are. New-comers from Germany must have a newspaper printed in German. No other paper fills their need ; and hundreds of thousands of Germans, long in the country, and using the English language in business or the workshop and even at times in the home, continue loyal to the German newspaper. German-American newspapers discuss American political questions from a German point of view. They usually have special correspondence by mail from Berlin and other large cities in Germany ; and editorially as well as in the news columns more attention is given to Germany than in the ordinary American daily newspaper. These German newspapers, moreover, give constant attention to the doings of the German community ; and especially to the musical, literary, athletic and trade societies and organisations which are so marked a feature of German-American communities, urban and rural. There are more German communities dotted all over the United States than of any other race, excepting, of course, the Anglo-Saxon. Clannishness and love of the language and the fatherland are the characteristics of these aggregations ; and they are served by more than 800 newspapers, all printed in German. In cities like New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati and

St Louis, there are three or four daily German newspapers; and there is scarcely a city with a population over a hundred thousand that has not at least one weekly newspaper in the German language.

It is not pretended that these German-American organisations—newspapers, churches, clubs, 'sängerbunds,' 'turnvereins,' and other social institutions—were called into existence to aid the pro-German propaganda. Associations of this character are nearly as old as the advent of the German immigrant in the United States. Thousands of them, like many of the German-American daily and weekly newspapers, date back to the fifties and sixties of last century. But all this machinery was to hand and in good running order when war was declared. Some of it, there is reason to believe, had been overhauled and oiled in recent years in view of the war which Germans had so long regarded as inevitable. It was all available when Dr Dernburg went over in the early days of the war to direct the pro-German propaganda, to hold German-Americans together for 'Kultur,' and to persuade Americans that they had reached wrong and biased conclusions as to the war because they did not know the facts, and because the British had cut the German-American cable, so that only the case of the Allies had reached the American press.

Had the war been confined to the German States and Russia—had Belgium with Great Britain and France not been involved—it is possible that by March 1915 Dr Dernburg might have reported a large measure of success in stimulating American sympathy for Germany. But Belgium confronted Dr Dernburg when he began his tremendous and thankless undertaking in the United States; and he, with Professors Münsterberg, Von Mach and Burgess, Mr Hermann Ridder of the New York 'Staats-Zeitung,' and other colleagues of Dr Dernburg in the press and on the platform, soon found that Belgium would not down. In the early days of the frantic campaign for American sympathy, the case put forward was that Russia had wantonly made an aggressive war on Germany, and that Germany was doing no harm when Russia, out of pan-Slavonic fury, assailed her; while, as regards Belgium and the violation of

neutrality treaties, it was asserted in the literature and by the speakers of the propaganda that Great Britain did not heed treaties when it suited her interest to disregard them. The South African war and an alleged violation of Portuguese East Africa were cited as proof of this, even after it was shown that there was no mention of Portuguese East Africa in the history of the war of 1899-1902 prepared by the historical section of the Great General Staff at Berlin. Some of Dr Dernburg's understudies became so confused over Great Britain's wrong-doing and her disregard of neutrality treaties that one of them told an audience at Carnegie Hall, New York, that during the Boer war Great Britain had invaded Portugal.

Germany's dread of Russia, as a reason for the war, made very unsatisfactory material for the platform division of the propaganda; for the agents of this division, once on a platform, could not escape embarrassing questions from the audience. 'If Germany was afraid of Russia,' it was asked at these meetings, 'why did she invade Belgium?' The road to Russia, it was suggested, did not lie through Belgium; and the German apologists were knocked over the ropes. At other meetings where Belgium would persist in obtruding itself, the champions of German 'Kultur' sought to persuade their audiences that Belgium had really no grievance against Germany, because Germany had offered to make good any material damage resulting from the temporary use of Belgium by the German armies, and had, moreover, given an undertaking that her active interest in Belgium would cease at the end of the war.

Dr Dernburg himself, who between September and the end of January covered more ground in the United States, addressed more meetings, and gave out more newspaper interviews than any lecturer or literary celebrity who ever did one-night stands in the United States under the auspices of Barnum or Pond, had a disconcerting experience at Amherst College, in connexion with this offer and pledge to Belgium. He was asked how Belgium was to know that Germany would keep her word. He had no answer to this question; and, when further pressed, he conceded that if he had been a Belgian he would have been in arms against

Germany. Dr Dernburg, in arranging for platform engagements, usually restricted the range of the questions to be asked of him; and, with the extreme courtesy towards the platform—to chairmen as well as speakers—that characterises American public discussions, the restrictions were generally observed. But American college students, accustomed to ‘quizzing’ professors, are not so easily kept in hand as audiences at century and ‘get-together’ clubs or political and social academies. At Princeton University Dr Dernburg evaded questions that might have been embarrassing by intimating that he was not on tour to be catechised by undergraduates. At Amherst, he was apparently caught off his guard, and was obliged to abandon the claim that Belgium ought to have trusted the Kaiser.

Nevertheless the ground which Dr Dernburg so assiduously cultivated was not altogether unprepared. To begin with, there are Americans, even of Anglo-Saxon stock, who have long been jealous of England’s control of the seas. Ever since the war began, expressions of this jealousy have occasionally occurred, in the papers. For instance, an editorial article in the Washington ‘Post’ of Jan. 13 remarks:

‘At this time, when Great Britain appeals to the sympathy of the American people in her fight against Germany, while calmly attempting to destroy American commerce, it behoves Americans to look the facts squarely in the face, and not to be misled by sentiment that is not based on truth. . . . What England desires is to destroy the German fleet. That is her real objective. With Germany crippled on the sea, England does not care how strong Germany may be on land. . . . Individual Americans place their sympathies where they please; and many of them freely express their abhorrence of the acts which have laid Belgium waste and caused France to mourn. They may be violent in their denunciation of German militarism. But they are not thereby blinded to the aims and purposes of Great Britain. They see clearly the development of Britain’s plans; and they are determined that the United States shall not be made a cat’s paw of the island kingdom.’

This passage bears traces of the influence still exercised by the text-books of American history used in the high schools and colleges until some twenty years ago.

It is clear that there is some survival of the old-time dislike of Great Britain, due to their treatment of the Revolutionary War, the war of 1812, and the attitude of Great Britain during the Civil War of 1861-1865. This feeling has found expression at times in American newspapers which dare not risk their reading constituencies by openly espousing the cause of Germany. But the old dislike and hatred of England had almost disappeared before the beginning of the present war; and there was consequently little ground ready to receive the seeds of Anglophobia which the pro-German apologists were eager enough to sow. There was no need to sow them among the Irish of the A.O.H., or the German-Americans ready to endorse all that Germany has done since the ultimatum to Serbia was sent from Vienna—a city sometimes described by New Yorkers as the 'up-town office' of Berlin.

Even before Germany openly turned her propaganda to the gospel of hatred for England, there were indications that the pro-German campaign in the United States was nearing the end of its usefulness. Belgium had made it hopeless from the outset. No direct preaching of hatred of England marked the first six months of the propaganda; but, from the first, pro-German platforms rang with charges of British perfidy as regards treaties, together with claims that Germany was as much entitled to a place in the sun as Great Britain, and with charges that England's participation in the war was due to her jealousy of the industrial and commercial expansion of Germany. When they were quibbling over the neutrality treaties of 1839 and 1870, or seeking to convince their audiences that the German Empire could not be bound by treaties made by Prussia, pro-German speakers could expect no success; for the American conviction since the war began is that, treaty or no treaty, the invasion of Belgium is the most appalling outrage recorded in modern history. But in pushing other pleas they had more chance, for American audiences, when they listened to the demand put forward on behalf of Germany for a 'place in the sun,' seldom asked where this place was to be—in Canada, Australia, Texas, or South America. They seemed to have a hazy idea that there are still unpeopled areas where it is

possible to settle people of a white race in large numbers. Even men who have been through high school and college have asked in open meeting, 'If England can have colonies, why not Germany?'; and the discussion of colonies for Germany has brought out the fact that many Americans are quite unaware that the last vestiges of Great Britain's old colonial system disappeared when England adopted free trade in 1846.

Comparatively few Americans realise that Canada enjoys complete fiscal freedom; that she can pass and has passed protective tariffs without the slightest regard to the commercial and manufacturing interests of Great Britain; and that the British oversea dominions have now the right to negotiate their own commercial treaties. It is news to seven out of ten educated Americans that no British colony, whether a dominion or a crown colony, contributes a cent towards the cost of the British Government or even the maintenance of the Colonial Office in London. It is a surprise to these Americans when they are told that in the last fiscal year the share of the United States in the total imports of Canada was over \$410,000,000, and that of the United Kingdom only \$132,000,000. They are even more surprised to learn that the same tariff duties are paid at ports in British India on cotton goods from New England or the southern states and goods from the mills of Lancashire; and that Germany exported goods to the United Kingdom in the year 1913-14 to the value of 80,400,000L., on which not a cent of protective duty was levied. It is a result of this ignorance that speakers harping on Germany's need of a place in the sun and on England's jealousy of Germany's expansion have had a more patient hearing than when expatiating on Belgium's rebuff to the Kaiser's tenders; but, on the whole, the campaign to influence American public opinion has been a failure. There are many German-Americans, sympathising with the Allies, who insist that not more than half of even the German-American population has been won over by the pro-German propaganda. Only a poll could determine whether this claim would hold, but it may be taken as certain that, excluding the Irish-Americans, whose sympathies would have been with any nation at war with England, all that Dr Dernburg and Mr Hermann Ridder

have accomplished is to hold the bulk of the German-Americans firm for the Kaiser.

More than this was impossible, for reasons that are quite on the surface. No answer was conceivable to the case of Belgium. The propaganda offered half-a-dozen answers—that payment was offered for the right of way; that to go through Belgium was a matter of life and death to Germany; that Germany offered peace to Belgium after the fall of Liège; that the German Empire could not be called upon to observe treaties made by Prussia; that Belgium had forfeited all claim to German observance of neutrality by military conventions with Great Britain in 1906 and 1912; and that France had no intention of observing the neutrality of Belgium or had even violated it. Not one of these answers could be defended long enough to allow the speaker who made it to get off the platform. The propaganda had also to carry the burden of Von Halle and his book* (maintaining that Germany must seize Holland and all the Dutch colonies) as well as the staggering load of Bernhardi. It tried desperately to unload Bernhardi—to persuade American audiences that this ‘old man of the sea’ was of no account, military or social, in Germany; and that no more weight could be attached to his ‘prophecy and programme’ than to any book that might be written by a retired officer of the United States army. It was all in vain. Bernhardi was persistent and all-pervading, especially at the meetings addressed by Dr Dernburg’s zealous understudies, where the audiences had a chance to heckle.

A third reason for the failure of the propaganda in its first six months was the method of approach. During the first few weeks, when Count Bernstorff was in charge, and was spending most of his time in New York, and later after the German Ambassador to Washington had been succeeded by Dr Dernburg as director of the propaganda, it was assumed that Americans knew nothing about Germany, nothing about the war and Germany’s aims

* Dr Ernst von Halle, ‘Volks-und Seewirtschaft,’ 2 vols, 1902: vol. I, ‘Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft an d. Jahrhundertwende’; vol. II, ‘Weltwirtschaftliche Aufgaben und weltpolitische Ziele.’ Berlin: Mittler und Sohn, publishers to the German General Staff and the German naval authorities.

and the 'Kultur' that is made in Germany, and that their minds were a blank as regards the war, its causes, and its developments. The propaganda was a failure for the same reason as German diplomacy—that the Kaiser failed to realise what the wanton invasion of Belgium was to mean for Germany. Dr Dernburg and his associates were without imagination. They could not see that there could be any view-point but that of Germany; and they proceeded with their campaign on the assumption that they could secure American sympathy for the Kaiser, if they only told the story of the war and its causes as it was told to people in Germany, who since the war began have not been permitted to see any foreign documents or uncensored newspapers.

The people of the United States pride themselves on being greater readers of daily and weekly newspapers and of magazines than any other nation. This claim, so much a matter of pride, was brusquely ignored by the Dernburg propagandists, thereby offering an affront to the intelligence of Americans. The propagandist appeal was, moreover, repulsive and abhorrent to Americans who were not blinded by race sympathy, by anti-English antagonism, or by worship of 'Kultur.' Another reason for the failure of the propaganda was the want of a direct cable between New York and Berlin. A cable controlled at both ends by the German Government was necessary to the leaders and organisers of the propaganda. Such a cable was lacking, with the result that, while the propagandists in the United States were saying one thing, prominent Germans in the land of Kultur were making directly opposite statements; and the statements made in Germany had the effect of knocking out the underpinning of the propaganda in the United States.

The campaign will go on apparently as long as the war lasts, unless Americans grow too weary of it. At the end of March there were signs of this weariness. But persistence, thoroughness, and resourcefulness are as characteristic of the campaign in the United States as they were of Germany's forty years' preparations for war. American impatience may result in a slackening of the efforts to win sympathy for Germany; but the machinery will be kept in order, with a view to a new campaign just as soon as it is realised in Berlin that

no sacrifice can avert defeat. Then the aim will be to secure the intervention of the United States in order to break the fall for Germany. England must be prepared for a move of the pro-German forces in the United States to this end. In the meantime there should be no advocacy in English journals or on English platforms of any intervention by the United States when the plenipotentiaries who are to settle the terms of peace are being chosen and are about to assemble. There should be no nonsense about 'America's first full open entrance into European politics in the capacity of peace-maker' being 'the assumption of a great historic rôle as glorious for the people of America as it would be beneficial for the peoples of Europe'—a rôle that 'would have the further virtue that it would make a profound appeal to the emotions and imaginations of the people of the United States.' To American sympathisers with the Allies, who after Scarborough and Yarmouth were becoming increasingly impatient with the failure of the Washington Government to protest against the invasion of Belgium, the placing of mines by Germany where they endangered neutral shipping, and the shelling of unfortified towns, such sentiments as those quoted—sentiments expressed on the editorial page of a London Liberal weekly journal so recently as December 12—excite only ridicule and irritation. Only pro-Germans among Americans ever hint that, in view of the course of events from August to the end of March, the United States can either expect or claim to have any part in the settlement at the end of this appalling war.

EDWARD PORRITT.

Art. 9.—THE GOLDEN BOUGH.

The Golden Bough. By J. G. Frazer. First edition, three vols, 1890; third edition, twelve vols. London: Macmillan, 1907-1914.

THE completion a short while ago of the twelve volumes of 'The Golden Bough,' with its modest sub-title of 'A Study in Magic and Religion,' is an epoch-making event, we must believe, in the life of the author and certainly in the history of anthropological science. If the dignity of knighthood is the fitting reward for achievement in scientific literature, Sir James Frazer has been rightly selected for that honour. For, besides the work with which this review is concerned and by which mainly this writer will in all probability be remembered and judged, he can reckon to the account of his life's larger output such products as his 'Commentary on Pausanias' and his four volumes on 'Totemism and Exogamy,' and to each of these one might apply Pliny's phrase, '*præclarum opus, etiam si totius vitæ fuisset.*' Meantime our author has inaugurated another *magnum opus* by publishing the first volume of a treatise on 'The Belief in Immortality.'

The colossal work which is now before us for appreciation has grown into its third edition from a much scantier but still ample treatise published in 1890, which had for its aim the solution of the mystery attaching to the priest of Aricia, 'the priest who slew the slayer and shall himself be slain.' But in these twenty-four years the researches of the writer have travelled very far afield from the grove of Nemi. And his excursions have brought back such a booty that it may have become a question of indifference for him and his readers whether he has solved the original riddle that started him on the quest. The titles of these volumes, one on 'The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings,' one on 'Taboo and the Perils of the Soul,' one on 'The Dying God,' and two on the cognate theme of Adonis, Attis, and Osiris, two on 'The Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild,' one on 'The Scapegoat,' two closing volumes on 'Balder the Beautiful: The Fire-Festivals of Europe and the Doctrine of the External Soul,' present the outlines of a world-wide research, and yet are inadequate as a summary of the

varied wealth of material that is in them. For the titles of each book and of some of the chapters fail to indicate the often bewildering variety of the content; in fact, in regard to the two volumes on 'Balder the Beautiful,' a captious reader and one specially interested in Balder might often be tempted to cry οὐδὲν πρὸς Διόνυσον. But, indeed, the whole series is a vast encyclopædia of primitive and advanced anthropology; and it is hard to mention many problems proper to this field which one does not find discussed or which one could not gather material to elucidate in this labyrinthine treatise. And besides the enormous compilation of primitive facts and the many theories, advanced usually without dogmatism and as if only for the sake of stringing those facts together, there are many oases to allure the reader who girds himself to traverse these thousands of pages; for the writer is skilled in linking up many a savage ritual, many a savage myth and thought, with the achievements of our highest civilisation, our ideal philosophy, science and religion. Hence the sudden digressions on the Greek philosophers, modern science, Kant and Hegel, in which the well-known literary skill of the writer is approved, but which come upon us so unexpectedly that the harsh critic may call them purple patches. Yet the purple is good and true colour, and has a meaning of its own in the landscape.

To have said as much as this is to say that no critical and adequate review of these volumes will ever be written, for such a review would itself be a volume. The ordinary reviewer may be content to express his reverent admiration for the amazing industry, the devotion to research, the moral energy that could alone inspire and achieve such an intellectual output. But the conscientious critic, having carefully read and pondered on the whole, must try to formulate his impression of the primitive life which the writer reveals, and must candidly give his judgment concerning the value of the methods pursued, the accuracy of the research, and the validity of the inductions drawn.

This picture of the world of thought and belief through which the higher races are assumed to have passed and in which the lower races, even perhaps some of the modern European peasants, are still abiding, may be found by the imaginative reader gloomy, dreadful,

and repulsive. The phrase that seems to have been invented as if for Oxford 'Greats' papers by an early amateur in these matters, Walter Bagehot—'the mind of the savage is tattooed all over with monstrous images'—will perpetually recur to him. The primitive man of the past and the present is depicted in the pages of Sir James Frazer as a being devoted to cruel, hideous and licentious rites, as ridden with the terrors of demons, ghosts and witches, and tortured with the fears of malignant unseen powers when he rises in the morning and lays him down at night, when he goes out and comes in, when he puts his spade into the soil, when he culls the first-fruits or gathers in the last sheaf of his harvest, when he marries a wife, when his daughter reaches puberty, when he goes on the warpath and no less when he returns triumphant or defeated; and he defends himself against these evils real or imaginary by magic rites that are always futile and wasteful and often very unclean. Our writer is himself well aware of the appalling impression that he gives us of our early ancestors; and, while he usually makes use of his faculty of gentle banter and irony to save himself and his readers from the depressing influence of his facts, yet at times he gives way to his own lurid imagination and intensifies the blackness of his colouring. His chapter on the 'Omnipresence of Demons' (Part VI, p. 73) is a typical example of his power; in his hypothetical reconstruction of the Jewish Passover, starting with the assumption that the primitive Hebrew did actually sacrifice his firstborn, he conjures up the phantom-forms of midnight executioners (Part III, p. 178), and veritably makes our flesh creep—a pastime not wholly scientific. It is in keeping with this that he is inclined to the more pessimistic type of hypotheses, even in respect of ritual where all trace of cruelty has vanished; behind many an innocent masquerade of an All Fools' day, he detects the tragic ritual murder of the aging King; and with the over-eagerness of the earliest pioneers in anthropology, he scents human sacrifice in places where later students would refuse to acknowledge any trace of it, as, for instance, in the quite harmless ritual and ritual-legend of Sosipolis of Elis (VI, p. 353). Moreover, he even ventures on the dismal vaticination that civilisation

and humanity may one day abandon the higher religions and revert to the 'Walpurgisnacht' of the past (v, 2, p. 335; cf. vi, p. 89). The reader who appreciates our author's facts in their true grimness will tremble at the prospect.

We are not here concerned with his views concerning the future of mankind, but with the picture that he presents of modern savagery which may reflect our own past. The reader who accepts the facts here gathered together as true, and also as the whole truth, may wonder how our race has escaped extinction through the devastating effects of a suicidal race-madness, still more how it has succeeded in winning through into a civilised sanity and a reasonable psychic state. Certainly we may draw one induction from this survey of the anthropological phenomena, namely, that the human animal, just because he combines a rudimentary thought with intensity of emotion and feeling, is liable to morbid and often self-destructive exaggeration of sentiment and to perilous disturbances of the mental equilibrium; hence the ghastly self-mutilations of savages, their exhausting asceticisms, their occasional deaths from the terrors of taboo and the spirit-world or from the auto-suggestion of sorcerers. His magic is, indeed, to some extent protective; and, as Sir James Frazer has observed, the higher religion of the good deity may sometimes deliver from the menace of evil spirits. But magic may kill as many as it saves; and high religion has at times diffused as dark and deadly a terror as the lower polydaimonism. It is fortunate that primitive as well as civilised man has been helped by other influences, by the faculty of contradicting himself, by the refusal to carry through a fatal logic of life or death, by the power of *insouciance* whereby he can escape from his morbid states into a saving and restful lightheartedness.

Sir James' picture is the more lurid because he does not sufficiently emphasise the other side. At times he shows himself aware of it, as when, in dealing with the omnipresence of demons, he says (Part VI, p. 78), 'The savage and indeed the civilised man is incapable, at least in his normal state, of such excessive preoccupation with a single idea, which, if prolonged, could hardly fail to end in insanity'; and in a note there he quotes some

'judicious observations' of Mr Dudley Kidd on the merry disposition of the Kafirs, in spite of the swarms of devils that the anthropological report finds in their region. But the reader, relieved for a moment, is soon plunged into terror and pity again as he follows our author round the world, especially when he gets to Corea and Ceylon. And he may feel the contradiction in the statement quoted with apparent approval from Dr Wallis Budge (VI, p. 103)—'though naturally of a gay and lighthearted disposition, the Egyptian must have lived in a perpetual state of fear of spirits of all kinds.' There is often a lurking fallacy in a 'must,' and things that 'must be' often are not so. Hence it is that observant sojourners in savage lands often find the actual savage very different in psychic temperament from what, according to the decision of the anthropologic *littérateur*, he 'must be.' We ourselves are often very different on Monday from what we were on Sunday; hence, it may happen, we are able to continue living. Doubtless our writer's statistics concerning the 'omnipresence of demons' are of great value as raw material for our history of the human mind. But we have to do our own estimating and sifting; and, as he throws statistics of all races, primitive and cultured, into the same pigeon-hole of demonology, his chapters do not help us to distinguish the various peoples according to their less or greater burden of this dangerous yet fruitful superstition. Yet this distinction, which marks off, for instance, the Hellenes in their prime from the Babylonians and Egyptians, is vital for the history of progress.

Another general reflection is suggested by this vast exposition of human facts. We seem to want a new formula, a phrase for describing the process of our life from primitive to modern times. The 'stratification' theory, demarcating the stages of our history as clearly as the strata of the earth, seems to be quite inadequate to the facts; and Sir James himself writes a good note of warning against its fallacy (Part v, 2, pp. 36-37). His readers certainly need the warning, and perhaps he himself might bear it more steadily in mind; for he is apt to speak of 'an age of magic' followed by 'an age of religion,' or of anthropomorphism as superimposed upon a previous theriomorphism or theriolatry. Yet

his own evidence helps us to discern the past differently, so far as knowledge or conjecture can penetrate back. We do not see separate strata clear-cut from one another; rather we see a great variety of contradictory forms, the contradiction not being felt, existing in germ altogether; magic mixed up with religion, the lowest magic with a possible god in the background, vague anthropomorphism with a vague theriomorphism, ideas cruder than animism combined with animism, the terror of spirits touched at times with some instinct of love; the existence of individual thought in a circle of collective consciousness. There may have been an age of pure magic, a godless age, a preanimistic age, an age purely theriomorphic, purely matrilineal; but no conscientious anthropologist dares yet say that he has found it.

More helpful is the evolution-formula, derived as it is from the physical study of the organic world; and it is this which governs our writer's exposition in his fascinating short study called 'Psyche's Task.' But in his last chapter of Part II on 'Our Debt to the Savage,' he is less satisfying, less in accord with the reasonable verdict on his own facts. These ought to intensify our sense of the mental value of civilisation, of which in this chapter he tends to speak disparagingly, taking the easy and fatal 'pragmatic' view of truth; at the same time he over-estimates the mental life of the savage, at least as he has exposed it; for he speaks here of savage society as a faultless model constructed with rigorous accuracy upon the lines laid down by a barbarous philosophy. But in very much that he has presented to us we cannot see, nor does he try to show us, this 'rigorous accuracy'; we see rather in many directions a violent exaggeration, morbidity and unexplained caprice. And from his evidence we may gather the impression that civilisation cannot be regarded wholly as the result of a gradual progress in a straight line, as the slow evolution of a savage germ, or as the gradual transmutation of savage life, though these descriptions may apply to some parts of the whole complex change; we must regard it also as partly due to a higher lift, achieved by rejection and negation of much perilous and poisonous matter, and we must believe that the sceptical steady brain has been one of the lifting powers. The term

'evolution' then does not seem altogether appropriate and contains its own 'fallacy of metaphor.'

Our author's own attitude towards the savagery that he so copiously chronicles is difficult to fix. Generally he compels the reader to abhor it by his power of lurid painting; at times he records its futilities in the tone of Voltaire or Gibbon; but on the whole it fascinates him and he makes out a brilliant case for it. As regards his method of investigation, it is that which he has always employed, and which we may call the universal comparative method. Its procedure rests on a general survey of all mankind without regard to locality, race, or stage of culture, and on the view that a fact of anthropological interest and difficulty presented by one locality may be elucidated by comparison with other facts more or less similar reported from any other part of the world. This method in the hands of the master can lead and has led to great achievements; but there are certain pitfalls to which the worker on this and only this method is specially exposed. In the exigency imposed by his world-wide quest he may have neither time nor inclination for intensive study, that is, for the study of a fact in relation to its immediate and adjacent ethnic and social surroundings, in short for what is now being called 'adjacent anthropology.' Lacking this, he is always liable to misinterpret a fact, to attribute to it a certain significance, to place it in a certain setting, that does not accord with the probabilities suggested by its environment. And, partly as a consequence of this, he is liable to bring under one category doubtfully similar facts, which by reason of some unnoticed but essential incongruity are really incommensurate. In fact, the employment of the method of universal comparison alone is not likely to engender in the anthropologist the spirit of criticism; and I have tried to indicate elsewhere the advantages of combining it with the method of adjacent anthropology or with intensive study.

Great master as he is in his own method, which is no longer the most modern, Sir James cannot be said to have escaped wholly the pitfalls alluded to. This is most manifest when he comes to deal with areas of ancient culture, in which the facts are most complex and multifarious, and which specialists have devoted long

years to elucidate—such areas as Palestine, Babylon, Crete, Greece, Rome. A special student of Babylonian religion, for instance, will be startled by the thesis (Part III, p. 4), ‘the High Gods of Babylon periodically died.’ This is given on the authority of a discarded and unauthoritative little treatise by Mr King, who, like other good Assyriologists, is now aware that that statement only holds good of Tammuz. More especially in his long and frequent discussions of matters concerning Greek and Roman religion, he fails to impress the specialist or to display the true perception that comes from patient, sympathetic and critical study. Wissowa’s work on Roman religion reaches solid results, but is dry and narrow, and often ineffectual, partly through want of geniality, partly through disdain of comparative anthropology. Our author is his antithesis; having failed to ‘Romanise’ himself, being content with the universal comparative method only, he achieves no convincing truth, but is content to propagate many quaint and interesting theories, the children of cloudland, emanations from the realm of the barely possible. It is only the purely ‘comparative’ student, unversed in the lore and unfamiliar with the atmosphere of a special area that asks such questions as on p. 245, Part I, Vol. 2—‘if the Peruvian Vestals were the brides of the Sun, may not the Roman Vestals have been the brides of the Fire?’ Sir James Frazer would have theorised better on Roman religion, if he had allowed himself to be influenced by Mr Fowler, our greatest authority on the subject, who combines the advantages of the two methods. He might, then, have been corrigible on the question of the marriages of Roman deities, of Jupiter and Juno, for instance; he might have been critically careful of the distinction between what is late and Grecised and what is early Roman or Latin; and he would not have accepted the story of the Martyrdom of St Dasius as evidence for the primitive religion of Latium (VI, p. 308).

The universal world-survey is apt to engender hurry; and we sometimes find mistakes in our author’s statement of facts which suggest the hurry that prevents one looking carefully at a context or weighing the value of a literary passage. We are told (v, 2, p. 240, n. 1), ‘The Hebrews sacrificed and burned incense to their nets,’

on the authority of Habakkuk i, 16; but if we turn to the prophet's page we find that he quite clearly refers not to the Hebrews but to the Chaldeans. A childish bird-story in Antoninus Liberalis is quoted as evidence that the ancient Attic kings were identified with Zeus (I, 2, p. 127); one might as well conclude from the love-story of Cupid and Psyche that all beautiful women in ancient Greece were identified with Aphrodite. He marks a statement of the Scholiast on Aristophanes that the Greek sacrifice to the dead took place at noon-tide; and as an explanation he tentatively suggests that the custom may have arisen from the belief that spirits cast no shadow (II, p. 88). No explanation would have been needed if he had remarked that another Scholiast (on Apollonius Rhodius, I, 587) and Diogenes Laertius merely contradict the 'fact.' Again, he has no time for the weighing of authorities, or he would not have allowed himself such an *obiter dictum* as 'according to one account, Apollo himself was buried at Delphi' (Part III, p. 4); he would have realised how fatuous that late 'account' is. The same appearance of hurry is visible in his study of the Greek Saturnalia, which is the weakest and least critical portion of his work, forming the concluding chapter of 'The Scapegoat' (Part VI). Upon this very frail foundation is based the important induction that there existed in prehistoric times a uniform society ranging from South Italy to India. Occasionally, under the exigencies of a popular style, he ventures too sweeping generalisations on a quite insufficient basis: 'in classical antiquity there was a popular notion that every human being had his own star in the sky' (III, 66). He merely quotes Pliny (2, 28), who only attests the belief of his own time. But might not the intelligent reader conclude from these words that the Greek and Roman peoples throughout the periods of their respective histories were as liable to this unfortunate superstition as our Middle Ages or the age of the Renaissance? Our author must be aware how seriously important for the history of European civilisation are the exact facts concerning the prevalence of astrology, and that before the time of their decadence the Greeks were innocent of the disastrous illusion.

Again, one cannot resist the uneasy impression, while

one admires the vastness of his range, that in dealing with the leading problems of classical religion, such as the Anthesteria and Thargelia festivals, our writer's work is secondhand and uncritical. These are subjects that have been worked over most minutely by modern specialists; and our author's references suggest a sufficient familiarity with the modern literature of this department. Yet its influence upon him, whether positive or negative, seems usually slight; and he does not allow himself the time or concentrate himself for the effort to follow out a problem to its legitimate end. His restless mind is constantly flickering away down side paths, and he has to apologise to the reader—not without cause—for this weakness for casual roaming (v, 2, p. 96). The reader will easily forgive him, for we owe to it some fascinating anthropologic excursions; but our desire to see an argument driven home by continuous hard-headed reasoning, to follow down one track till something definite is found, is continually baffled. We are often bewildered with a mirage of half-realised innumerable possibilities.

There is another danger that naturally besets the rapid and omnivorous investigator and co-ordinator. All is fish that comes to his net; and at one cast he is apt to bring in many fish that are very unlike. Sir James Frazer casts his nets wide, and often the facts that are brought together are by no means co-ordinate. Careful investigation will reveal this in his development of one of his favourite themes, the killing of kings (III, 34–58). The ceremonious slaying of the king as a god-man to save him from the weakness of old age; the gallant end of a king on the battlefield, as of Saul; the casual and utilitarian execution of a king, as of Charles I—all these different types of cases are brought together as if they explained each other. Or again, in his discussion of the many interesting problems connected with the sacred women of Anatolia and Mesopotamia, he blurs the distinctions between many different types which modern criticism has laboured to keep distinct. The perfected scientific spirit needs in equal degree the faculty of seeing resemblances and the faculty of seeing differences. Our writer has the former in a striking degree; he is defective in the latter.

Some of these drawbacks may be inherent in his

method; and one may ask if he himself is aware of its limitations. At times he cautions the reader well and warily against too much dogmatism; he speaks of the 'slipperiness and uncertainty of the ground' (III, p. 112), but this does not deter him from very bold skating. 'Even the lamp of comparative mythology (he says) cannot always illumine ancient mythology' (ib.). This is certainly true; all the lamps that can be applied illuminate only a very small part; but his words imply that this is the true and only lamp. A test-case might be the argument that meanders through two volumes on 'Balder the Beautiful' to prove or to make probable that Balder was the oak that was burnt on the Midsummer Fires. All the comparisons and analogies strung together in these volumes do not and cannot bring us any conviction that Balder was an oak; and, if they were increased indefinitely, they would be valueless by comparison with a single direct Scandinavian record associating him with this tree. Even his statement, given on slight authority, that these fires are or were called 'Balder's Bale-fires' in modern Sweden outweighs as evidence the rest of the two volumes; but Scandinavian scholars do not regard that term as possessing any value for the original Balder-myth.

So far it is the method and the workmanship that have been discussed. But even the most general survey of this great work must take note of some of the writer's special theories. Criticism is checked at the outset by the candid openmindedness, even the indifference, of the writer in regard to them. He is always ready to abandon them if better can be shown him. This is scientifically praiseworthy. In the preface to the second edition, which he reprints at the beginning of the third, he pronounces his interest as more in the facts themselves than in the hypotheses which colligate and illumine them. But it is not to be expected that his reader will share his indifference. In the first place these eleven volumes are as full of theories as an egg is full of meat; and without them the whole work would lose the slight degree of unity which at present it possesses. It is just his particular theory about Balder that allows him to fill the last two volumes—dedicated to that god—with

bewilderingly various matter ; while in an Appendix he at last inclines to a totally different theory about him which at once renders nearly all these two volumes irrelevant. Elsewhere (VII, 2, p. 218) he embodies in the text 'a suggested theory of Totemism' in which he no longer fully believes, 'because it serves as a convenient peg on which to hang a collection of facts which are much more valuable than any theory of mine.' This is not quite worthy of the dignity of a *magnum opus* ; and he does himself an injustice. Yet his words recognise the necessity of some theory, without which our perception, memory and sense of values would be drowned and lost beneath the flood of accumulated facts. A fact by itself is not yet of any value. The past and present history of mankind contains potentially billions of 'facts,' most of which are useless, and none of which are useful until interpreted and illumined by some theory or hypothesis. Even 'The Golden Bough,' by far the richest storehouse of anthropological facts that has ever been accumulated, is only a selection ; and every selection implies a theory.

We cannot, then, be indifferent to theories ; but at the same time it is well to realise their inadequacy. Sir James Frazer is modest enough about his own ; but it is not clear that he recognises with sufficient acuteness how inadequate are his own theories, as well as others that have been put forward, to explain nine-tenths of the facts in certain domains of anthropology, especially mythology and ritual. Let us accept and apply to the phenomena of ritual and myth all the most prevalent hypotheses, theories of sun-worship, weather-magic, fear of ghosts and witchcraft, ideas of purification and taboo, totemism and the worship of animals ; then we are pulled up short by a question of detail—'Why do savages knock out their two front teeth?' or, 'Why must the priestess of Athena at Athens abstain from native cheese?' or by any other of the thousands as embarrassing as these in Dr Frazer's collection ; and all our theories fall helpless. Anthropology can show the leading ideas in such a priestly code as Leviticus, but no theory can rationalise more than a fraction of the amazing details. Nothing is more eccentric and baffling than the ceremony of a savage funeral. Nothing in

our writer's discussion on the worship and reverence paid to animals explains why men should hunt the wren with such curious rites (v, 2, p. 317). Mythology is, even more than ritual, elusive of the net of the theorist, especially if he is narrow-minded enough to work on the sole theory that all myth comes from ritual. Dr Frazer is too much of a veteran to cherish that illusion; but it may be that inadvertently he encourages it in the tyro.* He puts forth, for instance, a theory of Balder and thinks that, if accepted, it explains the myth. We feel that at best it only explains a fraction of it; the myth of Balder is too rich and original to be explained as the 'text-book' of any conceivable 'sacred drama.' It is the fault of much modern research into the origins of Greek mythology, that, when it has discovered and proclaimed the origin of a particular myth, it leaves all that is really interesting in the myth unexplained and more mysterious than before. A capricious fancy, at once exuberant and meticulous, appears to have prevailed in primitive ritual and myth-making. It is our duty to endeavour to systematise their products by reference to general principles that regulate them; but it is also our present duty to confess how slight our success has been and how evasive the detail is.

Our author's theories are mainly concerned with magic, religion and sociology in the broadest sense of these terms. Now, it is a vice of much modern anthropology that it blurs the distinction between magic and religion and fails to arrive at any precise definition of them. This cannot be said of our writer, who gives a clear and workable account of the difference between the two spheres (Part I, 1, p. 222). By religion he understands 'a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life.' Magic is not defined with such precision in this treatise; but he uses the term to denote a mode of control or compulsion exercised upon the outer world (including men and gods) according to a law of sympathy between phenomena; which sympathy he analyses into the ideas of homœopathy and contiguity. His analysis is a reasonable

* Cf. VII, 2, p. 88, where he gives a too narrow definition of 'myth.'

interpretation of the facts from the point of view of the modern observer; but it may be thought to fail as a vivid representation of what is going on in the mind of the savage magician. His theory might have been more complete and more real, if he had engrafted upon it Dr Marett's exposition of magic in his 'Threshold of Religion' as an ebullition of will-power or 'mana,' using such means as mesmeric words, gestures, and actions. Such a view will protect us against the temptation which is strong in Sir James Frazer to affiliate the modern man of science to the primitive magician, as if the point of view of both in respect of the outer world were the same, each assuming the invariability of nature and its obedience to certain fixed laws, while the votary of religion regards it as variable and depending on the capricious or incalculable will of a personal power. It might be truer to say that the magician is distinguished from both the other characters by his egoism, his self-confident assertion of force; and that both he and the typical religious person are distinct from the man of science in that they consider the world of nature as an elastic and sensitive medium, indefinitely responsive at any point to an immediate discharge of will-power.

As regards the relations between magic and religion in the history of man, our writer is well aware of their deep interfusion; but he maintains the thesis, which is scarcely susceptible of historic proof, that in our human history an age of magic preceded an age of religion. At the same time he strongly and clearly refuses to regard religion as in any sense evolved from magic; for the rise of religion involved a self-abnegation, a breach with the past, a new point of view which was adopted by the higher minds as they discovered the futility of the old. That the human race has passed through a wholly non-religious era is a quite defensible hypothesis; but our author's proofs of it in the fourth chapter of Part I (Vol. 1) will hardly be considered adequate. For instance, such a statement as that on p. 233—'obviously the conception of personal agents is more complex than a simple recognition of the similarity and contiguity of ideas'—is hardly obvious or convincing as phrased.

As regards his general theories on religion and its progress through the various stages of lower and higher

life, there is some characteristic vagueness arising from lack of clear definition. He has no perception or imagination of a possible preanimistic mode of religious feeling; he is vague concerning the meaning of fetichism, confusing it with pure animism. For instance, he defines the former as 'the view that the fruits of the earth and things in general are divine or animated by powerful spirits' (IV, 2, p. 24); and he is occasionally loose in his application of the term 'god.' When he deals with the interesting question concerning the genesis of the idea of 'gods,' he tries to preserve an open mind; and in an excellent preface to his treatise on 'Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild' (Part V), he warns his readers against attributing too much weight to the quantity of the evidence that he there accumulates, and against the narrow view that each and every deity was in germ and origin a vegetation-spirit. He rightly proclaims his belief in many different origins of deities. Yet here and there, we may think, his early and life-long devotion to the theory of Mannhardt, the discoverer and the champion of the Corn-dæmon, still leads him astray; for instance, it misleads him into a jejune and narrow-viewed account of Demeter and Persephone (V, 1), who in origin and throughout their career are vaster potencies than the Corn-Mother or the Corn-Maiden, and whose careers cannot be wholly explained, as he would explain them, by reference to that trifling peasant-fetich.

Though he strives to be open-minded, studies so wide and copious as Sir James Frazer's naturally entitle him to a predilection for certain views. There are two concerning the genesis of gods that are salient in these volumes. The first, to which, I think, he has only been inclined in recent years, we may call the Euhemeristic. At the end of the two volumes, somewhat daringly entitled 'Balder the Beautiful,' he adds an Appendix on 'African Balders,' in which he finally gives his adhesion to the opinion that Balder was a real man. Again, in Part IV, after sketching the religion of Osiris, he comes to favour the suggestion that Osiris also was once a real personage, in fact to be identified with Khent, an Egyptian king of the first dynasty, who was buried at Abydos. Now, the Greek who gave his name to this theory of the human and historical genesis of gods may have been

a very foolish theorist; his followers in antiquity were undoubtedly among the most fatuous of the later writers. But this ought not to prejudice us against the tenability of the theory as an abstract proposition. Like other theories, it has its turn to be true; in fact, within historic times, as Sir Alfred Lyall in his 'Asiatic Studies' has shown in respect of India and China, and recent anthropologists have proved in respect of certain African communities, it gives us an undoubted *vera causa* of the growth of gods. Therefore we have the right to posit it as an operative cause in the prehistoric period.

It is only a slight personal misfortune for our author that, if his final theory about Balder is right, the title he gives to the two volumes of Part VII becomes even more irrelevant than before. But what alone concerns us here is to ask whether he gives us any criteria, or whether any such can be found, for determining, in any particular case, whether a god was once a real man. I believe such criteria exist and can be stated. But criticism and sharp definition of criteria are not our writer's strong points; the vaguely synthetic and lax habit of the roving comparative method has led him to discover Balders in Africa, who are not Balders except at one point, and who do not help our question at all; when he ought to have spent more intensive study on Scandinavian religion and the Balder-myth. The reader will find the theory of a real man-Balder more critically set forth and the evidence for it seriously considered in Golther's 'Handbuch der Germanischen Mythologie,' published in 1895.

A further reflection bearing on religion may occur to the reader of these volumes on Balder; and it is strange that it did not occur to the writer. Whether a god was once man or not man, in popular mythology many human traits and attributes are sure to be attached to him, which are the same as those that belong in the real world to men and heroes, for instance, a coat of mail, a spear, a wife, a horse, a ship. It was an actual custom for a great Norse hero to drink beer, and on his death to be burnt on his viking-ship. Therefore Odin's gods drink beer, and Balder is burnt on his ship. It is the real heroic life of the period that suggested this trait, not the peasants' midsummer fires, with which Balder is not known to have had any concern. Sir James Frazer's

Euhemerism might have saved him from infecting heroic saga with too much ritualistic interpretation.

A second predilection of the author in his speculations on the evolution of deities is towards the theory that the anthropomorphic god was 'evolved' from a previously divine animal or divine plant. From his occasional statements the hasty reader, as was hinted above, might imagine that our race in its religious development has passed through the distinct stages of 'phytomorphism,' 'theriomorphism' (the direct worship of plants and animals), and finally—if it is final—'anthropomorphism,' the worship of humanly conceived and human-shaped divinities; in fact, we might as well coin another ugly word, 'lithomorphism,' for the direct worship of stones and rocks, and call this another 'stage' in religion. This 'stratification' theory has led many rash students astray. No age purely theriomorphic, no all-prevalent worship of mere animals without the human conception present at the same time, has as yet been shown to exist. As has already been said, our author has warned us against this pseudo-scientific theory of our religious development. The following passage in Part v (Vol. 1, p. 22)—'the advance of thought tends to strip the old animal and plant gods of their bestial and vegetable husk and to leave their human attributes (which are always the kernel of the conception) as the final and sole residuum'—well expresses a true induction from our evidence. The theriomorphic does not necessarily precede the anthropomorphic conception; both may be working simultaneously. In fact, at times, the former may be subsequent to the latter; a real man has been worshipped after his death as incarnate in the crocodile, and Zeus the Aryan sky-god might be imagined vaguely in his earliest period as a superman in the sky, and much later, for casual and temporary reasons, might become incarnate in a bull. Yet, after the excellent sentence just quoted, Sir James can speak of 'the animals and plants which at first were the deities themselves'—a less careful and vaguer phrase, sure to provoke the same misunderstanding. And he cherishes the desire, often quite illusory, to discover the previous animal from which the high humanly-conceived deity was 'evolved.' His conjecture (iv, 1, p. 88, note) that 'the Furies themselves may, like Æsculapius, have been

developed out of the reptiles,' is unlucky and suggests no careful study of either the Erinyes or Asclepios; why not as well conjecture that the latter was a real man-doctor like the Egyptian physician-god, and that his snake was merely the usual incarnation of the dead spirit?

In another place (Part v, 1, p. 23) he gives us a criterion for discovering the animal which produced the anthropomorphic deity; 'wherever a deity is described as the eater of a particular animal, the animal in question was originally nothing but the deity himself.' This is only put forward as a conjecture; it rests on the assumption of Robertson Smith that all sacrifice was once a sacrament, the eating of a deity, which no one now believes. An anthropomorphic deity is naturally supposed to eat what men eat. Our author would not have commended this conjecture as giving us a general criterion, had he studied more deeply the ritual and religion of the Mediterranean. Wherever in these volumes he speaks of the 'worship'—a word often uncritically used—of animals, and of their relations to higher deities, we find no recognition or consciousness of the truth, which is so important for the right understanding of Mediterranean religion, that the sanctity of an animal may be only temporary, not possessed by it in its own right, but coming to it solely through contact with an altar impregnated with the spirit of a humanly-conceived god.

Finally, in this connexion, the reader should carefully note the evidence collected in Part v, 2, pp. 169-293, on the veneration and propitiation of animals. The account is interesting and valuable; but none of the numerous examples show us the evolution of any high god from the animal; in many cases the high gods are seen in the background as altogether distinct from the animals; even the revered tiger of the Battas of Sumatra is not grouped with the gods.

His sociological theories concerning the origin of certain social and religious institutions remain to be briefly considered. In this last edition he does not put forward any new theory of importance, but restates what his earlier editions had made familiar to us, adding some new evidence and considering some objections that his critics had raised. The real value of his work in this direction lies in his untiring exposition and colligation

of the facts reported from existing primitive societies; and, if we take him at his word that he cares little for theories, he will be content with our gratitude to him for this excellent service. But he is prone to indulge himself in fanciful reconstructions of the great societies that at last emerged into the culture of the historic period; and here we cannot help feeling too often that his historic imagination is whimsical, his critical sense deficient, his judgment of the archæological and anthropological evidence undisciplined. We know that mythology reflects prevailing social institutions of the present or past; and therefore an ancient mythology may give us valuable anthropological testimony of ancient social customs. But it requires tact and caution for its interpretation, since it often reflects the abnormal and eccentric, certain startling breaches of the social custom. We rub our eyes, then, when we read our author's serious conjecture that the story of Œdipus, Laios and Jocasta reflects the social custom of the son murdering his father and marrying his mother (III, p. 193, n.). It will be time to consider such a conjecture when we find such a marriage-custom prevalent in any actual or recorded society. Meantime, we may feel that we have as much right to conjecture that the story of Hamlet reflects a Danish custom of all nephews killing their uncles.

A striking feature of many societies, usually in the primitive stage, is 'mother-kin' or the rule that kinship is counted through the female. Since McLennan's works on primitive marriage, the subject has been a leading topic of modern anthropology, and in unscientific hands has been debased by being perverted to the party purposes of the Women's Suffrage cause. Our author is happily free from any such vice; and he is well aware that mother-kin very rarely carries with it 'matriarchy' or the power of the female. But he devotes himself with zest to the discovery of the mother-kin system in ancient societies where it had not been recorded or hitherto suspected, for instance, in Greece and Rome and other Aryan communities. His evidence is partly the interpretation of myths, and his manner of interpretation is again unconvincing; for instance, he interprets the many Greek myths of the wandering hero-adventurer winning a kingdom by marrying the native king's

daughter as evidence of mother-kin in the royal line, the crown descending through the female (I, 2, pp. 278-280). Such stories may rather be thought to reflect the migrations and conquests of tribes; to conciliate the conquered people the successful invader unites himself with the old dynasty by a marriage. Such is the story of Hengist; such is the record concerning Canute; such was the claim of William the Conqueror. We know that myths can be valuable evidence of ancient society; but they never ought to be interpreted in direct contradiction with a definite historic record. Our author regards certain Lydian myths about Omphale as indication of mother-kin in the royal family and the inheritance of royalty through the female. This is in flat contradiction to the absolute statement in Herodotus that for twenty-two generations from Herakles down to Kandaules the kingship in Lydia descended in a direct line from father to son, all the Herakleidai being lineally descended from Herakles and a slave-girl (1, 7). Our author, therefore, 'conjectures' that Herodotus is wrong (Part I, 2, p. 282); but such a conjecture impairs his own reputation as a judge of evidence.

The whole question of Mediterranean mother-kin still needs to be reconsidered by a thoroughly trained and unbiassed scholar. It becomes even a religious question; for many writers, even many scholars, still believe that it is connected with and explains the predominance of the goddess. Our author holds this opinion himself without much consideration of the adverse arguments that have been urged; he is only able to adduce one positive and clear example, namely, from Assam (IV, 2, p. 202). But suppose we accept his anthropological formula (one not wholly true), which is worded thus—'the divine society portrayed in myths reflects the society of the worshippers'; suppose it is the case, as he maintains and as the evidence proclaims, that in the societies based on mother-kin the power is still in the hands of the king or the chief or at least the men; we must then conclude that a society based on mother-kin will usually reflect itself on the heavens in the form of the predominance of the god. The prominence of the goddess then, as in prehistoric Crete, must be due to some other cause. And other causes have been suggested.

The sociological theory that is most prominent in the whole treatise is his view of the origin of the monarchy and of the social religious rite of the slaying of the divine king. With his usual initial reasonableness he admits that kingship may have had many origins. But his thesis that the king was often 'evolved' from the magician and in early days was a divine weather-charmer or vegetation-priest, whose periodic slaying was a necessary refresher of the earth, is very dear to his heart, and with all his industry and ingenuity he labours to discover traces of it all over the world. He has not convinced us that such was its origin in the higher societies of history, in Greece, Rome, Palestine or the Teutonic North. His arguments are too often frail and forced, his evidence, as that, for instance, drawn from the consecration of sacred women to the Anatolian Goddess, too often irrelevant. It is more serious that he should condemn and pervert the evidence where it is wholly against him, as he does with the Biblical testimony concerning the origin and character of the monarchy in Israel (iv, 1, pp. 18-25).

But those who steadily and critically read these volumes to the end will not close the page with a feeling of disapprobation. They may miss in Sir James Frazer the severity of trenchant logic, the self-restraint that rejects the irrelevant, the *finesse* of the critical sense. But these faults are the defects of his other qualities, which themselves are near to greatness. Even if the colossal work had no other value save as an unique collection of the raw material of primitive life, the value will endure and will shed lustre on the writer, who deserves the congratulation of friends and critics upon the accomplishment of such a task.

LEWIS R. FARNELL.

Art. 10.—STRIKES, FROM THE WORKMAN'S POINT OF VIEW.

WHY do strikes occur, are they justifiable, and if so can no better means be found of attaining the same ends ?

Were the question asked abruptly, 'Why do men go on strike?' the average employer would probably reply, 'Because they are discontented,' while the typical working-man might answer, 'To get fair play.' Each of these answers seems to bear a little hardly upon that section of the community to which the speaker does not belong. It is the point of view which counts. The following remarks, made from the working-man's point of view, are the result of observation and (may one say?) *internal* conversations among working men throughout a period of nearly ten years. An opportunity like the present is seldom given the working man, for two reasons; he is but half articulate, and his point of view is the wrong one—wrong because it does not appeal to the educated, who very naturally do not appreciate the mass of detail which renders the lot of the working man so much less happy than it might be.

This reasonable ignorance is unfortunate for the working classes in many ways, and is not to be dispelled by the ordinary methods of the journalist or philanthropist, for any attempt to 'acquire information' soon betrays itself and creates an unnatural atmosphere. In practice the working man or his wife being interviewed—however informally—will always paint working-class conditions very much better or very much worse than they really are. There appears to be no middle course in this connexion; and grave misapprehensions arise, damaging the cause of the wage-earners.

All working-class grievances (hence practically all the economic unrest through which we are passing) are due mainly to the fact that working men consider there is a want of logic in the attitude of society towards its hewers of wood and drawers of water. There is still a reluctance on the employer's part to realise that his 'hands' can reason and are quick to trace to its source any specific grievance which, in their opinion, would not exist were a clear statement of the facts made public. This alleged want of logic produces two main results

from which all legitimate working-class grievances spring. First, the hours of the wage-earner are too long, and second, his pay is inadequate.

Consider the so-called eight-hour day. This would be more accurately described as the nine-hour day, because, for five days a week the working hours are usually eight and two-thirds in number. If the expression eight-hour day be insisted upon, then, as a matter of simple arithmetic, there would be no Saturday half-holiday in the forty-eight hour week; and the forty-eight hour week is the shortest within the general knowledge of the working classes. 'Terminological exactitude' is of something more than academic importance here, because working men may, with some show of reason, point to its absence as an indication of the spirit in which matters concerning them are discussed. It has been contended that,*

'In many fields of intellectual work men frequently take no account of time, but go on as long as may be necessary to complete some task, and much longer than any workman is ever called upon to exert himself. Some intellectual workers habitually do it—there are numerous classical examples—and even in ordinary professional life it is not uncommon. The head of a business often works longer than anyone in his employ.'

This is only incontrovertible if we assume that the boot-mending, plot-cultivation and so forth, which actual necessity imposes on the worker, are not work. Employers seem unable to realise that the vast majority of their more poorly paid hands have to toil for very many hours, week in week out, to bring the works or *official* pay up to a living wage. Further, the working man does for himself and his family very many of those things which members of the more fortunate classes pay domestic servants or others to do.

Again, it is generally accepted as a fact beyond dispute that mental work is more fatiguing than mere bodily labour. Yet the working man in Government employ knows that he will be compulsorily retired at the age of sixty-five,† while he is also aware that Judges, Cabinet

* The 'Times,' Aug. 19, 1910: 'Mental and Manual Work.'

† Ordnance Factory rule 70, 'In any circumstances workmen, whether entitled to superannuation or not, are compulsorily retired on attaining

Ministers, High Commissioners and others whose work is on the highest mental level may, and very frequently do, continue their labours to a much greater age. May not the labourer, worn out at sixty-five, contend that his toil must have been harder than that of the Judge still working at seventy-five, eighty or ninety? One who had earned his pay at both brain work and labour said not long ago, 'The truth is that, whereas mental work fatigues the brain only, manual labour fatigues the body and the brain too.*' It is matter of everyday experience that the man with a tired body can do no useful work, mental or manual—cannot even derive profit from reading—though the mentally tired man may do good bodily work and find therein recreation.

Up to this point our comparison of working hours has been confined almost exclusively to the notion of hours *per diem*, but it must not be forgotten that the working man will probably never have one entire week for his own until he is deemed past work, unless, in the wearisome years between schooldays and his premature old age, sickness or other misfortune befall him. Is he so much to be blamed if he sometimes compare his statutory holidays with the wider and more frequent breathing-spaces allowed to others? and is it not clear that his hours of work, reckoned throughout the year, are very much longer than those of his superiors? Monotony and constant subordination too bring in their train an awful cramping of spirit quite unknown to the brain-worker.

Recent railway disasters have brought out in a painful manner the fact that monotony of work tends to subconscious performance, and we know that any action performed subconsciously is liable to be forgotten on occasion. Major Pringle, enquiring into the disaster which occurred at Waterloo Junction on Oct. 25, 1913, asked a witness whether men did not take things too much for granted sometimes.†

'When a man,' was the reply, 'is kept a long time in the box he gets so used to the work that it comes to him quite

the age of sixty-five.' The rule also states that a workman may be retired on the ground of age at sixty.

* The 'Times,' March 31, 1911: 'Labour and Brain Work.'

† The 'Daily Mail,' Nov. 6, 1913. The witness was himself a signalman,

naturally.' 'What would you suggest as an alternative—move a man?' 'It would do him a bit of good sometimes.' 'You think that being in one box for a long time a man becomes less careful?' 'Not less careful, but they do the work and a minute or two afterwards do not think what they have done. They do not think enough about it.'

But the soul-destroying monotony with its attendant catastrophes is for our purpose a side issue. The important points are three: the manual worker is worn out at an earlier age than is the brain-worker, and the man on the lower rate of pay will be compelled to put in very many hours per week at some form of drudgery which it is not usual to consider when reckoning his hours of toil, while of holidays throughout adult life he has practically none. By what standard then do we measure if his hours are not too long?

Secondly, the manual worker's pay is inadequate. It might be argued that our Alms-houses, Hospitals and Workhouses, together with the Old Age Pension Act, are all standing monuments to the inadequacy of the working-man's pay. Though such a contention is by no means the exaggeration it may seem to many, it is certainly sweeping, and we willingly abandon it with the remark that, if there were no charity in the world save charity in thought, our civilisation would be upon a higher plane.

There are certain things which the working man can never do because his pay is insufficient. He can seldom or never afford to occupy a house in which there is a bathroom. The story of the bath used as a receptacle for coal is familiar, and no doubt true, but it scarcely furnishes good proof that working men would not appreciate fitted baths. On the other hand, it brings out the fact that even the more provident of our poor are compelled to purchase coal extravagantly—by the cwt. or half hundredweight—because their homes have not the storage accommodation for larger and more economic purchases. The working man who is determined to be clean must either spend a great deal of his spare time (when he is not working), carrying pails of water about,* or he must pay at the public 'Wash

* The so-called 'Saturday afternoon strike' in Sept. 1913 was largely due to the bath difficulty.

houses' for the risk of innumerable chills. Further, though the working man may lay no exclusive claim to inability to afford illness, yet illness bears much more hardly upon him and his than upon his social superiors; and he may contend with absolute truth that the few days' rest which might stave off a severe illness is a luxury beyond his means—he must go on, taking the risk. It seems at best a paradox that the less a man is paid the greater is the physical endurance demanded of him; in other words, the man worst fed, housed and clothed is called upon to run the greatest risk of physical injury. That the working man cannot afford holidays is made clear by the practice of the punishment known as suspension. Could he afford it, it would be no punishment at all, but the mere granting of an unexpected holiday, for nearly all working-class holidays are days upon which there is neither work nor pay. Superior persons who work fewer hours and for higher pay suffer no deduction in respect of statutory holidays.

The average working man holds very decided opinions concerning his own and other people's holidays: 'How is it,' he asks, 'that the more important a gentleman's work is in the place, so much the longer is the period for which he can be spared from it each year, and things—including his pay—go on just as though he were there? How is it that, though I may be entitled by rule to a few days' leave each year, of course without pay, yet, when I have a single one of those days, there is generally a fuss? And why, if my time is of so little value, must it be checked to the half minute, while the man whose time is paid on a very much higher scale may wander in half or three quarters of an hour late daily? It is a crime for me to lose half a minute (valued at a fraction of a farthing) once a year, while the other man may lose his shillings' worth every day. I pay heavily for the small loss, he pays nothing for the greater.'

Fortunately it is within the power of anyone interested to draw up an imaginary balance sheet of working household expenditure if he will but take the trouble to enquire into the question of rent (as a rule the working man earning twenty-five shillings a week pays no less than six shillings in rent), and will also bear

in mind that all too often clothing *must* be paid for on some iniquitous instalment plan, while gas, coal, sugar—practically every necessary—is dearer to the working classes than to persons able to pay for larger quantities. Tobacco and tea too are taxed irrespective of quality; and so the wearisome tale of something which is surely less than justice might be prolonged.

It is particularly difficult, if not impossible, to compare the work of the educated with that of the uneducated when relative rates of pay are under consideration, yet it is not difficult to find instances where startling incongruities prevail. For example, educated persons frequently occupy positions wherein there is not much work while there is grave responsibility; such posts are highly paid. The wage-earner, on the other hand, is often called upon to undertake both work and responsibility. For the responsibility he is not paid, but has instead to work under the knowledge that any neglect of responsibility on his part may mean imprisonment or other serious punishment which the educated responsible man has little need to contemplate.

But perhaps the situation as regards working-class pay may best be summed up in this manner: the working man who is in full work—earning his weekly wage fifty-two times a year, but for statutory holidays—is in much the same financial position as a trader unable to make net profit would be; all the gross profit is absorbed in working expenses. In either case the cost of necessary food, clothes and housing should surely not be reckoned as a charge upon net profit; it is an essential working expense. Were this fact recognised by accountants it would be found that, while the wage-payer's net earnings would show but slight diminution, the wage-earner's would become evanescent. Here we are brought face to face with the fact that there is no living pension for the man who cannot save during working years.

Have wage-earners a moral right to strike?

This question has been discussed again and again, and the discussion has frequently led to no more definite conclusion than may be conveyed in the one word 'sometimes.' From so brief an answer the seeker after truth can deduce but three things: instances have arisen when

the wage-earners' strikes have been justified by unfair treatment; there have been other occasions when the treatment meted out to the workers has been equitable, so that their action in striking cannot be justified; and there may have been other cases where the generosity of employers has made the mere thought of striking a gross ingratitude. But what is fair, what equitable, and what generous? Again we are made conscious of the diametrically opposite points of view. Should a poacher be tried by Justices who preserve game? Should questions concerning fair treatment of the uneducated be settled entirely by the educated? Should the purchaser of labour fix the price? Of these three questions the second offers peculiar difficulties, which can only be indicated here by some such further question as, How many barristers have had the education (technical, domestic and social) of the average blacksmith? But, supposing it to be agreed that in a particular trade the pay is not adequate, is a strike then justifiable? Extremists can be found who will say, 'No. Men must not quarrel with their bread and butter, bring their wives and children to starvation, and then appeal to the public for help.' Yet an ideal public would be upset by the mere knowledge that a section of its servants was being hardly dealt with, and no strike would be necessary. Even a public not quite ideal is often stirred to its depth when it gets to know. Ignorance may be bliss, yet justice sometimes demands knowledge. The Press does not help in these matters as it might. This much at least seems certain: there have been, and no doubt there will be again, times when it is a mere matter of prudence to withhold a portion of corn that it may serve as seed, even though the daily ration be thereby diminished. Further, it is probable that had there never been a strike or anything akin to a strike, the earth's population might be broadly divided into two classes—slave-owners and slaves. The Press Gang suggests an argument in this connexion which is not easily refuted.

If a strike is to reach any importance, it must have for its object an honest desire to better the lot of the working classes. That section of the Press which is loudest in its outcry against the foolish masses who are

swayed and led by paid agitators is no less noisy concerning splits in the ranks of labour and the discrediting of labour leaders by their former supporters. 'Labour,' they say in effect, 'is always foolish, foolish to support a voluble self-seeker, and foolish, having found him out, to withdraw their support.' It is the same spirit which all too often creates confusion between the precipitating cause and the real reason of a strike. No strike which involved the idleness of even one hundred men has ever been brought about solely by the dismissal of one man. Ethically, for the sake of the community at large, this may be a pity, but practical conditions in the work-a-day world of labour render such a happening impossible. The true explanation of very many of the so-called 'One-man strikes' is not far to seek. Given a body of men who feel, rightly or wrongly, that they are not getting fair play, let these men read one-sided accounts of their own and their fellows' doings, accounts in which the masters' case is not infrequently set forth as though it were the men's, then a quite trivial incident may be sufficient to bring about a strike. Vast masses of rock are not blasted that another fuse may be made. While the object of every reasonable strike is to improve the lot of the wage-earners in this and succeeding generations, there is always present too the hope that 'The public may get to know.' This last—no mere childish outcry for sympathy, but rather hope of means to an end—is a point upon which the Daily Press generally is reticent. When we read that a striker has assured a journalist that he does not know why he is on strike, we may be sure either that the striker was a foolish specimen of his class or that the journalist was, for a journalist, singularly obtuse.

The public has often believed all to be right with an industry until a strike has been in progress for some time. In this connexion, as in many others, the dock strike of 1889 is worthy of special attention, not because it was the first of the great dock strikes (we must revert to 1872 for that), but because the dock workers may justly claim to have been the pioneers of useful strikes and strike methods, since it was they who, by enlisting the sympathy of one or two public-spirited persons of

education, showed how it was possible, as the result of strife and suffering, to overcome the culpable negligence of the Press and to gain public sympathy in spite of that negligence. Moreover, the strike of 1889 showed clearly one new feature—public sympathy—a feature not generally recognised yet, to which reference will be made later; and it has required dock strikes to accentuate the influence, the enormous influence, which Roman Catholic priests exercise in labour struggles.

The dock strike of 1872 left us the nucleus of the Labour Protection League, which flourishes to-day, doing good work and more than justifying its existence, even if it be credited with nothing but its readiness to champion the widow and fatherless; our civilisation boasted a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals before the inception of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children.

The dock strike of 1889 left us a public beginning ever so dimly to realise that there might be hardships in the lives of the working classes concerning which newspapers failed to speak. Certainly the first scene of the struggle was played to an unsympathetic public. The 'man in the street' had his existence in those days, but he knew neither his name, his responsibility nor his power. The one thing of which he felt sure was this: a mob of ignorant, drunken ruffians, who were jolly well off because they had no appearances to keep up, were quarrelling with their bread and butter—the key, by the way, to most of our labour troubles might be found in an honest interpretation of that cant phrase 'no appearances to keep up!' At the commencement of this strike, then, the public, *qua* public, was unsympathetic, if not actually hostile. Fortunately, however, there were one or two individuals, members of the public, yet head and shoulders above it in this connexion simply because they had seen for themselves. Mrs Annie Besant, Mr Sydney Buxton and others knew, for example, that hundreds of literally starving men presented themselves daily at the dock gates and, after a more or less protracted wait, were permitted to take part in a scramble for perhaps thirty brass discs which were flung among the crowd. These observers knew further that the few who emerged from the awful

mêlée in possession of the coveted checks were engaged. This being engaged or 'taken on' meant that the fortunate men were permitted to work strenuously for threepence halfpenny or, more frequently, fourpence an hour; and, though the job might last for but one hour, crimps and other types of hanger on were present to claim a percentage of each man's earnings.

Later, as the result of a charge of theft (a loaf of bread figuring as the Police Court exhibit in the case, if memory serve), Cardinal Manning made public some details of starvation. Meanwhile the processions of 'drunken ruffians' which paraded the streets were frequently headed by Mr John Burns—a life-long abstainer. And Australia knew enough of the trouble to subscribe and forward the Strike Committee 37,000*l*. In consequence of the knowledge thus forced upon the public the dock workers' pay was increased variously, by ten per cent. in some cases and as much as forty per cent. in others, while no engagement was to be paid as a period of less than four hours. From this it followed that a man being taken on could not earn less than two shillings on that day. Thus it was the dockers who led the way in the attainment of a minimum wage.

After this some twenty-two years elapsed before the occurrence of another notable dock strike, that of 1911. The cost of living had risen more than fifteen per cent. in the interval, while wages had remained stationary. It was the dock workers who first brought about the establishment of the minimum wage; and, as a natural consequence, it was they who first realised that Capital in its dealings with Labour is apt to regard minimum as the synonym of maximum when wages are concerned. The twenty-two year old conditions were no longer good enough. This plain issue was, however, complicated in a most unfortunate manner; and there was complete misunderstanding on certain points. An idea got abroad and was largely adopted by the men, to the effect that the Masters of the Port of London were making conciliation an excuse for the complete breaking-up of the men's Trade Unions. As a result there was great delay in the resumption of work, the men refusing to go back until the demands of every section had been

satisfied. Ultimately, the hours of the lightermen having been reduced and a 'Penny and Penny' increment having been granted, work was resumed; but the feeling against free labourers was greatly acerbated. The so-called 'penny and penny' increment (*anglicè*, sixpence per hour to be in future sevenpence, and the previous sevenpenny rate to become eightpence) was practically equivalent to the fifteen per cent. rise in the cost of living since the last adjustment of wages.

The dock strike of 1912 is now generally regarded by the strikers themselves as having been a foolish performance. Ostensibly it began over the employment of one non-union man; and considerable effort was made to secure complete recognition of the Transport Workers' Federation. So far as the majority of the men were concerned, this strike constituted a breach of agreement; and for a time it appeared that the entire system of collective bargaining had broken down. An effort was made to call out the workers at all the ports about our coast; this, however, met with something very much less than half-hearted response. Yet it must not be supposed that there was no shadow of excuse for the men's action. The previous attitude of certain Port of London Masters, together with the employment of free labour in specific instances, had set up an honest belief among the men that once more a determined effort was being made to smash the unions. Hence, breaches of agreement, weeks of semi-starvation, and crowds marching to the work-houses. And the net result? The strikers returned to work unconditionally, having lost the right of choosing where the 'taking on' should be done, while the Lightermen's charter was gone, and there was a marked increase of bitterness against the free labourers.

In taking away the Lightermen's charter the Port of London Authority struck the final blow at a system of apprenticeship which was perhaps the finest London ever knew. The apprentice was, as a rule, bound to his father or some immediate relative—it is wonderful to note how certain family names have survived in the industry. Further, the Watermen's and Lightermen's Company not only forbade the apprentice to enter a public-house or music-hall, but (and this even in comparatively recent times) if he did so they fetched him out! This system

has been finally shattered that a working man's monopoly might be destroyed.

Is it unreasonable to contend that strikes are a natural consequence of educating the masses and at the same time a means of furthering that end? The old argument that a hand into which a book has been placed is spoiled for the plough appears to be a curious half-truth. Are we not hearing of University Graduates in business, of highly educated women farmers, bee-keepers and so on? May we not look forward to the day when the time of men and women shall be reasonably divided between mental and manual labour? Is it not terrible that one of our great dailies should feel called upon to apologise for 'the subjugation of London by the Tango,' saying that it and such vagaries 'form a slight relief to the monotony of amusements which is far more deadly to the mind and spirit than the monotony of work'? *

Can the wage-earners find no better means of attaining their ends than the strike?

Working men generally may be regarded as a class of trader coming into the market to sell their time, their strength and a certain amount of skill. They offer perishable commodities. By no possibility can the time, energy or manual dexterity unsold to-day realise a price to-morrow. They are not even as the apple-growers who, having found the makers of cyder obdurate, discover that their produce can be turned to profitable account as food for cows. What the labourer has to sell to-day must be sold to-day or lost for ever—to him and to the community. It is this unfortunate fact which renders sweating a possibility; could our working classes afford a few real pauses for breath in their adult lives we should see great changes. The working man comes into the market, then, to sell the most perishable of all commodities—labour. If the would-be purchaser fixes the price at a figure which experience has taught the would-be vendor to consider too low, then the labour, not of one man only, but of an entire section, is apt to be withheld—for, as a general rule, numbers rather than individuals are concerned in these bargains—and a strike

* The 'Daily Mail,' Nov. 11, 1913.

is declared. While the strike is in progress it is the working classes who are much the greater sufferers; they have deprived themselves of very many actual necessities and have so depleted their funds that on resuming work they may have to put up with a great deal before they dare embark upon another strike. The employers have lost no more than the profit they might have made on the men's labour (save in certain peculiar cases, as, for example, in mines, where damage is caused by flooding during periods of inactivity),* and the public has been inconvenienced. Fortunately the British striker seldom or never indulges in sabotage, our sensational Press notwithstanding. Here let but just one instance be noted with a view to substantiating inevitable statements concerning our daily Press. During the railway strike of some four years ago a paragraph went the round of the morning and evening papers accusing the strikers of having cut certain signal wires. To the average reader this would naturally appear a dastardly outrage; but every railway worker knows that should a signal wire break or be cut the arm would at once fly to danger, the shorter portion of the arm being weighted for that purpose. The statement concerning the cut wires seems to have been widely circulated, but this explanation appears to have been published nowhere. Clearly then the immediate consequence was apt to be more grave to the strikers than to anyone else concerned. Nor must it be forgotten that there is yet another and very terrible risk which all strikers run—that of permanent loss of employment through the bringing in of free or blackleg labour.

Has the striker any sort of justification for interference with the free labourer?

It is only for so long as we regard manual labour as a walk in life apart from all others, that this interference seems unique and without warrant. Recollecting that the labourer too is human, that his actions are dictated by motives which operate in higher circles, it

* In the Yorkshire coal strike of April last the men whose duty it was to keep the pits in condition remained at work with the full knowledge and consent of their mates.

may be found that he is blamed not so much for what he does as for the all too blatant manner of the doing. If similar motives are at work in other circles, how do they operate? to what extent can we find parallels? Recently a barrister speaking in public informed his audience that he did not go on strike, because he was a member of the finest Trade Union in the world. In other words, free labourers would not presume to interfere; should they make any such attempt, drastic action would no doubt be taken; yet the crude methods of dock labourers and others could be avoided among members of the Bar. Again, if shopkeepers complain to a manufacturer that one of their number is cutting the price of a certain article, it is usual for the manufacturer to refuse further supplies to the retailer complained of. Such methods are understood, society endorses them; but, insisting that the manual worker is of a race apart, that the worst is always good enough for him, no such help or moral support is given in his case. He must, therefore, take the law into his own hands or let himself be undersold. And the awful pathos of this underselling! Half a loaf may be better than no bread, but it does not follow that it will be sufficient. Drowning men clutch at straws, only to find the support inadequate. It is very terrible to work and to starve simultaneously.

The common assertion that union men endeavour to drive non-union workers out is very far from the truth. A cordial invitation is constantly being extended to the free labourers to join the societies or unions. It is only the man who cannot furnish simple proof of competency who is kept out. Further, after every big strike there is usually a considerable influx of new members. The engineers' eight-hour strike of some thirteen years back, which failed, was remarkable in this respect. If masters have a right to say to men, 'Work in the manner we appoint and for the pay we choose to give, or starve,' then there is not one single word which can with honesty be said in support of trade unions. If, on the other hand, masters have no such right, then the manual labourer is justified in refusing to work with any man whose action or want of action would have a tendency to enforce the aforesaid conditions upon him by appearing to confirm the master in such right. The term

'Free Labourer' is of course a misnomer, coined probably by the Capitalist Press. These men are free only to undersell their fellows for just so long as their fellows cannot prevent the underselling.

The law allows 'peaceful picketing'; and to the superficial observer this would seem a great concession. Men are allowed to surround their 'shop' and may endeavour to dissuade others from doing the work which they themselves have abandoned. But may a man dig up the seed potatoes which another has planted and devour them on the ground that the other is not eating them? Would not the planter be very apt to think he had a right to adopt some course more drastic than mere verbal remonstrance? Here the analogy may seem overstrained, yet the case for the striker has not been fully stated. His policy is anything but that of the dog in the manger. How many of the reading public understand that, when a strike is in progress and free labour appears on the scene, it is a quite usual custom for the Union to offer these men the same strike pay as the Union men are receiving, on the simple condition that they leave the job alone? Thus we have the planters saying in effect to the free men:—'If you will but leave our seed in the ground we will share with you from out what we have put by, though we are ourselves on short commons and though too you have refused in the past to put by for yourselves. Help us to this extent for the sake of our future, your future and all our children's future.' When such an appeal fails is it wonderful if an occasional blow be struck?

Public inconvenience, employers' losses and strikers' privations all combine to exhibit the strike as at once a clumsy and a deadly weapon. Yet strikes have in many cases served a useful purpose. In 1889 the public had little or no sympathy for dock labourers. The labourers struck; the facts concerning their conditions of employ filtered through as the strike progressed; and public sympathy was with the strikers. Again, when one hears of a large body of strikers putting in the forefront a demand for a code of working rules,* one cannot doubt that the treatment meted out to these men must

* Painters and Decorators, Aug. 1913.

at times have been strange. Yet again,* when employers (on the introduction of the Insurance Act) levied a charge for material on their workers, so that in effect the workers should pay the entire cost of insurance stamps, can we wonder that no time is lost in discussion, that the strike, armed from head to heel with something more than 'peaceful' picketing, springs into being?

Yet the strike is undoubtedly a clumsy method of procedure. Of other means at present we seem only to recognise the interview between masters and men, the conference between employers and trade union officials, and the Conciliation Board, or Enquiry, presided over by some neutral arbitrator—who may or may not be a Government official—and *ad hoc* legislation. In years gone by one heard of the 'Round Robin,' an institution which probably met its death at the hands of the new-born 'Dignity of Labour,' though the reason for its existence survives. An interview between masters and men means in practice that one or two workmen speak on behalf of their fellows. Throughout that interview the men are heavily handicapped (if not actually obsessed) by the knowledge that they must pick and choose their words. The master labours under no such difficulty. And ever after the spokesmen are marked individuals. This of course is the reason for the men's desire that their case may be stated by Union officials.

Any comment upon recent happenings in this connexion would be a labouring of the obvious. Here then we have the position that an interview where the men must state their case is not satisfactory to them, while one at which Union officials make the representations is not favoured by the masters; and the Board of Enquiry presents its own peculiar difficulties. The type of man who can approach these questions with an open mind is not born many times in a generation; and when the case for labour is stated the judge is in effect a defendant, for he belongs to the employer class.† Nor must we forget that the plaint of labour is all too often

* Somerset Collar and Shirt Makers, July 1912.

† The Report of the Federation of Trade Unions, 1913, contains a suggestion to the effect that 'Judges who try cases in which the interests of capital and labour clash should be selected from a different class from the one which now provides them.'

put forward by yet another of the defendant class. But supposing all such difficulties to have been overcome, and that there is an adequate supply of suitable chairmen for our Boards, how are their decisions to be made binding upon both parties? This latter question seems to bring us at once to the method in general use to-day, *ad hoc* legislation. Nor are objections wanting here; such legislation is apt to be hurried, the 'hard cases' which lawyers tell us make bad law are apt to receive undue prominence, and a lack of special internal knowledge of detail sometimes leads to the making of strange errors.

What then is to be done? Are the occasionally working rich and the ever-toiling poor to remain so very far apart? The following suggestions, put forward in all humility and as a mere tentative outline of possibilities which would at least go far to satisfy working men may be of some service. This is an age of specialisation; why not a new type of specialist, an Average Adjuster in matters of labour? Such an expert would need to have received an education on quite definite lines with a view to the office he is to fill. This education would require to be of a peculiarly high order, but its catholicism must not depend on a knowledge of the classics. Firmness, tact and dignity would of course be essentials. Ability to sift evidence from the standpoint of common sense rather than a comprehensive legal training would also be indispensable.

But above all he must have an intimate knowledge of working-class conditions. To obtain this he must actually become a workman for a time—a period of certainly not less than three years. This will be the most difficult part of the training, for it must be thorough if it is to serve any useful purpose; he must live on his pay, not embarking on this period with a well-stocked wardrobe nor receiving allowance or presents from his friends; indeed his communication with them ought, if the thing is to be thorough, to be rigidly restricted. Moreover, he must understand at the outset that 'not feeling quite the thing' is to entail no stoppage of work—a fact he would soon learn for himself, but it should in common fairness be impressed upon him at first. Then,

and only then, it seems we shall get a sufficiently large class of men capable of presiding at labour enquiries, men who will know both sides of the question. Having held such an enquiry, it might be best for the 'Adjuster' to submit his conclusions to a small committee of his colleagues, and their pronouncement might become automatically an *ad hoc* statute. It may be objected that Sir G. Askwith is here already to do this sort of work. From the working man's point of view Sir George has done splendidly; but my middle-class friends tell me that it is easy to settle strikes by giving in to the striker. Are there many men who will act upon sympathy for the under dog in the teeth of their own friends' opposition, unless beside sympathy they have also exact first-hand knowledge upon which to base action which is not conventional? Sympathy plus experience gives a greater fund of moral courage than is usually derived from sympathy alone.

If this outline of a tentative scheme be considered worthy of discussion, the matter of labour training will probably receive criticism. The suggestion that men should be taken from refined homes and compelled to associate with working men, living and working as such men live and work, may seem absurd if only because the educated man would naturally feel his changed surroundings much less congenial to him than would be the case had he been born in such a condition of life, and may thus be led to take an exaggerated view of the hardships. This is true, but may it not be urged, as tending to counteract such depression, that our student will have definite hope, and will know that for him the period is but a period? It may also be argued that even at the end of his three years he would not be able to take his place in any skilled trade. Let him then either undergo a longer period of labour training or be content to work throughout the shorter course as a labourer. Probably this latter suggestion would be found best in practice, if only on account of the saving in time. The labourer is always cognisant of the way of life of his 'mate' the mechanic.

Industrial peace will never rule the earth; but a band of arbitrators knowing both sides of the question would go far to remove friction, while the mere fact that such

a body, however small, was making the sacrifice, undergoing the necessary training, would do much for labour.

Since the foregoing remarks were written, war, international war, has come upon us, bringing in its train an immediate cessation of industrial hostilities, to be followed after a period of some seven months by a most unfortunate recrudescence of labour troubles in those industries upon which our own and our Allies' existence as free peoples are most vitally dependent. If we try to explain the working man's attitude throughout these happenings as briefly as possible, the fact is that he never has believed, probably never will believe, that there is danger for England. Overwhelming proof of this statement can be adduced by anyone who has worked with him on terms of anything like intimacy. When a fleet of Zeppelins was believed to be approaching the Royal Woolwich Arsenal, the men could not be got to take the situation seriously. It was a stupendous joke.

Why, then, did the declaration of war produce immediate economic peace? Because the violation of Belgian neutrality aroused all that was best in our working classes. Naturally there follows the question: why did this state of things not continue? Here a complete answer cannot be given in few words. Strikes are seldom, if ever, attributable to one single cause. The final or precipitating event is generally to be regarded as no more than the makeweight which turns the scale. Further, though we may accept it as an axiom that there should be no strikes in war time, it hardly follows that, if strikes occur, the blame is entirely with the workers.

The most important and consequently the most regrettable strikes of which we have been hearing in the immediate past are to be attributed broadly to natural weariness and equally natural resentment of injustice. The strain of the war has fallen very heavily upon the workers. Overtime is by no means the unmixed blessing which certain persons would have the general public believe. A dock labourer, writing to the editor of one of our daily papers, says: 'It is possible for a man to work three days and three nights in one week.' To the additional hours of work the delays due to the crowded state of trains and trams about industrial centres should

be added when one is considering the fatigue of overtime. Frequently it seems as though many persons, whose hours are probably under their own control, elected to travel for amusement at just those times when working men consider they have a right to easy homeward transit; while it is certainly the fact that the London County Council Tramways Committee has not risen to the demands of the period, the early morning service being quite inadequate. Loss of one minute by the working man may mean the loss of hours in his pay.

With regard to the injustice. Here again we find the Daily Press, with but few exceptions, arrayed against the working man. That large section of the Press whose ubiquitous representatives can learn all about anything in less than half an hour and whose columns admit no contradiction, has been guilty of criminal folly again and again throughout the past six months. The headline provocative, most dangerous of implements since it stirs up the ignorant who read little beyond placards and head-lines, has been all too much in evidence, while sensational stories have been told of drunken dock labourers arrested with anything from twenty to sixty pounds in their trouser pockets, and quite interesting little fables have been related in cold print concerning the working man's preference for notes because a paper hoard can be moved without noise. The mischief done by these exaggerated statements and insinuations concerning working-class earnings is incalculable. Dealing with one aspect only, do such statements not furnish semblance of excuse for the artificial inflation of prices? Since contradiction or correction from those who know is seldom or never admitted, great bitterness is engendered. The dock labourer previously quoted, who succeeded in getting a letter published, wrote: 'I have been a dock labourer for thirty-five years and the last three weeks have been my best weeks for years, my wages averaging 2*l.* 5*s.* . . . so where does the four or five pounds per week come in ?'

Before leaving our consideration of the Press attitude towards increased earnings there are yet two points to which attention should be directed. It has already been said that very few working men live on their normal weekly wage. From this it follows that overtime

pay is by no means all gross profit, for garden-plots are perforce neglected and boot repairing must be put out and paid for. Suppose his subsidiary industry be worth five shillings per week to the man—and this is a low estimate—he has to put in five shillingworth of overtime each week on this count alone that his budget may be normal. Next, if we consider that the increased cost of food and fuel be no more than fifteen per cent., and if, still keeping our estimate very low, of his normal wage sixty per cent. is absorbed by these two items, then nine per cent. must be added to that normal wage to make up for this increased cost of living. Now what is the position of the man whose normal rate is twenty-five shillings? He requires an additional five shillings plus nine per cent. on twenty-five shillings—in all an increase of seven shillings and threepence each week. How much overtime does this mean? If he is in Government employ and puts in three hours extra a day for each of four days, he earns eight shillings and fourpence as overtime pay—thus making one and a penny gross profit by overtime. And even the anti-labour Press admits that labourers on twenty-five shillings a week are able to make very little extra. Supposing he works but two and a half hours extra on four nights, his weekly earnings will be sixpence less than in times of peace. On the other hand, should he work all day on Sunday, he will earn nine shillings at one fell swoop, for he receives double pay for that day—a surplus of one shilling and ninepence for the loss of his day of rest.

It is the knowledge of these facts which enables one to say that the workers generally are feeling the strain of additional work and are labouring under a sense of increased injustice. Of the 10,000 strikers on the Clyde the great majority have had no increase of pay for seventeen years, the increment then having been one halfpenny per hour; and, in simple justice to them, some stress should be laid on the fact that their demand for the additional twopence was formulated and presented before there was any prospect of war. Their subsequent refusal to work overtime pending a settlement is hardly to be wondered at when one reflects that, whereas an employer would deem it disgraceful to delay his reply to a business enquiry addressed to him from without his

own works for longer than a week, such an enquiry coming from within his establishment may be indefinitely shelved. Yet a strike in war time and against the advice of Union officials clearly has its bad points.

Of the 8000 Liverpool carters who handed in strike notices recently not much need be said, for they have displayed both courage and patience by returning to work in so short a time. Of the London Shipowners who declined to meet Dockers' representatives nothing need be said.

Concerning the Committee appointed to report upon production in engineering and shipbuilding establishments, there has been much public talk anent the absence of Union officials from such a body; and it is not without interest to note that a very great deal is being said privately, and quite unofficially, with reference to the fact that there are no 'Men without handles to their names on the job.'

As regards the immediate present, the question of strikes may perhaps be summed up in this way. The workers have absolutely no idea of endangering the Empire or of exposing our troops to added risks. Their attention is concentrated on the notion that a state of war is being made the excuse for further exploiting them. Requests made before the war are still undealt with, while the cost of living has been much increased. Protest has been unavailing, hence the strikes—unfortunately in war time. The suggestion that our Government should adopt yet another German method and mobilise strikers overlooks the fact that a large majority of our strikers have already volunteered for active service and been told that they would be of more use to their country by remaining at work. A proposal which seems far more sound is that due to the Hon. William Pember Reeves, who suggests that we should adopt the Australian system of arbitration, at least for the period of the war. If this be done the prospects of successful working will certainly not be made more remote by the inclusion on the arbitration boards of men who understand both the work and the workmen.

Art. 11.—INDIAN ART.

1. *Indian Sculpture and Painting.* By E. B. Havell. London : Murray, 1908.
2. *The Ideals of Indian Art.* By E. B. Havell. London : Murray, 1914.
3. *A History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon.* By Vincent A. Smith. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1911.
4. *Selected Examples of Indian Art.* By A. K. Coomaraswamy. London : Quaritch, 1910.
5. *Indian Drawings.* Two Parts. By A. K. Coomaraswamy. London : India Society, 1910 and 1912.
6. *The Arts and Crafts of India and Ceylon.* By Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. London : Foulis, 1913.
7. *Eleven Plates of Indian Sculpture, chiefly in English Collections.* Edited by E. B. Havell. London : Probsthain, 1914.

WITH the opening of the 20th century the art of Europe finds itself in strange condition. It is full of self-questioning, full of perplexity. It feels the desire to go forward, but is not sure of its direction. The underlying causes of this condition are not difficult to trace. It has been for centuries an accepted theory that art consists of an imitation of nature. It is true that the great artists have always understood that their fundamental business was design; but the belief that the representative side of art is its essential function has influenced the practice of all artists; and the signal success of science has also, consciously or unconsciously, coloured the minds of all of us, so that the zest of discovery and exploration has been for art too a commanding inspiration. Like men of science, artists have put their life's effort into the wrestle with nature. A perpetual reference to nature, a close touch with the inexhaustible variety of natural form, colour, and movement, makes for health and vigour in art; but with the true artist the problems of representing these are subordinated to the fundamental problem of design. And design need not be concerned, though in ripe and great art it always is concerned, with nature. After long labour and struggle, aided by scientific study of anatomy, perspective, and

atmospheric effect, culminating, with the last impressionists, in an almost feverish effort to transfer to canvas the vibration and splendour of sunlight, there has been a sudden recoil. How can we go forward on these lines? There seems nothing left to be done. Various attempts are being made under sounding or mysterious names to organise a forward movement. But like those advertised medicines for a score of diseases at once which are found, when analysed, to contain nothing but some well-tried ordinary drug, these movements only disguise something very simple—a return to design. A sure instinct is driving us back from a conception of art as specialised not merely in painting but in a special kind of painting, to a conception which relates together everything designed by human workmanship. At the moment this instinct forces up, with the elements of self-questioning discontent and rebellion, a desire to get back to the beginning. A kind of disgust with the drawing-room atmosphere of complacency which has long reigned in art leads to a weariness of the authority of accepted classics. And so, turning away from Europe, eyes are turned to the art of other and strange lands.

When we turn from the art of Europe, it is of course with the art of Asia that we are first confronted. It is truly amazing, considering our relations with the East, that the art of Asia has for so long a time remained unknown in Europe. The products of the bazaars have been known; the so-called industrial arts of the East have been long appreciated. But the greater arts of the continent, those in which its ideals have been enshrined and expressed, have been till quite recent years wholly neglected. And it must seem a singular thing that, while India was the first of the great Oriental lands to come into close contact with Europe, its art is the last to have been recognised. Japan was an unknown country till after the middle of the last century; yet it was Japanese art which first received the serious recognition of European connoisseurs. Even in the case of Japan, the grandeur of its early sculpture and the beauty of its classic painting remained for years unsuspected. When this rich world opened out, it was seen at once how much it derived from the genius and inspiring example of China; and we realised that, while for so long we had been

collecting Chinese porcelains, we had totally ignored the art of which the porcelains were merely a reflection, the splendid painting and sculpture of the classic epochs. But China again is not to be understood without reference to India, and to the Buddhist religion by which Chinese art was so powerfully affected; and, if we are to study the art of China, we must also study the art of India.

The actual study of Asiatic art, however, has not been pursued on these general lines, since it has necessarily been undertaken chiefly by specialists, who have approached the study each from his own point of view; and, while the initiation of the public has followed the sequence just indicated, the discovery and the championship of the art of India have been due to scholars steeped in Indian lore and Indian atmosphere.

Before Mr Havell wrote, it was the fashion to deny that India had produced any 'fine' art at all. That fashion is now exploded. Mr Havell has done a real service by his championship of Indian sculpture, painting, and architecture. He has shown that India possesses a creative art animated by its own ideals, and he has interpreted those ideals with sympathy and eloquence. He has made the English public, so ignorant of the real India and its achievements, and so little enlightened by the returning Anglo-Indians, acquainted with an art of which it had no conjecture. The impetuosity of his attack on ignorance and prejudice, and the very excesses of his zeal, have probably been more effective than a more critical and judicious treatment of his subject. For it must be confessed that Mr Havell's enthusiasm often outruns his judgment. Former writers had been prone to attribute anything they found of merit in Indian art to some foreign influence; especially to that of Greece. Greek influences exist in Indian art; they are notably strong in the Buddhist sculpture of Gandhara, just as Persian influence is strong in the Mogul school of painting. But these 'influences' are always being exaggerated by archæologists and historians of art. Every great art absorbs elements from without, and the most original artists are generally those who have borrowed most. The sole question to be considered is what use has been made of the borrowed material. Has it been truly absorbed into the creative energies of the

artist or of the race, or does it remain foreign and external? If the borrowed element be not congenial, it will be wasted. But art works from within, with a fusing and perpetually transforming power. Every one sees that the important and essential thing in Shakespeare's plays is Shakespeare, and not the histories, legends or Italian novels which he took for his plots, although whole passages of his actual dialogue are to be found in the sources he drew from. But in pictorial art people are far too prone to represent similarly borrowed material as the dominant and even the essential factor. What is interesting in Indian art is that which is Indian in it. Gandhara took a method of representation, choice of type, forms of drapery, from a Hellenistic school of sculpture; but the Buddhist inspiration soon transformed these from within, so that in the resulting tradition of Buddhist art which passed across Asia to China the Greek element is a dwindling and almost insignificant factor. So too the Persian influence on Indian painting in the 16th and 17th centuries never penetrated deeply; the quite different spirit of the Indian artists made of it something new, not a mere imitation.

Mr Havell quite rightly defends Indian art from this perversity of criticism. But, not content with defending, he carries the war into the enemy's camp, and tends to find Indian influence everywhere, in Persia, in China, even in medieval Europe. And we are obliged to answer Mr Havell in turn, as he answers his opponents, and to say that what interests us in Persian art is the Persian genius, what interests us in Chinese art is the Chinese genius, what interests us in Gothic architecture is the Gothic genius. Whatever influences of whatever kind may have gone to the forming of these great schools, it is undeniable that each is a separate and unique creation of the human spirit; and it is what each in its ripeness has become, the inner life which has controlled its growth, which concerns and attracts us. Mr Havell may rejoin that we ignore an essential distinction. What India has borrowed has been methods, motives, forms, conventions, things belonging to the means of representation. What India has given out has been a kindling of the mind, an ideal, something belonging to the inner spirit. The actual influence of Indian ideals

outside India seems to us to be overestimated by Mr Havell; but, even were it as potent and wide-pervading as he would have us believe, we have still not got to the root of the matter. For in art a race expresses something more profound and secret than any formulated ideal, something deeper than words, something underlying even thought; it is for a race what attitude and gesture are to a man seized by emotion, a silent index of his innermost nature. An artist cannot disguise himself in his art; what he really *is* appears inevitably in it, however strenuously he may aspire to be something different. And so it is with a race. If we seek for that which is quintessential and incommunicable in a nation's art, we must seek it not so much in ideals which can be translated into language as in its distinctive design. By design we mean that ordering of the relations between the parts, by which a work of art acquires organic unity; it is something belonging to the mystery of life itself, and it is this which justifies our calling art creative. Forms, conventions, decorative motives, can be absorbed by this subtle fluid of vitality; but so also can ideals, thoughts, and emotions. The influence of Christianity on the art of Europe has been immense. It provided fuel for the creative fire in those races which imbibed the faith; it gave impetus and direction to the art thus called into being. But of itself it did not create art. So it was with Buddhism, and Indian thought generally, in the world of Asian art. Let us recognise, with Mr Havell, that Indian art is something sprung from the soil, something personal to the race; what it has absorbed from outside is of little significance. But let us also recognise that the same is true of the arts of the other great races of Asia, and of mankind.

If we emphasise this point, it is because we think Mr Havell's main defect is that he does not seem to realise the fundamental importance of design in art. He opposes Indian idealism to European naturalism, and exalts the spiritual character of Indian art as a supreme quality. But a work which has an ideal subject can be just as bad art as a still-life painting, and, because of the greater difficulty, is usually worse. And if European art has often been swamped by its materials, its best inspiration lies in the faith that nothing in the visible world is too

mean or common for the uses of the spirit. It is the miracle of art, of the designing faculty, that it can everywhere transform fact into idea and from the merest hint in nature can create something that appeals to the most profound elements in man. Indian art has never fallen into the slavish pursuits of naturalism, though on the other hand it has often been too contemptuous of nature; but its capital weakness lies in something that comes from neither of these tendencies, it comes from a comparative lack of energy in the designing instinct, by which an art grows and is renewed.

Though it would be a mistake not to recognise the weak side of the Indian genius, it is more important at the moment to rejoice in the many beautiful creations which have lately been disclosed to the European public; and let us be grateful to Mr Havell for a pioneer work which will never be forgotten. With Mr Havell must be associated Dr Ananda Coomaraswamy, who has done so much by publishing fine sets of reproductions to spread the knowledge of Indian art, and who has studied its history with critical thoroughness as well as with sympathetic insight. Of another school is Mr Vincent Smith, long known as a learned archæologist, who has been led to modify considerably his views on the æsthetic merits of Indian art—not uninfluenced by its recent champions—and whose 'History of Fine Art in India and Ceylon' is the fullest and completest historical account that has yet been published.

An Englishman who wishes to find some actual work from which to start on a study of Indian art cannot do better than visit the Indian Section of the Victoria and Albert Museum. There, among a mass of miscellaneous objects and poor modern work, he will find a certain torso of dark red sandstone. We often find that a single work (whether of art or literature) belonging to a school which we have regarded with indifference, or even aversion, converts us to a new view of that school. It delights us and surprises us; and then we begin to wonder if there are not other works of the same school which may delight us also. A fresh angle of vision is gained, and with it the eye of sympathy. The torso in question is of singular beauty. Its beauty is different from the beauty of a Greek marble; though merely a

torso, it has a kind of aroma of spiritual rather than bodily charm. It reminds us at once of Greek and of medieval sculpture; but such reminders only serve to emphasise its uniqueness. It is akin to the art of Ajanta in its inspiration; vigorous but gentle, it seems to express the grace and poise of a spirit neither withdrawn from the delights of the world and disgusted with the mortality of man, nor on the other hand immersed in the life of the senses. The restricted but rich ornament shows the germ of Indian tendency in decoration, afterwards to become extravagant and heavy.

There is very little of Indian sculpture in the same collection to attract or compel admiration from the lover of art. One cannot but deplore that in this country, the one above all others which ought to have intelligently studied and collected what is best in Indian art, so little has been done. Even with the meagre and ill-assorted material available at South Kensington, a generous treatment by high administrative authority might enable those directly in charge of the collections, who are at present cramped and disabled by want of accommodation, to dispose them to far greater advantage and focus attention on the finest things. The torso which we have described, for instance, deserves a place to itself, with good lighting and space about it. If it were placed in a gallery with nothing else but Lady Herringham's copies from the Ajanta Frescoes on the walls, how immensely different would be the effect on the visitor! He would then have some definite conception of the early art of India, and would have some means of realising what this art stands for in the art of the world. Lady Herringham's beautiful copies, lent by the India Society, are on the walls of one of the upper galleries; but the view of them is so interrupted by the floor-cases that it is impossible to contemplate them at one's ease. Yet for one who wishes to gain an acquaintance with Indian art these copies are of paramount importance. The frescoes show the Indian genius at its finest; but very few travellers undertake the difficult pilgrimage to that remote glen in the mountains of Haiderabad where in a great curve of cliff above a stream are hollowed out the Caves of Ajanta. 'Caves' is a convenient but misleading word, for the frescoes are painted on what are really great halls

hewn out of the rock in imitation of actual structures, with architectural and sculptured ornament. A remarkable series of photographs has been made by M. Victor Goloubew, and is to be published by him in the admirable 'Ars Asiatica.' Meanwhile the forthcoming annotated publication by the India Society of Lady Herringham's copies will be a most valuable acquisition for the student. But the copies themselves bring us nearer to the originals, for scale is important.

Two former sets of copies have been made from the frescoes, the first by Major Gill, the second by Mr Griffiths; but both of these were more or less destroyed in two separate fires, though a damaged remnant of the second set may still be seen in the Indian section. Hitherto the paintings have been best known through the coloured lithographs and the collotypes in Mr Griffiths' two folio volumes published in 1896. It is curious to note the difference of selection in that publication and in Lady Herringham's series. The two sets make a quite different impression; and it must be said that the paintings chosen by Lady Herringham are at once much more attractive and give a far finer notion of the art of Ajanta. And it must be remembered that these frescoes represent not one single school or period, but a succession of schools working from the first or second centuries A.D. to the seventh, the latest being the best.

These paintings are all Buddhist in subject. We are apt to associate Buddhist art with a hieratic character, with the mystical figures of the Bodhisattvas, apparitions from the supernatural world; with an art that has no concern with the actual and the visible. But the most characteristic of the Ajanta frescoes have for subject the stories told of the lives of the Buddha in his previous incarnations on earth. And so we find portrayed before our eyes the actual life of India of that time. Here in a palace-interior, where pillars of deep red are crowned by capitals of pale blue marble, a prince is seated, receiving offerings from young girls. How full of natural grace and courtesy are their attitudes and movements! We have no need to make excuses for a primitive stage of art. All is largely designed, with an easy mastery over the means of representation. Others again are outdoor scenes. Here is the story which afterwards wandered to

Europe and became the well-known legend of St Hubert, the huntsman who chased a stag which turned to show him a crucifix planted between its antlers. In the Indian story it is a certain king, fanatically enamoured of the chase, who pursues a deer headlong, leaving his courtiers behind him, till he falls into a pit full of water which he had not noticed in his haste. The deer takes pity on him and pulls him out, and so transforms his nature. The freshness and animation of this scene, with its thickets of green so admirably suggested, and the many moving figures, remind one of Pisanello. But the all-embracing tenderness of Buddhism, its recognition of the dignity and patience and beauty of the life outside humanity, gives to these scenes an atmosphere very different from that of any mere hunting-scene. The deer itself is the being who was afterwards to be born as the Buddha.

Another story is of the great white elephant, also an incarnation of the Buddha. Owing to a spite conceived in a former existence, a young queen determined to rob this king of elephants of his tusks, and sent a hunter to procure them. The hunter after surmounting incredible obstacles found his victim, but was unable to saw off the tusks himself. The elephant then took the saw in his trunk and cut them off himself, knowing why and for whom the thing was done. The prize was brought home to the queen; but she, at last perceiving her own littleness of soul and the Buddha's magnanimity, turned away from the sacrifice and allowed herself to die. The group of the dying queen surrounded by her attendants is one of the most beautifully conceived in this whole series of frescoes, or indeed in the whole of Indian art. And the drawing of the elephants in the scenes of this story is masterly.

The characteristic spirit of compassion flowing out for all living creatures, which gives a singular gentleness to all these scenes, a gentleness felt even in the drawing of the figures—this spirit finds its culmination in a super-human figure which is the supreme expression of the art of Ajanta. No one certainly knows whom this figure is intended to represent; whether Gautama renouncing the world, or (more likely perhaps) the great Bodhisattva, the genius of compassion, Avalokitesvara, who is said to refuse salvation till the salvation of the whole world be

accomplished. Of superhuman size, among a confused multitude of smaller shapes, and with a background of rocky ledge and tree, this great form stands out detached as a spirit looking down in pity on the world. If little known as yet, this figure will assuredly become famous among the great creations of art.

In these Ajanta frescoes we find an abounding and inexhaustible delight in life; in the beauty of form and movement in men and women and animals, in the freshness of leaves, in the earth and the sunshine. And yet in the midst of this joyous exuberance, the natural vigour and hope of youth, there is the capacity for profound sorrow and an exalted compassion. The secret of this art is a deep recognition of the spiritual element in man, conceived not as an essence apart, to be cloistered and protected from the material world, but as something pervading and refining all the actions and events in which men and women take part, and colouring with its own tinge even the unconscious life of nature.

These frescoes have the same kind of significance and promise for the art of Asia that the early Italian frescoes have for the art of Europe. If inferior in some aspects, especially in design, they are superior in one aspect; they are not so exclusively occupied with human figures, they admit refreshingly the world of animals and vegetation. Animals and birds are painted with more mastery because with more sympathy and insight. From a morning of such magnificent promise what might we not expect? But, alas! the story of Indian painting, so nobly begun, drops into centuries of total darkness. No doubt the practice of painting continued—it reappears again in the 16th and 17th centuries—no doubt there has been immense destruction; but for close on a thousand years, so far as anything is known at present, we have an astounding gap and silence.

We will return to the later phases of Indian painting. Meanwhile let us consider for a moment the sculpture, which is of immense variety and extent. The torso at South Kensington was found at Sanchi, the site of a famous *stupa*, and is said to have crowned one of the pillars erected by Asoka in the 3rd century B.C. Mr Vincent Smith is of opinion that it is correctly ascribed

to the age of that Emperor ; but Mr Havell is strong against so early a date, and would put it down to the 4th or 5th century A.D. However this may be, we do not often find in Indian sculpture forms of such purity and distinction.

The early Buddhist sculptures and reliefs of Sanchi and Bharhut, which are later by a century than the time of the Emperor Asoka, show already in a pronounced degree the Indian characteristics; the teeming multiplicity, as of luxuriant vegetation, the fullness and softness of the forms, the animation in detail, and the absence of relieving spaces. There is inventive floral ornament, and the animals are admirably treated. The technique is really that of the woodcarver, surviving into a time when wood had been supplanted by stone; but even to this day the practice of making statues in perishable materials—wood, clay, or mud—continues.

The same style, with its ornateness and love of filling every available space, is developed further in the sculptures of Amaravati in the south, which date from the 2nd or 3rd century A.D. This monument, like others in India, has suffered greatly from the demolitions of local builders in want of stone. The remnants which have been saved are preserved in the Madras Museum and in the British Museum, where they are seen by every visitor who mounts the main staircase. According to Dr Coomaraswamy, these stone reliefs were originally covered with painted plaster. In any case, we cannot well judge of the effect intended without the architectural setting and the congenial glow of Indian sun. In their own type of richly crowded design these reliefs show extraordinary invention. Fergusson thought them the crowning achievement of Indian sculpture; but few would now agree with this judgment. Much has been discovered since Fergusson wrote; and it is noteworthy that, while he remarked on the 'almost total absence of sculpture in Ceylon,' the efforts of the Archaeological Survey have quite disproved this statement, and some of the finest classic sculpture is to be found in the island. Among these is one of the grandest of the great seated statues of Buddha, and the magnificent figure of Kapila, carved in the rock. The Kapila especially has a latent energy and a contained simplicity

of contour which give it a place apart. It is thought to be contemporary with the latest and finest of the Ajanta frescoes, about the 7th century A.D. Of a like monumental quality, though very different in style, are the colossal statues at Konarak in Orissa, of horses and warriors, and of elephants. In these, however, which belong to the 13th century, a certain barbaric exuberance and tendency to break the outline are to be noticed; the design and the sense of style are comparatively on an inferior plane, though their grandiose force gives them a place among the memorable sculptures of the world.

A properly equipped and adequately housed museum of Indian art would find room for casts of the most representative of such statues, and would give the student an opportunity of realising the achievements of Indian sculpture, in comparison with the sculpture of Egypt, Assyria, Greece, and the medieval art of Europe. Such a museum would also have casts of a selection of the reliefs at Borobodur in Java, where Indian Buddhist artists have lavished a wealth of skill in endless narrative sculptures of the Buddha legends, complementing the so different Buddhist sculpture of China and Japan. At present England offers little for study besides the fragments from Amaravati, except the collections of Gandhara sculpture, chiefly in the British Museum. And the Gandhara sculptures are not purely Indian. They represent the efforts of a provincial Hellenistic school in Bactria to express the ideals and portray the legends of Buddhism, and inevitably reflect the character of a hybrid art. They have been rather absurdly overpraised by writers of an archaeological bent, prone to see wonders in anything connected with Greece. They are now vilified as extravagantly, in revenge, by Mr Havell and Dr Coomaraswamy. The latter dismisses them as 'purely commercial art, of the same order with, but scarcely equal to, those of modern Catholic plaster saints.' This is certainly to say too much; for many of the reliefs and statues are of considerable charm, and we see no reason why they should all be dubbed 'purely commercial.' The makers of these images may have been full of genuine fervour, though hampered by an inherited convention which was not very appropriate to their themes.

From the broad human point of view, the art of Gandhara, the meeting-place of Greece and India, is of singular interest. At the same time we must beware of regarding the sculpture as of any real importance in the history of Indian art.

Purely Indian sculpture provides a vast mass of material which has yet to be systematically and critically studied in detail. Mr Havell has written much about the spirit inspiring the artists; but for a connected historical survey the student must turn to Mr Vincent Smith's well illustrated volume, or to the lucidly condensed account given in Dr Coomaraswamy's 'Arts and Crafts of India and Ceylon.' Undoubtedly from all this mass of work a very impressive selection could be made. But, taken in the mass, Indian sculpture is apt to leave a sense of dissatisfaction, fatigue, and sometimes repulsion. We are struck by the beauty of individual figures, by a charm of attitude, gesture, mood; but the relation between the figures is rarely felicitous. Again and again the relation seems accidental; the main forms follow haphazard lines in a variety of directions, creating a feeling of unease and incoherence. The interesting sculptures from Deogarh temple, Plates 34 and 35 in Mr Vincent Smith's 'History,' serve as an example. There is immense skill, there is inexhaustible invention; it is the instinct for organic design which is wanting.

Mr Havell and Dr Coomaraswamy insist greatly on the surpassing spiritual qualities of Indian sculpture. But, though we can admit the pervading concern with the things of the spirit and the desire to express them, the impression on the mind of the spectator is the essential test. We may discover the ideas inspiring the artists and then read these into their works, but it is the mood created by the sculptured images which should transport our spirits into the ideal world; and confused, distracted design will not so transport us, it leaves us rather in agitation. The general impression left by the mass of Indian sculpture is of a tremendous, almost tormented desire to create something transcending human possibilities and inevitably failing in the attempt. The marvels that design can do by contrasts, by spacing, by great reserves, by isolation—these are left unstudied by an art which seems to find no effort

worthy but that which exhausts itself in pouring out all in a flood at once. The Indian mind seems unable to avoid this tendency; it seeks to impress by fabulous dimensions and impossible feats; it has not learnt the power of understatement. It multiplies the limbs of divinities, to ensure that they shall not seem as feeble men; but the images of these divinities, however beautifully treated, create a sense rather of impaired than of superhuman power. The Indian artists are not content that the beauty of men and women should be merely human beauty; it is part of their traditional canon that the shoulders should have the form of an elephant's head, the waist should be like a lion's, the thigh like the trunk of a plantain tree, the eyes like a fish in shape, and so on for all the parts and features of the body. An artist will be quick to note the similarities of form in all the world of life; but, after all, the ideal of any form of living thing is something that belongs to its own nature, and the beauty of man is intimately his own.

These tendencies manifest the ingrained idealism, the preference for type over individual variety, which is characteristic of Indian art. Along with this we find at times a curious naturalism. This is notable especially in the sculpture of animals, above all of the elephant. There is a relief of swarming human figures at Mamallapuram, with two colossal elephants beneath, which, in a photograph, give almost the illusion of actual living animals moving across the base of the relief. The magnificent bull at the same place is of a nobler naturalism. In some of the great contemplative Buddha statues, again, we find the flaccid tissue of disused limbs portrayed with a literalism which obtrudes itself incongruously where a deeper sense of style would have compelled us to forget the disablements of the flesh, and created a convention adequate to the conception of a spirit absorbed in thought and still as a windless flame.

Indian sculpture, like Indian art in general, is anonymous. If there were great masters, we do not know their names. We have not, as we have in Greece, and in Europe since the Renaissance, the landmarks provided by the grouped works of a single genius, radiating the energy

of a personal force. Rather we have an art comparable to the medieval sculpture of Europe. It is an art of the people, with an immense power of tradition supporting it; the art of a race rather than of individuals. It knows no sterilising divorce between art and craft; and even to-day, in architecture, this power of tradition is a living force in India; it can still create. To us, who have utterly lost this continuity in art, there is something both interesting and attractive in such conditions. Unfortunately, as Dr Coomaraswamy says, 'there is one fatal weakness of the later phases of a traditional art; it has no power to resist the corruption from without. It is beautiful by habit rather than intention.' And a traditional art has other sources of weakness too, which Indian sculpture seems to betray even in early times. The craftsman tends to usurp the function of the designer. We seem to miss the influence of controlling master-minds, jealous of the unity of their creations.

Till lately it was a generally accepted notion that the Indian painting of modern times, from the 16th century onwards, was a mere continuation of the Persian style introduced with the Mogul conquerors. The miniature painters of Persia, whose masterpieces are all in the manuscripts they illustrated, created an art which is unique in the world. Their themes were steeped in the spirit of romance. It was an art of sensuous beauty, informed by the genius for decoration and the love of colour which belong to the Persian race. A passionate delight in the beauty of things, the delicacy of single flowers, the grace of animals, the glory of the sunlight, the charm of youth, the fine texture of woven stuffs and their gorgeous dyes, the luxury of gardens with their tanks of cool water and their whispering trees—all this inspires pages of a dream-like intoxication. Nowhere, moreover, have artists revelled more in the possibilities of the materials they employed—the ivory-like paper, the choice, pure richness of the pigments, the sensitive outlines of the brush. The sumptuous pages of Bihzad and Mirak, so immensely prized now by European collectors, were the classics of art for the painters of the Court of Akbar and his successors. But the golden period of the late 15th and early 16th centuries

had passed away; and by the opening of the 17th century a rapid decay seems to have set in.

In India the Mogul conquerors found a native art flourishing. Abul Fazl, the minister and biographer of the great Akbar, has a passage of great interest on the painters of his day, which has been often quoted. The Emperor, he tells us, had from his youth taken great interest in art, and was wont to reprove bigoted followers of the letter of the Mohammedan law. 'It appears to me,' he is quoted as saying, 'as if a painter had quite peculiar means of recognising God, for a painter in sketching anything that has life, and in devising the limbs one after another, must come to feel that he cannot bestow personality upon his work, and is thus forced to thank God, the giver of life, and will thus increase his knowledge.' Abul Fazl goes on to describe the encouragement given to artists by Akbar and the flourishing state of art which this encouragement produced; and he asserts that the painters of his time produced masterpieces 'worthy of a Bihzad,' which 'may be placed at the side of the wonderful works of the European painters who have attained world-wide fame.' Then comes a sentence about the Hindu painters which has been seized on as a significant admission. 'Their pictures,' he says, 'surpass our conception of things. Few indeed in the whole world are found equal to them.'

Now it is notoriously unsafe to build on literary references to art, unless we can control these by actual examples. Abul Fazl's account points to the existence of an eclectic school, hampered probably by court patronage as much as it was encouraged by it. The evidence of surviving work does not at all countenance a rivalry with the masterpieces of Bihzad and his contemporaries, so far as the Persians are concerned.

But what of the Hindus? 'Their pictures surpass our conception of things.' In that phrase Abul Fazl expressed more than perhaps he understood himself. It was not in technical qualities, as such, that the Hindus surpassed the Persians. But Persian art, with all its enchantment for the eye, lacked a soul. It was not nourished by ideas; and it is by the pressure of ideas, of spiritual emotion and imaginative thought, on the instinct for design in form and colour, that art grows and keeps

alive. Lacking this pressure, this craving for expression and expansion, Persian art, having reached a climax of superb decoration, suddenly fails and ebbs away into lifeless repetition. The Indians, whatever their defects, belonged to a world of which the very life-current was religious and philosophic thought and emotion. And one cannot but think that it was this superior depth and intensity of mind which impressed the minister of Akbar, this superior 'conception of things.' Certainly the work of the Indian painters of the Mogul Court, while far inferior in richness of pattern and splendour of colour to the classic painting of Persia, shows always the trace of an underlying spirituality. It is by no means an enfeebled and imitative continuation of the Persian style. At the same time we must not fall into the error of considering the Mogul school as typically Indian. The painters of the Court of Delhi were greatly influenced by Persian models; and they worked to please an emperor who had ideas of his own and to whose wishes they conformed. The remarks quoted by Abul Fazl indicate Akbar's attitude to art. A scrupulous fidelity in drawing God's creatures was the quality most to be prized. And portraiture, in a wide sense, is the main field and the main excellence of the Mogul school. Hardly any period of the world's history is richer in portraiture of individuals than the period of Akbar and his successors on the throne of Delhi. These portraits were endlessly copied, and it is important for the true appreciation of the school that they should be seen in fine and original examples. The British Museum Library possesses (among others) a precious album, once seen by Sir Joshua Reynolds, whose special admiration of certain examples has been recorded; and we may recall the similar admiration of a still greater master, Rembrandt, attested not by words but by the actual copies from Mogul drawings which he made in some numbers. Another fine album made for the ill-fated prince Dara Shikoh has recently been acquired by the Library of the India Office.

But, though of fascinating interest from the human and historical point of view, these Mogul paintings represent, after all, a hybrid art. Exquisite in delicate truth of feature and detail, they are small in style and lacking in vitality of design. The painters confine

themselves to a narrow range of repeated poses; and the relation of the figure to the framing space is little considered. Their studies from nature, animals, flowers, and birds, admirable as they often are, are inferior to Persian work of the best period. We feel that the true Indian spirit is not deeply engaged, or employed with real congeniality. The difference is at once felt when, deserting courtly subjects, the painters take a theme from native life. Mr Havell reproduces in 'Indian Sculpture and Painting' (pl. lxiii) a 'Scene in a Courtyard,' from the Calcutta Gallery, where bricklayers are busy at work, and an old man prostrates himself before another, begging for mercy or for pardon. Here the Indian feeling finds beautiful expression even in a scene of daily life; still more is it apparent in the drawings where groups of holy men are seen in meditation, or scholars listen to a mullah's reading, while the placid work of the Indian fields goes on about them. We have only to place one of these paintings beside a classic Persian page, steeped in the joy of the senses, to realise at once the immense difference of spirit and atmosphere.

But the difference is still more apparent and arresting when we contrast the Persian work, not with the drawings of the Mogul school, but with the pure pictorial art of India. For, apart from the Mogul school, there exists a whole body of Indian painting which is entirely independent of Persian influence. This is an incontestable fact, though till recently it was not suspected, and is even now little realised. Even Mr Havell, when he wrote in 1908, did not clearly bring out the distinction. Depreciating the classic Persian art, as that of a degenerate school, governed by 'conventionalism' and 'mechanical formality,' he is unable to find any merit in it till 'the true spirit of Indian art began to assert itself in the Muhammadan world.' 'The art of the Moguls . . . quickly grafted itself on to the older Buddhist and Hindu schools, and thus became truly Indian.' Such a view, with its attempt to represent Persian art as insignificant and merely preparatory to Mogul art, leads to confusion. Only when we appreciate the native excellence and unique quality of genuinely Persian painting, do we appreciate the contrasted excellence of the genuinely Indian style which existed side by side with

the hybrid Mogul school and was practically unaffected by its influence.

For a fuller acquaintance with the native art we must turn to the publications of Dr Coomaraswamy. This author's account of 'Rajput' painting is now pretty generally accepted, as the production 'of Hindu painters, from the 15th to the 19th centuries, in Rajputana and the Panjab Himalayas.' There is still no quite satisfactory explanation of the complete gap between the Ajanta frescoes of the 7th century and Rajput paintings on paper of the 15th. We can only surmise that the medieval wall-paintings have all been destroyed, and that the Indians were slow to adopt the practice of painting on paper. It is important, however, to note that the Rajput paintings are not, like the Persian, illustrations to MSS, and have not the character of miniatures. Technically, they derive from the ancient methods of Asiatic fresco, and in their inspiration they hark back to the traditions of Ajanta. Their subject-matter is profoundly Indian, not the life of courts and palaces, but the life of the people with its old, popular tales and romances, and its pervading delight in the legend of Krishna, the divine cowherd.

Take, for example, the painting which Dr Coomaraswamy reproduced in colours in the 'Burlington Magazine' for March 1912. Its theme is Krishna's Quelling of the Serpent. The serpent, a semi-human Naga king, dwelt in a whirlpool of the Jumna. Krishna leapt in to fight with him, while his companions on the bank cried and wailed in fear. Krishna overpowers the serpent, and the serpent's wives, mermaid figures with human bodies and fishy tails, come round him in the water, supplicating for the life of their lord. This is the moment represented. Although to eyes trained on European art the similarity of general conventions in Oriental painting may at first deceive, even a brief study of such an example as this will convince any one that it is in essentials a whole world apart from any Persian painting; it is quite different in character from even any Mogul work. It is extremely animated; it lacks the repose of the finest Persian design; and, though the colour has passages of great beauty, it has not the Persian gem-like harmonies of richness. But the main thing to note is the entire

absorption of the artist in his theme, and in making each figure expressive of the emotions within. We are reminded at once of the Ajanta frescoes; for here, on a small scale and with more delicacy of outline, we find the same genius for seizing the expressive movements and gestures of the body, the same thoroughly Indian types and attitudes, the same suppleness, gentleness and animation. Of especial charm are the sinuous supplicating forms of the Serpent-king's wives, floating and bending forward with outstretched hands in absolute abandonment to their emotion. Here is a beauty not of the senses, but of the spirit; or rather of the spirit through the senses.

The productions of the Rajput schools are as yet little known in Europe, and are still often confused with Mogul paintings. Dr Coomaraswamy has proposed a classification of them according to their *provenance*; placing in one group the paintings from Rajputana, the chief centre of which was the city of Jaipur, and in another group, which he would call the Pahari or Hill-Country school, those produced in the Himalayan valleys of the Panjab. While the colouring of these paintings is often of great charm, sometimes schemed in pale and tender tones, and sometimes of a vigorous depth and lustre, we find numbers that have been left in outline only. In these outline drawings the peculiar quality of the art is even more delightfully disengaged.

Dr Coomaraswamy has reproduced a series of these Pahari drawings, which make us hope that more will be brought to light. They are characterised by a fluent and continuous rhythm of line, such as we never find in drawings of the Mogul school. The sweetness of the gestures of the supple forms lends itself to this love of sinuous containing lines, and prevents it from becoming too obvious a mannerism. If the new Calcutta school, which now seeks to turn its back on the imported academics of Europe, and to revive native traditions, can learn to recapture the secret of this happy and spontaneous art, then indeed it will have done a great thing.

LAURENCE BINYON.

Art. 12.—THE SULTANATE OF EGYPT.

ON July 4, 1261, Beybars, Sultan of Egypt, rode forth from Cairo in great state, attended by all the Court, to a marquee which had been set up in a spacious garden without the walls. Here had been brought the insignia by which the Caliph signified his confirmation of the royal title. Arrayed in these—a turban of black and gold, a long purple tunic, and a collar and chain of gold—the Sultan displayed himself to the people. The investiture was complete. There remained only the reading of the diploma. Ibn Lokman, the chancellor or chief archivist, ascended a lectern and recited the formal document which he had composed to the admiration of all future exponents of oriental diplomatic.

After praise to God and the Prophet, the orator came quickly to the point—an unstinted panegyric of the virtues and exploits of the new Sultan, among which he signalised the restoration of the Abbasid Caliphate, lately overthrown by the Mongols. His concluding paragraphs, shorn of much rhetorical ornament, may be paraphrased as follows :

O Prince, the Commander of the Faithful testifies his gratitude by making you Sovran of Egypt, Syria, the Hijaz, the Yemen, and the banks of the Euphrates, and all lands, plains or mountains, which you may henceforth subdue, not excepting a single town or fortress or anything great or small. Watch therefore over the welfare of the people. Shun ambition and the lure of worldly goods, which are but fleeting shadows. Do justice and mercy, for happy is the man who ensues justice; his days will be brighter than festivals and shine like the star on a charger's brow, more sparkling than jewels on the neck of beauty. Keep a watch over your men in authority, for whose acts you will be accountable at the last day. Choose good officers, who will dispense the law with mildness and moderation, and will use impartiality and treat all men as brothers; for to a Muslim, be he ever so much a Sultan, all other Muslims are brethren. Reform the late abuses and exactions. Wealth unjustly gained is but a load on the prince's back, for which he must one day account; and a treasury thus filled, even to bursting, is really destitute. Let his Highness elevate himself by lightening the burdens of his subjects. Let him fight in God's

way, and above all let him guard the frontiers of Egypt. God has granted you all the success you could desire, and endowed you with the gift of foresight. By you he has restored vanished hopes and dispersed gloom from all hearts. He has led you in the path of justice, and has set your duty before you. He will not cease to bless you with his protection and fill you with gratitude for his grace: for gratitude is the corollary of grace.

After hearing this pronouncement, signally memorable at the present moment, the Sultan mounted a white horse, caparisoned in Abbasid black, and with standards waving over his head and the diploma of investiture borne before him by the Master of the Household, rode under the old Bab en-Nasr into Cairo. The city was *en fête*, the streets festooned, the Sultan's path strewn with costly carpets. Amid the acclamations of the crowd Beybars traversed the city to the Bab Zuweyla, and so regained his palace in the Citadel.

Thus was a Sultan of Egypt invested with his dignity six and a half centuries ago, two generations before Orkhan, the son of Black Othman, planted the Ottoman flag on Brusa in 1326, and assumed the same title. Beybars, however, was not the first Sultan of Egypt. Originally the title, which is merely the Arabic for 'might,' and hence 'authority' (and, it may be added, is feminine as well as masculine—there is no such word as 'Sultana' in the East), did not imply any of the majesty which accrued to it in later times, but, as Burton said, could be applied indifferently to a village sheykh or the ruler of an empire. Some early historians give the Caliphs of Baghdad the title of Sultan; and it has been argued that it was applied also to the Captain of the Caliphs' Turkish bodyguard so early as the 9th century. It was a favourite style with the Turks, in preference to the respectable old title of Melik, and was not adopted by the numerous Persian dynasts who sprang up on the weakening of the Caliphs' temporal power. The Turk Mahmud of Ghazna, the first of Muhammadan rulers who invaded Hindustan, is generally credited with being also the first to style himself Sultan; but he did not use the title on the most authoritative of all official documents, his coins. His later successors, however, did

so use it, probably in emulation of the Turkman Seljuks, who made the name of Sultan respected from the borders of Afghanistan to the Mediterranean coast, and familiar to Roman writers. By the influence of the imperial Seljuks in the 11th and 12th centuries the title attained its full significance, and rose to the level of Cæsar.

Saladin, one of the few oriental rulers whose name, Salah-ed-din, has been familiarised in a European spelling, was undoubtedly the first to be styled Sultan in Egypt. Though not a Turk himself, he had been brought up under the Seljuk system and adopted their military and civil organisation. That he should also adopt their title, after he had acquired independent sovereignty in Egypt and Syria, was natural. His contemporary biographers, who were in his personal service, refer to him throughout as 'the Sultan'; and as such he was well known all over Europe. In the 'Romance of Richard Cœur de Lion' he is called 'the cheff Sawdon of Hethenysse'; and we are told 'How Kyng Richard, the noble man, encounteryd with the Sawdan.' It is clear that he was *the* Sultan of the third Crusade. The curious thing is that he did not himself use the title on his coinage. The three points to which a Muhammadan ruler attached the greatest importance in the Middle Ages were, first, the formal diploma of investiture sent by the Caliph of Baghdad by a special ambassador; secondly, the insertion of his own name and style, after the Caliph's, in the *khutba* or bidding prayer which formed an impressive feature in the Friday office in the mosques of his dominion; and thirdly, the right of *sikka*, or issuing a coinage impressed with his name and title. The Abbasid Caliph certainly sent Saladin the insignia of investiture, whether as Sultan or Melik; but the testimony of the coins, that he styled himself Melik and not Sultan, is conclusive.* Probably his unassuming character made him indifferent to mere titles. His sons and collaterals who succeeded him in Egypt followed his example. All

* The only exception is a copper coin struck at Damascus in 1191 (A.H. 587), when Saladin was absent from Damascus, busily engaged in repelling Richard I in Palestine; and it names him Sultan el-Muslimin, 'Sultan of the Muslims,' not as his chief title (which is still el-Melik en-Nasir on this coin) but as an appendage to the others, obviously with a topical reference to the Jihad or Holy War, then in an acute stage.

eight of them were styled simply Melik on their coins; but they not only were known as Sultans but called themselves so in the inscriptions which they put on their buildings. Thus we have on the one hand the restriction to the old title of Melik on the most formal of all documents, and on the other the general use of Sultan by contemporary writers and on public monuments.

It was not, in fact, till the Ayyubids were succeeded in 1250 by the Mamluks and till Beybars by a masterly stroke of policy restored at Cairo the Abbasid Caliphate overturned by Hulagu at Baghdad, that the title of Sultan appears on the coinage. The representatives of the Abbasids thus elevated may not have enjoyed an indefeasible title, and undoubtedly were held in no great esteem even in Cairo. They were kept almost as prisoners in the Citadel and only produced when a new Sultan required his often ill-gotten and always precarious title to be legitimised by a diploma. One 'Commander of the Faithful' was even publicly flouted as 'Commander of Wind'; others were deposed and imprisoned, or forced to unfrock themselves. But they answered their purpose in maintaining the formality of the appointment of princes by the spiritual head of orthodox Islam. One indeed consented to become Sultan himself, but only on condition that he should be allowed to resume his caliphship when he chose; which he did in a few months' time, only to lose both titles. How little Beybars himself thought of them, apart from the formality of investiture, is shown by the way in which he sent the unfortunate Caliph, who had just invested him, on a mad expedition to recover Baghdad, taking care to furnish him with a miserably inadequate force, so that he was routed by the Mongols and died. Beybars was not the man to encourage a too powerful Caliph in the old seat of their renown; but the convenient presence of a titular spiritual head, under strict control, at Cairo, made Egypt the centre of the Muhammadan world, and enabled the Sultans to assume the imposing names of 'Partner of the Commander of the Faithful' and 'Sultan of Islam and of the Muslims.'

Moreover, the possession of the Hijaz implied the charge of the Holy Cities of Mekka and Medina. The actual government of these sacred places was in the hands of special emirs or sherifs, with whose authority

it was not safe to meddle; but the Emir of Mekka was obliged to get his diploma of investiture from the Egyptian Sultan, and there were various means of exerting a discreet influence at the shrines of pilgrimage. The covering for the Kaaba, still manufactured in Cairo and sent with much pomp to Mekka every year with the Egyptian pilgrims, commemorates the fact that the Sultans of Egypt were lords of the Hijaz and the Holy Cities, where their names were prayed for in the mosques, and their authority was vindicated by a military force.

The Sultanate of Egypt, established in fact by Saladin in 1175, and officially regularised in the person of Beybars in 1261, lasted for 341 years, until the conquest of Egypt by Selim I of Turkey in January 1517. In little less than three centuries and a half there were fifty-eight Sultans.

'A distinguished member of the family of Mehemet Ali,' to quote the words of Lord Cromer in his discriminating study of the late Khedive * . . . 'whom I believe to possess all the qualifications necessary to fill the high office to which he has been called with advantage to the people over whom he will rule, has [now] been named Sultan of Egypt.' His Highness Hussein is the 59th holder of the title.

There is a marked distinction to be drawn between the first dynasty, that of the Ayyubids, which was hereditary in the family of Saladin, and the subsequent line of Mamluk Sultans, which only intermittently recognised hereditary title; and a further distinction is to be noticed in the fact that Saladin and some of his successors were more closely associated with resistance to the crusades in Palestine and Syria than with sovereignty in Egypt. Saladin himself never saw Egypt after his departure for the Holy War in May 1182; but his short residence there had converted Cairo from a mere fortified palace of heretical caliphs into one of the capitals of Islam. He laid out the walls of what was to be a great city instead of a royal enclosure, and began the building of the Citadel. To restore the inculcation of the orthodox faith, which had been interrupted during the domination, for two centuries, of what he considered a virulent variety of the Shi'a heresy, he introduced a

* 'Abbas II.,' p. xvii. By the Earl of Cromer. Macmillan, 1915.

new form of religious building, the *medresa*, or theological college, which became the characteristic type in Cairo of what we call a 'mosque,' and which differs in plan and in purpose from the congregational mosque which preceded it.

Since the foundation of Saladin's colleges, Egypt has remained predominantly orthodox; and his influence on its future was even greater in the direction of religion than in the defence of the capital. His wise brother El-'Adil and even wiser nephew El-Kamil continued his policy. Public works, defensive and religious, were multiplied; the power of Egypt still formed the rock against which the crusading wave broke in vain; the invasion of Jean de Brienne was repulsed, and Frederick II was easily conciliated and induced to enter into an alliance with El-Kamil which exasperated alike the Pope and the rigid Muslim. The Republics of Venice and Pisa were encouraged to establish marts and send consuls to Egypt; and trade and industries increased under the rule of these enlightened and benevolent Sultans.

Saladin's dynasty, already broken up by the contests and jealousies of kinsmen, came to an end in the turmoil of Louis IX's invasion of Egypt. It is a curious circumstance that the link which connects the House of Saladin with the Mamluk Sultans and also with the Caliphs of Baghdad is a Muslima Queen. The first of the Mamluk Sultans (though styling herself *Melika*) was once a slave of that Abbasid Caliph whom Hulagu the Mongol put to death at Baghdad. She was purchased by Es-Salih Ayyub, Saladin's grandnephew, who made her his wife and was so fascinated by her that he would not let her out of his sight. Unfortunately he died at the critical moment when Louis had just started from Damietta on his march towards the capital. The heir to the throne was far away in Mesopotamia. An interregnum, in face of the enemy, meant anarchy and destruction. Shejer-ed-durr, or 'Pearl-Spray,' was equal to the emergency. She called to her council two trusted leaders and confided to them her plan. The Sultan's death was concealed; it was announced that he was ill. Meals were sent in at regular hours to the presumed invalid, and general orders were issued in his name, with forged signatures. For three months, during the winter of the

French advance, the heroic woman carried on this brave deception, controlled the administration from behind her purdah, and allayed the jealousies of the rival factions in the army; until Beybars and his Mamluks had cut down the chivalry of France in the great charge at the battle of Mansura and turned an apparent victory into a fatal defeat of the Most Christian King. It was the Queen—for she had been unanimously elected to the Sultanate on the murder of her husband's heir—who received the royal ransom which Louis' Queen had partly scraped together at Damietta; it was she who loyally held to the terms of the treaty, when others wished her to break them, and to her Louis owed his safe escape from Egypt. There are few Queens in Muhammadan history, and Shejer-ed-durr is the more illustrious.

There was afterwards a great crime and a tragic end, such as befall great queens in a cruel age. The chiefs of the army were proud to be subject to such a woman; but the whole force of ecclesiasticism—if such a word may be permitted in regard to a religion which has no priests—was against her. Had not the blessed Prophet laid it down that 'the people who elect a woman to be their ruler are past saving'? The Caliph was seriously annoyed, and wrote significantly to the Egyptian emirs that if they could not find a *man* amongst them, he would send one. That the Queen had once been in his own harim was doubtless in his eyes an aggravation of her effrontery. Shejer-ed-durr offered no resistance to the decree of her spiritual and formerly temporal master. She married a leading emir of the Mamluk army which she had so wisely ruled, and allowed him to enjoy the title whilst she retained the power. The arrangement did not work well; there were domestic complications; Aybek paid for his disloyalty with his life; and 'Pearl Spray,' having first pounded up her jewels in a mortar that they might adorn no other woman, expiated the jealous crime in her own barbarous death at the hands of a rival's slaves. Her end was like Jezebel's, yet she was a great Queen; she had saved Egypt from the Frank and founded the long line of the Mamluk Sultans.

Saladin, the creator of the Egyptian Sultanate, was also responsible for the introduction of the Mamluks. He brought them to Egypt as part and parcel of his

stock of political and military ideas. Mamluks, or white slaves, generally of the virile Turkish or Turkman race, had for three centuries formed the bodyguard of the Caliphs of Baghdad; and the decay of the Caliphate and the influx of Turks into Persia had led to the growth of dynasties of the same race, of which the Seljuks were the most powerful and lasted the longest. The Seljuks ruled through an army and an administration conducted by trusted slaves. Nur-ed-din, the grandson of a Seljuk slave, extended and strengthened the system in Syria. Saladin, brought up under the Seljuks and Nur-ed-din, carried it to Egypt. Repugnant as a polity based upon slavery is to western ideas, there is something to be said in its favour. It consecrated the principle that advancement should depend solely upon merit. The Mamluk who attained to power was, as a rule, unquestionably the man who had earned it, by valour, physical training, administrative ability, address, or manners. It was no light work to rise to authority in the Mamluk service; but every man, though he might begin as a common trooper, bought for 20*l.*, or as a clever page boy, carried, like Napoleon's sergeants, a Marshal's baton in his pocket. There was no bar to promotion; equal opportunities lay before each—and equal risks. It is difficult for us to realise that, far from being a slur, the status of slave has always ranked higher than that of servant in a Muhammadan society. The slave was a member of his master's family, almost his son; the servant was 'an hireling' with all the hireling's irresponsibility and untrustworthiness. Indeed, in the days of the Mamluks, the only road to power lay through slavery; and it is related that a free merchant, who afterwards became a great emir and built a famous mosque at Cairo, actually sold himself as a slave to the Sultan as the only means of setting his foot on the ladder of advancement. The ladder led by various degrees, military and civil, in the barrack and at the court, through the many lucrative appointments of the Mamluk organisation, till possibly the slave, long since given his freedom, grew powerful enough to surround himself with a trained guard of slaves like himself and even to aspire to the throne, by the help, if necessary, of assassination. Such a crime, however, to be successful must be backed by sufficient

force. The Mamluks were rigorous in punishing other people's crimes; and the assassin who was not powerful enough to vindicate his act by his own triumph was likely to suffer the penalty which was exacted from one of the murderers of Sultan Khalil—he was slain by his victim's bodyguard, who proceeded, in accordance with ancient precedent, to feast upon his liver.

The series of the Mamluk Sultans is merely the succession of fortunate emirs, who were strong enough to oust the previous Sultan and to dominate the other members of what was always in principle a military oligarchy. In the earlier of the two dynasties, into which the Mamluks are divided, the choice of a Sultan was more exclusive than in the later. It was in practice restricted to the famous brigade of the Bahri Mamluks, a *corps d'élite* formed by Es-Salih, Pearl-Spray's first husband, and deriving its name from 'the river' (bahr), because its barracks were on an island in the Nile close to Cairo. The Bahris supplied the royal line, as a matter of unwritten privilege, though there were other 'crack' brigades in the Mamluk army, such as the Burgis of the Citadel. It was as though, after the Commonwealth, it had been agreed that the Kings of England should be chosen from the Coldstreams, as heirs of Cromwell's famous 'New Model.' The privilege had no foundation in law, but the power of the Bahris enabled them to exercise it unchallenged, until they found it more convenient to accept an hereditary line.

There was, therefore, some recognition of the hereditary principle. At first it was a failure; the sons of Aybek and Beybars, when raised to the succession, proved incapable; but in the family of Kala'un—originally a slave of Beybars and an expensive one, for he cost 1000 dinars—an hereditary prestige was created which kept fourteen of his descendants on the throne to the fifth generation. Of all the fourteen, however, only two can be said to have ruled; and the reign of Kala'un's son En-Nasir Muhammad was as long as the combined 'reigns' of all his twelve descendants, and covered forty-two years of the most brilliant period in medieval Egypt. The hereditary idea served its purpose even in his ephemeral successors; the *magni nominis umbra* impressed the crowd, at a time when the great lords

were too numerous and each too powerful for any one of them to assert his sovereignty over the rest. They found a *roi fainéant* of En-Nasir's blood a convenient figure-head, whilst they distributed the high offices of state and shared all the real power amongst themselves. In the later Circassian dynasty of Mamluk Sultans, no such illustrious family was discovered, and the hereditary principle dropped out. Several of these Sultans, indeed, had a son proclaimed as heir designate, and even abdicated in his favour to ensure the succession, but the device never answered. It was judged that an experienced and mature leader, although without claim to royal descent, generally proved a better ruler than a princely fledgeling who knew nothing of the management of men and gave way to youthful dissipation.

The Mamluk Sultan, apart from hereditary prestige, was but the head-mamluk, *primus inter pares*; and he was often constrained to understand his true position. When Lajin was elected Sultan, the other Mamluks made him swear twice over to remain as one of themselves, consult them in everything, and show no favouritism. He broke his oath, set up a worthless favourite above the rest, and was duly assassinated, like many before and after him. If it was no light task to work up to the dignity of an 'emir of a thousand,' and to become cup-bearer, taster, chamberlain, commander-in-chief, and viceroy of the realm, it was an even harder business to be Sultan over such a body of turbulent emirs, each with his miniature court, his trained lifeguards armed *cap-à-pie*, his host of retainers and confederates, and his enormous wealth. Ever since Beybars organised this wonderful machine of government, the Mamluk chiefs had been granted more and larger fiefs in the spoliated land of Egypt, and also drew great revenues from the exorbitant transit duties on the European trade with India, which necessarily passed through Alexandria. We need not believe the fabulous stories which Egyptian chroniclers tell of the riches of these emirs—how one gave his daughter a dowry of 160,000 dinars (half-guineas); another, the Court polo-master, spent 85,000 on his pilgrimage to Mekka; a third never drank twice out of the same cup (such a beautiful work of chased and inlaid silver as we may still see in our museums),

and 'prided himself on being perpetually 15,000*l.* in debt.' We have but to look at the mosques, colleges, hospitals, schools, and fountains, with which they beautified Cairo and Damascus and other cities of their realm, or to study the beautiful vessels of their domestic luxury preserved in museums—the perfume burners, tables, ewers, basins, lamps—to realise that the pretorian lords of the palmy days of Mamluk civilisation in the 14th and 15th centuries were enormously rich, and lived in most elaborate and sumptuous profusion.

The more money they had, the more slaves they bought; and the more slaves they possessed—and not merely possessed, but trained with the utmost care in every manly exercise, sport, and discipline—the greater became their menace to the Sultan. It took no little diplomatic ability to play off one faction against another. On the first sign of failure, the reigning Mamluk was imprisoned, exiled, or murdered; occasionally he might be allowed to retire into private life and even become a privileged guest at his supplanter's table. Meanwhile the rival factions, led by various claimants to the throne, fought in the streets, or bombarded each other from the Citadel and the opposite roof of Sultan Hasan's great mosque; and the great wooden gates that guarded the separate quarters of Cairo would be shut for days or weeks, till some emir managed to get the upper hand and force his way to the Citadel and the throne. Those were exciting times for the inhabitants. No one could feel dull when the Mamluk squadrons were on the war path; and the life of medieval Cairo had all the interest of variety and colour.

The remarkable thing is that this slave organisation, fully elaborated by Beybars in the latter part of the 13th century, endured, practically unimpaired, till the beginning of the 16th. A parallel may perhaps be found in the wonderful machinery of the Ottoman Empire in the great days of Suleyman, on which Professor Lybyer has recently published an illuminating study largely based upon contemporary Italian evidence.*

* 'The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent,' by A. H. Lybyer, Ph.D., Professor of European History, Oberlin College, Ohio (Harvard University Press).

That also was a slave organisation, much more perfect than that of the Mamluks; and, so long as it was maintained on the original lines, it was the most formidable rival to the Empire in the 16th century. The Janissaries were the only equals of the Spanish infantry. The analogy between the Ottoman and Mamluk systems, however, breaks down in one essential point. The Ottoman troops were the slaves of the Sultan of Turkey, and remained his slaves; there was always the real head of the state, the heir of 'Othman, above them, at whose mercy they stood, so long as he retained the manly qualities of his forefathers. It was never a matter of *primus inter pares*. On the other hand, the Mamluk Sultan rarely had the prestige of ancestry; and the majority of the Mamluks were not his slaves but the slaves of freed men and possible supplanters.

There seem here to be all the seeds of anarchy and disruption; but what kept the Mamluk organisation going for so long (and indeed in a modified form down to the days of Napoleon and of Mohammed Ali) was its tenacious *esprit de corps*. The Mamluk emirs and their splendid troops of lifeguards might fight with each other in a bloody struggle for supremacy, but the moment an outside force came against them they became as one man. They came of superb fighting stocks, and few armies could withstand the shock of their charge. Four times this magnificent cavalry routed the Mongols, before whom all Asia trembled and bowed down. The battlefields of Goliath's Spring, of Abulusteyn, of Emesa, of Marj-es-Suffar witnessed what Mamluk discipline could achieve against the Tartar hordes. When at last they were conquered, it was by another and even finer discipline, founded like theirs on slavery. In the very earliest years of their domination, they had proved themselves strong enough to drive off the assaults of various legitimist claimants to Saladin's throne, to suppress a 'nationalist' rising whose cry was 'Egypt for the Arabs, not the Turks,' to expel the remaining Latin intruders from Palestine and Antioch, and to disarm the formidable and pervasive Secret Society of the Assassins. As they had repulsed the Mongols, so they defied even Tamerlane, who found it his policy to come to terms.

The Empire of Beybars stretched from the Cyrenaica to the Pyramus and the Euphrates, and southwards to the Holy Cities of the Hijaz and the fourth cataract of the Nile; and, until the Ottoman advance 250 years later, its limits had scarcely shrunk. In spite of intestine discord and a precarious tenure of power, the Mamluk Sultans managed to keep their heritage almost intact and to make their weight felt in the councils of Europe for a period as long as from the Restoration of 1660 to the present year. The Kings of France, of Castile, of Aragon, the Emperors both east and west, the Pope himself, as well as the powerful Khan of the Golden Horde, thought it worth while to conciliate the Sultans of Egypt by embassies and gifts and alliances. The great merchant republics, Venice, Genoa, Pisa, eagerly accepted the privileges accorded to their agents, and established marts and consulates to watch over their vast eastern trade. Bars-Bey sent fleets to Cyprus and took King James of Lusignan captive, and made him kiss the ground in the Citadel of Cairo. His ransom cost 100,000 gold pieces; and Cyprus paid tribute to Egypt down to the end of the Mamluk rule.

Strong and permanent foundations must have underlain a political edifice that endured so many grievous shocks, exerted so wide an influence, and held its head high for two and a half centuries. Its success is the more remarkable when it is considered that it was the triumph of a foreign military oligarchy, however knit together, with no support whatsoever from the population it ruled. It is true that, until lately, the patient East has always been accustomed to the oppression of its rulers; but seldom has a foreign oligarchy more cynically ignored the prosperity of the people, except so far as it affected its own revenues. An armed and disciplined force of martial race will naturally control a rabble; but the time usually comes when that force loses its discipline and breaks into factions. The Mamluks did often break into factions, but the iron discipline remained. The secret probably lay not only in the *esprit de corps* already noticed, but in the fact that they were led by Sultans who had to be strong on peril of their lives. This may sound absurd when we look at the long list of ephemeral puppets in both the Mamluk dynasties; but the point

is that no *roi fainéant* was tolerated for long. As soon as he was found out, steps were taken to replace him by a real king.

It must be remembered that the race and qualities and training which went to the making of the splendid Mamluk soldiery went also to the making of a Sultan. He was a Mamluk before he was a Sultan, except in the negligible cases of hereditary succession; and to have won the first place in competition with a *corps d'élite* is proof of unusual talent. In the corrupt times of the later Circassian Sultans, bribes and intrigues may sometimes have succeeded where better claims failed; but most of the Sultans fought their way to the top by sheer merit. Beybars would have come to the front anywhere. He began with no advantages, for he was bought in Kipchak for the low price of 30*l.*, because of the defect of a cataract in the eye, which in the slave market counterbalanced the vigour of his iron frame and the ruddy health of his colour. He passed into the service of an emir who was known as 'the arbalesteer,' whence Beybars was called el-Bundukdari, the name familiar to William of Tripolis. 'Bondogar,' he says, 'as a soldier was not inferior to Julius Caesar, nor in malignity to Nero,' but he was 'sober, chaste, just to his own people, and even kind to his Christian subjects.' He was, indeed, a just and strict ruler, suppressed wine, beer, and hashish throughout his dominions, and kept a tight rein on the morals of his subjects. He was a punctual and indefatigable man of business, and dealt with an enormous correspondence with method and despatch. He was in touch with every part of the wide Empire, and seemed to be ubiquitous; he was sometimes met with in Damascus when his sentries believed him to be asleep in the Citadel of Cairo. He was a skilful diplomatist, and by his alliance with the Golden Horde of his native land of Tartary he put a curb on the Persian Mongols; he made friends with Michael Palaeologus, Manfred, James of Aragon, and the Seljuk Sultan of Anatolia, and crowned his statesmanship by the masterstroke of reviving the old Abbasid Caliphate at Cairo, and so making Egypt the premier state of Islam, and the Azhar the university of the whole Muslim world.

If he was dreaded and distrusted by his officers, who found him suspicious and perfidious—as might be expected in the circumstances of his time and the conditions of his own rise to power—he was the idol of the people, who for centuries loved to listen to his exploits recited in a coffee-house romance. They dearly loved a fighting Sultan, and admired the accomplished sportsman and athlete; for Beybars was as great in the hunting-field or on the polo-ground or at the butts as he was when leading his matchless Mamluks against Bohemond of Antioch or the Knights Hospitallers of Crac. He was a man all over, and if he came to his throne through blood, he left the State founded on rock.

Of a very different character was En-Nasir, whose reign, twice interrupted, was the longest of all the Mamluk Sultans and formed the climax of Egyptian civilisation under Muslim rule. He was no soldier, and came to the throne by inheritance, not through the Mamluk ranks. The unhappy experiences of his youth, when he had twice been driven from the Sultanate by the intrigues of his emirs, had made him at twenty-five a cynic, a double-dealer, and a 'good hater.' He was a statesman, nevertheless; and Egypt was never more respected by the Mediterranean Powers than in his reign. His name was put up in the public prayers at Mekka and even at Tunis; the King of Delhi, no less than the Eastern Emperor and the Pope, sent embassies to Cairo. En-Nasir was a great builder, as his capital witnesses to this day; but he was also a great administrator, and, like Beybars, abolished burdensome taxes, developed agriculture, and rigorously put down wine-bibbing and vice of every kind. His public works, such as the Alexandrian canal, the great causeway by the Nile, and the aqueduct to the Citadel, showed public spirit and foresight, and like his mosques and other foundations cost vast sums.

'This self-possessed, iron-willed man, absolutely despotic, ruling alone, physically insignificant, small of stature, lame of a foot, and with a cataract in the eye, with his plain dress and strict morals, his keen intellect and unwearied energy, his enlightened tastes and interests, his shrewd diplomacy degenerating into fruitless deceit, his unsleeping suspicion

and cruel vengeance, his superb court, his magnificent buildings, is one of the most remarkable characters of the Middle Ages.*

No one approached En-Nasir in his magnificent public works and religious foundations except Kaït Bey, one of the latest of the Circassian Sultans, whose exquisite tomb-mosque in the eastern cemetery of Cairo, miscalled the 'Tombs of the Caliphs,' is among the purest gems of Saracenic architecture. Indeed for most artists the many lovely Circassian mosques form the chief beauty of Cairo. They were built out of the huge profits of the transit dues of the Indian trade, in an age of shameless corruption, when justice and place were openly sold, and the soldiery, mixed with a rabble of Levantines and Mongols, got out of hand, without, however, quite losing their old capacity for collective action at a crisis. Several of the Circassian Sultans, while guilty of barbarous cruelty and abominable treachery, were men of strict and even austere life, keeping the Muslim fasts, drinking no wine, and dressing with studied simplicity. Of one it is recorded that he lived with only one wife, but could not write his own name. Other Sultans were men of literary tastes; some were learned theologians; and of one it is mentioned that he spoke and read Arabic, though it was considered rather 'bad form' for Mamluk Sultans to know the language of the common people. Bars-Bey, a singularly stern and oppressive ruler, took pleasure in having historical books read to him. Muayyad was a poet, an orator, a musician, and a lover of art. In short, many of these Sultans were accomplished men, and it is evident that they must have possessed political sagacity. Few of them, indeed, were born soldiers; and the martial character of the famous Mamluk cavalry must have degenerated under such leaders, as the end proved. Yet Egypt still kept a bold front to the enemy gradually encroaching from Asia Minor, sent her fleets to Cyprus and to India, and maintained a show of her old solidarity and state. A Venetian ambassador who had audience of the last ruling Mamluk Sultan, Kansuh el-Ghuri, is

* 'History of Egypt in the Middle Ages,' 2nd ed., 316-317.

1503, records his reception at the Citadel. After passing the iron gate at the head of the fifty steps, where some 300 Mamluks in white stood silent and respectful 'like observant Franciscan friars,' the embassy passed through eleven more doors, each with its guards, till, tired out, they 'had to sit down to rest themselves.'

'They then entered the area or courtyard of the castle, which they judged to be six times the area of St Mark's Square. On either side of this space 6000 Mamluks dressed in white and with green and black caps were drawn up; at the end of the court was a silken tent with a raised platform covered with a carpet, on which was seated Sultan Kansuh el-Ghuri, his undergarment being white surmounted with dark green cloth, and the muslin turban on his head with three points or horns, and by his side was a naked scimitar.'*

Thirteen years later, on Aug. 24, 1516, the brave old Sultan fell fighting against the Ottomans in the disastrous battle near Aleppo. Tuman Bey, who reluctantly took up the sceptre at Cairo, and made a gallant stand, was defeated and hanged at the Zuweyla gate. Selim of Turkey was hailed Sultan in the Friday prayers of the mosque of Cairo in January 1517; and the last of the shadowy caliphs was carried a prisoner to Constantinople.

So ended the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, of which it may at least be recorded that it staved off the flood of barbarism, both east and west, of Mongols and of Crusaders, rescued Egypt from the fate of Persia, and preserved the unbroken continuity of Muslim learning and civilisation, as it was preserved nowhere else, in the city which the Mamluks made beautiful and renowned as the capital of imperial Islam.

STANLEY LANE-POOLE.

* Paton's 'Egyptian Revolution,' quoted in Prof. Margollouth's interesting sketch of the history of 'Cairo, Jerusalem, and Damascus,' p. 135.

Art. 13.—A VISIT TO RUSSIA.

It may not be without value to sum up in a few pages some personal observations made in Petrograd and Moscow in the course of a visit to Russia this winter. Blood is thicker than water; and, as a Russian, I felt intensely the desire to come into direct touch with Russian society, to learn about its needs and aims, to convey tidings from England and, possibly, to help by deed or advice. It would be out of the question to trouble the readers of the 'Quarterly Review' on the present occasion with dry data and statistics, but something may be gleaned from opinions and impressions; and it is in this unassuming spirit that I should like to submit some recollections and thoughts.

I may say at once that what impressed me most was the spectacle of a grand mobilisation of society in the service of the Commonwealth, a mobilisation not decreed nor ordered but spontaneous and organic. The best introduction to what I saw in Russia was provided by what I saw in England. Those who have lived in England during the momentous autumn and winter months of 1914 will never forget the transformation of the country at sight, the all-pervading khaki which spread over the land, the martial aspect of doctors, the dwindling of the Universities in their hibernating state, the tramping and drilling of recruits on all roads and squares. The British were indeed showing that they were in earnest about their voluntary army system, and one did not want to read about the feats of the United States volunteers in the Civil War in order to feel that a great national force has been roused to action.

I saw something of the same kind in Russia; but, if I may say so, the dominating emblem was not the khaki uniform, but the Red Cross. Not that Russia had sent out fewer soldiers, but the millions of armed men had already, to a great extent, been pushed to the front; and the reservists and conscripts on drill did not make the same show in contrast with the rest of the population as in England. On the other hand, everybody was more or less engaged in hospital work or in preparing equipment for the troops.

I am speaking from personal experience about the

two capitals—Moscow and Petrograd, but I have been assured on reliable authority that the same characteristic applies to the provinces as well. I witnessed, for example, the hospital work done by the personnel of a large girls' school in Moscow. After a full day's teaching, the mistresses started off to help in the daily routine of two hospitals, one of which was organised and maintained at their cost in co-operation with other high schools, while the other was supported by voluntary contributions from the pupils, each of the eighteen forms providing for the maintenance of one patient. The pupils were naturally full of personal interest for their patients, and were allowed to visit them at certain hours. There was accommodation for some 100,000 wounded in Moscow alone; and 64,000 beds were actually occupied in December when I visited the city.

The only complaint on the side of the military authorities was that the patients were too well cared for and rather spoilt as regards commodities of life. Such a consideration may have some weight from the point of view of a strict disciplinarian, looking forward to a new career of hardships in the trenches for those many who were able to go back to their regiments. But, humanly speaking, it was touching to see how assiduously the poor heroes from the Bzura or the Carpathians were tended and comforted after the terrible days of fighting and privation, and thus received some acknowledgment of their unstinted efforts in the cause of their country. One scene comes back to my memory with special vividness. A Christmas tree gathering in the hall of one of those hospitals, a crowd of swarthy men around the room, some with pale, emaciated faces, all with some sign of suffering about them, eagerly watching a figure in a Pierrot dress dancing a lively jig. The merry dancer, a sergeant with a shattered arm and a 'George' on his breast, had led his company under a hellish fire when all the officers had fallen.

The communion between the army at the front and the nation in its rear makes itself felt in many small but significant facts. The regular medical service of the Army would have been powerless to cope with the unheard-of requirements of this gigantic war. The medical staff of the Army is fully absorbed by the

immediate assistance to the wounded in the field. Even in this respect the Red Cross organisation, with its sanitary trains and hospital installations immediately behind the front, is giving efficient help. But the base hospitals had to be practically given over to the management of voluntary organisations; and it is this that one sees at work in the interior of the country. The most powerful are the Union of the Counties (Zemstvos) and the Union of Municipalities, but there are many others. Moscow city, for example, acts both as a member of the municipal union and as a separate city unit; and it may be said without fear of contradiction that the ancient capital has assumed a unique position in the competition of efforts and sacrifices. The State has assigned over 100 million roubles (10,000,000*l.*) to finance the work of the unions; but great sums are being levied and contributed daily in addition to the State grants. And the value of the personal services entailed by these huge organisations cannot be gauged even approximately. Men like Prince Lvoff, President of the County Union, or Mr Avinoff, the manager of the 'evacuation' department of the County Union, give their whole time to the work of organisation and supervision; others, like Mr Chelnokoff, Mayor of Moscow and President of the Municipal Union, somehow contrive by dint of energy and unceasing labour to combine their war duties with an enormous quantity of ordinary business.

The work performed is conspicuous by the orderly, efficient and energetic manner in which it is being carried out. In the beginning the organisations formed in the provinces were met by unexpected and trying emergencies. In Kaluga, for instance, the town had volunteered to provide accommodation for 600 wounded; towards the beginning of September 2000 were dumped down on one day. Hospital attendance and accommodation had to be literally improvised; and this was done by calling to aid the owners of all the likely houses in the town. It has happened that people came from the street with the wounded in order to assist in these hurried arrangements, and have remained in these improvised hospitals as improvised attendants ever since. A similar miracle of speedy organisation was achieved by the infirmary of the Women's College in Moscow.

Gradually, however, action became more and more systematic; and now the Unions of self-governing bodies control not only the base hospitals in the interior, but a very large number of hospital centres at the front, and are sending out numerous hospital trains to assist in the transport of the wounded from the field. It would have been impossible to carry out such a gigantic task if the workers had not been animated by ardent patriotism and by the sense of self-imposed duty. This voluntary character of the machinery is very remarkable in a country which is supposed to be entirely ruled by discipline and compulsion. The truth is that behind the frontage of the official hierarchy an immense power of self-government and independent action is rapidly growing, and that in seasons of great stress and peril like the present this force becomes irresistible, and brushes away all the restrictions of red-tape and officialism.

This feature of the situation was forcibly brought home to me almost on the first day of my stay in Moscow. A young graduate and a girl student called to ask me to deliver a public lecture in aid of a relief organisation acting in a distant quarter of the city. It came out in the course of conversation that the relief committee in question, formed under the auspices of the City executive, consisted largely of students and young graduates. No special police formalities had to be gone through; people joined and left the committee of their free accord; and the work was going on splendidly, with self-denial and energy. I went to look at their local centre, and found by the side of hospitals a canteen providing meals at half-price, a large factory building turned into barracks for homeless families, and a labour dispensary in which the staff distributed materials to the wives and daughters of soldiers at the front and other unemployed persons for the making of underwear ordered by the Commissariat. The dispensary was crowded with women taking work; most of these were using cheap Singer machines bought at a discount, while those who had no such machines went to a central workshop provided with some forty machines by the organising committee. I may add that the price paid for making a shirt ranged from 7 to 9 kopecks (from 1½d. to 2d.). A skilful worker was able to make nine or ten shirts in one day.

In this way voluntary social organisation met not only the problems of hospital assistance but also those of unemployment and of the distribution of public work. The committee I refer to was by no means an isolated venture. Moscow was covered with similar institutions; and they provide the natural centres for utilising and co-ordinating the enormous work of equipment and supply which goes on in the rear of the army. As I have already mentioned, orders from the Commissariat of the army are directed through these channels, and not only for underwear, but for warm clothing, boots, etc. Curiously enough, the lack of surgical instruments consequent on the cutting off of German supplies is being met to a great extent by the house industry traditional in certain districts of the government of Nishni Novgorod.

The initiative in social organisation is by no means restricted to the members of the so-called 'intellectual' class. My friends of the committee already mentioned took me on to visit a distributive centre of work just over the way, which was managed by a co-operative society of factory workmen. This society had sprung into existence several years ago and had as its chief object the provision of necessary articles of consumption of good quality and at low prices. I found the manager of the executive and two assistants receiving Commissariat work and distributing it to women in the same way as in the committee workshop. I may remark that the manager had been serving his association for about eight years without salary, as a matter of 'elective duty,' as he expressed it. Truly an aristocratic conception!

Society is thus really mobilised in Russia. The temper of this formidable body is characterised not by any fervid excitement but by a calm settling down into work which has to be done at any cost. It would be preposterous to suppose that the strain and the sacrifices entailed by such work are not felt, that there is no occasional grumbling, no criticism of this or that measure or action. The duties undertaken may be irksome, but no one thinks of shirking them.

The attitude towards military events and the strategic progress of the war is also characteristic. When one talks with the wounded singly, many of them seem

weary and certainly do not minimise the hardships and dangers through which they have gone. But they are keen to hear news from the front; they are proud of their regiments and of their commanders; and the spirit of brotherhood in arms is exceedingly strong. Poles and Jews share in this spirit with born Russians.

An interesting scene occurred the other day at one of the Moscow hospitals. It was visited by the wife of a captain in a regiment of Siberian rifles, who had followed her husband as his orderly, was attired as a soldier, and had taken part in several engagements. She had been sent to Moscow to get some stores for the regiment, and came to a ward in the girls' school hospital to visit a convalescent soldier of her company. The whole ward eagerly listened to her tale of what had been taking place, and at the close she bade them 'Come back and help us.' 'We *shall* come back,' they all replied.

The views of the soldiers as to the war are not necessarily the same as those of the working classes in general, because soldiers, even if they do not realise the strategical connexion between different operations, are nevertheless facing the grim realities of the contest. The enemy is not a vague abstraction for them, but a very definite being, manifesting his existence by shell and bayonet, by musketry fire and night attacks. But the attitude of the Russian soldier towards this war is shared by the people at large. Few of the peasants have a clear notion as to the points in dispute and the exact aims to be attained, but they firmly believe that Mother Russia is assailed by an impious and crafty invader. They start for the army with a feeling of submission to a religious command, and, once in the ranks, they display a characteristic quality of corporate cohesion. They stick together and feel together by instinct, quite apart from disciplinary organisation; they act by nature up to the Slavophil ideal of 'choral action'; and it is easy to see how much this psychological feature contributes to the far-famed stubbornness of the Russian army.

The attitude of the 'intellectual' and ruling classes towards this war is also very satisfactory. Fortunately there is no occasion for fundamental criticism of the conduct of the war by the military authorities. The Russian army has at last found chiefs worthy of its

unrivalled soldiery. We are spared a tragic situation like that which existed in Manchuria, when the army had to follow incapable leaders. Criticism is not silent behind the scenes; there are many things, especially as regards equipment and preparation, which might have been better. But, on the whole, it is a great thing to be able to believe in the firmness and insight of the Supreme Command, and to know that most of the armies are led by trusty chiefs and some by men of real talent. One would like to know more about these chiefs and about the exploits of the various units. It seems strange that the victories of Sarakamysh and of Prashnitz should remain anonymous, or that the feats of Brusiloff's regiments in the Carpathians should be relegated to the pages of heavy volumes to be published some day by the General Staff. Skobelev or Lazareff were not thus eclipsed in the war of 1877-78. This nebulous tendency is not confined to the Russian reports; it obtains also, e.g., in the French army, and is probably connected with the democratisation of the war by the huge masses in action. Still, people do not approve of it in Russia, any more than they do in England. The introduction of the personal element may have its drawbacks, but it would certainly heighten popular interest in the war. In any case there is no trace of the perverse spirit which in the course of the Japanese war made some people more anxious for tidings of defeat than for reports of victory. Not that men are less concerned about home affairs and internal progress, but thinking people feel that, unless German aggression is crushed, all hopes of progress and reform will fade away into nothing, for the simple reason that national humiliation and demoralising defeat are not the proper factors for fostering a healthy development.

It is among reactionaries and absolutists that attempts have been made to influence the Court in order to break away from the Allies and to enter into a compromise with the Germans. These absurd schemes are to be explained partly by intrigues conducted through various more or less influential personages of German descent, and partly by an apprehension that the alliance with Western Powers might undermine the traditions of bureaucratic rule which have grown up during the long

years of Russo-Prussian friendship. The Germans, in spite of their social clumsiness, had succeeded in making capital of the 'splendid isolation' in which reactionary policy had placed the Crown in Russia. Even the best of bureaucrats framed on the German pattern were firmly convinced that they had to play the part of providence to a stupid and lazy people. As the satirist Saltykoff put it, a Russian subject was supposed to have two cries at his disposal; he had to shout either 'hurrah' or 'help' (Karaul); for all other purposes he was dumb. The literary exaggeration points to a very real and customary frame of mind.

I do not mean to imply either that Russian bureaucracy is entirely Germanised, or that the Germans in Russia have exerted only a mischievous influence. Most of our officials at the present day are Russians; and there can be no doubt that in the past Germans have rendered to Russia signal services. Men like Bunge and Totleben will always be remembered with profound gratitude; and it would be impossible to write the administrative or military history of 18th or 19th century Russia without making a very large allowance for the educational value of the German element. But the German school of administrators has been naturally inclined to look down upon the Russian nation as a whole; and in modern times this element has more and more lost touch with national development. One need not take extreme instances like that of Victor Hehn, a distinguished antiquary, who, while spending most of his life in Government service in Petrograd, kept a diary replete with hatred and contempt and full of poisonous gossip in disparagement of Russian society. His book ('*De moribus Ruthenorum*') is characteristic not of the customs and manners of Russians but of the psychology of a learned German who picked up all sorts of malignant stories and failed to notice the great revival of Russian thought and life in the sixties of the last century.

In connexion with present events it is chiefly men of German descent and of bureaucratic tendencies who have tried to sow mischief between Russia and England, and to plead the cause of the Kaiser and of his Junkers. Fortunately such people have very little authority in the

realm of foreign affairs ; and their only chance of regaining some authority in that respect consists in misdirecting the domestic policy of Russia and suppressing the political aspirations of Russian society. Now, the intimate connexion between domestic and foreign politics in Russia can hardly be exaggerated. The continuous progress of the country towards enlightenment and fruitful activity cannot be doubted, and is bound to bear fruit ; but it must be admitted that the relations between Government and Society are still far from being normal, and that Russian domestic politics are still subject to contradictory tendencies and to the influence of irresponsible factors. The great problems of self-government, equality before the law, freedom of conscience, harmonious combination of nationalities within the Empire, are still unsolved ; and the great opportunity for their solution presented by the national upheaval has not been utilised hitherto.

I do not propose to touch on these problems on the present occasion, but I should like to express the view, shared by many representative men in Russia, that our alliance with the Western States must be cemented by Russia's approximation to the fundamental requirements of legal order as accepted in Europe. Those who still dream of bureaucratic providence for Russia are 'working for the King of Prussia.' After all, the general march of events is governed not by reactionary misgivings, but by the main tide of steady national growth ; and there is no more occasion to doubt of ultimate progress in the field of domestic politics than there is to be nervous as to the outcome of the struggle in the field on account of occasional and local reverses. Human affairs do not follow straight lines in their development, but rather move in waves ; and the really important point is to watch the general direction of the current. There can be no uncertainty on this score ; and we may confidently assume that the progressive tide which is favouring the Western alliance will prevail.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few words about the aspirations of Russian society as regards the eventual peace settlement, confining myself, of course, to questions which touch Russian interests. No detailed discussion is appropriate in this respect, for the simple reason that Russians are fully aware that the ultimate recasting of

the map of Europe will depend to a great extent on events which cannot yet be foreseen with sufficient clearness. This applies pre-eminently to the redistribution of Turkish and Austrian territories. It is quite clear that both these luckless Powers will have to go into the melting-pot at the close of the war, as a penalty for having sold their soul to the German tempter; but to what extent they may survive the operation no one can exactly predict. Turkey will probably have to pay more dearly than the Dual Monarchy, but how far the latter will be allowed to continue her parasitical existence, to the detriment of the Slavonic populations, is a matter of vague speculation. Nor can one gauge the amount of concessions which will be extorted by the various Powers who are likely to fly at the eleventh hour to the assistance of the victors.

There are, however, certain points on which Russian public opinion seems emphatically settled. One of these regards the future of Poland. The Russian people is resolved to carry out the promise of Polish autonomy which accompanied the appeal made by the Grand Duke to the Poles. Apart from the promise involved, this appeal gave a definite lead as regards the international situation. Russia is striving to bring together the three fragments of Poland dissected by the partitions of the 18th century. Her own Poles have adopted this policy with enthusiasm; the Austrian Poles are naturally less eager, and many of them still side with the Habsburgs; but even they, it is hoped, will settle down into loyal adherents of the Russian Imperial combination if the Polish province of Prussia is wrested from the claws of the Black Eagle. This is a large order; and it remains to be seen how far military success will enable the Allies to achieve the task. It should be carefully noted, however, that though ultra-patriotic Poles sometimes talk about the reconquest of Dantzic and of the lower Vistula, plans of conquest in regard to the German or thoroughly Germanised districts of Prussia find no support in Russian circles. People realise more and more clearly the mischievous futility of the subjection of foreign populations. The Alsace-Lorraine experiment has been an effective object-lesson in this respect.

The second point which may be said to amount to a

national claim is the acquisition of Constantinople, together with the opening of the Straits. Russia cannot be expected in reason to continue relegated to the background of Europe, with no other access to the world's sea routes than the two outlets of the Baltic and the Black Sea, which may be closed at any moment by more favoured neighbours. Nor can the historical striving towards 'Tsargrad' be taken lightly. It is one of those tendencies which have ceased to be a matter of statesmanship or diplomacy and have become embodied in the psychology of a mighty nation. The peasants of Russia are not versed in the intricacies of the balance of power and of Near-Eastern intercourse, but they know about the great capital of Eastern Christianity conquered by the Turks ages ago.

The present imbroglio seems to have made it clear that the Western Powers at any rate are not interested in closing Russia's path to the Mediterranean. The old rivals, England and Russia, have found themselves ranged shoulder to shoulder not only against the overbearing militarism of Berlin but against an attempted outbreak of Pan-Islamic fury. The Caucasian army fought for European prestige at Sarakamysh; and it is difficult to guess what repercussion a disaster in the Caucasus might have had in Egypt and in India. One may rationally hope by this time that the sense of the brotherhood in arms will prevent any recurrence of Beaconsfieldian notions in British politics. Political anachronisms die hard, but they do die when confronted by inexorable situations. And the imperative requirement of the present situation amounts to this: it is not enough to win this war, it is also necessary to guard against the outbreak of a similar conflagration in the future. This is why it is of vital importance for every one concerned that Russia and the Western Powers should keep together.

PAUL VINOGRADOFF.

Art. 14.—THE WAR AND DOMESTIC POLITICS.

THAT the British genius shuns logical conclusions and loves compromise is a commonplace all the world over. Indeed, as any observer of Canadian politics must realise, it is one of those traits which the British carry with them, modified, it may be, by the presence of other races, but remaining the same in essentials. Seldom, however, has history afforded so striking a contrast of national characteristics as is displayed in the action of the allied French and British nations in the present struggle. For each country the war is a supreme national crisis; and the logical method of meeting a national crisis is a national government. The various members of such a government may continue to entertain their conflicting opinions on matters of domestic policy. They do not compromise about them; they hold them in suspense while they join in pursuing the supreme national interest which is common to all. Such is the course that has been followed in France. Political feeling in that country ran high before the war. In August, however, a Coalition Ministry was formed of the ablest men that all parties could produce. The same appreciation of the national danger combined with the same logical sense led to the law of Dec. 24, 1914, postponing all elections until the war should be over. The contrast in England is striking. Parties still oppose each other. For the most part the surface is unbroken, but underneath it the current of feeling flows almost as strongly as ever. Not only so, but now and again the turmoil breaks out openly. Yet, at the same time, vigorous support is given to the Government both in the legislative and administrative action which it takes to meet the various phases of the crisis.

Thus it would almost appear that the genius of compromise had achieved the impossible, and that the thinly-veiled hostility of political parties did not affect the national conduct of the war. Indeed, if the explicit question were put to well-informed Englishmen, in nine cases out of ten the answer would probably be that the prosecution of the war suffers nothing from the continued division of political parties. Such a conclusion,

however, plausible as it appears, will not bear closer analysis. In any organic body of men, union alone gives to capacity its full efficiency; and union in the present case means cordiality and confidence. Both are lacking in the present relations of the two political parties, though the ill effect of their absence must not, of course, be overestimated. It is not contended that the Government is the less determined to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion, or that the Opposition are the less anxious that this should be done. But the determination is rendered less effective—not greatly so, perhaps, yet perceptibly; and in a crisis like the present every degree is of importance. The Government has acted, and is acting, with great energy, but in all its action it has an eye to party interests. It always has its ear to the ground; and this attitude has affected its action, military, naval, economic, none the less clearly because perhaps unconsciously. So, too, the Opposition claims that it has rendered support such as has been given by no Opposition before. The claim is just. The spirit of its individual members is shown by the fact that one-half of them are on service as compared with one-eighth of the Government ‘bloc.’ Yet, while the help of the Opposition has been sincere and in some points most valuable, their general attitude is instinct with distrust and criticism; and these feelings are none the less real because they do not find full expression.

The continued severance of parties operates disadvantageously in yet another way, which is not often noticed but can readily be understood. Robust criticism, at once well-informed, well-intentioned and forcible, is of the very highest importance when a Government is confronted with a crisis like the present; and the Prime Minister has emphatically stated that he would welcome it. But under present conditions it is not and cannot be given. Supporters of the Government will not criticise it in important matters, when their criticisms may serve as a future basis for attack by the Opposition. The Opposition, on the other hand, will not press any criticism sufficiently far to make it really effective. For, where parties are still divided, and party spirit though seldom effervescing is still active, it is felt that criticism pushed strongly home may fairly or unfairly be dubbed factious.

The result is obvious. The chase waxes hot on the scent of a minor matter like a timber contract, and Government supporters join in the cry. But matters of great moment escape searching criticism or may pass entirely without debate.

What has just been said applies almost exclusively to the centre of government. Away from the centre this spirit of mutual party antagonism is not exhibited in nearly so acute a degree. In the country at large there is more of real unity, more of a truce in spirit as well as in act. But, just as the brain directs the limbs, so any cause of weakness at the centre is serious. It should not be overestimated; equally clearly, however, it should be remedied; and this is the more necessary if indeed the heaviest fighting and the severest strain are still to come.

The question is one of the present and future, but is essentially conditioned by the past. Not only so, but much of the trouble has arisen from the inability of each side to see the point of view of the other, and from the absence of any 'honest broker' who could mediate between them. A brief summary of the past, therefore, is necessary. The problem contains four principal factors, distinct yet always interacting—the Irish Question, the Welsh Church Bill, the Plural Voting Bill, and the next General Election. Of these, in July last the Irish Question formed the all-absorbing topic. Gun-runnings, the 'Ulster Plot,' the Dublin riots, were incidents of the immediate past. The claims of Ulster for exclusion, the demand of Nationalist Ireland for 'the Bill,' were present dangers, both menacing, if not in equal degree. So far back as March 1914 the Prime Minister had stated * that the danger of civil strife was not confined to Ulster, but also existed in Nationalist Ireland; and the danger had subsequently grown more threatening. The appreciation of the danger in Ulster led him to introduce the Amending Bill. It did not please his own stalwarts; it did not satisfy the Opposition. Nor, perhaps, was it likely that it should do so. From the first, however, the Prime Minister treated it as an integral part of his Irish legislation. Only reasons of convenience made the introduction of a separate Amending Bill preferable to

* March 9, 1914, Hansard, col. 906.

amending the principal Bill. It was intended to send both for the Royal Assent together,* and indeed to proceed with the Amending Bill, even if the Opposition did not endorse it.† Such was the situation when the war broke out.

In the case of the Welsh Bill, the position was not complicated by an Amending Bill. The Government, except on one occasion, constantly pressed it forward. That occasion was Lord St Aldwyn's suggestion of a Committee to look into certain points connected with the disendowment proposals, a Committee which the Government countenanced if it did not welcome. It could not, however, be said that they were in any way pledged to delay the Royal Assent to the Bill until the Committee had reported.

From the Home Rule Bill or the Welsh Bill to the Plural Voting Bill is a great transition. Plural Voting is a question over which the political manager waxes eager, but which leaves the average Englishman cold and the average outsider befogged. Yet it was in truth almost the pivot of the whole situation. The essence of the Bill is that by abolishing the Plural Vote the Government calculated to gain anything from 30 to 80 seats, counting twice that number on a division. Clearly, therefore, the Government thought it a most necessary and salutary reform, and were determined to make it law. Equally clearly, the Opposition were convinced that it was inimical to the true interests of the country, and were determined to obstruct it, unless it were coupled with an equitable Redistribution Bill. The only method, therefore, of passing it would be under the Parliament Act with its three years' curriculum. Now if, as was originally intended, it had started on its course in 1912, together with the other two Bills, the Government would have had a simple proposition to face last summer. But it did not start in 1912—and for the reason *cherchez la femme*. Introduced for the first time in 1913, the earliest date on which it could be passed into law under the Parliament Act was in June 1915. It may seem a pettifoggish business, this calculation of dates. But in sober

* Mr Asquith, May 12, Hansard, col. 955-6.

† Mr John Redmond, May 12, Hansard, 1001. Mr Lloyd George, May 12, Hansard, 1010.

truth it was as vital an element in the Parliamentary strategy as was the delay at Liège to the German armies. It meant that the Government last August had to carry on for another ten months of stormy weather if they wished to get the benefit of the Bill. Could they do so? A cataclysm threatened them in the autumn, which it became more and more clear they could not face. Their manifest course, therefore, was to try to last out till June 1915, but, if they were forced to go to the country earlier, to be able to demonstrate their own conciliatoriness and to throw the onus of any outbreak on the Opposition. By this it is not intended to argue that either the Government or the Opposition was not sincerely anxious to avoid civil war; only to make it clear that to be conciliatory, in appearance at any rate, was politic as well as moral.

With the momentous Fourth of August, all minor issues were overshadowed for the time being by the war. Already, on July 30, the Second Reading of the Irish Amending Bill had been postponed, 'without prejudice to the domestic and political position of any party.' This phrase, first used by the Leader of the Opposition,* was adopted by the Prime Minister and applied to the whole of the domestic situation.† It expressed the spirit and intention of both sides, and was repeated by private members. But the fatal defect in it was the absence of a definite application to existing problems. The war would inevitably work some change in the circumstances of all parties. What was needed was that the position of each in August 1914 should be properly estimated in any temporary settlement, the elements of strength and weakness recognised, and no detriment inflicted in essential matters upon any. Parties, however, failed to appreciate each other's standpoint; and there was no accepted arbiter above fear or favour. To Liberal stalwarts, as to Nationalists, the one accepted proposition was the passage into law, during the current session, of the Home Rule Bill and the Welsh Church Bill. Amending Bills or other modifications were non-essentials—acts of grace, and unwelcome at that. If,

* Mr Bonar Law, July 30, 1914, Hansard, 1602.

† Mr Asquith, Aug. 10, Hansard, 2298, and Aug. 31, Hansard, 436.

however, the final stages of the two principal Bills were now postponed, the changes and chances of the war would prejudice the ultimate passage to the Statute Book of the measures for which they had fought so long. So they argued; and there is no reason to think they were not honest in this opinion. It was true that in July the risk of a breakdown had been imminent, rendering nugatory even a technical passage into law. But the dangers which the Government had realised were never so apparent to their supporters; and in any case a risk which is passed soon appears shadowy, while the risk ahead gains in substance. Unionists, on the other hand, took the broad ground of saying that controversial measures should not be pressed. In particular, however, it was urged that the Home Rule Bill and the Amending Bill were integral parts of one whole. On this point the Prime Minister's previous utterances were quoted; and it was contended that to pass the Home Rule Bill without the Amending Bill would essentially 'prejudice the political position' of the party. In the case of the Welsh Church Bill also, the war had introduced new factors, which will be mentioned later, and for which it was claimed that allowance should be made. Indeed, a statement of the Prime Minister* shows that there was substance in the contention.

From this point onwards the course of events moves like that of a Greek drama—the catastrophe inevitable, yet due to misunderstandings which the chorus lament but are impotent to remove. The debate of Aug. 31 showed how beneath the ashes the lava was still glowing; and at length the eruption occurred on Sept. 15. The Prime Minister seems to have been sincerely anxious to find a fair settlement, but failed. It may have been that a waiting policy, often the wisest, was here tried once too often; or else that the preoccupations of the immediate business of the war were too great. In any case the announcement was at last made that the Home Rule Bill, without the Amending Bill, was to be passed into law, as also was the Welsh Bill. A Suspensory Bill† postponing the dates of operation was to be passed

* Aug. 31, Hansard, 437.

† The Suspensory Act discriminates in a curious manner between the Irish and the Welsh Acts. As regards the former, no preparatory action

at the same time, and a promise was given of an Amending Bill in the future. The effect, however, of the Suspensory Bill was doubtful; and Unionists openly scouted the value of the promise. The whole episode was marked by extraordinary bitterness—a bitterness, indeed, so unusual that it has been remarked* with reason that there may have been some incidents in the negotiations which have not yet seen the light.

It is a thankless task to apportion responsibility, but, if thankless, it is yet in some degree necessary in order to determine what ought to be done in the future. On the whole it is fair to say that the greater share of responsibility falls upon the Government.

There were several extenuating features. The Government was conducting a great war, about which at the outset there had been misgivings within its own ranks. It was therefore loth to offend its own stalwarts. The Irish Nationalists, too, presented a difficulty; and after the experience of the Boer War, it was worth much to conciliate their support, primarily in Ireland but also in America. On the other hand, the loyalty of Unionists was secure in any event. The Government view, therefore, may not have been profound, but at least it was natural. At the same time it is clear that injustice was done to an Opposition that had given loyal support, as the Government was in a stronger and the Opposition in a weaker position after what occurred. So far, however, as the Irish Question is concerned, the milk has been spilt. The best that can be done is that any promise of a future Amending Bill should be scrupulously kept in the letter and in the spirit.† With reference to the Welsh Church Act the situation is different, and the position has been growing acute of late.

The essence of the matter lies in the interval prescribed by the Act to elapse between the date of passing and the date of the Bill coming into operation—a minimum of six months, which may be extended to twelve. This interval was to serve two purposes. The Government

can be taken. As regards the latter, not only is such preliminary action not barred, but, not being barred, it becomes obligatory. Hence the trouble.

* 'The Round Table,' Dec. 1914.

† I.e. the mere introduction of a measure in a take-it-or-leave-it attitude is thus barred.

intended to use it in appointing the Commissioners and creating the machinery necessary to administer the Act. On the other hand, a respite was also vital for the Church. Disendowed, it had to collect fresh funds. Disestablished, it had to create a new system of government. In peace these would be difficult tasks; in war they become impossible. Many of the principal supporters of the Church were away on service, and all resources were drained by the war. It was necessary, therefore, to give some period of respite after peace should be restored.

The situation was early foreseen both by the Prime Minister and others. Unfortunately, however, the greatest extension of time given by the Suspensory Act is only till the end of the war; therefore it does not meet the case. Indeed, in some respects it makes the situation worse. Preliminary steps are still obligatory under the Welsh Church Act; and these are actually causing dislocation.* Still more unhappily, the incidents of the passage of the Suspensory Act and the subsequent debates have again rekindled party animosity and distrust. Into this side of the question it is unnecessary to enter further. On the main point, however, a Bill to meet the situation has been introduced by the Duke of Devonshire in the House of Lords; and it appears from the memorials addressed to the Prime Minister that it has received the support of a number of Liberals and Free Churchmen. Undoubtedly the situation ought to be met; and some measure on the lines of the Duke's Bill seems as good a method as any. The opposition to it, moreover, does not appear to be great, except from a comparatively small section. At the time of writing, therefore, events look hopeful, as the Prime Minister appears both to realise the situation and to be anxious to meet it in accordance with the spirit of his earlier speech. If not a *modus vivendi*, at least a *modus moriendi* is in sight.

When so much trouble has arisen over two of the three principal Government bills, it would seem all the more important to avoid controversy over the last. Thus far

* E.g. where a benefice becomes vacant, it is difficult to fill it. Any such appointment since the passing of the Act involves no right to the stipend after the date of Disestablishment is passed, while the state of war precludes a voluntary fund being raised in the meantime.

the problem of the Plural Voting Bill is not prejudiced by anything that has happened; and the Prime Minister in his remarks on Feb. 3 was most guarded in his references to it. What is the fairest course to take? For such a purpose it is necessary to estimate the chances of the Bill at the time when the war broke out. That date was Aug. 4, 1914. The earliest day on which the Bill could pass is June 3, 1915. There was thus, as has been said, an interval of ten months; and this interval was evidently all-important. It is probable that any impartial observer would come to the conclusion, that the chances of the Plural Voting Bill becoming law in this Parliament were infinitesimal. It may be true, as one irreverent supporter of the Prime Minister remarked concerning his political good fortune, 'the greater the hole he is in, the greater the convulsion of nature that gets him out.' But, on the principle of 'no prejudice,' unless some expedient is found of subjecting the Bill to as precarious a chance of existence as it enjoyed last July, the only fair course seems either to drop it or to pass it with a proviso that it should not come into force until after the next contested general election. Whether such a decision would be unpalatable to Liberals, only inside knowledge can tell; but to the outsider any manipulation of the franchise, the fairness of which was at all open to question, would of all measures appear the most provocative, especially after the series of preceding events.

Somewhat similar considerations govern the problem of an Election. Questionings and rumours appear rife. As the end of 1915 completes the five years of existence prescribed by the Parliament Act, much no doubt depends on the course of the war. An election during hostilities is inconceivable. But uncertainty in itself is harmful in view of the prevailing condition of mistrust; and it would be to the general good if some statement could be made. Probably a postponement following the French model would be best, with a proviso that an election should take place, say, six months after the conclusion of peace or armistice for negotiations. This could be effected by an amendment of the Parliament Act, or, if this was considered objectionable by Liberals, by an election, uncontested on both sides, with security

for a contested election six months after the date of peace or of the armistice.*

The preceding suppositions are, of course, all based on the hypothesis that, when the war is ended, British politics will run again on much the same lines as before it began. On the other hand, a coalition, such as has taken place in France, is always a possible eventuality. It would at least be an evidence of national determination, stronger than any speeches or proclamations, welcome at once to our Allies and convincing to friendly neutrals. But the likelihood of such a development is not great, as affairs appear at present. In truth, it would not much matter, provided that there can be conservation of energy, and that efficiency is coupled with determination. Unhappily, in the eyes of a critic, it is just this conservation of force and this efficiency which in their full measure are prejudiced by the present internal distrust and antagonism. Even from the merely party point of view it is likely that that party which could fully rise to the occasion, and which would give its life, would find it. From the national point of view, however, the issue is one of much greater significance. What is a nation worth which cannot attain a real unity in such a crisis as the present? What will be the future of Britain, if even now she knows not the hour of her visitation?

The foregoing pages were written before the Commons debate of March 15. What then happened confirms what has been said above. An agreement as foreshadowed on p. 562 has been reached. Once definitely decided, Mr Lloyd George defended it with characteristic courage, but it is clear that it was only reached after considerable searchings of heart. Again, as pointed out on p. 561, the debate showed how easily the turmoil of party warfare may openly break out; and it is possible that the passage of the Amending Bill in April may show similar expressions of feeling.

* It seems doubtful whether such a 'dummy' election would prove practicable on closer consideration. The idea, however, has secured the influential support of the Chancellor of the Exchequer and others.

Art. 15.—THE LAW OF NEUTRALITY AND THE PRESENT WAR.

INTERNATIONAL 'law' is the label by which, not having a word corresponding to *Droit* and *Recht*, we describe a heterogeneous mass of alleged rules of inter-state conduct. Until, roughly, the last half-century these rules were derived from the practice of States, supplemented by deductions drawn by text-writers from the reason of the case. They constituted a fairly certain nucleus, fringed with uncertainties, and they inevitably lacked precision.

The only really satisfactory way of making international law is that which began with the Declaration of Paris, 1856, namely, by express Convention. The series was continued in the Declaration of St Petersburg, 1868 (forbidding the use of explosive bullets); the (unratified) Declaration of Brussels, 1874 (on the laws of land-war); the Geneva ('Red Cross') Conventions of 1864 and 1906; the Conventions drawn up at the two Peace Conferences of The Hague, 1899 and 1907; and the (unratified) Declaration of London, 1909 (about naval warfare). These 'law-making' treaties are the nearest approach in the international area to enacted municipal law. Inasmuch, however, as none of them has been agreed to by all States, they form what has been called a general, as contrasted with a universal, international law. And as regards the Conventions entered into at The Hague in 1907 it is to be noted that each of those which relate to conduct during war (i.e. Nos IV to XIII) contains a proviso that it is only to apply 'if all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.' Now, Montenegro and Serbia and Turkey have ratified none of them and, therefore, they are all technically inoperative as Conventions during the present war. Still, even the unratified Conventions, and those to which this or that State is not a party, or which are inoperative *pro hac vice*, possess a value only less than that of a generally operative Convention. They represent the reasoned convictions of specially-appointed state-agents as to what, having regard to the moral standards of the day, is right state-behaviour, or, in the case of a compromise,

as to what is reasonable in the circumstances. Hence we find that the Declaration of Paris was observed by two non-signatory Powers, Spain and the United States, when at war with each other in 1898; the unratified Declaration of London was appealed to in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912, as also by the Dutch in the recent case of the 'Medea' ('Times,' March 29); and several States, e.g. Argentina and Greece, in their Proclamations of Neutrality during the present war, have taken the technically inoperative Hague Conventions as their standard of conduct.

We propose to review here some of the happenings of the present war which affirm or tend to modify the rules operating between belligerents and neutrals.

Passage of belligerent troops over neutral territory.—This is one of the cases in which there was, until recently, no rule except that which arose from the nature of the case. The jurists were not quite agreed. The opinion of some of the older writers, that a neutral must on demand allow this passage, had, indeed, been rejected in the light of stricter doctrines as to territorial sovereignty; but there were some (e.g. Sir T. Twiss, writing about half a century ago) who thought that a neutral did not compromise his neutrality by granting passage to one belligerent provided he was ready to grant it to the other. Against this it was pointed out (e.g. by Heffter) that this was quite inconsistent with the requisite impartiality, because this passage would always be more advantageous to one belligerent than to the other—a criticism admirably illustrated on the Belgian frontiers at the beginning of the present war. The overwhelming majority of writers was of the same opinion as Heffter. In 1907 the pronouncement agreed to at The Hague resolved all doubts. Convention V ('Neutral Powers and Persons in Land Warfare') said:

- 'Art. 1. The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.
- 'Art. 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move across the territory of a neutral Power troops or convoys, either of munitions of war or of supplies.
- 'Art. 5. A neutral Power ought not to allow ("tolérer") on its territory any of the acts referred to in Arts. 2 to 4.'

Accordingly, the demands made on these States by Germany in the early days of last August were an invitation to them to violate the duty owed by them to France.

Passage of the Dutch portion of the Scheldt by naval forces of the Powers now belligerent is governed by the same general principles, for whatever rights of navigating the lower waters were granted by the Treaty of Vienna, 1814, were granted 'sous le rapport du commerce' only. The Scheldt being here a territorial river and not a part of the sea, an attack on Antwerp from the sea would come under the rubric 'Land Warfare'; and the articles cited above from Convention V (1907) would forbid its use for that purpose. This being so, it follows that the converse use of the waters by the Power in possession of Antwerp in order to carry on war in the open sea could not be allowed without a violation of the duty of impartiality. If, then, it be true that Germany is building at Antwerp submarines too large to pass to the sea except through the lower Scheldt, an improper use of these waters is contemplated which the Dutch ought to check by all available means.* That the Dutch would take a strict view of their duty is confirmed, if any confirmation be needed, by their refusal, after the fall of Antwerp, to allow the exit of merchantmen which had been taken by the Belgians as prize of war.

It is in China that the most conspicuous instances of the violation of neutral soil have occurred during the present war. These fall under two heads. First, those troops of the belligerent Powers which were guarding their national embassies at Peking when the war began could not join their main bodies without passing over Chinese soil. The President of China forbade this by a provision in his Neutrality Mandate.

'Troops of any of the belligerents,' it ran, 'their munitions of war or supplies, are not allowed to cross the territory of China. . . . The guards attached to the Legations of the various Powers in Peking . . . are not allowed to interfere with the

* When the erection of forts at Flushing and Terneuzen was in contemplation only, the late Mr Westlake pointed out that it would increase for the Dutch the effectiveness of the obligation contained in the words 'not to tolerate' in Art. 5 above mentioned. See 'Revue de Droit International,' 2nd ser., vol. xiii, p. 105.

present war. . . . Those who do not conform to the foregoing provision may be interned and disarmed by China until the termination of the war.'

Nevertheless the guard attached to the German Legation made its way to Kiaochau; and probably the guards of other belligerent Powers paid as little respect to Chinese neutrality. The circumstances of this case were so anomalous—the foreign troops being lawfully in China on the outbreak of the war—that ordinary considerations can hardly apply. The second instance referred to above is a clearer case of violation of neutral rights and of inability to carry out neutral obligations. The Germans had transported troops and material of war into Kiaochau by the Shantung railway, which, though a German concession, ran for 250 miles outside the part of China leased to Germany; the Japanese landed troops at Lungkow and travelled at least an equal distance across Chinese soil in order to invest Tsingtao on the land side. The Chinese Government protested, but to deaf ears. At the same time the President proposed to establish a war-zone such as had been established in the Russo-Japanese war, and disclaimed responsibility for the enforcement of neutrality there. The zone was a defined part of the peninsula north of Kiaochau Bay. Germany in reply warned China that she held her responsible for losses caused by her acquiescence in the use of her territory for hostilities; the Allies in their reply (so it seems) simply justified their conduct as the inevitable result of violations of neutrality previously committed by Germany.*

Passage of belligerent vessels over neutral 'territorial sea.'—No rule, customary or conventional, forbids a belligerent to send his ships of war over neutral territorial waters which are part of the sea. This is one of many instances showing that different considerations apply to water and to land. The question does not assume first-rate importance unless the territorial waters are the only way between two parts of the open sea, as in the case of the Sound and the Belts. The precedent furnished in 1854, when British and French ships, hostile

* The fuller story can be read in the deeply interesting account given by Sir F. Pigcott in the March number of the 'Nineteenth Century,' to which we are indebted for the facts set out above.

to Russia, passed the Sound without protest, is in favour, if not of a right of passage, at any rate of the non-existence of a neutral duty to restrain it. So also is the fact that in 1870 Prussia raised no objection on this score to a blockade of her Baltic coasts by the French. The topic was discussed by the Institute of International Law in 1894; and, while it was conceded that a neutral had a right to *regulate* the passage of its waters by ships of war, it was added, 'Straits which form a channel from one open sea to another can never be closed.' The reasonableness of allowing a neutral to regulate the passage of belligerent war-vessels through its territorial straits is obvious, for the straits might otherwise become the scene of hostilities, to the no small hurt of the adjacent shores. When, however, the matter came up at the second Peace Conference, nothing more was decided than that a neutral was not compromised by 'le simple passage' or the employment of its pilots by a belligerent warship. (Convention XIII (1907), Art. 10, 11.) If it enforced its right of regulating passage by the use of mines, this provision about the employment of pilots would be important. Whether this whole question has become actual in the present war cannot be stated until full information is obtainable with regard to the extent to which free navigation of the Sound and the Belts has been allowed.

Passage of belligerent air-craft over neutral territory.—The modern development of aeronautics has brought new problems before international law. A fundamental question is whether the subjacent state is sovereign of the air at all heights, or whether the air is free from territorial sovereignty, its navigation being merely limited in certain respects in the interest of the subjacent state. The question is an open one as yet. Switzerland made a definite stand in favour of the doctrine of territorial sovereignty of the air in connexion with the raid on the Zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen by British airmen on Nov. 21, 1914. Although the airmen had received instructions not to fly over Swiss territory, the evidence showed that they had done so. The Swiss Federal Council thereupon addressed a protest to both France and Great Britain. Both Governments expressed regret. The British note said that the airmen's failure

to carry out the instructions must be attributed to accident or to the difficulty of knowing, when at a great height, what the exact position of an aeroplane is. The note also contained the following reservation :

‘The British Government wishes to take this opportunity of stating that the orders given to the aviators and the expression of regret for the non-observance of its instructions are not to be interpreted as a recognition by the British Government of the existence of a sovereignty of the air.’*

The reply of the Swiss Federal Council was that, as International Law does not recognise any limit to the sovereignty of the air, the Council must claim this sovereignty to its full extent; and it pointed out that, since the mobilisation of the Swiss army, it had issued instructions accordingly. (‘Times,’ Dec. 8, 1914.) The right thus asserted was maintained in practice a little later. A message to the ‘Times’ from Berne, dated Feb. 4, 1915, said, ‘A foreign aeroplane flew over Swiss territory near Porrentruy at a great height. It was shot at by Swiss soldiers, but escaped.’ Holland has repeatedly asserted in the same practical way the right of preventing the flight of belligerent aircraft over its territory; so early as August last the Dutch fired on a German dirigible (see ‘Times,’ Aug. 22).

Hostilities on neutral territory.—Hostilities are not permitted on neutral land. And although, as we shall see, a belligerent is allowed to use neutral waters in a way which has no parallel as regards neutral land, the rule about hostilities is the same in both cases. The territorial sea is the ‘three-mile belt,’ a width fixed in the 18th century by reference to the maximum distance commanded at that time by a gun of position. Now, although three miles is still the width for purposes of jurisdiction and sovereignty, much may be said for an increase of the width for purposes of neutrality; for it

* This reservation can only have been inserted out of caution, for the British Government does not seem to have adopted elsewhere an attitude in favour of the rival doctrine of the freedom of the air. Indeed, the British Aerial Navigation Act, 1913, implicitly asserts the doctrine of sovereignty; for it empowers the Government to forbid the navigation of aircraft over ‘the whole or any part of the coast-line of the United Kingdom and the territorial waters adjacent thereto.’

is clear that, if a naval engagement took place now just outside the three-mile belt, it might go hard with many miles of neutral coast. The increase to, say, ten miles would have the further advantage of keeping a belligerent cruiser out of range of sight from the shore when it was performing the invidious but legitimate task of watching the neutral waters in order to prevent the escape of an enemy vessel or the transport of contraband. There is reason, then, in the step taken by Turkey, while still neutral in the present war, when she proposed to increase the width of her territorial waters to six miles. France had already, by a decree of Oct. 18, 1912, adopted, to meet the event of her being neutral in a maritime war, a width of eleven kilometres, measured from low-water mark.

A neutral may, of course, take precautionary steps to prevent a violation of its territorial waters. An instance of this occurred lately. The Government of Chile, says a communication printed in the 'Times' of Nov. 5, 1914,

'has . . . in order to procure respect for its neutrality, effectively employed her war-ships, which have convoyed, within territorial waters, merchant-vessels flying a belligerent flag that were threatened by cruisers of a contending nation. The most recent instances are the protection afforded to the British steamships "Ortega" and "Oronsa" by Chilean cruisers—to the first-named in the territorial waters of the Straits of Magellan, and to the other further north.'

Respect for neutral waters led to the escape of the German cruisers 'Breslau' and 'Goeben' from Messina early in the war; but in two cases Germany has taxed Great Britain with a violation of neutral waters. A complaint (not, perhaps, official) was made that when the armed liner 'Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse' was sunk by the 'Highflyer' off the Atlantic coast of Africa she was in neutral waters, although the engagement had begun in the high seas. And a complaint has been made that the attack on the 'Dresden' was begun when she was but a few hundred yards from the shore of the Chilean island of Juan Fernandez. If the facts were as alleged, a wrong would have been done in both cases, for which redress is due to the neutral; although, as regards the former case, there is the authority of

Bynkershoek for saying that a vessel escaping from battle into neutral waters may be pursued there *dum fervet opus*, provided no harm be done to the neutral. At the same time there may be circumstances which excuse, even if they do not justify, the attacking belligerent. Thus, it is recognised (as we shall see later) that a vessel which seeks in neutral waters an asylum from attack or capture must be detained during the war unless it quits reasonably soon. What, then, if the neutral waters into which a vessel is hunted are so remote that it is futile to look to the home Government to take immediate action? what if there be no local authority or if the local authority be impotent or supine, so that there is nothing to prevent the vessel from abusing the asylum by a stay prolonged until departure be safe? Is not the pursuer excused if in any such case he takes the law into his own hands?

Neutral land and asylum to combatants.—When fugitives from land-war escape into neutral territory, the neutral must, if it receives them, do what in him lies to prevent them from rejoining their army. This doctrine is quite modern. It was applied by Belgium and Switzerland to fugitive French soldiers during the war of 1870–1871. Some think it unduly favourable to the other belligerent, as giving him without fighting all he could hope to get by fighting. But it received the sanction of both the Peace Conferences at The Hague; and so the conduct of the Dutch in disarming and intern-ing British combatants who crossed the Dutch frontier in their retreat from Antwerp was strictly proper. These fugitives are not prisoners of war; their internment is simply a measure of ‘political police.’

Asylum to war-ships of a belligerent.—The rules about asylum on neutral territory are not so severe and uniform in the case of war-ships as in the case of land-troops. The unity of the sea and the nature of the risks shared by all seafarers have bred traditions of international hospitality in ports and roadsteads; the foreign man-of-war is one of the common objects of the seaport. Hence it is everywhere conceded that a neutral may shelter a belligerent war-ship whether fugitive or not. But there are limits. If the sheltering vessel were allowed by the neutral to delay its departure at its

pleasure and until the moment most disadvantageous to its enemy, there would be a breach of what the United States describes in its Proclamation of Neutrality as 'the duty of a neutral government not to permit or suffer the making of its waters subservient to the purposes of war.' The rule is to name a maximum duration for the visit. This rule is new; there was a trend in its direction before, but it was not fixed until the Hague Conference of 1907. The normal length of innocent stay was then fixed at twenty-four hours;* but a neutral may adopt any other period it chooses—France takes thrice twenty-four hours. What if the vessel outstays this period? The Hague Convention simply says that the neutral may take such measures as it considers necessary to render it incapable of putting to sea so long as the war lasts; the officers and crew are to be 'detained' with it; internment is not mentioned.

When Germany signed the Convention (XIII of 1907) containing the rule just mentioned, she made a reservation with regard to the Article in which it is found. But there have been many instances in the present war in which it has been enforced against her. Directly the war broke out, officials searched the German liners then lying in ports of the United States with a view to applying the rule to such of them as had an offensive armament. And the United States has since interned German cruisers under this rule, not only in ports on its mainland, but also, for instance, in Honolulu and at Guam in the Ladrone Archipelago. Norway is reported to have taken the same course; and in February last a German auxiliary cruiser was interned by Argentina. The United States, it may be added, deems it its duty to use due diligence to prevent the escape of vessels so interned. On one occasion when some of them were

* This is really the complement of another much older 'twenty-four hours' rule. The older rule said that, when war-ships of two enemy powers were together in the same neutral port, one of them must not sail within twenty-four hours of the departure of the other. In 1861 a Federal war-ship abused this rule. It arrived in Southampton Water when a Confederate cruiser was in dock there, and, by always being ready to start before its enemy, was able practically to blockade it in British waters. In Jan. 1862, accordingly, Great Britain issued the rule about a maximum stay of twenty-four hours, since adopted by many other powers, notably by the United States and Japan.

reported to be meditating a dash for the sea, Federal officials searched them in order to test the truth of the rumour ('Times,' March 8). The commanders of war-ships stationed in New York and Boston received orders to use force if necessary to prevent such a departure ('Morning Post,' March 16); and a German vessel which actually made the attempt at San Juan in Puerto Rico was driven back by shell-fire from the American guard-ship ('Times,' March 23). Further, a belligerent war-vessel, which after repairing in a United States port quits as an alternative to detention, will not be allowed to hug the American coast, but must put out into the open sea; this was laid down, according to a Central News message printed in the newspapers for March 31, in the case of the German cruiser 'Prinz Eitel Friedrich.'

Asylum to individual naval combatants.—The circumstances in which combatants may take refuge with a neutral from perils by sea are various. It may be from their own boats or by the enemy that they are landed on neutral soil, or they may have been picked up by a neutral vessel, either a man-of-war or privately owned; they may be the survivors of a naval engagement or the victims of mines, tempest or accident. It would seem as if one and the same rule should govern all these cases, namely, that the enemy might in no case demand their surrender—unless, indeed, the neutral vessel had intruded into an unfinished engagement in order to rescue them—and that in all cases the neutral should take the steps necessary to prevent them from serving again during the war. In fact, however, no such simple and uniform rule is recognised.

A dispute about this matter arose between Great Britain and the United States in 1864 in connexion with the sinking of the 'Alabama' by the 'Kearsage' off Cherbourg. An Englishman who witnessed the fight from his yacht picked up some survivors from the 'Alabama,' including its captain, Semmes. He then sailed straight for Southampton, where the rescued men were landed and allowed to go free. It seems that the 'Alabama' had struck its colours before sinking, so that Semmes and his crew were virtually prisoners of war; but the rescuer was unaware of this and declared that he had been bidden by the captain of the 'Kearsage' to do what

he could to save the men. The United States Government, however, complained that he ought to have handed over all the saved to the victor. The British Government was unable to agree. The matter went no further.

This topic was discussed at the first Peace Conference, but opinions were so divergent that no rule was adopted. More success was attained in 1907. By Convention X ('The Geneva Convention and maritime warfare') an agreement was made concerning wounded, sick, or shipwrecked combatants, which may be roughly summarised as follows:—(I) A belligerent war-ship may demand their surrender* from hospital-ships and private vessels of all nationalities (Art. 12). (II) They must abstain or be prevented from rendering further service during the war in the following cases, (i) when received on board a neutral war-ship (Art. 13), (ii) when landed by their enemy at one of their own ports (Art. 14), and (iii) when landed [by a belligerent] at a neutral port (Art. 15).

We can now see how it came about in this war that sailors sheltering in neutral countries were at one time interned and at another let go free. After the German armed liner 'Cap Trafalgar' was sunk by the British armed liner 'Carmania' on Sept. 14 last, her crew were landed in Argentina by one of her colliers; they were interned under Art. 15. Some of the men of our own navy, however, who were landed in Holland after their ship was torpedoed on Sept. 22 were released unconditionally. This is because they were rescued and brought on to neutral soil by fishing vessels. It will be seen that Art. 13 provides for the internment of those only who have been rescued by war-ships. It might, indeed, be thought that, as Art. 15 does not itself contain the words inserted above—'by a belligerent'—the men should have been interned because they were 'landed at a neutral port.' But it appears from a Report of the Committee which drafted the Convention that the Art. was meant to apply only to men landed by a belligerent; and such an ancillary

* Great Britain made a reservation that she understands this to apply only to combatants rescued during or after a naval engagement in which they have taken part; not, e.g., to men rescued after shipwreck caused by storm or a casual mine.

document has an authority in continental jurisprudence which is not known in the interpretation of a British statute. The men were, therefore, released because, though landed at a neutral port, they were not landed by a belligerent. If the technical reason of their release were explained to them, they would doubtless marvel as well as rejoice—especially as, under Art. 12, an enemy cruiser could have required their surrender to him by the rescuing fishing-vessels. The same rules have been applied to combatant aviators who have been rescued from the sea. In one case, Commander Hewlett who fell into the sea and was picked up by a neutral fishing-boat was allowed to return to England; in another, Flight-Lieutenant Murray, having in a similar predicament been picked up by a neutral war-vessel, was interned.

Supplies from neutral ports for belligerent war-vessels.—A neutral may grant other facilities than asylum to a belligerent war-vessel which enters its ports. Whatever the visitor needs in order to continue its active life as a vessel, as distinguished from a war-vessel—fuel, victuals, men, repairs—may be supplied in the neutral port without any breach of neutrality. Limits must, however, be observed; for it is obviously inconsistent with neutrality that such assistance should be rendered in the port as would make it a base of operations for the ship. The difficulty is to draw the line. This topic was discussed at the second Hague Peace Conference, and certain articles were agreed on which turn into general law rules previously enforced by this or that individual state. These articles are in Convention XIII of 1907 ('Neutral rights and duties in maritime war'). By them a belligerent war-ship in a neutral port is allowed to carry out such repairs as are absolutely necessary to render it seaworthy, but not such as in any way to put it in better fighting trim; to revictual so as to bring its supplies up to the peace standard; and, as regards fuel, to take in sufficient to enable it to reach the nearest port in its own country or even to fill its bunkers if this be the limit fixed by the neutral. What the Convention forbids is that the ship should replenish or increase its supplies of war material or its armament in neutral waters, or complete its crew, or, if it has once shipped

fuel in a neutral port, replenish its supply in a port of the same Power within the three succeeding months.

It will be noticed that no distinction is drawn above between repairs necessitated by injuries sustained in battle and other repairs. A proposal was indeed made to forbid the former, but it was abandoned on the ground that it might sometimes be impossible to assign the exact cause of the need for repairs. Instead it was expressly left to the neutral to indicate in each case what repairs might be carried out. Nothing in the Convention prevents the neutral from declining to allow the repair of injuries sustained in battle. The proper course would seem to be to disallow such repairs. This was the course adopted in the Russo-Japanese war, two years before the date of the Convention, by the United States; three Russian war-ships put into Manila in May 1905, after having been badly damaged in action; leave to repair them there was asked, but it was refused on the ground that no extension of the 'twenty-four hours' rule could be granted in such circumstances. The precedent is a valuable one. No similar question seems to have arisen as yet in the present war. After the battle off the Falkland Islands the German cruiser 'Dresden' is reported to have made for Punta Arenas, a Chilean settlement on the eastern part of the Straits of Magellan, and to have coaled there, but no mention is made of any repairing.* In the case of the small German cruiser 'Geier,' the need of repair was, it may be presumed, not due to battle; the successive telegrams appearing in the 'Times' concerning this vessel furnish, all the same, an interesting illustration of neutral diligence on the matter before us. They are as follows:

'October 19, 1914.—Honolulu, Oct. 17.—The German cruiser "Geier" will remain here indefinitely, repairing her engines, which will require several weeks. . . . American naval experts will determine what repairs are necessary. . . .

'November 1.—Tokio, Oct. 31.—The "Nichi Nichi Shimbun" to-day publishes a message from Honolulu which says that although the repairs to the German cruiser "Geier" are finished, the vessel is now seeking an excuse to remain in port for the purpose of keeping a Japanese war-ship occupied

* See official French announcement in the 'Times' of Dec. 26, 1914.

in watching her. A joint British and Japanese protest to the local authorities has proved futile, and joint representations will now be made at Washington.

'November 6.—Washington, Nov. 4.—The authorities here have fixed a date by which the German cruiser "Geier," which has been under repair for some weeks at Honolulu, must either leave port or be interned. In order to give the "Geier" a chance of avoiding the Japanese cruisers, the date is being kept secret.

'November 10.—Washington, Nov. 9.—The German cruiser "Geier" has been interned at Honolulu until the end of the war. She failed to leave the port within the time-limit set by the United States.'

Another admirable instance of United States sensitiveness to the claims of neutral duty is afforded—according to a message from Washington printed in the 'Morning Post' for March 16—in connexion with the flight of the German cruiser 'Prinz Eitel Friedrich' into American waters. The message says :

'Unofficially a report has reached Washington that Capt Thierichsen declares his boilers are in such a bad condition from the continued use of sea-water that he must have new boilers to put the vessel in a seaworthy condition, but there is a very grave doubt as to whether the Government will permit new boilers to be installed. Lawyers hold that under the strict construction of international law repairs may be made to a belligerent vessel in a neutral port, but that the terms of the repairs must not be made so elastic as to include rebuilding. To replace damaged boiler-tubes would be proper, but to replace worn-out boilers with new ones would violate the well-established practice of nations.'

If a belligerent war-vessel were repeatedly to come into a given neutral port and fill up its fuel-bunkers, it would undoubtedly be abusing the hospitality of the neutral, and the neutral who knowingly allowed this would commit a breach of neutral duty. But suppose the war-vessel never enters territorial waters of the neutral but arranges for a number of merchantmen to bring fuel out from the neutral port and deliver it on the high seas ; is the neutral bound to put a stop to this if he can ? It might be argued that the belligerent in such a case is not making the neutral port a base of operations, for it never enters that port, but is simply

drawing supplies from a neutral country by sea, an operation which renders the goods liable to capture as contraband but does not involve the neutral in any breach of duty. On the other hand, it may be urged that the merchantman is practically turning itself into a tender to the belligerent fleet and, as such, is itself become a belligerent war-vessel. The United States adopts the latter view. This is clear from the Rules issued on Sept. 19, 1914, for the guidance of its port-officials in dealing with cases like these; the Rules speak of the supply of fuel, etc., to a belligerent war-vessel either 'directly or by means of . . . merchant vessels of belligerent or neutral nationality acting as tenders.'

The State of Chile has carried the same view into practice. It has been ascertained that German cruisers in the Pacific have been systematically supplied with provisions and fuel by German merchantmen which have loaded in American, especially South American, ports. These merchantmen would declare that they were bound for Hamburg or Bremen and would load enough coal to take them to those ports and also large amounts of food-stuffs. A letter from Santiago (Chile) dated Nov. 9 and printed in the 'Times' of Dec. 16, 1914, cites an instance in which wireless communications between one of these steamers and German cruisers were intercepted by Chilean wireless stations. In the same letter it is pointed out how difficult it was for the port authorities, suspicious as they might be, to refuse the request of German steamers to be allowed to load the coal, seeing that British steamers sailing for Liverpool were regularly obtaining the large amount of coal required to take them to their destination. The German merchantmen, after delivering the coal, etc., to their cruisers, made as a rule for some other neutral state than that from which they had sailed.* It was not until the 'Karnak' broke that

* The Rules of Sept. 19, 1914, mentioned in the text, show that on this point the United States authorities were 'ware and waking.' In describing matters which would amount to circumstantial evidence that a merchant vessel laden with fuel or other naval supplies intended to deliver its cargo to a belligerent war-ship, Rule 3 includes the following: 'Where a merchant vessel has on a previous voyage between ports of the United States and ports of other neutral states failed to have on board at the port of arrival a cargo consisting of naval supplies shipped at the port of departure, . . .'

rule that the Chilean authorities were able to act. The 'Karnak' left Iquique on Oct. 2 with 6000 tons of coal, declaring her destination to be San Francisco via Callao. On Oct. 28 she arrived empty at another Chilean port, Antofagasta, 'with indications in her appearance that she had transferred her cargo at sea. She declared to the authorities that she had been chased by a British cruiser and had jettisoned her coal' ('Times,' Nov. 9, 1914). This excuse was transparently false; and the Chilean Government, on the British minister protesting, ordered an enquiry, and laid it down that, if steamers are proved or strongly suspected in these circumstances to have made false declarations, 'such steamers will be treated as ships forming part of a belligerent navy' ('Times,' Dec. 16) and will be detained until the end of the war. Subsequently two other German steamers, the 'Luxor' and the 'Memphis,' left a Chilean port without clearance-papers in order to take supplies to German cruisers. The Chilean Government not only ordered the capture of both vessels but, in consequence of this and other breaches of neutrality by ships of the 'Kosmos' line, forbade any of the vessels of this line to take on coal or provisions in any Chilean port pending investigations ('Times,' Nov. 23).

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Further remarks on the Law of Neutrality as illustrated by the present war will be made in a subsequent article.

Art. 16.—THE WAR.

I.—BY LAND.

DURING the past three months of war the principal scenes of the great drama have continued to be enacted on the Russian front. While the Allied armies, undeterred by conditions of weather that have in some localities made movement almost impossible, have, by ceaseless activity, compelled the Germans to keep very large forces in France, the latter, with their Austrian allies, have continued their offensive against Russia with a perseverance which in a better cause could not fail to command admiration. But, despite continuous fighting in both theatres of war, neither the Allies nor the enemy have achieved more than local and partial successes.

In order to apprehend the significance of military operations and the degree of success attending them it is first necessary to understand the object they are designed to attain. In this lies one great difficulty of reviewing a current campaign—that the object of the operations on either side is not definitely known. It can only be conjectured; and an erroneous conjecture not only vitiates all deductions based upon it, but may lead to distorted views on general questions. Thus, at the beginning of the war, it was generally supposed by non-military critics that the object of the German invasion of France was to attack or invest Paris; and because Paris escaped its supposed fate and the Germans turned aside to attack the Allied armies south of the Marne, the enemy's whole plan was assumed to have failed. On this occasion the reputation of the German General Staff became so discredited that many of the critics have never since been able to discern anything but flurry and ineptitude in many skilful and dashing strokes designed by a body of officers among whose failings lack of coolness and ability certainly finds no place. It is quite true that the Germans laid their march on Paris; and, partly to inspire their troops to great exertions, partly, perhaps, with the idea of intimidating the Allies, announced their intention of being in the capital by a certain date. But this presupposed the defeat of the Allied armies, after which the investment of Paris would

probably have been effected principally by second-line troops, the field army being released to operate against Russia. The Germans, in fact, acted in accordance with the principle which has governed the opening of nearly every offensive campaign since field armies became mobile, namely, to strike straight at the enemy's capital, or at some great centre of the nation's life and population which the hostile army cannot afford to abandon to its fate. The first object of war being the destruction of the enemy's army, the surest step towards that end at the beginning of a campaign is to strike along a line on which the enemy is certain to be found. A general engagement is thus ensured at the earliest possible moment, while the defending army is yet, perhaps, not fully prepared. The Germans turned aside from Paris at the beginning of September because the Allied army, though severely handled, was still unbeaten; and while it remained unbeaten any attempt to attack the Capital would have been unsafe and useless. For it is not to be imagined that the Allied army would have played the part of spectator at the sack of Paris; and the Germans were not strong enough to combine an attack on the great fortress with an offensive campaign in the field.

While the Germans at the outset of the French campaign were animated by the single purpose of defeating the Allied army as the first step towards the subjugation of the French nation, and as a preliminary to throwing their field army against Russia, the conditions of the campaign on the eastern front are more complex, making it impossible to determine precisely what object the enemy has in view. In every case the object can be conjectured only by determining from military considerations what would be the best course of action, and assuming that this course will be adopted. But without full knowledge of all the conditions the best course cannot be determined with any confidence; and, even when the military conditions are sufficiently known, political considerations may exercise an unforeseen influence which upsets the calculation. In the case of the Russian campaign, among many uncertain quantities there is one fact which dominates the German aims. For reasons dealt with in our article last January, Germany must bring the French campaign to a conclusion

before seeking a final decision against Russia. In no other way can she hope to dictate terms to the Allied Governments. It is therefore safe to conclude that in the present operations Germany does not expect to accomplish more than to reduce the Russian armies to a condition of inactivity for a sufficient period to permit of her throwing all her available strength against the Allied army, in order to destroy it and compel France to come to terms. If that were accomplished, Russia and Great Britain could be dealt with at leisure.

The circumstances which make Warsaw a point of great military importance were referred to in the last article. Briefly, it is one of the keys to the whole defensive system of Eastern Poland. This region, in its turn, constitutes a great *place d'armes*, well provided with railway communications, where Russian armies may assemble for operations against either Germany or Austria. It is enclosed on the north and west by the rivers Bobr, Narew, and Vistula, fortified bridges on the roads and railways providing for free egress; on the south it lies open to Galicia. In rear of it to the east the wilderness of the Pinsk Marshes fills the space between the Dnieper in the east and the Bug in the west, with a breadth from north to south varying from two hundred to three hundred miles. This vast area of marsh and forest, intersected by innumerable rivers, is quite impracticable for military operations.

The significance of the struggle for possession of the line of the Vistula, which has continued since early in October, may now be imagined. If the Germans gained the Vistula, the Russian armies would have to fall back from Western Galicia and the Carpathians, and the line of the Bobr and Narew would be turned. The further proceedings would depend on the state of the Russian armies after the series of defeats by which the Germans would have gained these advantages, and on the demands of the situation in France and elsewhere. The Germans might attempt to throw the Russians back on the Pinsk Marshes, advancing to the line of the Bug; but if, as is more likely, they were to rest content with holding the line of the Polish rivers, the invasion of Germany would at least be indefinitely deferred; and such troops as could be spared might be transferred to France to

assist in a final effort to overcome the Allied armies. In the absence of any practical alternative suggestion it will be assumed that the German plans have been formulated somewhat on the above lines.

At the beginning of the new year the Germans, by a rapid advance on Warsaw, had for the second time obliged the Russians to relinquish the offensive operations on which they were intent, and to concentrate considerable forces to defend the Polish capital. This second stroke had failed, less disastrously indeed than the earlier one, for reasons which need not be recapitulated. The Russian armies were firmly established on the line of the rivers Bzura, Rawka and Nida in Poland, and in Western Galicia on the Dunajetz. Further south fighting was proceeding on the Carpathian front in favour of the Russians, who were, moreover, again invading the Bukowina.

The failure of the Germans either to crush the Russian army in Poland or to possess themselves of the line of the Vistula, resulting, as it did, in a complete deadlock in Central and South Poland, invested the Carpathian front with quite a new importance. Its defence became as vital to the Germans as that of the Vistula had been to the Russians. Owing to the strength of the defences which had grown up in the course of the fighting during December, Poland had ceased to be a practicable area of active operations. Similarly the gap between the Upper Vistula and the Carpathians had become impregnable to either side. Only in the Carpathians was it reasonably possible for either army to break through or outflank the other. The complete command of the mountains once secured, the Austrians might endeavour to clear Galicia and turn the line of the Vistula; or the Russians might operate against the enemy's flank in Hungary, where it would find no secure support either from natural obstacles or neutral frontiers. Having regard to the deadlock which had existed for some months in France and East Prussia, and which had recently extended to Poland, the situation seemed pregnant with possibilities. Roumania was believed only to await a favourable opportunity and security against Turkish attack to throw in her lot with the Triple

Entente. Serbia, with her army reorganised and its equipment completed, was ready to exact vengeance from her assailant. It seemed not incredible that the plains of Hungary might be the scene of the penultimate act of the great drama; and that, when Austria had been beaten into submission, the invasion of Germany might come from the south.

These possibilities were not hidden from the minds of the German General Staff, who took immediate steps to guard against them. Rumour became very busy about events in Hungary. A fresh expedition against Serbia in which a couple of German army corps were to take part was sedulously advertised. The Hungarian railways were crowded with troops, Austrian and German. The Austrians made a show of bombarding Belgrade and occupying islands in the Danube. The thing was done so skilfully that the Serbians themselves were misled; and, in spite of military expediency and probability, it was generally believed in this country that Serbia was to be invaded in overwhelming force. It proved, however, to be only a clever ruse to cover the concentration on the Carpathian front of large German and Austrian forces, which quickly gained possession of all the passes east of and including the Uzok, and, by the end of the first week in February, were pouring into the Bukowina.

Concurrently with the despatch of troops (supposed to amount to at least four army corps) to help on the Carpathian front, the Germans began to prepare for a complementary move on the opposite wing. During the last week of January they renewed their attacks on the line of the River Rawka in the neighbourhood of Bolimoff with forces which, by Feb. 3, reached a total of seven divisions and a hundred batteries (probably about 100,000 men with 500 guns) on a front of about seven miles. Though this force was clearly inadequate, in the light of previous experience, to break through the Russian position in front of Warsaw unless highly favoured by fortune, the persistent violence of the attack was calculated to suggest such a design. Whether the Russian General Staff were misled is not certain, but they were admittedly surprised by the new move from which these attacks were intended to distract attention, namely, the

concentration of considerable forces on the eastern, or Niemen, front of East Prussia. In this region the Russian Tenth Army had embarked on an offensive movement towards the end of January, which by Feb. 2 reached the main German position on the River Angerap near Darkemen, and, further north, arrived within fifteen miles of Tilsit. Two days later the German concentration was detected, and the Russians were in the act of retiring when, on the 8th, a sudden attack combined with an outflanking movement led to the hurried retreat of the Russian right wing. This left the centre exposed, resulting in the twentieth army corps being enveloped and sustaining severe losses. The German right wing had meanwhile moved on Johannisberg and Lyck, driving the Russian left in the direction of Ossowetz, a fortress of the third class which guards the bridge by which the Königsberg—Bielostok railway crosses the River Bobr. The concentration of troops by which these rapid successes were attained comprised the 21st active army corps transferred from France, two newly-raised corps, and probably three or four army corps drawn from the Vistula front. These reinforcements, added to the force already on the Niemen front, probably made a total of nine or ten army corps, or from 400,000 to 440,000 men, who, according to German statements, were opposed by eleven Russian divisions, or about 200,000 men.

Having thus for the second time expelled the Russians from East Prussia, the Germans transferred a great part of the troops to reinforce the army corps, probably four or five in number, which had been deployed on the Narew front between Kolno and the Mława railway. Those which remained pursued the retiring Russians nearly as far as the Niemen, and detachments attempted to cross the river, apparently with the intention of destroying the Vilna-Warsaw railway. The Russian General Staff had meanwhile stated that the object of the retirement was to reorganise and reinforce the army under cover of the fortresses.

In spite of the unquestioned fact that a large part of the German forces had been promptly transferred to the Narew front, the view has been generally held by non-military commentators that the Germans intended to seize the line of the Niemen; and, because they did not

carry out this supposed intention, it has been assumed that they failed to give effect to their plans through exhaustion of their offensive power. The matter is obviously of some importance as indicating the value of the German army as an instrument for giving effect to the strategical plans of the General Staff. It also illustrates the importance of forming a correct idea of the object of military operations. If it was the purpose of the German General Staff to gain possession of the line of the Niemen, they failed in their purpose because of the inability of the army to develop the requisite offensive power. If, on the other hand, it had never been their intention to gain possession of the line of the Niemen, the commentators referred to have fallen into the error of underestimating the value of the German army; an error which, by misleading public opinion as to the magnitude of the effort needed to overcome the enemy's military power, might have serious consequences.

Considerations of space preclude a full discussion of the subject; but it may be said without hesitation that the view generally held is opposed to every consideration of military expediency. To hold the line of the Niemen is, from the German point of view, unnecessary at the present stage; it would entail unjustifiable extension of front; and, as a defensive line, the position is very disadvantageous because the country in rear of it, as far as the Prussian frontier, is a wilderness of swamp and forest, almost devoid of communications either by road or rail. For these reasons, among others not less weighty, it must be concluded that the German plan was successful in all essential points. The operations were prompt and decisive; the Russian army was severely handled and driven into the shelter of its fortresses; and a position was gained near the frontier which from the nature of the country and the communications is advantageous for the defence, and equally disadvantageous for the attack.

Concurrently with the fighting on the Niemen front there were daily encounters, from Feb. 7 onwards, along the whole Narew front from Johannisberg to the Vistula in the vicinity of Plock. On this front the Russians were favoured by the railway communications; and, as the German troops arrived from the Niemen front, they

were opposed by equal or superior Russian reinforcements. By Feb. 17 the fighting had become violent along the entire front, and on the 20th large German forces advanced with great impetuosity in the vicinity of Przasnysz. The battle, which raged furiously for ten days, appears to have culminated in a midnight panic, which caused the Germans to abandon their positions about Przasnysz on the night of the 26th—27th. The arrival of further reinforcements enabled the Germans to renew the offensive in this region on March 8, but the Russians gradually established a preponderance of force, and the enemy were being steadily pressed back towards the frontier when a general thaw, setting in about the 15th, made the continuance of connected operations impracticable.

The Germans have thus failed in three separate attempts to gain the control of the line of the Polish rivers. The first two attempts were made against the Vistula front; the last against the line of the Bobr and Narew, with the object of taking the line of the Vistula in rear. They have only succeeded in reaching the river-line at one point—Ossowetz on the Bobr—which they have attacked with heavy artillery, stated to comprise two 42-cm. howitzers, since Feb. 20. The fortress artillery appears to have had the advantage throughout, and the latest reports indicate that the attack is weakening.

The Russians, on the other hand, have attained their principal object, which has been essentially defensive. An invasion of East Prussia, or an advance from Western Poland on Posen, whatever might be the political effect, would not be justified on military grounds. The conquest of East Prussia would not end the war; and the further advance on Berlin is barred by the formidable obstacle of the Lower Vistula, so strongly guarded by fortresses as to be practically insurmountable. The province of Posen, though it lies on the shortest route to Berlin, is girt with swamps and forests; and beyond it the way is barred by the fortresses of the Oder. The fortress of Posen blocks the principal communications. The province itself is not of great political significance, and its lakes and marshes make it unsuitable for operations. An offensive from North or West

Poland would, therefore, offer no advantages. The Russians at the beginning of the war turned their attention to Silesia, for reasons which were indicated in the last article. The Austrian positions in Western Galicia have since become so strong that the Russians have concentrated their forces further south, and directed their efforts to the invasion of Hungary.

The situation on the Carpathian front has already been broadly outlined; it will now be examined more closely. The entrenched positions in Western Galicia, following the line of the rivers Dunajetz and Bialla, appear to merge in the broken country of the Carpathians in the region of Gorlice and Zmigrod. The Russian front is then thrown forward, beyond the Dukla and Lupkow passes, into the upper valleys of the Ondava and Laborcz. These advanced positions have been maintained since the end of January against numerous attacks. East of the Lupkow Pass the Russian line falls back into the valley of the Upper San in the neighbourhood of Baligrod, whence it runs parallel to the main ridge as far as the neighbourhood of the Wyskow Pass. This portion of the front has been the scene of heavy fighting, which has been especially severe at Koziowa, where the Russians occupy a formidable position on the high ground west of the railway from Stryj to Munkacs. Although the enemy hold the passes over this portion of the range, they have been unable to descend into the Galician plain. East of the Wyskow Pass they have been more successful. Early in February, while the Russians were developing their offensive in the region of the Dukla and Lupkow Passes, the Austrians concentrated large forces between Munkacs and the Roumanian frontier, and speedily drove the Russians from the Bukowina. The right of the line was then thrown forward, marching in the direction of Lemberg, while the centre advanced through the passes and co-operated with the movement. By Feb. 23 the Austrians had reached the line Dolina—Halicz, which seems to have been about the high-water mark of their offensive; for the Russians, having brought up reinforcements, defeated them in a series of engagements fought during the latter part of March in different localities between Halicz and Kolomea.

The purpose of these operations, regarded from the point of view of the Germanic Alliance, scarcely admits of doubt. The recovery of the Carpathians, the ejection of the Russians from Galicia, and, incidentally, the relief of Przemyśl were adequate objects to justify a campaign undertaken in the depth of winter, when snow lay deep in the higher regions, and frequent blizzards swept the frost-bound plains and valleys. The operations were complementary to those on the East Prussian front, and formed part of the general plan for holding back the Russian armies while a final bid should be made for victory in France.

The Russians, when confronted with the formidable concentration of German and Austrian troops in the Eastern Carpathians, suffered the disadvantages which are incidental to the defence of a mountain range. The entire front cannot be held in strength. The only practicable course is to hold all likely points of attack by fortified posts, and to place reserves at convenient places on the lateral communications in rear, from which they may be moved to threatened localities. The lateral movement of reserves is, however, hampered by the spurs which project from the main ridge; and the lateral roads usually, and railways invariably, keep to the more level country beyond the extremities of these spurs. Troops moving from point to point may, therefore, have to make considerable detours. On the other hand, the army which assumes the offensive enjoys the great advantage of being able to select the point of attack, where it can assemble secretly behind the mountain screen while making feints at other points. The locality of the real attack may be determined too late to enable the advanced position in the passes to be saved. When the problem of the defence is applied to the Russian front in the Carpathians, which had an extent of nearly 250 miles, the difficulties need no demonstration. They were much enhanced by the Russians being themselves engaged in an offensive against the Dukla-Lupkow front, where they had concentrated the bulk of their forces for the invasion of Hungary by the most direct route; while the scene of the enemy's concentration was 150 miles distant, in the locality where the Russian front was weakest. It is not, therefore,

surprising that our Allies were taken at a disadvantage, and that the Austrians made considerable progress in Eastern Galicia before they could be opposed in adequate strength.

The operations were admirably conceived, and it seemed for some time that they might be crowned with success. The advance from the Bukowina nearly as far as Stanislau was rapid, and was effected without much difficulty. The columns which descended from the Carpathian passes were in a position to turn the right flank of the Russian forces opposing the advance; while, having the passes open in their rear, they were themselves secure against being cut off. On reaching the vicinity of Stanislau, however, the conditions were changed; the advance came to a standstill, and the Austrians were defeated in several engagements. The details of the operations have not been disclosed, and the exact course of events can only be conjectured. It seems safe to conclude that the sudden collapse of an offensive which up to this point had been remarkably successful was due to two principal causes. The Russian arrangements for the redistribution of troops having begun to take effect, the Austrians found themselves confronted by formidable forces. The resistance thus encountered might have been overcome but for the failure of the flanking columns, which had secured the passes on the left of the advance, to carry the Russian positions on the lower spurs which barred their progress. Chief among these positions were those in the region of Koziowa, which a considerable German force had assailed almost without intermission since Feb. 8, but without success. Had these positions been carried, an attack would soon have been developed against the right flank of the Russian army in the Stanislau region, which would probably have been decisive. This suffices to explain the desperation of the German attacks on the Koziowa—Wyskow line, and the stubborn determination of the Russian defence which undoubtedly saved the situation.

So far as can be seen at present the only effect of the Austro-German offensive in Eastern Galicia has been to stop the advance of the Russians on the Dukla—Lupkow front, throwing them on the defensive; and to oblige

the Russians to effect a considerable redistribution of their troops, in order to concentrate large forces in Eastern Galicia. The invasion of Hungary, which seemed imminent in January, has, in consequence, been deferred. When the Austro-German army has been expelled from Eastern Galicia, the Russians will, however, be as well situated as in January to resume the offensive, having succeeded in retaining their advanced positions in the Ondava—Laborez region, which the further progress of the enemy's offensive would soon have obliged them to relinquish.

Some points of resemblance may be observed between the strategical conception of the German invasion of Poland in November and the recent offensive on the Carpathian front. It was pointed out in the last article how, in the former case, the Russians were obliged by the nature of the German attack to abandon their project of invading Silesia, and to withdraw the troops which they had been concentrating for that purpose in the neighbourhood of Cracow. In the latter case the Austrian advance in Eastern Galicia stopped the invasion of Hungary because it jeopardised the lines of communication of the Russian armies in Western Galicia and the Carpathians. The danger threatening the communications was more imminent than any conceivable consequences of the invasion of Hungary. The Austrians could afford to ignore the latter, because, had the Russians persisted in their offensive, their communications would have been cut long before they could make any sensible impression on the Austrian army or territory. This is a consequence of the relation between the line of the Carpathians and the Russian line of communication Lemberg—Sanok. The former flanks the latter in such a degree that the Austrians, while operating against the rear of the Russian army, were able to ensure the safety of several alternative lines of retreat.

The situation in Eastern Galicia at the time of writing is not very clear. The official reports indicate that subsequent to March 15 the fighting south of the Dniester became less severe, and that since March 20 only isolated engagements have occurred. The coincidence of this change with the beginning of the thaw suggests the

explanation that the swollen condition of the rivers has necessitated the suspension of operations. About the same period the Russians resumed their offensive in the Dukla—Lupkow region, extending their front so as to embrace Bartfeld on the west and the Uzok Pass on the east. Success in the latter direction would soon oblige the enemy to withdraw from the Beskid Pass; and our Allies would then have control of the three principal railways leading across the Carpathians to Homonna, Ungvar and Munkacs respectively. Unofficial reports indicate that the Germans, appreciating the gravity of the situation, have despatched further reinforcements, probably consisting of new formations, to the assistance of their Allies.

The prolonged resistance of Przemyśl, and the successful defence of the third-class fortress of Ossowetz against the Germans' heaviest siege artillery, stand out in sharp contrast to the speedy subjugation of Antwerp and other strong places in the West. In the case of Przemyśl the Russian artillery appears to have been out-ranged and out-classed by the guns of the fortress, which were able to keep the Russian guns beyond effective range. It is stated that at the period of the Balkan wars, when there was some prospect of Austria becoming involved, the defences had been brought up to date, and that guns of the newest design and of great power had been mounted. Accounts are, however, somewhat conflicting, for there have been reports on several occasions of out-lying forts having been reduced and captured, which could not have been accomplished without effective artillery bombardment. In the case of Ossowetz it has been stated officially that the armoured cupolas providing shelter for the heavy guns escaped scatheless, which can only be explained by supposing either that the fortress artillery overmastered that of the attack, or that the latter failed to determine the range and position of the cupolas. It seems probable that both these causes contributed to the result. Owing to swamps and forests the country round Ossowetz provides few practicable positions for artillery, and the ranges of these had, no doubt, been accurately determined. On the other hand, the Germans probably

lacked the information regarding the effect of their fire which, certainly at Maubeuge and probably at other places, they obtained through such agencies as spies and subterranean telephone communication.

While Ossowetz has successfully filled its rôle by preventing the enemy from gaining the line of the Upper Bobr, thus setting the Russian field army free to deal with the formidable German concentration in the Przasnysz region, where the country, under normal conditions of weather, is more favourable for military operations than elsewhere in North Poland, Przemyśl has been of little, if any, assistance to the Austrians at any stage of the war in Galicia. Its situation at the angle formed by the course of the River San was theoretically admirable both for defence and to serve as a pivot of manœuvre for a field army actively defending Galicia. In the latter rôle it failed signally. It did not enable the Austrians to make a stand during the retreat after the battle fought near Lemberg in September, nor does it seem to have helped them materially in the fighting on the line of the San in the following month. Its usefulness appears to have been restricted to blocking the main line of railway Lemberg—Przemyśl—Jaroslav—Cracow, thus obliging the Russians to rely on the cross-country line Lemberg—Rawaruszka—Jaroslav for the supply of their army in Western Galicia. Its defence absorbed a large number of troops who are now finally lost through its fall; while the army of investment provides a timely reinforcement for the Russian forces on the Carpathian front.

Before dismissing the subject of the Russian campaign, it may be well to observe that there is another theory, alternative to that suggested in the preceding pages, which may be thought to provide the solution of the German operations. It is this—that the Germans hope, by inflicting a series of blows on the Russian armies, to bring about a situation which may lead the Russian Government to abandon the Alliance and treat separately for peace. Having regard to the German doctrine concerning the sanctity of international obligations, this theory is not devoid of plausibility; but, being political rather than military in character, it will not be discussed here.

During the early part of the period under review the alliance between German and Turk ripened into a kind of forced and ephemeral activity. The invasion of the Caucasus, begun at the close of last year, was speedily brought to an end by the battles of Ardahan, Sarikamish, and Kara Urgan, fought in snow breast-deep. The excursion into north-western Persia, undertaken soon afterwards, effected nothing beyond inflicting great sufferings on the inhabitants, and causing a temporary redistribution of the Russian local forces. Most abortive of all was the attack on the Suez Canal on Feb. 3, for which a force said to exceed 50,000 Turks, with numerous Beduin auxiliaries, had been preparing for three months. The German dreams of a *jihad*, which would at least chain the British forces to India and Egypt, and which might result in the overthrow of British power in the East, were quickly dispelled. Even the hope that the Russians and the British might be driven to an embarrassing dissipation of force was not realised. The situation in the Caucasus was met by the three local army corps with the aid of a corps from Turkestan. Egypt proved a convenient halting-place for troops coming from Australia, New Zealand and India, where their organisation and training could be completed. On the other hand, the Turks were deprived of the suzerainty of Egypt, and lost all their ports on the Persian Gulf. The net result of the alliance has been that the Germans gained nothing, the Turks lost much, while the forces of the Allies in France and Poland suffered no diminution.

But the participation of Turkey in the war had more far-reaching results, which are all to the advantage of the Allies. Turkey was more valuable to Germany as a secret friend than as an active ally. To the Allies her open hostility was less dangerous than a doubtful neutrality. So long as her attitude should continue undefined, the situation on the vulnerable flank of the Germanic armies must remain indeterminate. Bulgaria was an uncertain factor. Greece and Rumania, whatever their inclinations might be, dared not risk making a false move, and were therefore forced to remain inactive, waiting on events. Turkey, by yielding to German influence, provided the opportunity for clearing up the situation. Of this the Allies availed themselves, as soon

as the course of events set free the necessary naval force, by striking straight at the heart of the Turkish Empire.

The attack on the Dardanelles has unfortunately been impeded by adverse weather, robbing it of some of its moral effect, and increasing its difficulty by giving time for the defensive measures which its initial stages showed to be advisable. The increased power of modern artillery having rendered fixed defences liable to destruction, the artillery of the defence, equally with that of the attack, must seek immunity in concealment and mobility. The Turks, under German guidance, appear to have done much, during the prolonged intervals of the attack, to prepare a mobile defence by means of heavy guns and howitzers mounted on trucks having an extended range of movement by means of concealed railways. Hidden batteries have also proved a source of annoyance difficult to cope with. This system of defence seems likely to prove more effective against ships confined by the narrow waters of the straits than any combination of armour-protected guns in fixed positions; and it can be adequately met only by a force on land co-operating with the naval attack. The two operations must go hand in hand, the ships supplying highly mobile artillery of great power, while the military force operates against the enemy's field army, and occupies the country adjoining the straits on either side. It is evident that the operation must prove one of considerable magnitude. The distribution of the Turkish army is not publicly known, for it is likely that drafts have been made on the force in Europe to reinforce the army in the Caucasus. At the end of last year five army corps and three or four cavalry brigades were quartered in European Turkey, the total strength, including fortress troops, amounting to between 200,000 and 250,000 men. It would be unsafe to put the force now available for the defence of Constantinople below the former figure.

It would be inexpedient to discuss the probable course of the operations. Enough has been said to show that a military force of considerable strength will be required. It was announced at Paris on March 6 that a French force was being concentrated in Northern Africa; and it has since become known that a British contingent is to take part in the operations. It may be presumed that,

when the weather conditions permit the resumption of the attack, it will be pushed forward simultaneously by sea and land. Success will depend largely on unity of purpose and close co-operation between the naval and military commanders; and those who recall the ill-success which on various occasions attended such combined operations in the past, under conditions far less formidable, may feel doubtful as to the result. Fears on that account may, however, be dismissed. The failures of the past were due chiefly to jealousy or differences of opinion between the two commanders. There was also a want of knowledge and appreciation of the respective functions and powers of naval and military forces. The two services, when called on to co-operate in war, suffered from lack of association during peace. These defects have been remedied since the formation of the Naval War Staff and the General Staff of the Army. During recent years the best brains of the Navy and Army have been trained and exercised together under competent instructors; community of thought has been inculcated; and a closer association between the Services generally has promoted mutual confidence and an appreciation by each of the capabilities and limitations of the other which was lacking in former years.


Dispersion of force consequent on the employment of troops on subsidiary enterprises away from the principal scene of operations is a violation of the great principle of war which enjoins the concentration of all available forces for the accomplishment of a single object. The attack on the Dardanelles may seem open to objection on this account; but a survey of the general situation will dispel what is certainly an illusion due to a too rigid application of the principle and a narrow view of the issues involved. While France is a principal theatre of war, six months of fighting have failed to bring about a decision; and experience has given some reason to doubt whether the results of the offensive are commensurate with the losses involved. Unless the existing balance of force undergoes material change, it may be doubted whether the ultimate decision of the war will be obtained in France. Instead of a general advance to the Rhine and a march to Berlin, the talk is now of a war of attrition; and the results of engagements are

The consequences are diverse and complex, the mere shortage of labour not being the most important. The men who enlist are the cream of the factory or workshop; the most intelligent, the most patriotic and public-spirited. Among those that remain the self-seeking element acquires an undue predominance. The better influences being removed, evil counsels are the more likely to prevail. Increased wages encourage idleness; and, while our soldiers endure danger and privation in the trenches, and suffer through the lack of adequate support from the artillery, many of their comrades, who should supply the deficiency, loaf away the week-ends, or strike for a rise of wage. Nor can employers be absolved from blame. There seems to be a tendency among both classes, happily not very widespread, to use the nation's necessities and the distress of the army as means for extorting concessions or amassing profits. In a crisis which demands a united effort the sordid selfishness of a few threatens to paralyse the energies of the nation. Those who during the years of peace found more congenial occupation in sowing the seeds of discord than in preparing for the great struggle which they knew could not be long deferred have now to taste the bitter fruit of their labours. And Germany is jubilant at having been correct in her diagnosis of one of the many sources of weakness which she believed would sap the military strength of Great Britain.

W. P. BLOOD.

II.—AT SEA.

THE series of British naval despatches recently issued, and the short summaries published from time to time of the progress of the bombardment of the forts in the Dardanelles, have shown a number of preconceived opinions to be unfounded. On the one hand, the battle-fleets of Germany and Austria-Hungary have been condemned to continued inactivity; on the other, battle-cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers and submarines have been in action. Some data have been forthcoming as



to the relative efficiency of the gun and the torpedo; the gun has apparently maintained its position as the primary weapon. There have been some indications of the value of armour; it has failed to save vessels from being sunk, even when attacked by gunfire at long range. A good deal has been learnt as to the influence of the submarine on operations in circumscribed waters; it has been greater than most naval officers anticipated. Light has been thrown on the relation of ships to coast defences; the latter have been shown to be not impregnable. The conclusions formed on these and other matters may require revision in the light of information which a battle on the grand scale or the bombardment of the German coast might supply; but in the meantime they rest not on hearsay statements, but on despatches or official reports open to the study of the world. The issues may therefore be freely discussed.

The success with which the great fleet of Germany and the smaller fleet of Austria-Hungary have been contained and reduced to complete inactivity for about two-thirds of a year must have constituted one of the greatest surprises which the German and Austro-Hungarian naval staffs have experienced. It was always assumed by Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz and those associated with him, that circumstances would occur in which German battle-squadrons would be able to 'sally forth' periodically to fight details of the British Fleet, thereby doing considerable injury and assisting in the war of attrition in which their hopes resided. This expectation found expression again and again during the debates on the German naval legislation. It had no small influence in reconciling the people of the German Empire to the large expenditure which the new fleet involved, after it was realised by them that the British nation was determined to maintain a Navy of unquestionable superiority. The argument which carried weight with uninstructed opinion in Germany was somewhat on these lines. 'It is true that, owing to our activity, the actual strength of the British Fleet is being increased, and that the relative margin against us in capital ships will be approximately sixty per cent. While we should be at a grave disadvantage if we possessed only ten capital ships to Britain's sixteen, the disadvantage when the

numbers are roughly sixty to ninety-six will be considerably less marked, as it is improbable, under the conditions of war, that the enemy will be able to bring the guns of all these vessels into action at one and the same time.'

The Germans have always been the victims of methodical thinking. The naval staff appears to have worked in one water-tight compartment and the military staff in another. It was only after war actually broke out that these two bodies appear to have realised that the Navy and the Army of Germany, as of Great Britain, are complementary the one to the other, though their relative importance is reversed. When hostilities began, the theories of the naval staff proved fallacious. They realised that Grand-Admiral von Tirpitz's idea of a 'sally fleet,' useful as it had been during the discussions in the Reichstag, was a fallacious one, because it left entirely out of account the responsibility devolving upon the German Navy as a coastal defence force.

It remained for Grand-Admiral von Koester to break to the German people the bitter truth that for the main purpose for which their fleet was created, namely, to fight the British Fleet on the high seas—and hence the title High Sea Fleet—it was useless in existing conditions. The former Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Fleet assembled a large audience at Kiel for the express purpose of conveying to them the facts of the situation, which contrasted unpleasantly with the hopes hitherto entertained. This officer, the special confidant of the Emperor William on naval affairs and President of the Navy League, first directed attention to the overwhelming strength of the British Fleet, and then reminded his hearers that a naval battle meant 'death or victory'; once a fleet had been destroyed it could not be renewed during the course of the same war, even if the campaign went on for years. He proceeded to urge that the German population should not be impatient, because the naval authorities 'must refuse to be tempted into taking any action in the performance of which they might be defeated.' 'Our Fleet (he declared) must in all circumstances protect us and must accept battle only when it can count on success.'

When can a fleet count on success? Villeneuve, when he went into action with thirty-three ships of the line of the allies against Nelson's twenty-seven, thought that he could count on success. He was mistaken; the human factor more than counterbalanced the material advantage which lay with the enemy at the battle of Trafalgar. Since the present war opened, engagements have been fought which show that our guns are more powerful than the German guns, our admirals not less skilled in tactics, and our gunnery at least not inferior to the German gunnery. It is impossible to conceive, in view of our great margin of strength, the possibility of conditions existing in the North Sea which would correspond with Grand-Admiral von Koester's *sine qua non* that the German Fleet 'must accept battle only when it can count on success.' In the absence of an assurance of victory, the splendid battleships under the German and Austro-Hungarian flags are reduced, not to impotence, but to employment as coast-defence forces in order to prevent the two armies being taken in the rear by oversea military expeditions of British or French troops.

In containing the enemy's fleet, the fleets of Great Britain and France have not, however, been condemned to inactivity. Germany possesses only ten pre-Dreadnought battleships carrying as large a weapon as the 11-inch gun, and Austria has only three vessels falling in a similar category. The other nineteen older battleships belonging to our enemies are armed only with the 9·4-inch gun, which is comparatively ineffective. On the other hand, the British Fleet includes thirty-six ships of the pre-Dreadnought era,* each carrying four 12-inch guns (10-inch in the case of the 'Swiftsure' and the 'Triumph'), and France possesses fifteen heavily gunned vessels of the same period, apart in both cases from a superiority in ships built since the general adoption of the big-gun principle embodied in the 'Dreadnought,' and apart from the great British predominance in large armoured cruisers, some of which are superior to Germany's older battleships. Owing to the increased speed

* There were 40; but the battleship 'Bulwark' was blown up in the Medway, the 'Formidable' lost by submarine attack in the Channel, and the 'Irresistible' and 'Ocean' sunk by mines in the Dardanelles.

and gun-power of the all-big-gun ships, the older vessels of the Allied fleets are unsuited to act with the newer vessels in fleet formation; nor is their support needed. The intervention of Turkey in the war suggested a useful purpose to which these less modern battleships could be put, since the capital of the Porte was approached by a well-defended strait. It was unlikely that, if a battle action occurred, the older battleships of the Allied fleets would be employed. On the other hand, these vessels, deficient in speed and lacking the concentrated gunfire which distinguishes the Dreadnought and her successors, carry guns which, though of older and less powerful types, are still of considerable value.

The suggestion that these older battleships should be employed in the destruction of the fortifications of the Dardanelles raised afresh a problem which it had hitherto been contended had been decided for all time, namely, the impossibility of reducing coast defences by gunfire from ships. That conclusion was based mainly on the unfortunate experience of British ships in attacking Sevastopol and other Russian fortifications. The verdict of sixty years ago had never been seriously contested; nor can it be said that the foundation upon which it rested had been examined with an open mind. As soon as it became known that the British and French Governments had decided to utilise some of their older battleships to force the passage of the Dardanelles, it became apparent that the conditions had changed since the Crimean War and had changed in favour of the naval gun. During the attack on Sevastopol the sailing ships which engaged in that operation were towed to their firing positions, and then, while in a stationary condition, opened at a range of 2000 yards. The modern naval gun can fire and, as experience has shown, with considerable accuracy, at a distance of as much as 20,000 yards. The powder chamber of the naval gun is larger and the range, other things being equal, longer than in the case of the shore gun. The naval gun is submitted to pressures far greater than those of the shore gun, for the simple reason that it can more readily be replaced. When the rifling of a naval gun wears and the firing becomes erratic, as it does after a limited number of rounds, the ship can proceed under her own steam to

a dockyard and the impaired weapon can be replaced by another one taken from the reserve; the worn gun is then speedily relined. A gun in a shore fortification cannot be easily removed for relining. Once, owing to wear, its fire has become inaccurate, its life, probably for the duration of the war, is at an end. In view of these considerations the shore guns, such as are (or were) mounted in the Dardanelles, have smaller chambers—so that they may wear less rapidly—and have a shorter range than naval guns. Nor is this the only advantage possessed by a naval force in attacking shore defences. Apart from the advantage which steam has conferred on the ship of war since the Crimean period, enabling a moving target to be presented, aeronautics have been developed to a stage which enables aircraft to assist in 'spotting' long range fire, and directing ships' gunners. In the light of these advantages resting with the modern naval gun it was decided to begin the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts. The gunners ashore, it was assumed, would not have the assistance of aircraft, would suffer under the disadvantage, becoming more and more apparent as the operations proceeded, of a shortage of ammunition, and would be inexpert in using the weapons in their charge upon ships under steam.

The task of forcing the Dardanelles was commenced on Feb. 19. Shortly afterwards the Admiralty revealed that, in addition to a number of older battleships of the Allied Fleets, they were employing the battle-cruiser 'Inflexible,' with modern 12-inch guns, and the battleship 'Queen Elizabeth,' carrying eight of the new 15-inch guns. The forts guarding the entrance to the Straits were soon silenced and the mines which had been laid by the enemy swept up. It then remained to demolish the redoubtable defences at the Narrows, about fourteen miles from the Ægean Sea. In this work aircraft, judging by Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden's reports, proved of the greatest assistance. Seaplanes, acting from the new mother-ship 'Ark Royal,' directed gunfire at long range over the high land of the Gallipoli Peninsula. By indirect fire, the forts of the Narrows, as well as the defences on the Bulair line, were attacked. Subsequently direct fire was opened. The fortifications

replied ineffectively, but unfortunately two British battleships—the 'Irresistible' and the 'Ocean'—and the French battleship 'Bouvet' were sunk by floating mines, apparently carried down on them by the current. At the time of writing, though unfavourable weather has interfered with the progress of the Allied Fleet, there is good prospect of the forts on either bank of the Straits being silenced, while the fire on the Bulair line has effectually cut communication between Constantinople and the Gallipoli Peninsula. The mine rather than the gun has proved effective against the attackers. It is well, however, that final deductions should not yet be drawn from these operations. The doctrine hitherto accepted as to the relation between ships and forts may require revision; but not until something more is known of the character of the Turkish forts and the efficiency of their gunners, together with the value of the aerial observations, utilised by one side only, will it be possible to tell whether the conditions existing at the time of the Crimean War have been so completely reversed as to depreciate seriously the value of shore fortifications when confronted with modern ships carrying high-powered guns.

The bombardment of the forts of the Dardanelles, however difficult the operation may prove, will serve to illustrate the long arm of sea-power and the influence which it can exercise over land warfare. When Turkey threw in her lot with Germany and Austria-Hungary, she assumed that, owing to her large expenditure on fixed defences in the Dardanelles and at Smyrna, she was beyond the reach of the British and French fleets. The Germans professed complete confidence that the defences of the Straits and of the great Turkish commercial port constituted an effective barrier against naval attack. In the circumstances, therefore, there is no reason to think that they paused to consider what influence the intervention of the Allied Fleets in and about the Ægean Sea might have upon the course of the operations ashore. Events have since shown the intimate relations between sea-power and land-power. Immediately the bombardment of the Dardanelles was begun, the enemy abandoned the farcical expedition for

the conquest of Egypt. Probably other changes occurred in the disposition of the enemy's military forces, to the derangement of the strategic plans which had hitherto been in process of development. It was realised that, once the Dardanelles had been forced, the whole military situation in Southern Europe would undergo a change, apart from the economic value which the safe passage from the Black Sea, with its stores of grain to the Mediterranean, would confer on Russia and her Allies.

Nothing in the naval despatches undermines the general conclusions reached in a former article in the 'Quarterly Review' as to the engagement off the Falkland Islands; they have indeed been confirmed by the action in the North Sea on Jan. 24. On both occasions the results achieved were traceable to the employment of the battle-cruiser. This is a type of ship which was more severely criticised than any other introduced in the British Fleet in the past ten years. Experience has shown that the combination of the high-powered gun of the battleship with the speed of the swiftest cruiser represents a compromise of high military value. Such vessels may form the fast wing of a battle fleet, or they can be employed with dramatic effect on detached service. Off the Falkland Islands the battle-cruisers 'Inflexible' and 'Invincible' held the two principal ships of Admiral Graf von Spee's squadron under heavy fire, to which, owing to the German guns being outranged, no effective reply could be made. The two British battle-cruisers were able to sink, with very little loss, the two big ships under the enemy's flag, while other British cruisers chased the three small vessels and succeeded in destroying two of them. One vessel only, the 'Dresden,' managed to escape; she owed her temporary deliverance to her efficient high-speed engines. Whether in the later stage of the engagement, after the 'Scharnhorst' had been sunk and the 'Gneisenau' seriously damaged, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee could, or could not, have detached one of his battle-cruisers to round up the 'Dresden,' the swiftest of the German vessels, and destroy her, is a subject upon which in the absence of fuller information it is impossible to judge. Fortunately, though the 'Dresden' escaped on Dec. 8, she was caught off the island of Juan Fernandez by the British cruisers

'Glasgow' and 'Kent,' supported by the auxiliary cruiser 'Orama,' on March 14 and destroyed.

Sir David Beatty's despatch describing the engagement in the North Sea on Jan. 24 supplies further confirmatory evidence of the high value of the battle-cruiser. The brunt of the fighting fell to the 'Lion,' flying the flag of the Vice-Admiral, and the 'Tiger,' owing to the fact that their fast steaming enabled them to get within effective range of the flying battle-cruisers of the enemy after the 'Blücher' had been abandoned to her fate. After the action had been in progress for some time, the 'Lion' had to leave the line owing to 'a lucky shot' on the part of the enemy. By this time the large armoured cruiser 'Blücher' was doomed, and two of the enemy's three battle-cruisers, the 'Derfflinger' and 'Seydlitz,' had been seriously damaged. The engagement promised to result in the sinking not only of the 'Blücher,' but of the other two vessels which, in an injured condition, were making for their home ports. In Sir David Beatty's despatch no explanation is given of the reason why the pursuit of the enemy was not continued when it promised such fortunate results. In the first announcement by the Admiralty, however, it was stated that the enemy's ships 'reached an area where danger from German submarines and mines prevented further pursuit.' In the fuller statement subsequently issued by the Admiralty and based upon a 'preliminary report' from Sir David Beatty, no mention was made of mines, but it was remarked that 'the presence of the enemy's submarines subsequently necessitated the action being broken off.' In the full and later despatch from Sir David Beatty reference is made to submarines, but it is not suggested that the Admiral considered their presence justified the discontinuance of the action. Judging by the various reports, Sir David Beatty, owing to the injury sustained by the 'Lion,' had to relinquish his command for about an hour, during which time he was shifting his flag from his injured ship to the 'Princess Royal.' It was presumably during this period that the chase was abandoned.

In the light of the various conflicting statements, the cause of the escape of the two badly damaged German battle-cruisers remains obscure. It is admitted that the enemy's submarines were active; Sir David Beatty refers

to their presence in his despatch. On the other hand, the British cruisers were steaming at 25 or more knots; and the experience of war suggests that submarine attack upon any vessel travelling at 15 knots or more will probably fail. There is no evidence which supports the suggestion that, when the action was broken off, the British ships were in dangerously close proximity to the enemy's mines. Not until the war is at an end and the full official records are available will it be possible to decide whether, in fact, the British success might or might not have been converted into a notable victory. In any event it is unfortunate that an action which offered such good prospect of inflicting grave military loss upon the enemy resulted merely in the sinking of one cruiser, and that the least valuable of the quartette which took part in the attempted coast raid of Jan. 24, and serious damage to two others. Ships which are not sunk or captured are ships which can be repaired and can again do mischief.

At the beginning of February the Germans declared 'the waters round Great Britain and Ireland, including the English Channel,' to be 'a military area.' It was added that from 'Feb. 18 every hostile merchant ship will be destroyed, even if it is not always possible to avoid thereby the dangers which threaten the crews and passengers.' Neutral ships were at the same time warned that they would incur danger in 'the military area.' German newspapers, officially inspired, confessed that the attack on merchant shipping would be carried out by mines and submarines. It was pleaded that the frail character of the underwater craft, their want of accommodation for crews of ships attacked, and their inability to provide prize crews, furnished excuse for disregarding not merely the ordinary usages of war but the dictates of humanity. In making this declaration, the enemy, conscious of the inadequate number of his submarines for such a purpose, trusted to the moral effect of his threat upon neutral shipping. Neutral nations, however, were not dismayed; the flow of shipping to and from British ports actually increased.

Thus the policy of destruction which was decided upon with the boasted intention 'to starve England' was revealed from the first as a failure. A relatively small

number of ships, belonging to neutral as well as to British owners, were sunk with some loss of life, but no appreciable effect was produced on the economic condition of the United Kingdom, with arrivals and sailings averaging from 1400 to 1500 weekly. On the other hand, the German Government, by its procedure, not only robbed itself of whatever sympathy on the part of neutrals it may have hitherto enjoyed, but gave the British Government an opportunity of using its sea-power with greater effect in order to put increased economic pressure on the enemy. The British Government, in association with France and Russia, determined not to endeavour to adapt to the peculiar geographical situation of Germany the recognised rules governing an effective blockade. Thereby they favoured neutrals, since a blockade involves the confiscation of neutral shipping and cargoes endeavouring to leave or reach the enemy. The course decided upon was to extend the list of contraband and to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany. The Order in Council was framed in order to spare neutrals, while at the same time condemning Germany to all the effects of a blockade. On the part of those who realise the close connexion between naval and economic power and who are also conscious of the importance of retaining the sympathy of the neutral world, there will be no inclination to condemn the Allied Governments for showing the utmost consideration to nations not actually engaged in war.

ARCHIBALD HURD.

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